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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260519T051155Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260831T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260831T120000
SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
UID:20260607T114812Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Abstracts on <em>Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical</em> (University of Zurich\, 18th-20th February 2027)</strong></p>\n<p>We invite the submission of <strong>extended abstracts</strong> (but no longer than <strong>1000 words</strong>) for presentations at the international conference on <strong>&ldquo\;Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical&rdquo\; </strong>that takes place at the <strong>University of Zurich</strong> from <strong>18th to 20th February 2027</strong>. The abstracts should be sent to <a href="mailto:sebastian.schmidt@uzh.ch"><strong>sebastian.schmidt@uzh.ch</strong></a> until <strong>August 31st 2026.</strong></p>\n<p>The conference will host a series of renowned experts from ethics and epistemology to discuss the role of relational normativity across philosophical disciplines. If your talk gets accepted\, travel expenses\, including up to three nights at a central hotel in Zurich\, flight and train tickets\, as well as lunch and dinner\, will be covered. We also plan a follow-up project such as an edited volume with a major publisher or a special issue for an academic journal. Accepted talks will be invited as contributions to this follow-up project.</p>\n<p>A recent trend in epistemology is to borrow ethical concepts to think about epistemic normativity. Maybe most notably\, the concept of epistemic injustice is meant to track the wrong that is done to someone in their capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007). More recently\, the idea that there is something we epistemically owe to each other (cf. Basu 2019) is taking hold. Epistemologists defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of accountability and blame (Kauppinen 2018\; Brown 2020\; Boult 2020\; 2024)\, that we expect each other to meet our epistemic obligations to believe or know (Goldberg 2018)\, and that we owe epistemic redress (Hull 2019)\, atonement (Woodard 2023)\, or reparations (Altanian 2022\; Lackey 2022) to those we epistemically wronged\, who might then decide to epistemically forgive us (Green 2024). This has led some epistemologists to propose more fundamentally social meta-epistemologies (Dyke 2022\; Fleisher 2024\; Hannon &amp\; Woodard 2025)\, even proposing that epistemic normativity has relational foundations (Boult 2024).</p>\n<p>While epistemologists take inspiration from the work of ethicists to develop their ideas on epistemic relationality\, the above literature develops largely in isolation from broader engagement with the recent ethical discussions on the relational structure of morality. Relational ethics has focused mostly on the explanation of our moral obligations to one another\, where obligations are typically understood as the correlates of rights or similar claims. To be under a moral obligation\, on this view\, is to be under a directed or second-personal duty to another person which is constitutively connected to the claim-right that this person has on you (e.g. Darwall 2006\, Wallace 2019\, Zylberman 2021). The relational understanding of morality illuminates the social significance of morality and the commonly held assumption that morality is grounded in relations of accountability and that moral wrongness warrants blame.</p>\n<p>The pioneering work and ongoing research by ethicists should be studied closely for the transposition of ethical concepts into epistemology to be intelligible and bear philosophical fruit. The aim of this conference is to bring together these two perspectives with a focus on discussing foundational issues surrounding relational normativity. Questions that will be discussed may include the following:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What grounds the authority of relational normativity? Do we have obligations towards one another simply in virtue of our nature as social creatures\, or is there something else that explains the authority of relational obligations?</li>\n<li>To what extent should relational normativity play a role in epistemology? Should it play a role only insofar as epistemologists are interested in moral questions pertaining to our beliefs\, or is there a distinctly epistemic kind of relational normativity?</li>\n<li>Can epistemic norms in general or in part be understood as relational duties? Maybe we owe it to others to comply with certain epistemic norms when others testify or when it comes to not wronging others with what we believe about them. Or maybe we have epistemic relational obligations in virtue of certain social roles\, such as being a scientific expert. Even so\, is there any hope in understanding epistemic normativity more broadly as relational? We do not seem to owe it to any concrete party to generally fit our beliefs to our evidence. Or do we?</li>\n<li>How can a relational perspective on epistemic normativity gain inspiration from and ground projects in social\, feminist\, and decolonial philosophy? For decades\, feminist epistemologists and ethicists have attended to how we relate to one another under conditions of oppression. While meta-normative discussions tend to pass over this more applied literature\, feminist philosophers tend to focus on the concrete contexts rather than meta-normative theory building. Can we get them into conversation?</li>\n<li>What are the relevant relations between a) practical agents and b) epistemic agents? Are these the same relations and if so on what grounds are these relations built? Or do these relations differ? What can we learn from legal relations on the one hand and personal relationships like friendship on the other hand when thinking about how to best conceive of the relevant relations?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Speakers who accepted our invitation to present at the conference include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College\, California\, USA)</li>\n<li>Monika Betzler (LMU Munich\, Germany)</li>\n<li>Cameron Boult (Brandon University\, Canada)</li>\n<li>Stephen Darwall (Yale University\, Connecticut\, USA)</li>\n<li>Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University\, Illinois\, USA)</li>\n<li>Antti Kauppinen (University of Helsinki\, Finland)</li>\n<li>Fabienne Peter (University of Warwick\, England\, UK)</li>\n<li>R. Jay Wallace (University of Berkeley\, California\, USA)</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We are very much looking forward to receiving your abstracts\,</p>\n<p>Jonas Vandieken (LMU Munich) &amp\; Sebastian Schmidt (University of Zurich)</p>\n<p>This conference is part of the Swiss National Science Foundation project on Relational Epistemology (<a  href="https://data.snf.ch/grants/grant/223891"  target="_blank">https://data.snf.ch/grants/grant/223891</a>).</p>\n<p>&nbsp\;<a href="https://zegra.ch/events/event/relational-normativity-epistemic-and-practical/">Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken:
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260519T051155Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270218T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270220T170000
SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
UID:20260607T114813Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006
DESCRIPTION:<p><a href="https://zegra.ch/events/event/relational-normativity-epistemic-and-practical/">Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken:
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