Precaution and Consciousness

Online Workshop “Precaution and Consciousness”  

This workshop aims to develop our ethical framework to treat creatures/entities which it is unclear whether can have sentience and consciousness. There are many relevant questions and debates. Can AI and human brain organoids be conscious in the future? If so, how much moral consideration we should give to them? What standard should we adopt to attribute sentience and consciousness? Recently some argue that we should apply the precautionary principle to the attribution of consciousness, stating that many animals and even human brain organoids should be regarded as having consciousness. However, some object that too much precaution is rather harmful. When is the use of the precautionary principle acceptable and effective? By addressing those questions, we discuss how we should treat creatures/entities which it is far from clear whether can have conscious experiences. 

Workshop Date and Format: 

This workshop is held online using zoom at March 17th, 2022. Please fill in the registration form to participate in the workshop: https://forms.gle/5n3RozsAhhF2Wgea9

We will send the zoom link a few days before the workshop date. 

Program: 

8:00-9:15 (GMT) Takuya Niikawa (Kobe University) & Tsutomu Sawai (Kyoto University) “The precautionary principle about consciousness”.

9:15-10:30 (GMT)　Jonathan Birch (LES) “The Edge of Sentience: Humans, Animals, AI”.

Abstract:

Takuya Niikawa & Tsutomu Sawai “The precautionary principle about consciousness”

This talk aims to clarify the precautionary principle about consciousness. Although it is widely accepted that sentient beings deserve moral consideration, there are many kinds of beings which it is unclear whether can have consciousness, such as insects, plants, brain organoids, and AIs. It is thus far from clear whether they deserve moral consideration. Some philosophers apply the idea of precaution to the attribution of consciousness. For instance, Birch (2017) states that “where there are threats of serious, negative animal welfare outcomes, lack of full scientific certainty as to the sentience of the animals in question shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent those outcomes” (3). Likewise, Niikawa et al (2022) claim that “if there is theoretical disagreement over whether X has consciousness—and where treating X as not having consciousness would cause more harm to X than benefit to X— we ought to err on the side of being liberal with attribution of consciousness and assume that X does have consciousness”. Although the underlying idea seems clear, there remain many questions to address. How should the precautionary principle about consciousness be formulated? Should it be interpreted as a procedural requirement, a decision rule or an epistemic rule? How can we justify it? By addressing those questions, we attempt to formulate and defend the precautionary principle about consciousness.   

Jonathan Birch (LES) “The Edge of Sentience: Humans, Animals, AI”

We increasingly seem to find ourselves confronted with the question of where to draw the line between sentient and non-sentient beings: beings with at least some subjective experiences, perhaps including experiences of pain and pleasure, and beings with none. We face this question now in relation to animal welfare: should only vertebrates be protected by law, or should some invertebrates, such as octopuses and crabs, also be protected? We will face it in the (potentially near) future in relation to human neural organoids and artificial intelligence (AI). My aim in this talk is to set out what I hope can be the basis of a consensus on how to make decisions in the face of uncertain sentience.

Inquiry

Please direct any inquiries to [email protected] (Takuya Niikawa).