BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260619T141443Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20220322T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20220324T170000
SUMMARY:Understanding others factively
UID:20260620T125351Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Dortmund\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p>Understanding others factively</p>\n<p>DATE &amp\; ACCESS:</p>\n<p>22-24 March 2022</p>\n<p>This is a hybrid event. Registration is only possible for online attendance. Instructions and access information will be sent to registered participants on 21 March 2022.</p>\n<p>SPEAKERS:</p>\n<p>* Maria Alvarez (KCL)</p>\n<p>* Joe Cunningham (Nottingham)</p>\n<p>* Anna Kr&auml\;mer (Salzburg)</p>\n<p>* Arturs Logins (Z&uuml\;rich)</p>\n<p>* Jennifer Nagel (Toronto)</p>\n<p>* Jonathan Philips (Dartmouth)</p>\n<p>* Johannes Roessler (Warwick)</p>\n<p>* Eva Schmidt (Dortmund)</p>\n<p>* Brent Strickland (Jean Nicod)</p>\n<p>* Julia Wolf (Bochum)</p>\n<p>AIMS &amp\; SCOPE:</p>\n<p>The claim that we (sometimes) explain others&rsquo\; behavior by appeal to factive mental states&mdash\;or facts that agents are aware of &mdash\;has recently garnered significant attention in epistemology\, philosophy of action\, and cognitive science research on social cognition and mindreading. But how exactly such explanations work\, what their advantages might be over a more traditional belief-desire model of explanation\, and especially how the perspectives of epistemology\, philosophy of action\, and cognitive science fit together\, has not been sufficiently discussed. This workshop aims to fill this gap and thereby lay the groundwork for future interdisciplinary collaborations on this topic.</p>\n<p>Some of the questions to be discussed are:<br>* Is factive action explanation developmentally prior to\, or simpler than\, non-factive action explanation?<br>* How does this style of action explanation interact with perspective-taking (or more generally\, ways of explanation that involve stepping into another agent&rsquo\;s shoes)?<br>* How should we conceive of the factive attitudes\, for instance knowledge\, involved in such explanations? Which kinds of attitudes do such explanations plausibly appeal to?<br>* Can a (factual) understanding of motivating and other reasons from the philosophy of action throw light on social cognition with factive mental states?</p>\n<p>PROGRAMME DETAILS:</p>\n<p>The programme is available at https://tu-dortmund.sciebo.de/s/dGEOyNluGrxV96M</p>\n<p>A book of abstracts is available at https://tu-dortmund.sciebo.de/s/LGHs6x9HYUsdOZo</p>\n<p>REGISTRATION &amp\; ORGANISATION:</p>\n<p>* Please register by sending an e-mail with subject header "Registration" to Paul Klur (paul.klur@tu-dortmund.de).</p>\n<p>* The deadline for registrations is Sunday 20 March 2022</p>\n<p>* Organisation: Paul Klur\, Eva Schmidt\, Jessica Struchhold\, and Simon Wimmer</p>\n<p>* If you have any queries\, send an e-mail to paul.klur@tu-dortmund.de</p>\n<p>* A poster can be found at https://tu-dortmund.sciebo.de/s/FstDSrSH8hXysiC</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Eva Schmidt;CN=Simon Wimmer;CN=Jessica Struchhold:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR