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VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260409T034112Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220128T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220128T170000
SUMMARY:Death by Paradox?: Inconsistency and Nihilism
UID:20260410T093908Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-r5qzs
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:St George's Centre\, 60 Great George Street\, Leeds\, United Kingdom\, LS1 3DL
DESCRIPTION:<p>Workshop exploring the connections between paradoxes of various kinds (such as the liar paradox\, <em>sorites</em> paradox\, paradoxes of validity\, Arrow's impossibility theorem) and nihilist theories of various kinds (such as alethic nihilism\, semantic nihilism\, logical nihilism\, moral nihilism).</p>\n<p>Paradoxes should be disturbing.&nbsp\; A paradox typically starts from premises that are obviously true and proves a conclusion that is obviously false.&nbsp\; Unless we can show where the reasoning goes wrong\, a paradox seems to show that the world simply&nbsp\;<em></em>cannot be as we think it&nbsp\;<em></em>must be.&nbsp\; It is not merely that our conception of the world is imperfect\, but that it is in some sense fundamentally flawed.</p>\n<p>Resilient paradoxes therefore motivate nihilism of one kind or another.&nbsp\; Nihilism in some domain is (roughly) the view that the entities or properties of that domain do not exist.&nbsp\; Paradoxes motivate nihilism because they seem to show that the relevant entities or properties&nbsp\;<em>cannot</em> exist\, on pain of absurdity.&nbsp\; For instance\, it seems built into our concept of truth that it validates all instances of the T-schema ('p' is true iff p).&nbsp\; But paradoxes like the Liar and Curry seem to show that there cannot be a property that does so\, on pain of absurdity.&nbsp\; But if truth is a property that validates all instances of the T-schema\, and there is no property that validates all instances of the T-schema\, then there is no such property as truth.&nbsp\; This is alethic nihilism.&nbsp\; Other paradoxes can be used to motivate other kinds of nihilism.</p>\n<p>This line of argument has a long history.&nbsp\; Zeno's paradoxes of motion were formulated to defend Parmenides' view that there is no such thing as motion\, after all.&nbsp\; But it is comparatively underrepresented in the current literature.&nbsp\; This workshop aims to revive interest in the connection between paradox and nihilism.</p>\n<p>The workshop will be hybrid\, with 2 virtual speakers and 2 in-person speakers.&nbsp\; Attendance is free\, but numbers are somewhat limited\, so please email Will Gamester at w.gamester@leeds.ac.uk to register beforehand.</p>\n<p><em>Provisional schedule</em>:</p>\n<p>09:30-10:00 - Coffee</p>\n<p>10:00-11:30 - Gillian Russell (virtual)\, "Logical Nihilism"</p>\n<p>11:45-13:15 - David Liggins\, "An Anti-Realist Inconsistency Theory of Truth"</p>\n<p>14:15-15:45 - Christopher Cowie\, "A New Defence of Moral Error Theory"</p>\n<p>16:00-17:30 - Kevin Scharp\, "Paradox Meets Property"</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Will Gamester:
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