Call for Papers:
\nSynthese Topical Collection: Temporal Reasoning and Tensed Truths
\nGuest Editors:
\nVincent Grandjean\, Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Oxford\, Oxford\, United Kingdom
\nMatteo Pascucci\, Institute of Philosophy\, Slovak Academy of Sciences\, Bratislava\, Slovak Republic
\nTopical Collection Description:
\nThis topical collection is dedicated to the formal representation of arguments involving \;temporal \;reasoning \;and \;tensed truths\; in particular\, arguments with a clear significance to everyday life. In a broad perspective\, temporal reasoning can be rigorously encoded via \;intensional logic\, treating tenses as modalities\, or via \;extensional logic\, quantifying over domains of temporal objects (e.g.\, instants\, intervals\, etc.). Nowadays there are several formal devices (languages\, systems\, semantics\, etc.) able to deal with time in many regards. Each of these devices is characterized by peculiar features\, such as a certain choice of primitive notions and\, arguably\, a certain kind of ontological commitment (see\, e.g.\, the surveys of approaches offered by Prior 1967\, van Benthem 1983\, Gabbay\, Hodkinson &\; Reynolds 1994 and Ø\;hrstrø\;m &\; Hasle 1995). The truth-conditions of (the propositions expressed by) statements involving tenses can be explained either in terms of the &ldquo\;past-present-future&rdquo\; opposition (McTaggart&rsquo\;s A-theory) or in terms of the &ldquo\;earlier-later&rdquo\; opposition (McTaggart&rsquo\;s B-theory). Moreover\, taking into account the difference between chronologically definite propositions and chronologically indefinite propositions (Rescher 1966)\, it is possible to distinguish between atemporal and temporal (or \;tensed) notions of truth. This topical collection will primarily focus on the latter.
\nIt is often argued that tensed truths do not float free\, but are grounded in reality. Accordingly\, the present truth of (the proposition expressed by) a statement such as &lsquo\;Napoleon lost at Waterloo&rsquo\;\, requires it to be grounded in \;what there is and how it is. However\, this view has undesirable consequences. First\, it seems to force one to adopt an eternalist ontology: assuming that past- and future-tensed statements are not exceptions to the \;principle of bivalence \;(which states that all declarative sentences express propositions that are either true or false)\, there must be things located in the past and the future of the moment of evaluation that provide grounds for their classical truth-values. Secondly\, it seems to threaten the openness of the future: assuming that the truth-value of a future-tensed statement\, such as &lsquo\;The first human on Mars will be a woman&rsquo\;\, is grounded in \;what there is and how it is\, it seems that everything regarding the exploration of Mars is already settled.
\nMany options have been envisaged to avoid these undesirable consequences. One option is denying that future-tensed statements are bivalent (Broad 1923\, Markosian 1995). However\, this view is subject to criticism too since (i) it conflicts with retrospective evaluations of future-tensed statements (Besson &\; Hattiangadi 2013\, MacFarlane 2003\, 2008)\, and (ii) it is not clear what semantics one ought to assume when modeling truth-value gaps. A second option is to argue that the bivalence of past- and future-tensed statements is compatible with non-eternalist ontologies and/or with an open future. This option comes in various flavors: Todd (2016) argues that future-tensed statements are all false\; Barnes &\; Cameron (2009\, 2011) say that although future-tensed statements are bivalent\, the truth-value of some of these is unsettled\; Correia &\; Rosenkranz (2018) assert that the grounding requirement on tensed truths must be weakened\, so that it allows the present truth-values of some future-tensed statements to be grounded in how\, \;at some future time\, things will be\; etc. Thus\, the problem of finding an appropriate way of formally representing arguments involving tensed truths is still a source of intense debate.
\nE. Barnes and R. Cameron\, 2009. &lsquo\;The Open Future: Bivalence\, Determinism and Ontology&rsquo\;\, in \;Philosophical Studies. Vol. 146\, pp. 291-309.
E. Barnes and R. Cameron\, 2011. &lsquo\;Back to the Open Future&rsquo\;\, in \;Philosophical Perspectives. Vol. 25\, pp. \;1-26.
C. Besson and A. Hattiangadi\, 2013. &lsquo\;The Open Future\, Bivalence and Assertion&rsquo\;\, in \;Philosophical Studies. Vol. 167\, pp. 251-271.
R. Cameron\, 2015. \;The Moving Spotlight. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
F. Correia and A. Iacona (eds.)\, 2013. \;Around the Tree: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future. Dordrecht: Springer.
F. Correia and S. Rosenkranz\, 2018. \;Nothing to Come: A Defense of the Growing Block Theory of Time. Berlin: Springer.
D.M. Gabbay\, I. Hodkinson and M. Reynolds\, 1994. \;Temporal Logic: Mathematical Foundations and Computational Aspects \;(Volume 1)\, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
J. MacFarlane\, 2003. &lsquo\;Future Contingents and Relative Truth&rsquo\;\, in \;The Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 53\, pp. \;322-336.
J. MacFarlane\, 2008. &lsquo\;Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths&rsquo\;\, in \;Relative Truth. M. Garcia-Carpintero and M. KoĢlbel (eds.)\, Oxford: Oxford University Press\, pp. 81-102.
P. Ø\;hrstrø\;m\, 2019\, &lsquo\;A critical discussion of Prior&rsquo\;s philosophical and tense-logical analysis of the ideas of indeterminism and human freedom&rsquo\;\, in \;Synthese. Vol. 196\, pp. 69-85.
P. Ø\;hrstrø\;m and P. Hasle\, 1995\, \;Temporal Logic: From Ancient Ideas to Artificial Intelligence\, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
P. Ø\;hrstrø\;m and P. Hasle\, 2020\, &lsquo\;Future Contingents&rsquo\;\, in \;Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. Zalta (ed.)\, URL: \;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/future-contingents/.
A.N. Prior\, 1967. \;Past\, Present and Future. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
N. Rescher\, 1966. &lsquo\;On the Logic of Chronological Propositions&rsquo\;\, in \;Mind \;Vol. 75\, pp. 75&ndash\;96.
P. Todd\, 2016. &lsquo\;Future Contingents are all False! On Behalf of a Russellian Open Future&rsquo\;\, in \;Mind. Vol. 125\, pp. 775-798.
J. van Benthem\, 1983. \;The Logic of Time\, Dordrecht\, Boston\, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. [Second edition: 1991.]
Appropriate Topics for Submission include\, among others:
\nFormal accounts of tensed truths
\nGrounds for tensed truths
\nLogics for chronologically definite and indefinite propositions
\nReasoning problems involving time
\nTemporal vs atemporal notions of truth
\nTruth-value of tensed statements
\nThe unrestricted application of bivalence
\nThe absoluteness of utterance-truth
\nThe problem of future contingents
\nTruthmakers for tensed truths
\nFor further information\, please contact the guest editors: \;
\nvincent.grandjean@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
matteopascucci.academia@gmail.com
The deadline for submissions is:
\nDecember 31\, 2022
\nSubmissions via:
\nhttps://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx \;(T.C. : Temporal reasoning and tensed truths)
\nOrganizers:
\nVincent Grandjean\, Postdoctoral researcher\, Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Oxford\, United Kingdom. Email: \;vincent.grandjean@philosophy.ox.ac.uk.
https://philpeople.org/profiles/vincent-grandjean
Matteo Pascucci\, Postdoctoral researcher\, Institute of Philosophy\, Slovak Academy of Sciences\, Slovak Republic. \;Email address: \;matteopascucci.academia@gmail.com.
https://philpeople.org/profiles/matteo-pascucci