Interdisciplinary Workshop for advanced MA students\, doctoral and \;postdoctoral scholars
Chair: Prof. Dr. Markus Wild (Philosophy)\, University of Fribourg
Organisers: Andreas Heise (Philosophy)\, University of Lucerne\, and Tanja
Klankert (Cultural and Dance Studies)\, University of Bern
Application (short statement of interest):
Until 15 April 2013 to \;tanja.klankertATiash.unibe.ch \;or \;andreas.heiseATunilu.ch
Description:
The notion of understanding is pivotal in the humanities and the social \;sciences. But what does it mean to understand something? The logical grammar \;of &ldquo\;understanding&rdquo\; seems to suggest that we understand something as \;something\, i.e. as falling under a certain concept. We understand a sentence \;like &ldquo\;this is red&rdquo\; if we are able to assign it a place in our conceptual \;framework. This amounts to acknowledging certain consequences that follow \;from this sentence being true such as &ldquo\;this is coloured&rdquo\;\, &ldquo\;this has the same \;colour as blood&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;this is not green&rdquo\;. In other words\, it looks like a \;necessary condition of understanding that we can make explicit pertinent \;bits of knowledge.
Knowledge\, in turn\, is usually held to be about propositions. These are \;commonly conceived as structured\, abstract and truth-apt theoretical \;entities which form the content of what we believe and\, given they are true\, \;know. If asked\, e.g.\, which university is Switzerland&rsquo\;s oldest\, we would \;respond (in case we know the answer and are willing to provide it): &ldquo\;The \;University of Basel is Switzerland&rsquo\;s oldest university.&rdquo\; That the University \;of Basel is Switzerland&rsquo\;s oldest university is the content of what we know \;and hence the proposition. Now\, insofar as propositions are patterned on \;sentences as they occur in language\, one may call this wide-spread view of \;understanding and knowledge the &ldquo\;linguistic dogma&rdquo\;.
Are there other forms of understanding that follow a different logic? \;Michael Polanyi\, e.g.\, held the view that &ldquo\;we can know more than we can \;tell&rdquo\;. What he terms tacit knowing is allegedly at work in somatic processes \;and technical skills as well as in artistic and academic abilities. This \;seems to match with current research on embodiment according to which we \;convey abstract ideas via gestures and so-called conceptual metaphors that \;reflect basic bodily experiences. While these modes of expression are \;essential to cognition and communication\, as well as to aesthetic \;appreciation\, they purportedly resist reduction to linguistic meaning.
In a two-day interdisciplinary workshop\, we will explore some of these forms \;of assumed non- or pre-propositional knowledge. Apart from Polanyi\, our \;focus will be on such programmatic approaches as Lakoff and Johnson&rsquo\;s \;conceptual metaphor theory as well as Shusterman&rsquo\;s somaesthetics. Thereby\, \;we will be pursuing the following questions:
While the first part of the workshop concerns foundational theoretical \;questions\, we will turn to specific examples and case studies in the second \;part.
Recommended Literature:
Short biography of Markus Wild:
Markus Wild is Professor for Philosophy at the University of Fribourg\, \;Switzerland. He specializes in early modern philosophy and contemporary \;philosophy of mind. Currently\, he is editing a volume on embodied cognition \;for Suhrkamp (with Rebekka Hufendiek and Joerg Fingerhut).
IASH Theory and Method Workshop:
The Institute of Advanced Study in the Social Sciences and the Humanities \;(IASH)\, University of Bern\, facilitates various types of courses for \;doctoral and postdoctoral students that are conceptualised and organised by \;members of its Graduate School\, alone or in collaboration with other \;institutes in Bern or doctoral programmes at other Swiss universities. \;(Further information can be found on the IASH website: \;www.iash.unibe.ch.)