Investigating the Social Self

September 10, 2014 - September 12, 2014
University of Parma


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Investigating the Social Self

Parma, September 10-12, 2014
Via d'Azeglio 85/a, Aula B

Organized by:
Katja Crone (Dortmund) and Wolfgang Huemer (Parma)


10 September

14.30   Welcome address

15.00   Joel Krueger (Exeter)
Shared Emotions and the Social Self

16.30   Hans Bernhard Schmid (Wien)
Trust as Effective Expectation

11 September

9.30   Alex Burri (Erfurt)
The Cartesian Other

11.00   Roberta Lanfredini (Firenze)
To be a thinking thing: closure and openness of the self

14.00   Kristina Musholt (Magdeburg)
Towards a multi-level account of the Social Self

15.30   Johannes Brandl (Salzburg)
Being Observed. The Social Background in Mirror Self-Recognition

17.15   Alfredo Paternoster (Bergamo)
The Obsession of non-reflective Self-consciousness

12 September

9.30   Corrado Sinigaglia (Milano)
Bodily and Social Selves

11.00   Manos Tsakiris (London)
The Plasticity of the Self-other Relation: from Body-ownership to Social Cognition

12.30   Closing statement

For information please contact: 
Katja Crone (
Wolfgang Huemer (

Self-consciousness, collective intentionality, and social cognition are widely discussed in current philosophical and interdisciplinary debates. Even though it is agreed that these three issues are related to one another in various ways, most discussions focus on only one of them, often in isolation from the other ones. This leads to the result that the interrelations between these fields of study – interrelations that might turn out to provide stimulating insights or even be of explanatory value – often remain unexplored. The workshop intends to overcome this shortcoming by drawing attention to the interdependence of the three topics and by discussing prospects of different methodological perspectives, ranging from phenomenological and analytical to empirical approaches.

Topics that will be discussed include:
Does the ability to ascribe mental states to others presuppose the awareness of oneself?
In what sense does self-consciousness presuppose the awareness of others as mental subjects?
Is there a (and, if yes, what is the) difference between the ascription of mental states to oneself and to others (symmetrical or asymmetrical)?
Is social interaction between embodied subjects relevant to the ability to conceive of oneself and the others?
Can we simulate mental states of others in the absence of self-awareness?
Is face-to-face interaction between embodied subjects indispensable for simulating each other’s mental states and understanding each other’s behaviour?
Is collective intending reducible to individual intending?
Is our conceiving of the other as an experiencing or self-conscious being prior to collective activities?

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