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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261117T193122Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Nicosia:20270115T234500
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Nicosia:20270115T234500
SUMMARY:Self-Effacement\, Moral Reasons\, and Practical Deliberation
UID:20261119T051539Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-58d8844b6d-xr98t
TZID:Asia/Nicosia
LOCATION:St Andrews\, 5 The Scores\, Leuchars\, United Kingdom\, KY16 9AL
DESCRIPTION:<p>The aim of this workshop is to bring together researchers in normative ethics and metaethics who work on topics related to moral self-effacement. After its introduction to analytic philosophy by Sidgwick (1874) and Parfit (1984)\, self-effacement remained understudied outside of the narrow field of consequentialist ethics. However\, in recent years\, it has begun to receive increasing attention in the philosophical literature.</p>\n<p>On the one hand\, there is an ongoing\, unresolved debate about which kinds of theories are self-effacing\, which spans different ethical traditions - from virtue ethics (Woodcock\, 2022\; Pettigrove\, 2011) to new developments in consequentialism (Venkatesh\, 2021). On the other\, researchers have been noticing the connection between self-effacement and high-level metaethical categories such as expressivism and realism (Streumer\, 2026). Finally\, some have questioned whether self-effacement is a flaw of a theory (Woodcock\, 2022)\, as it has been customary to see it (Stocker\, 1976).&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Furthermore\, self-effacement bears important yet understudied connections to central topics in moral philosophy: the problem of moral alienation in intimate relationships (Railton\, 1984)\, indirect or two-level moral theories (Hare\, 1981)\, and the publicity condition (Eggleston\, 2013). Last but not least\, it is also receiving increasing attention outside of moral philosophy (Nguyen\, 2020).&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>At the same time\, if our moral theories are indeed self-effacing\, we need to seriously reconsider multiple common assumptions about morality. We need to ask questions about the nature and structure of moral deliberation anew. This workshop aims to address these questions\, situating self-effacement within the debates on moral reasons and practical deliberation.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Possible paper topics include (but are not limited to):</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>What is self-effacement?&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>Is self-effacement a &ldquo\;malady of the spirit&rdquo\; (Stocker\, 1976\, p. 454)? Is it a flaw of a theory if it&rsquo\;s self-effacing?</li>\n<li>Is self-effacement psychologically implausible?</li>\n<li>Which moral theories have to be self-effacing? Are virtue ethics and deontology as self-effacing as consequentialism?</li>\n<li>What is the role of moral reasons in practical deliberation?</li>\n<li>Might being moral sometimes require not acting on moral reasons?</li>\n<li>Intimate relationships and the problem of moral alienation</li>\n<li>Self-effacement in non-moral domains</li>\n<li>Esoteric morality and the publicity condition</li>\n<li>Two-level moral theories</li>\n</ul>\n\n<p><strong>Confirmed speakers:</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Julia Driver (UT Austin)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Bart Streumer (University of Groeningen)&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Sophie Grace Chappell (Open University) &nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Nikhil Venkatesh (University of Sheffield)&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Agata Łukomska (University of Warsaw)&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Stefan Fischer (University of Zurich/University of Konstanz)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Max McLoughlin (Uppsala University)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Ida Miczke (University of St Andrews)</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>There are <strong>two open slots</strong> to be filled through the call for papers. We especially encourage contributions from women and early career scholars.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Please send <strong>an abstract of 700-1000 words</strong> prepared for anonymous review <strong>by 15 January to izm1@st-andrews.ac.uk</strong>. Please attach a <strong>separate cover sheet</strong> including: your name\, title of your paper\, your affiliation. In addition\, please indicate in the cover sheet if you are an early-career scholar (within 12 years of finishing your PhD) or a woman. Selected speakers will be notified by the end of March at the latest.</p>\n<p>The workshop will be streamed online on Microsoft Teams\, but all speakers are required to present in person.</p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Ida Miczke:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261117T193122Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Nicosia:20270504T140000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Nicosia:20270506T170000
SUMMARY:Self-Effacement\, Moral Reasons\, and Practical Deliberation
UID:20261119T051540Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-58d8844b6d-xr98t
TZID:Asia/Nicosia
LOCATION:St Andrews\, 5 The Scores\, Saint Andrews\, United Kingdom\, KY16 9AL
DESCRIPTION:<p>The aim of this workshop is to bring together researchers in normative ethics and metaethics who work on topics related to moral self-effacement. After its introduction to analytic philosophy by Sidgwick (1874) and Parfit (1984)\, self-effacement remained understudied outside of the narrow field of consequentialist ethics. However\, in recent years\, it has begun to receive increasing attention in the philosophical literature.</p>\n<p>On the one hand\, there is an ongoing\, unresolved debate about which kinds of theories are self-effacing\, which spans different ethical traditions - from virtue ethics (Woodcock\, 2020\; Pettigrove\, 2011) to new developments in consequentialism (Venkatesh\, 2021). On the other\, researchers have been noticing the connection between self-effacement and high-level metaethical categories such as expressivism and realism (Streumer\, 2026). Finally\, some have questioned whether self-effacement is a flaw of a theory (Woodcock\, 2022)\, as it has been customary to see it (Stocker\, 1976).&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Furthermore\, self-effacement bears important yet understudied connections to central topics in moral philosophy: the problem of moral alienation in intimate relationships (Railton\, 1984)\, indirect or two-level moral theories (Hare\, 1981)\, and the publicity condition (Eggleston\, 2013). Last but not least\, it is also receiving increasing attention outside of moral philosophy (Nguyen\, 2020).&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>At the same time\, if our moral theories are indeed self-effacing\, we need to seriously reconsider multiple common assumptions about morality. We need to ask questions about the nature and structure of moral deliberation anew. This workshop aims to address these questions\, situating self-effacement within the debates on moral reasons and practical deliberation.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Confirmed speakers:</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Julia Driver (UT Austin)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Bart Streumer (University of Groeningen)&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Sophie Grace Chappell (Open University) &nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Nikhil Venkatesh (University of Sheffield)&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Agata Łukomska (University of Warsaw)&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Stefan Fischer (University of Zurich/University of Konstanz)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Max McLoughlin (Uppsala University)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Ida Miczke (University of St Andrews)</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The workshop will be streamed online on Microsoft Teams\, but all speakers are required to present in person.</p>\n<p>We aim to make the conference accessible and follow the BPA/SWIP guidelines for accessible conferences. The conference is organised in an accessible venue and we encourage participants to get in contact with the organising team if there are any specific accessibility issues on which they might require support. We do not have any accessibility funds at the moment\, but we are very happy to help in applying for additional accessibility funding\, as well as to arrange additional accessibility options. There is also an opportunity to apply for additional funding to offset costs of dependent care\, and we encourage participants to inform us about their needs in this respect.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The workshop is generously supported by <strong>the Scots Philosophical Association</strong>\, <strong>Aristotelian Society</strong>\, and the <strong>Department of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews.</strong></p>\n<p>Organiser: Ida Miczke (izm1@st-andrews.ac.uk)</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Ida Miczke:
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