BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260609T084607Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260720T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260724T170000
SUMMARY:Frankfurt Ethics Summer School: Contractualism and Claims of Recognition
UID:20260610T122505Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Norbert-Wollheim Platz 1\, Frankfurt am Main\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are happy to announce the first edition of the&nbsp\;<strong>Frankfurt Ethics Summer School (FESS)</strong>\, which will be held from 20&ndash\;24 July 2026 at Goethe University Frankfurt am Main.</p>\n<p>Our guest in 2026 is&nbsp\;<strong>Rahul Kumar</strong>&nbsp\;(Queen&rsquo\;s University\, Canada)\, who will present his book manuscript&nbsp\;<strong>Contractualism and Claims of Recognition</strong>.</p>\n<p>Contractualism&rsquo\;s animating idea is that moral reasoning is aptly characterized as reasoning about the justifiability of our conduct to others. It is one that many find resonates with their moral sensibilities. Why this is so is standardly thought to have to do with the appeal of the distinctive way contractualism develops the idea of justifiability to others\, inviting us to view the core of common-sense morality as a system of directed duties\, the flouting of any of which wrongs the person to whom the duty is owed and justifies the wronged holding the wrongdoer to account.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;But this interpretation does not do justice to the sources of contractualism&rsquo\;s resonance.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;The theme of the book is that a more compelling interpretation of the theory takes as central to it an ideal of living with moral community with others\, one in which persons are bound to one another by valuable relationships of mutual recognition. This reorientation both sheds light on various structural aspects of the contractualist account\, prompts a reconsideration of what reasoning on its terms involves\, and casts doubt on the interpretation of it as being an account of interpersonal wronging.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The course is intended for MA and Ph.D. students\, but in addition\, it is open for interested advanced BA-students\, and postdocs.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Unfortunately\, the number of spaces is limited. If you would like to participate\, please send a registration email including a brief CV\, and a short letter indicating how the course would benefit your work\, to&nbsp\;<strong>fess@em.uni-frankfurt.de</strong></p>\n<p>Please note: We can grant up to 6 travel bursaries of max. 500&euro\;\, please mention in your application if you like to be considered.</p>\n<p>Registration is open&nbsp\;<strong>until Mai 20th</strong>\; we will notify applicants by May 30th.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Singa Behrens:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260609T084607Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261119T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261120T170000
SUMMARY:Normative Reasons and Morality 
UID:20260610T122506Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Norbert-Wollheim-Platz 1\, Frankfurt am Main\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p>While the concept of a normative reason is often taken to provide a common currency across different domains of normativity\, its role and nature within the moral domain continue to raise a number of difficult and intriguing questions. Some philosophers have argued that moral reasons are distinctive in virtue of their stringency or overridingness\; others question whether the notion of a normative reason provides the most illuminating framework for understanding moral demands at all. More generally\, the relationship between morality and normative reasons remains contested\, both with respect to the nature of moral reasons and their place within moral thought and practice. This workshop aims to examine these issues from a variety of perspectives and to explore the significance of reasons-based approaches for contemporary moral philosophy.</p>\n<p>We welcome contributions addressing questions including (but not limited to):</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What is the relationship between moral reasons and moral obligations?</li>\n<li>What distinguishes moral reasons from other kinds of reasons\, such as prudential or epistemic reasons?</li>\n<li>How should conflicts between moral reasons and other normative reasons be understood?</li>\n<li>How should cases of supererogation be understood within a reasons-based account of morality?</li>\n<li>Are moral reasons agent-relative or agent-neutral?</li>\n<li>What role do moral advice and moral testimony play in moral thought and practice?</li>\n<li>How should moral uncertainty affect the reasons we have for action?</li>\n<li>How should we understand the relationship between moral reasons and moral reasoning?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>A limited number of slots are available through an open call for abstracts. Please send your abstract\, prepared for anonymous review\, as a PDF file to si [dot] behrens [at] em [dot] uni [hyphen] frankfurt [dot] de (subject line: &ldquo\;Morality and Reasons&rdquo\;). Abstracts should be between 500 and 1\,000 words (including notes but excluding bibliography). Papers should be suitable for a 40-minute presentation. The deadline for submissions is<strong>&nbsp\;July 15\, 2026.&nbsp\;</strong>Applicants will be notified of the outcome by July 31\, 2026.</p>\n<p>We particularly encourage Ph.D. students and individuals from underrepresented groups to submit.</p>\n\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Singa Behrens:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
