[All seminars] 17:00 to 18:30 pm (GMT+0): https://meet.google.com/odf-sdnr-grw
\nAbstract: \;Thoroughgoing modal anti-realism is unachievable. In fact\, anti-realism cannot even curtail real modality because anti-realism about a given necessity implies realism about a corresponding possibility and vice versa (or so I&rsquo\;ll argue)\, and this undermines the original motivation for modal anti-realism. However\, the modal anti-realist&rsquo\;s tools could still be put to fruitful work in figuring out where to draw the line between real necessity and real contingency\, though this is a significant retreat from the original aims of the view.
\nHere&rsquo\;s the argument in a nutshell. Assume that it is necessary that &phi\;\, the anti-realist must say that it is not really necessary that &phi\; in the sense that this modal truth does not hold in virtue of how the world objectively is. But if it is not really necessary that &phi\; then it is really possible that not-&phi\; because if it is not really possible that not-&phi\; then it is really necessary that &phi\;\, contra the anti-realist assumption about the necessity of &phi\;. On the other hand\, if it is not really possible that not-&phi\;\, this possibility holds just in virtue of facts about semantic rules\, say\, then it follows that it is really necessary that &phi\; because if it is not really necessary that &phi\; then it is really possible that not-&phi\;\, contra the anti-realist assumption about the possibility of not-&phi\;. Hence\, we cannot be throughgoing anti-realists about modality. We can be anti-realists about modality piecemeal but not across the board because anti-realism about a given necessity always implies realism about a corresponding possibility and vice versa. Real modality is ineliminable.
\nI&rsquo\;ll spend the talk examining this argument in more detail before discussing the significance of its conclusion.
ORGANIZER;CN=Raoni Arroyo;CN=Pedro Merlussi: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR