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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260609T140755Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20130904T133000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20130906T180000
SUMMARY:Paternalism and Libertarian Paternalism
UID:20260611T062602Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Manchester\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>Paternalism continues to be an important topic in moral and political philosophy/theory. But what it is? Most agree that it involves some sort of interference with a person motivated and/or justified by her good.&nbsp\; However\, Seana Shiffrin has denied that paternalism need to have this rationale\, and proponents of libertarian paternalism typically deny that it need be interfering. It seems even the two most basic elements &ndash\; interference and benevolence &ndash\; may not be so basic. What is the most constructive strategy in light of this controversy? Do we keep the conceptual discussion going or can we somehow get around it or do without it?<br><br>Libertarian paternalism is a recent political program founded on behavioural research. We now know that what we prefer depends on the context and not only the content of a choice. So our wellbeing can be promoted not only by restricting the content of our choices - blocking or discouraging harmful options\, but also by designing or changing the context of our choices - making good options more salient\, appealing or otherwise more likely to be chosen. Libertarian paternalists say we should use choice context to promote wellbeing\, without restricting content. Can this distinction be maintained? Is libertarian paternalism a coherent strategy? How are pro and con positions on libertarian paternalism related to pro and con positions on paternalism proper?</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Kalle Grill:
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