The Nature of Epistemic Normativity

May 13, 2021 - May 14, 2021

This event is online

Sponsor(s):

  • Riksbankens jubileumsfond

Organisers:

University of Sussex
Stockholm University
Stockholm University

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DATE & TIME: 13th and 14th of May, from 3:00pm to 7:20pm Central European Time.

REGISTRATION: All sessions will take place on Zoom. To register, and receive the zoom link, please send an email to [email protected] with ‘The Nature of Epistemic Normativity Registration’ in the subject line.

SPEAKERS & SCHEDULE: 

13 May

3.00–4.20 pm    Conor McHugh, The University of Southampton “Logic and Norms of Reasoning”

4:30–5:50 pm    Debbie Roberts, The University of Edinburgh “Irreducible Epistemic Normativity”

6:00–7:20 pm    Terence Cuneo, The University of Vermont, title TBC

14 May

3.00–4.20 pm    Christos Kyriacou, University of Cyprus, “Against Epistemic Conventionalism”

4:30–5:50 pm    Jonas Olson, Stockholm University, “Error Theory and Self Defeat”

6:00–7:20 pm    Thomas Kelly, Princeton University, “Doubts about Epistemic Value”

DESCRIPTION: Realism and anti-realism are old rivals in philosophy, and epistemology is among the most frequented battlegrounds. Disputes abound concerning the status of epistemic norms regarding justification or epistemic reasons.

One such foundational dispute revolves around the relation of epistemic normativity to the ‘natural’ or non-normative facts. Is justification irreducibly normative, or can it be reduced to a natural relation, such as probability-raising? Are there categorical epistemic reasons, or are all epistemic reasons instrumental? In short, can epistemology be naturalized? And if it cannot be naturalized, is robust realism about epistemic norms defensible?

Such foundational questions relate to semantic ones: do normative epistemological statements represent, or do they express non-cognitive attitudes of some kind? Are normative epistemic statements true absolutely, or are they merely true relative to a particular perspective? Are such statements true in some substantive sense, or are they only true in a deflated sense? 

The workshop is funded by Riksbankens jubileumsfond in connection with the project The Foundations of Epistemic Normativity (P17-0487:1), run by Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm) and Corine Besson (Sussex). The project is hosted by the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, Sweden, in collaboration with the Department of Philosophy, University of Sussex, UK. 

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May 12, 2021, 11:00pm CET

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