As Israel continues its genocide in Gaza and genocidal violence continues to be waged against the Rohingya in Myanmar\, Uyghurs in China\, the people of Sudan\, Ukraine\, Yemen and other places\, this calls for the re-examination of the basic contours of democratic theory. What are the implications for our thinking about democracy and democratic ideals when a genocide is perpetrated\, in the case of Israel\, by a regime that understands itself and is understood by many to be a democracy? What does it mean when genocidal violence is supported and facilitated in one way or another by democracies? When some genocides are sidelined\, minimized\, or denied by democratic publics or even by left movements that appeal to democratic ideals? How should this affect our analyses of democracy\, of its central commitments and tensions\, its values and authority\, its current crises and its futures? The goal of the workshop is to bring political philosophy and democratic theory into conversation with insights from genocide studies and other relevant fields.
\nGenocide has received relatively little attention from contemporary political philosophers (notable exceptions include contributions from Anne O&rsquo\;Byrne\, Mathias Thaler\, Larry May\, Claudia Card). Few contributions consider it from the perspective of democratic theory. The logic and practice of genocide is usually seen to be the antithesis of a presumed universalistic and egalitarian ethos of liberal democracy. Helpful starting points for addressing this theoretical disconnect include Mahmood Mamdani&rsquo\;s (2020) genealogy of political modernity. The political anthropologist argues that nation-states (first as settler democracies) are created from an ethnonationalist logic for which ethnic cleansing and genocide are\, if not inevitable\, always an option. This logic has led to ongoing cycles of political violence as nation-building necessarily creates permanent minorities. Genocide scholar Dirk Moses (2021) has argued that a liberal notion of permanent security\, which envisions the world to be secured from &ldquo\;enemies of humanity&rdquo\; in the name peace and self-determination\, has been used to justify civilian destruction and mass displacements. Malcom Bull (2006) has polemically argued that liberal just war theory&rsquo\;s consideration of &ldquo\;supreme emergencies&rdquo\; and humanitarian interventions in &ldquo\;outlaw states&rdquo\; have allowed for the liberal justification of mass violence against civilian populations. Sociologist Michael Mann (2004) has suggested that murderous ethnic cleanings are the &ldquo\;dark side of democracy\,&rdquo\; where the democratic ideal of rule by the people entwines the demos with the dominant ethnos. Philosopher Anne O&rsquo\;Byrne (2023) has emphasized the intricate tension between demos and genos\, the &ldquo\;empty form of democratic citizenship&rdquo\; and the need for a people&rsquo\;s reproduction over time and the creation of boundaries of belonging (which are attacked by genocidal violence). \;
\nFellow philosopher Melanie Altanian (2024) has observed that long-term genocide denialism serves to &ldquo\;consolidate relations of domination through epistemic means&rdquo\;\, with serious implications for the presumably egalitarian ethos of democracies. Indeed\, theorist of psychoanalysis Sarah El Bulbeisi (2026) argues that the suppression of the Palestinian experience of violence serves a social function\, especially in post-Holocaust Germany\, where it enables the construction of &ldquo\;a national narrative of atonement and moral righteousness&rdquo\; despite the country&rsquo\;s historical and continuous entanglements in racializing and colonial violence. Meanwhile\, these and other legacies of erasure and genocide denial have also significantly shaped scholarly debates. In response\, environmental humanities scholar and theorist of ecocide Darya Tsymbalyuk (2022) has highlighted that academia ought to re-center embodied and uncomfortable knowledges\, as its ongoing normalized detachment from the &ldquo\;wreck of reality&rdquo\; and lived experience reinforces hierarchies of knowledge&mdash\;and thereby arguably undermines the egalitarian character of democratic deliberation. Concerningly\, decolonial scholar Madina Tlostanova (2025) has observed that too often\, these hierarchies of knowledge reinforce the hierarchies of suffering\, fueling a binary either-or logic dividing the world into us and them\, which effectively enables various forms of exceptionalism that fuel genocides\, and in turn\, fail to uphold humanity and protection of life for all. \;
\nAgainst the backdrop of these persistent issues\, workshop contributions will confront genocidal aspects and tendencies of (or at least seeds in) central concepts of democratic theory and political philosophy\, such as peoplehood\, popular sovereignty\, majority rule\, national self-determination\, citizenship\, security\, and self-defense. How do seemingly emancipatory democratic ideals and rhetorics become intertwined with the large‑scale destruction of civilian life and social worlds? What does it mean when democratic publics authorize\, support\, tolerate\, or deny such genocidal violence? What are blind spots of global left\, decolonial and anticapitalist movements in recognizing and supporting victims of genocidal violence? How do colonial and imperial legacies shape who is removable\, killable\, and grievable? How does the so-called boundary problem of democratic theory relate to genocidal forms of boundary-drawing? How do anti-imperialist national movements avoid the pitfalls of postcolonial nationalism\, and simultaneously\, how can we better distinguish between the forms of ethnonationalism that drive genocides and the political forms of nationalism that resist the genocidal erasure and annihilation of a people? How do we imagine genuinely non-genocidal forms of political life (building on\, for example\, Wendy Brown&rsquo\;s notion of &ldquo\;reparative democracy&rdquo\; or Mamdani&rsquo\;s project of &ldquo\;decolonizing political community&rdquo\;)? And which approaches to knowledge making and political deliberation can best nurture such communities and support livable and equitable conditions across the world?
\nThe discussions in the workshop are meant to be exploratory and generative. The workshop is open to contributions from various disciplines and philosophical traditions\, and welcomes systematic and historical contributions and discussions of particular case studies\, specific theoretical approaches\, or individual thinkers. \;
\nPlease send abstracts of 300-500 words to \;gdt.mancept2026@protonmail.com. The deadline is May 1\, 2026. We will encourage participants to share a draft of their thoughts in some form (short paper\, handout\, etc.) by Aug. 1\, if feasible. \;
\nThe workshop will be held in person on Sept. 2-4\, 2026 as part of the annual MANCEPT Workshops. Please visit the \;conference website \;for information about costs and registration. MANCEPT provides a limited number of bursaries to participants on the basis of need. \;
\nIf you have any questions\, please feel free to contact us directly (torsten.menge@northwestern.edu).
ORGANIZER;CN=Torsten Menge;CN=Tereza Hendl: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260517T071639Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260902T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260904T170000 SUMMARY:MANCEPT 2026: Who "knows" what Gender is? Arguments and Debates at the Intersection between Epistemic Injustice and Gender Identity UID:20260526T045938Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Europe/London LOCATION:Manchester\, United Kingdom DESCRIPTION:Who "knows" what Gender is? Arguments and Debates at the Intersection between Epistemic Injustice and Gender Identity
\nOrganisers: Miriam Ronzoni (University of Manchester)\; Esa Dí\;az Leó\;n \;(University of Barcelona).
\nApplication form:
\n\nIn \;recent years\, the "Gender Wars" have dominated public debates in several Western countries. Whilst in the US the debate is largely one between progressives and conservatives\, the UK debate\, and many other European debates\, are often framed as being internal to feminism and what a feminist public policy should look like. Gender critical feminists argue that gender is an oppressive social construct\; thus\, the feminist thing to do with it is simply to destroy it (while failing to recognize trans identities). Trans-inclusive scholars contend that both gender and gender identity cannot be erased without committing very serious harms to some of the already most marginalised people. Predictably\, very different public policy agendas follow.
\nAt closer look\, however\, trans-inclusive scholars and activists agree that gender is largely a social construct. The idea that trans activists and scholars consider gender identity (whether cis or trans) as immutable and innate is largely a myth. The trans-inclusive claim is\, however\, that something can be a social construct yet be very real and serve important social purposes within a certain social context &ndash\; such that destroying the concept *whilst maintain the broader social context* would produce significant harms. Most trans-inclusive actors also agree that gender has many oppressive elements &ndash\; yet contend that\, all things considered\, trans-inclusion is the most promising way to deconstruct those elements. Gender critical feminists usually counter-argue that this stand is simply confused: if gender and gender identity are not something innate but social constructs\, then what are they if not just the oppressive creation of the patriarchy? What else can they be? Thus\, according to gender critical feminism\, either gender identity is conceived as something immutable and innate &ndash\; and that is an implausible claim\, or it is part of an oppressive ideology which should be dismantled. Everything else is mysterious.
\nThis workshop aims to bring together this debate with developments in feminist epistemology. Recently\, much has been written about how the marginalised can be wronged not just in material terms\, but also in their &ldquo\;capacity as knowers&rdquo\; (Fricker 2007). This can happen because their very plausible accounts of their lived experiences are discredited\; because mainstream language and knowledge lack the terms and concepts for their experiences\; and because\, as a result\, marginalised people have struggled to make sense of their own experiences &ndash\; both to themselves and to others. All of this is compatible with marginalised people being\, in spite of all\, very competent or even uniquely insightful knowers in certain domains (Medina 2013).
\nThe workshop asks whether this can be the case for the concepts of gender and gender identity. Could it be that\, when the opponent says that trans-inclusive accounts of gender identity are &ldquo\;confused\,&rdquo\; &ldquo\;mysterious\,&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;don&rsquo\;t make sense\,&rdquo\; epistemic marginalisation is playing a role? It would not\, after all\, be the first time. A standpoint of uncertainty and puzzlement is not necessarily one of ignorance: it can indeed be the starting point of productive epistemic innovations. Indeed\, paradigmatic cases of hermeneutical injustice confirm that: the working women who struggled to make sense of their experience of unwelcome sexual flirtation in the workplace are the very same women who went on and developed a new concept for it &ndash\; workplace sexual harassment.
\nThe aim is to explore whether this can apply to trans-inclusive conceptual innovations about gender and gender identity and\, if so\, how barriers of intelligibility can be overcome. Conceptions of gender identity are undergoing revisions in feminist philosophy (e.g.\, Barnes 2022\, Cosker-Rowland 2023\, Cull 2024\, Hernandez &\; Bell 2025\, Jenkins 2023). Our aim is to further explore the connections between debates about conceptual innovations on gender and gender identity\, on the one hand\, and questions about epistemic injustice\, epistemic marginalization and conceptual interventions\, on the other hand.
\nIf you are unsure about whether your proposal might fit\, please feel free to reach out to the organisers before submitting.
\nTo apply\, please fill in and submit the application form below by 30th April \;(EXTENDED UNTIL 7 MAY):
\n\nReferences
\nBarnes\, Elizabeth (2022). Gender without Gender Identity: The Case of Cognitive Disability. Mind 131 (523):836-862.
\nBriggs\, R &\; B. R. George (2023). What Even Is Gender? Routledge.
\nCosker-Rowland\, Rach (2023). Recent Work on Gender Identity and Gender. Analysis 83 (4):801-820.
\nCull\, Matthew J. (2024). What Gender Should Be. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
\nFricker\, Miranda (2007). Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. New York: Oxford University Press.
\nHernandez\, E. M. &\; Bell\, Rowan (2025). Much Ado About Nothing: Unmotivating "Gender Identity". Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 12 (50):1313-1340.
\nJenkins\, Katharine (2023). Ontology and Oppression: Race\, Gender\, and Social Reality. New York: OUP.
\nMedina\, José\; (2013). The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression\, Epistemic Injustice\, and the Social Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press.
ORGANIZER;CN=Esa Diaz-Leon;CN=Miriam Ronzoni: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260517T071639Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260902T113000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260904T170000 SUMMARY:Tolerance and Education: Concepts\, Justifications\, and Limits (MANCEPT Panel 2026) UID:20260526T045939Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Europe/London LOCATION:University of Manchester\, Manchester\, United Kingdom DESCRIPTION:Tolerance and Education: Concepts\, Justifications\, and Limits
\n\;
\nPanel at the 2026 MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory\, 2-4 September 2026
\n\n&ldquo\;Toleration&rdquo\; has long been a central concept in political philosophy\, yet its role in education remains surprisingly under-theorised. Philosophers typically analyse tolerance as forbearance: refraining from interfering with practices or ways of life one disapproves of. By contrast\, educational policy\, public debate\, and classroom practice often invoke tolerance in a thicker sense\, associating it with open-mindedness and being &ldquo\;non-judgemental&rdquo\;. This divergence raises a set of questions about what tolerance should mean in educational contexts\, and what schools can legitimately be expected to teach.
\nThis panel will explore the concept\, justification\, and practical implications of tolerance in education. It will bring together work in political philosophy and philosophy of education to examine how tolerance should be understood when the subjects are children and young people rather than adults\, and when the setting is the classroom rather than the public square.
\nOne set of questions concerns conceptual analysis. In the educational context\, is tolerance best understood as non-interference\, as non-disapproval\, as open-mindedness\, or as something else entirely? Are these rival concepts in tension\, or can they play complementary roles at different stages of education or in relation to different kinds of disagreement? Should tolerance be understood as a civic virtue\, a moral attitude\, an epistemic virtue\, or a cluster of beliefs and practices? And how does tolerance differ from neighbouring ideals such as respect\, recognition\, and inclusion?
\nA second set of questions concerns \;legitimacy and justification. Liberal political theory has traditionally been wary of state efforts to shape citizens&rsquo\; beliefs or attitudes. Yet schools routinely aim to influence how students think and feel about others\, and educational policy often treats certain attitudes &ndash\; racism and sexism\, for example &ndash\; as objectionable in themselves. When\, if ever\, is it legitimate for the state\, acting through its educational institutions\, to promote or discourage particular attitudes? And does the justification for tolerance in education rest on harm prevention\, autonomy\, or something else?
\nThird\, there are questions relating to \;feasibility and efficacy. Can tolerance be taught\, and if so\, what does successful teaching look like? How should philosophical accounts of tolerance respond to recent challenges questioning whether tolerant attitudes can be taught?
\n\nPresentations are likely to take the form of 30 mins presentation followed by 25 mins Q&\;A. The Q&\;A will be friendly and exploratory\, and there is no need for your paper to be near final form &ndash\; it can be a work-in-progress. Participants will be encouraged to submit and read papers in advance\, but this will not be a requirement.
\n\nLike all other MANCEPT workshops this year\, this event will take place in-person only.
\nFor information about the conference\, see the conference website: https://sites.manchester.ac.uk/mancept/mancept-workshops/
\nPlease note that registration\, travel and accommodation fees must be covered by speakers themselves. Information on current registration fees will be available on the MANCEPT website. Bursaries are available to help cover the conference registration fee\, and participants are encouraged to apply for these if needed (deadline 10th June).
\n\nSubmission Guidelines:
\n\;
\nPlease also feel free to reach out to Christina Easton\, the workshop convener\, with any questions.
ORGANIZER;CN=Christina Elizabeth Easton: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR