The wrong of deception\, has\, since Kant\, been characterised as a failure of respect for the agency of the other. \; \;According to Kant\, as rational beings capable of evaluating and setting their own ends\, persons are not to be treated as mere means to another&rsquo\;s end. In lying we manipulate the other&rsquo\;s rational capacities in order to achieve ends we know\, or fear\, they would not share. This is paradigmatically a failure of respect. Truthfulness then\, is seen as a central mode of respect for each other&rsquo\;s agency. \; \;We agree. But we claim that a closer examination of our goals \;qua agent \;and of the ways in which agency can be supported or undermined in our interactions with each other reveals a further and distinct mode of respect for agency. \;The importance of truthfulness lies in significant part in the ways in which it answers to and supports our agential need to make intelligible\, to \;make sense of \;our world\, other people\, and ourselves. \;
\nWhile truthfulness is widely held to be fundamental to respect\, the main burden of this paper is to draw out the notion of sense-making and highlight its importance for human agency. \;Since sense-making is something we often do together\, and that we can support or undermine\, it generates norms of interaction that we claim constitute a distinctive mode of recognition and respect for another&rsquo\;s agency. \;Truthfulness and support for sense-making are both modes of respect for agency\, but\, as we will demonstrate they might sometimes conflict. When they do\, what should we do?
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