Through Thick and Thin: Why a Husserlian Phenomenology Matters to Moral Philosophy

Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (University of Graz)

The Significance of Phenomenology 

Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam

Netherlands Institute for Cultural Analysis 

Institute for Logic, Language and Computation

Wednesday 28 May, 16.00-18.00  

E0.02 (VOC-zaal), Oost Indisch Huis

Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (Graz)

Through Thick and Thin’: Why a Husserlian Phenomenology

Matters to Moral Philosophy

Abstract:

The fact/value distinction lies at the heart of some of the most prominent and most persistent controversies in modern moral philosophy and philosophical theorizing in general. While this distinction covers a wider range of problems including, for instance, Weber’s famous principle of value-free science, the present talk will focus on related issues in the field of moral philosophy. Taking the fact/value distinction as a starting point, I shall try to answer the question why Husserl’s phenomenology matters to moral philosophy by referring to various problems revolving round the issue of thick concepts (e.g. insidious, brave, benevolent) as distinct from thin concepts (e.g. good, right, wrong, admissible). Although Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological approach does not fit into the picture of a clear-cut dividing line between adherents and opponents of thick concepts it will be shown that, owing to the peculiar character of its intentional analysis, it is suited to considerably improve our understanding of the related problems.

All welcome