CFP: Meta-theories of Disagreement

Meta-theories of Disagreement

Special Issue for Metaphilosophy - Deadline Extended: 16th July 2020.

MTA-Lendület Morals and Science Research Group

Various forms of disagreement are ubiquitous in all fields of discussion, such as values, science, philosophy, politics and aesthetics. The theoretical understanding of many forms of disagreement (such as faultless disagreement, reasonable disagreement etc.) relies on different epistemological, semantic and metaphysical considerations. Studies on disagreement have profound implications on the nature of truth, normativity and objectivity. Given the complexity of these interrelated problems and their manifold implications on various fields of philosophical inquiry, we need to reflect on how general conceptual frameworks, such as accounts of realism and anti-realism on certain domains, various forms of relativism and scepticism, as well as cognitivism and non-cognitivism on normativity could help us get a better insight on the fundamental problems in disagreement and initiate future discussions. We would expect papers on disagreement in relation to other widely debated topics like hinge-epistemology, entitlement-epistemology, pluralism about truth, relativism, non-cognitivism as well as some interrelated themes on social epistemology and the philosophy of science.

Please send your submissions to Metaphilosophy Editorial Board: [email protected]

For more information please email to the special issue editors: Peter Hartl ([email protected]); Akos Gyarmathy ([email protected])