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CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260519T044431Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20260529T140000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20260529T153000
SUMMARY:Mere Difference without Arbitrariness: A Normative Model of Disability
UID:20260605T204152Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Monash Clayton Campus\, Melbourne\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:<p>Join Zoom meeting:</p>\n<p>https://monash.zoom.us/j/86351045263?pwd=1gHMLhmDnXiFJIV0Jl8s6GxhgBgylb.1&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Meeting ID: 863 5104 5263 // Passcode: 184791</p>\n<p>Abstract: According to Barnes&rsquo\; solidarity model of disability\, S is physically disabled in C iff S is in some bodily state X and the rules for solidarity employed by the disability rights movement classify X in C as among the conditions the movement is seeking to promote justice for. This model is attractive because:<em>&nbsp\;</em>(i) it does not imply that being disabled is other things equal bad\; (ii) it gives disabled people&rsquo\;s testimony significant weight in determining what it is to be disabled\, and (iii) it avoids counter-examples to alternative models. However\, many have argued that the solidarity model is objectionably arbitrary due to its reliance on the rules employed by the current disability rights movement. This paper proposes a normative model of disability that it argues can preserve attractions (i-iii) and avoid the arbitrariness problem. On the normative model\, S is disabled in C iff S has X and the rules for treating people as disabled that we morally ought to accept and use in normal conditions hold that someone with X in C is to be treated as disabled. This paper also raises new problems for other recent accounts of disability which it argues that the normative model avoids.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sandra Leonie Field:
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DTSTAMP:20260519T044431Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20260602T110000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20260602T170000
SUMMARY:The Systemic Stance: Culpability and Obligation in Unjust Systems
UID:20260605T204153Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:750 Collins St\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3057
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>BOOK MANUSCRIPT WORKSHOP<br> <em>The Systemic Stance: Culpability and Obligation in Unjust Systems<br> </em></strong>book-in-progress by Stephanie Collins</p>\n<p>Injustices resulting from social systems are difficult to pin on agents. This gives rise to a widely-discussed question: who has responsibility for systemic injustice? This book proposes a new two-part answer\, which adopts a new perspective called &lsquo\;the systemic stance.&rsquo\; When we adopt the systemic stance\, we target our indignation\, resentment\, anger\, and rage at the system itself. This is the first part of the book&rsquo\;s two-part answer:&nbsp\;<em>negative reactive attitudes concerning systemic injustice fittingly target the social system</em>. This conclusion contradicts the widely-held assumption that reactive attitudes are apt only when they target agents. The second part of the systemic stance concerns moral obligations:&nbsp\;<em>moral obligations concerning systemic injustice are held by agents\, starting from where those agents are in the system</em>. Obligations from within the systemic stance call upon agents to pull the levers the system makes available to them to engage in a practice the book calls &lsquo\;contextual care.&rsquo\; The account of moral obligations under systemic injustice is applied to public organizations\, private organizations\, and individual humans.</p>\n<p>Each session will begin with a brief overview of the chapter by Collins\, followed by a 10-15 minute critique by a commentator\, before the conversation is opened for general discussion.</p>\n<p>Participants are not expected to read the book in advance. Handouts summarising each chapter will be available\, to accompany the chapter overviews that begin each session. If you would like to read the book or the handouts\, that's awesome: please email stephanie.collins@monash.edu.</p>\n<p>For catering purposes\, please email stephanie.collins@monash.edu by 26 May\, including any dietary or accessibility requirements.<br> <br> <strong>SCHEDULE</strong><br> <br> 10.45: Coffee and pastries available</p>\n<p>11.00: Welcome and Overview</p>\n<p>11.10-11.55: Chapter 1 &ldquo\;Theorising Responsibility for Structural Injustice.&rdquo\;<br> Commentator: Suzy Killmister (Monash)</p>\n<p>12.00-12.45: Chapter 2 &ldquo\;Standard Theories of Reactive Attitudes&rdquo\; and Chapter 3 &ldquo\;System-Targeting Reactive Attitudes.&rdquo\;<br> Commentator: Luke Russell (Sydney) The commentary will focus on Chapter 3. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>12.45-1.30: Lunch (provided)</p>\n<p>1.30-2.15: Chapter 4 &ldquo\;Moral Obligation from the Systemic Stance.&rdquo\;<br> Commentator: Katrina Hutchison (Macquarie)</p>\n<p>2.20-3.05: Chapter 5 &ldquo\;Moral Obligations in Public Organizations.&rdquo\;<br> Commentator: Luara Ferracioli (Sydney)</p>\n<p>3.05-3.30: Afternoon tea</p>\n<p>3.30-4.15: Chapter 6 &ldquo\;Moral Obligations in Private Organizations.&rdquo\;<br> Commentator: Will Tuckwell (Charles Sturt)</p>\n<p>4.25-5.10: Chapter 7 &ldquo\;Individuals&rsquo\; Obligations and Social Norms&rdquo\;<br> Commentator: Jeremy Moss (UNSW)</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Stephanie Collins:
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