Two Concepts of Virtue Ethics

Prof. Stan van Hooft (Deakin University )

This paper describes two concepts of virtue ethics. The first is tied to modern moral theory in that it is concerned to present a new way of deciding which actions are right and wrong. It depends on a conception of moral realism which sees the rightness of an action as an objective feature of it and on a metaphysics of subjectivity that sees the self as a rational and self-aware deliberator. The second, contrasting conception of virtue ethics derives from Aristotle and focuses on the character of the agent. It relies on an expression theory of action and on a concept of normativity which is more akin to standards of honour and appropriateness than to the standard of moral rightness. It is important to understand this distinction because many contemporary virtue ethicists, while they claim kinship with Aristotle, actually subscribe to the first view.

Stan van Hooft is Professor of Philosophy at Deakin University. His is the author of numerous works, including, most recently, Hope (Acumen, 2011) and Cosmopolitanism: A Philosophy for Global Ethics (Acumen, 2009), which was shortlisted for the Australian Museum Eureka prize for research in ethics in 2010. Professor van Hooft’s current research centres on Global Ethics and Political Philosophy, the concept of caring in contemporary moral theory and the role of hope in politics and religion. He is currently editing, with Dr Nicole Saunders, The Handbook of Virtue Ethics (Acumen, forthcoming).