Knowledge, Skepticism and Modality

WORKSHOP: KNOWLEDGE, SCEPTICISM AND MODALITY

FISPPA Department, Sala Giacon, 

P.zza Capitaniato 3 - Padova (Italy) 

24 February 2014

14.30 - 16Davide FASSIO (Université of Genève)

Title: Moderate Skeptical Invariantism

Abstract: Some linguistic intuitions seem to show that knowledge-attributions vary depending on pragmatic factors, such as the subject's interests in a circumstance. Philosophers suggested couples of scenarios in which the evidential support for a certain belief is held fixed, and the practical relevance of getting things right about a believed proposition varies. Intuitively, it seems to be correct to ascribe knowledge in the scenario in which not too much is at stake for the subject, but incorrect in the scenario where much more is at stake. Different explanations of this apparent sensitivity of knowledge-ascription to pragmatic factors have been suggested. Some philosophers argue that such linguistic intuitions reflect genuine features of knowledge. Such cases would show that pragmatic factors have consequences on whether someone is in the position to know (or correctly be said to know). More conservative philosophers preferred to deny that, holding fixed epistemic conditions, a mere change in the subject's practical situation may affect her epistemic status.Accordingly, they argued that knowledge is preserved in both Low and High-stakes situations, and therefore that intuitions are wrong in the high-stakes scenarios.Alternatively, one could argue that only assessments in high-stakes scenarios are right, while intuitions go wrong in low-stakes scenarios. This possibility has not been embraced by any philosopher and has been marked as sceptical. In effect, according to such an alternative, the subjects do not know in both the considered scenarios. In my talk I want to defend a version of this latter view, that I will call Moderate Sceptical Invariantism (MRI). According to MRI, a subject knows that p only if she is rational to act on p no matter what it is at stake in being right/wrong about p. I will distinguish such a view from traditional forms of scepticism according to which one cannot know except if one is absolutely certain of something. I will argue that MRI is not so counterintuitive as it could seem at a first sight, and it has several explanatory advantages over the alternative views.

16 - 17.30Daniele SGARAVATTI (Università dell'Aquila) 

Title: Benacerraf Problem and Modal Knowledge".

Abstract: In this talk, I will try to show that the so-called Benacerraf problem is a serious problem for modal epistemology – as opposed to a pseudo-problem or a problem which has a trivial solution. At the same time, I will try to get clearer on the nature of the problem both in itself (as it applies in several areas, including mathematics), and as it applies to modal knowledge in particular. 

17.30 - 19JiriRACLAVSKY (Brno University)

Title: A Revenge Form of Fitch's Knowability Paradox for Russellian Typing Knowledge

Abstract: It is already known that typing knowledge is capable to resolve Fitch's knowability paradox.  The present paper focuses on a special form of the recently raised criticism of Russellian typing knowledge which consists in a revenge form of Fitch's paradox. The revenge problem was suggested by Williamson, Hart and also Carrara with Fassio. The basic idea of the main form of a revenge Fitch's paradox employs quantification over type levels. However, the formalism evoked in the criticism is ambivalent. Suggesting a proper method of quantification over types, I examine several possible readings of the revenge paradox. As I show in details, if such readings were viable, they would violate the proper typing rules. It seems thus the there is no revenge for the Russellian typing approach to Fitch's knowability paradox.

Organized by: 

Massimiliano Carrara ([email protected])

Vittorio Morato ([email protected])