After long having been neglected\, the possibility of evaluative perception is once again being given \;serious philosophical consideration. For example\, in aesthetics\, there has been renewed interest in \;the possible relations between imagination and aesthetic perception\, and a growing discussion of \;the Wollheimian idea that the phenomenon of seeing-in\, which is apparently typical of pictorial \;experience\, marks out a distinctive form of perception (e.g.\, Lopes (1996\, 2005)\, Hopkins (1998))\, \;Pettersson (2011)). Elsewhere\, in meta-ethics\, there has been a flurry of debate around the topic of \;whether ordinary human agents could perceive the instantiation of ethical properties (e.g.\, \;Vä\;yrynen (2008)\, McBrayer (2010)\, Dancy (2010)). These developments have complemented a \;long-running tradition of Aristotelian interest in ethical perception\, the most famous contemporary \;proponent of which is John McDowell (1998). Finally\, and related to this\, is the development of \;interest in the idea that human agents could perceive reasons (e.g.\, Church (2010)).
At least some of these developments have\, it seems\, been partly inspired by progress in the \;philosophy of perception. For example\, the emergence of the high-level view about the content of \;perception (e.g.\, Siegel (2006)) has arguably given credence to the view that conceptually \;sophisticated perception might be possible. In addition\, discussions about the possibility of \;cognitive penetration\, i.e.\, the idea that the cognitive states and characters of perceptual agents \;can alter how they perceive the world (e.g.\, Macpherson (2011))\, arguably provide proponents of \;evaluative perception with the beginnings of a psychological account of how evaluative perception \;might be possible.
In light of these developments\, the Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience at the University \;of Glasgow is convening a conference on the topic of Evaluative Perception\, where &lsquo\;evaluative&rsquo\; is \;being understood so as to include aesthetic\, ethical\, and normative perception. The central \;questions to which the conference will be addressed include:
As well as these questions\, the topic of the conference will connect with broader discussions and \;debates in aesthetics\, epistemology\, ethics\, and the philosophy of perception\, e.g.\, the possibility \;of cognitive penetration\, amodal perception\, and cross-modal perception\, the admissible contents \;of experience\, the relationship between imagination and perception\, the impact of so-called \;&lsquo\;framing effects&rsquo\; on perceptual experience\, whether perception can be said to be rational and \;whether perception could be the conclusion of an argument\, the role of experience in aesthetic \;appreciation\, and the prospects for various approaches in ethics\, e.g.\, ethical intuitionism and \;virtue ethics.
\nCall for Papers
\nSubmissions should:
\nPapers will be double-blind reviewed. Notifications will be sent out by the 1st of August 2013.
The conference workshop is supported by the Mind Association who has first refusal on the edited \;volume for their Occasional Series published by Oxford University Press. The papers selected \;through this call cannot be guaranteed publication. Subsequent to the workshop\, a book-manuscript will be submitted to OUP and all papers will be individually refereed.
Accepted speakers will have their conference fee waived. Food and accommodation for the \;duration of the conference will be provided. Travel costs of a value up to £\;400 will also be covered.
Any enquiries should be addressed to:
Dr Anna Bergqvist (a.bergqvist@mmu.ac.uk)
or
Dr Robert Cowan (robert.cowan@glasgow.ac.uk)