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DTSTAMP:20260430T082932Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260529T170000
SUMMARY:12th LSE Graduate Conference in Political Theory (2026)
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TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:London School of Economics\, London\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>The LSE Department of Government is pleased to announce its 12th&nbsp\;annual Graduate Conference in Political Theory\, taking place on&nbsp\;May 28th and 29th\, 2026. The conference will be held entirely in-person.</p>\n<p>This year&rsquo\;s conference will follow a&nbsp\;workshop model\, fostering deep engagement and constructive feedback on research from graduate scholars. Each presenter will be assigned a&nbsp\;commentator&nbsp\;followed by an open Q&amp\;A.</p>\n<p>We welcome submissions from graduate students in political theory and related disciplines. Papers can engage with normative\, historical\, analytical\, or critical approaches\, as well as interdisciplinary perspectives.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Lunch will be provided for speakers on both days. Coffee\, refreshments\, and a drinks reception will also be included. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover transportation and/or accommodation costs.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>We are also delighted to feature two keynote speakers\, who will participate in workshop discussions: Sean Ingham (UC San Diego) and Shuk Ying Chan (UCL).</p>\n<p><br>More details to follow.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Matt Davies;CN=Luca Marsico;CN=Jack Wilkinson:
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DTSTAMP:20260430T082932Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260616T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260616T170000
SUMMARY:Justice in Local Space
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TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Sir Arthur Lewis Building\, Lincoln's Inn Fields\, London\, United Kingdom\, WC2A 2PH
DESCRIPTION:<p>The use and control of physical space has long been central to political philosophy (conceived\, for instance\, in terms of private property rights or collective territorial rights). However\, this rich body of work has focused primarily on the justification of exclusive control rights at either the small (individual-property-right) scale or the large (territorial-right) scale\, rather than on the normative dimensions of intermediate local-scale use of physical space and everyday spatial experience\, the demands of justice or morality that arise from the local-level inhabiting of a shared physical environment. This is beginning to emerge as a subject of study in political philosophy/theory\, and recent book-length treatments (e.g. Kohn's The Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth (2016)\; Kukla's City Living (2021)) and emerging literatures on topics such as gentrification and housing justice begin to address these concerns. Much of this work\, though\, assumes "the city" (metropolitan area or municipality) as the relevant unit of analysis. Yet for theories concerned with justice in day-to-day life\, issues of justice in local land use need not be distinctively urban\, and the local space more generally&mdash\;neighbourhoods\, districts\, villages\, rural areas&mdash\;and the relations between them (home to work\, home to community) may be a more meaningful unit of analysis.</p>\n<p>In this workshop we wish to explore what is distinctive about justice at the local scale and in the local organisation of land use\, and how established justice frameworks might need modification when applied to everyday spatial experience.</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>Invited speakers:</p>\n<p>Katy Wells (Warwick)</p>\n<p>Bart van Leeuwen (Radboud)</p>\n<p>Tyler Zimmer (Chicago)</p>\n<p>Holly Longair (Kwantlen Polytechnic)</p>\n<p>Pilar Lopez-Cantero (Antwerp) &amp\; Dan Guillery (LSE)</p>\n<p>Bettina Lange (Radboud)</p>\n<p>Corey Schuck (Radboud)</p>\n<p>This workshop is hosted and funded by the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science at the LSE.</p>\n<p>Practicalities</p>\n<p>9.30 - 18.00\, 16th June 2026\, in person</p>\n<p>London School of Economics and Political Science (Sir Arthur Lewis Building\, Room G.03)</p>\n<p>All are welcome\, but please register your attendance at the link above\, so that we have an idea of numbers for catering\, and since\, if you are not a member of the LSE\, you will not be able to access the building unless you are on our list in advance.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Daniel Guillery;CN=Corey Schuck;CN=Bettina Lange:
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DTSTAMP:20260430T082932Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260914T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260915T170000
SUMMARY:New Directions in Law-Based Explanations in the Sciences
UID:20260430T083612Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>When we look at current research across the natural and social sciences dealing with explanations of phenomena in their respective fields\, the word &lsquo\;explanation&rsquo\; is often modified with an adjective: causal\, non-causal\, mechanistic\, nomological/law-based\, topological\, mathematical\, and narrative are some of the non-mutually-exclusive modifiers that one may encounter. It is generally accepted that fields such as physics rely more on laws for their explanatory practices than disciplines such as cell biology\, which are\, for the most part\, concerned with mechanistic explanations\, for example. In the philosophy of science\, particularly since the advent of the New Mechanism literature in the 1990s\, barring some exceptions\, there has been relatively little sustained work on the pragmatic side of law-based explanations as opposed to other explanatory modalities\, and the interest that law-based explanations have garnered has mostly focused on the metaphysics of laws. This workshop aims to bring the philosophy of law-based explanations\, with particular attention to their pragmatic dimensions\, back into focus. Moreover\, while being historically informed\, the hope is to discuss new directions within this strand of the philosophy of explanation. Some questions for consideration could include (in no particular order):</p>\n<ul>\n<li>In the sciences that have traditionally relied more on law-based explanations\, are there any law-discovery programmes\, or has the pool of available laws reached a plateau in most law-heavy disciplines? How can one begin such a programme in a law-light field?</li>\n<li>Has the strict law vs. <em>ceteris-paribus</em> law distinction\, or the terminological variety of law-talk such as &lsquo\;nomological&rsquo\;\, &lsquo\;nomothetic&rsquo\;\, &lsquo\;lawlike&rsquo\;\, &lsquo\;generalisation&rsquo\;\, &lsquo\;principle&rsquo\;\, and so on\, been conducive to\, or has it hindered\, law-based explanations?</li>\n<li>How does a law-based explanation in physics or chemistry compare to a law-based explanation in\, say\, linguistics (notwithstanding superficial differences in subject matter)? Relatedly\, do laws that could be said to straddle autonomous fields\, e.g.\, thermodynamic laws in physics and chemistry\, perform the same explanatory roles in both disciplines?</li>\n<li>How can laws and mechanisms gain traction in a combined nomological&ndash\;mechanistic explanation? Moreover\, how can an &lsquo\;understanding&rsquo\; of a given phenomenon based on a law-based explanation differ from an &lsquo\;understanding&rsquo\; based on a mechanistic explanation of the same phenomenon?</li>\n<li>How can metaphysical claims and arguments about laws of science translate into claims about the pragmatic role of laws in explanations?</li>\n<li>There have been successful modelling attempts using allometric scaling laws in biology. But are laws\, especially newly posited laws\, more refractory to modelling than\, say\, mechanisms? Relatedly\, could laws be integrated into existing models of a given mechanism?</li>\n<li>What lessons could be drawn from the philosophy of law (i.e. legal philosophy) for law-based explanations in the sciences?</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Confirmed Speakers:</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Sepehr Ehsani (LSE): <em>can modelling the content of laws aid in their explanatory use?</em></li>\n<li>Amir Feizi (Gero AI): <em>laws of ageing and longevity</em></li>\n<li>Alexander Gebharter (Marche Polytechnic University): <em>preconditions for causal inference and non-causal laws</em></li>\n<li>Jos&eacute\; Antonio P&eacute\;rez Escobar (Universidad Nacional de Educaci&oacute\;n a Distancia): <em>mathematical explanations in the sciences: principles\, laws\, or rules?</em></li>\n<li>Bryan Roberts (LSE): <em>do laws of symmetry explain or ground the dynamical laws?</em></li>\n<li>Deniz Sarikaya (Vrije Universiteit Brussel &amp\; Universit&auml\;t zu L&uuml\;beck): <em>laws and theories in precision medicine</em></li>\n<li>Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi (King's College London): <em>laws in medicine and psychology</em></li>\n<li>Philip H Thonemann (LSE): <em>pedagogical aspects of laws in physics explanations</em></li>\n<li>Jidong Wang (Fudan University &amp\; LSE): <em>laws in linguistics</em></li>\n</ul>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sepehr Ehsani:
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