Conatus &ndash\; Self-determination &ndash\; Subjectivity &ndash\; Hegel and/or/with Spinoza
\nPhilosophisches Seminar\, University of Heidelberg
\n\nHö\;rsaal 04a\, Neue Universitä\;t\, Heidelberg University
\nUniversitä\;tsplatz 1\, \;69117 Heidelberg
\n8&ndash\;9.07.2026
\n\nWednesday\, 8th \;of July
\n\n9:45 Welcome\, coffee
\n\n10:00 Ursula Renz (Graz): Spinozean \;acquiescientia in se ipso \;vs. Hegelian Reconciliation
\n\n11:00 Coffee break
\n\n11:30 Yitzhak Melamed (Johns Hopkins): Spinoza and Hegel on Self-Negation
\n\n12:30 Lunch break
\n\n13:30 Misa Sanada (Nagoya): From Conatus to Being-with-Oneself-in-Another: Mendelssohn\, Jacobi\, and the Path from Spinoza to Hegel
\n\n14:30 Coffee break
\n\n15:00 \;Bojana Jovićević (Ljubljana): Knowledge and Action in Spinoza&rsquo\;s Ethics and Hegel&rsquo\;s Logic
\n\n16:00 Coffee break
\n\n16:30 \;Julia Peters (Heidelberg): Privatio nihil est? Hegel&rsquo\;s Critique of Spinoza on Negative Affect
\n\n17:30 short coffee break
\n\n17:45 \;Birgit Sandkaulen (Bochum): Wie passt das Theorem des conatus zu Hegels negativistischer Spinozalektü\;re?
\n\n19:30 Dinner
\n\n\nThursday\, 9th \;of July
\n\n10:00 Oliver Toth (Heidelberg): Sensory and rational principles of action in Spinoza and Hegel
\n\n11:00 coffee break
\n\n11:30 Jack Stetter (Louisiana State/South Florida): State Individuality and War in Spinoza and Hegel
\n\n12:30 Lunch break
\n\n13:30 Martin Saar (Frankfurt): Hegel or Spinoza? Subjectivity\, Intersubjectivity and &ldquo\;Transindividuality&rdquo\;
\n\n14:30 Coffee break
\n\n15:00 Ana-Silvia Munte (Tü\;bingen): Spinoza&rsquo\;s Conatus and Hegel&rsquo\;s Stocking: Why a Mended Self-Consciousness is Worse than a Torn One
\n\n16:00 Coffee break
\n\n16:30 \;James Kreines (Claremont McKenna): Philosophy of Action and Priority of the Practical\, Without Human-Perspective-Defensive Reasoning: Spinoza&rsquo\;s Conatus and Hegel&rsquo\;s Self-Determination
\n\n17:30 Concluding remarks\, reception
\n\n20:00 Screening of the movie &ldquo\;Spinoza: Six Reasons for the Excommunication of the Philosopher&rdquo\;
\nGloriette Cinema\, Hauptstraß\;e 146\, 69117 Heidelberg
\nFollowed by a podium discussion &ldquo\;Spinoza and the Good Life&rdquo\; with the director of the film David Ofek\, and Michael Engel (Heidelberg University of Jewish Studies)\, Yitzhak Melamed (Johns Hopkins)\, Ursula Renz (Graz) on the therapeutic role of Spinoza&rsquo\;s philosophy\, moderated by Julia Peters (Heidelberg).
\n\nThe conference is free and open to everyone. Due to limited seating\, we ask for registration by sending an e-mail to: \;oliver.toth@uni-heidelberg.de.
\n\nRegistration does not automatically include a ticket for the screening\; tickets can be bought directly at the cinema independently from the registration.
\n\nThe conference is organized by Julia Peters and Oliver Toth\; it is generously funded by the DFG and is part of the project &bdquo\;Conatus\, Trieb und die Erkenntnis der Freiheit: Spinozas Einfluss auf Hegels praktische Philosophie&ldquo\;.
ORGANIZER;CN=Oliver Toth;CN=Julia Peters: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260707T175217Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260712T080000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260712T080000 SUMMARY:Rational Action and Belief – Recognising and Responding to Reasons UID:20260707T223424Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Heidelberg\, Germany DESCRIPTION:Workshop: Rational Action and Belief &ndash\; Recognising and Responding to Reasons
\nDo rational actions and beliefs require us to recognise reasons as reasons? If so\, what does such recognition consist in\, and what role does it play in responding rationally to reasons? \;
\nWe invite submissions of abstracts for a workshop on these and related questions. \;
\n\;
\nKey Information
Date &\; Location: October 29&ndash\;30\, 2026\, Heidelberg University
Invited speakers: Carlotta Pavese (Oxford)\, Kurt Sylvan (Southampton)
Funding: travel expenses up to &euro\;600 and accommodation in Heidelberg will be covered
Contributed slots: up to six
Abstract length: ca. 1000 words
Submission email: \;rational_action_belief@protonmail.com
Submission deadline: July 12\, 2026
Notification: by the end of July
\;
\nWorkshop Themes
\nDoes forming an intention or belief in a rational manner require recognising that the corresponding action or belief enjoys some form of rational support? Many action theorists and epistemologists answer this question affirmatively. For a doctor&rsquo\;s belief that the patient has measles to be rational\, it must be based on a suitable reason. That the patient has Koplik spots is such a reason. But it seems insufficient to rationalise the belief that the patient has measles\, unless the doctor recognises that Koplik spots support that belief. Similar examples for actions abound.
\nOn this view\, rational belief and rational action respond not only to reasons but also to their being reasons for those beliefs or actions. This idea is often captured by appeals to a \;taking condition\, or by the requirement that rational reasons must be \;treated as normative reasons. While such views have gained prominence in recent epistemology and action theory\, they raise pressing questions about the nature of responding to normative reasons. \;
\nWe invite contributions that explore the role of recognising\, taking\, or appreciating reasons in rational belief and action\, including critical perspectives.
\nTopics include (but are not limited to):
\n·\; \; \;Do rational action and belief require the recognition that the action or belief enjoys support\, for example that the evidence supports a particular conclusion?
\n·\; \; \;What does this recognition require? Does it require a doxastic state\, for example\, that the evidence supports p\, or is the recognition condition non-doxastic?
\n·\; \;If the recognition condition is non-doxastic\, then how does it operate? Does it involve the exercise of some non-doxastic skill\, is it a form of rule following\, or something else entirely? \;
\n·\; \; \;If the recognition condition is doxastic\, then how does it avoid regress problems? Can an appeal to additional non-doxastic factors block such regresses?
\n·\; \; \;Is recognising normative support sufficient for rational action or belief\, or does responding to that recognition introduce additional constraints?
\n·\; \;Can the basing of action or belief on reasons be analysed into constituent psychological states\, or does such analysis generate explanatory regresses? \;
\n·\; \;What is the correct semantic theory for linguistic expressions of acting and believing for reasons\, such as &ldquo\;therefore&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;because&rdquo\;?
\nPlease send your submission\, prepared for blind review\, together with a separate title page containing the author&rsquo\;s details (name\, title\, affiliation\, and email address) to \;rational_action_belief@protonmail.com. Please direct all queries to the organisers Andreas Mü\;ller (andreas.mueller.philosophie@em.uni-frankfurt.de) and Tobias Wilsch (tobias.wilsch@gmail.com). Queries sent to the submission email may be overlooked.
ORGANIZER;CN=Tobias Wilsch;CN=Andy Mueller: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260707T175217Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261029T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261030T170000 SUMMARY:Rational Action and Belief – Recognising and Responding to Reasons UID:20260707T223425Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Heidelberg\, Germany DESCRIPTION:Workshop: Rational Action and Belief &ndash\; Recognising and Responding to Reasons
\nDo rational actions and beliefs require us to recognise reasons as reasons? If so\, what does such recognition consist in\, and what role does it play in responding rationally to reasons? \;
\nKey Information
Date &\; Location: October 29&ndash\;30\, 2026\, Heidelberg University
Invited speakers: Carlotta Pavese (Oxford)\, Kurt Sylvan (Southampton)
There are up to six open contributor slots\, please see the related CFP and submit an abstract.
\nWorkshop Themes
\nDoes forming an intention or belief in a rational manner require recognising that the corresponding action or belief enjoys some form of rational support? Many action theorists and epistemologists answer this question affirmatively. For a doctor&rsquo\;s belief that the patient has measles to be rational\, it must be based on a suitable reason. That the patient has Koplik spots is such a reason. But it seems insufficient to rationalise the belief that the patient has measles\, unless the doctor recognises that Koplik spots support that belief. Similar examples for actions abound.
\nOn this view\, rational belief and rational action respond not only to reasons but also to their being reasons for those beliefs or actions. This idea is often captured by appeals to a \;taking condition\, or by the requirement that rational reasons must be \;treated as normative reasons. While such views have gained prominence in recent epistemology and action theory\, they raise pressing questions about the nature of responding to normative reasons. \;
\nWe invite contributions (see separate CFP) that explore the role of recognising\, taking\, or appreciating reasons in rational belief and action\, including critical perspectives.
\nTopics include (but are not limited to):
\n·\; Do rational action and belief require the recognition that the action or belief enjoys support\, for example that the evidence supports a particular conclusion?
\n·\; What does this recognition require? Does it require a doxastic state\, for example\, that the evidence supports p\, or is the recognition condition non-doxastic?
\n·\; If the recognition condition is non-doxastic\, then how does it operate? Does it involve the exercise of some non-doxastic skill\, is it a form of rule following\, or something else entirely? \;
\n·\; If the recognition condition is doxastic\, then how does it avoid regress problems? Can an appeal to additional non-doxastic factors block such regresses?
\n·\; Is recognising normative support sufficient for rational action or belief\, or does responding to that recognition introduce additional constraints?
\n·\; Can the basing of action or belief on reasons be analysed into constituent psychological states\, or does such analysis generate explanatory regresses? \;
\n·\; What is the correct semantic theory for linguistic expressions of acting and believing for reasons\, such as &ldquo\;therefore&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;because&rdquo\;?
\nPlease direct all queries to the organisers Andreas Mü\;ller (andreas.mueller.philosophie@em.uni-frankfurt.de) and Tobias Wilsch (tobias.wilsch@gmail.com). \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Tobias Wilsch;CN=Andy Mueller: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR