Time: 9:30 - 19:00
The historical turn in philosophy of science which began in the late \;1950s and early 60s rattled the way that philosophy of science was \;hitherto practiced. New concepts\, such as paradigm\, incommensurability\, \;and theory-ladenness were introduced\, and new problems were raised\, such \;as the rationality of scientific development\, the integrity of \;scientific practice\, relativism and idealism in relation to science. The \;effects were very disconcerting and quickly historical philosophy of \;science was vehemently criticized and eventually marginalized as not \;meeting the standards and expectations which this turn attempted to \;question\, for instance\, an algorithmic and ahistorical understanding of \;rationality\, or the belief in unremitting scientific progress. The \;reception that historical philosophy of science received obstructed the \;full appreciation of several important aspects concerning its roots\, \;contentions and implications. Thus Wittgenstein was not on the agenda of \;mainstream philosophy of science when historical philosophy was \;discussed and his influence on the protagonists of this movement passed \;largely unnoticed\; the challenge that Kuhn and Feyerabend mounted to \;Western rationalism was swiftly condemned rather than attended to\; and \;the concepts of paradigm and incommensurability were demonized rather \;than carefully interpreted and judged.
In the seminar\, we will put aside facile and worn-out categorizations \;and assimilations. Instead\, we will revisit the work of key figures of \;historical philosophy of science\, principally the work of Kuhn and \;Feyerabend\, to explore the dimensions and implications which were not \;emphasized and generally recognized in the previous period. For \;instance\, instead of simply dismissing rationality\, the emphasis on \;practice shifts interest from an intellectualist understanding of \;rationality to the concrete practical decisions scientists have to make\; \;and the historical dimension made prominent by historical philosophers \;of science calls attention to the intricate relations between philosophy \;and science in different historical periods and hence to the influence \;exercised by scientists on philosophers\, e.g.\, by Boltzmann on \;Feyerabend and Wittgenstein. On this basis we hope to reach a more \;judicious assessment of the historical turn\, its achievements and its shortcomings.
Bibliography available on request.
Registration: \;phd@philos.uzh.ch