BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261022T232411Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261030T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261030T170000 SUMMARY:Philosophical perspectives on artificial reasoning systems UID:20261025T084701Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:e8eb:30ff:feda:226%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Emil-Figge-Straße 50\, Dortmund\, Germany DESCRIPTION:

The philosophy department of TU Dortmund is organising a one-day workshop exploring the philosophical dimensions of (limitations of) reasoning in large language models. Early LLMs were notorious for frequently generating outputs that\, to users\, appeared to contain basic reasoning errors. However\, in recent years\, researchers and AI developers have invested much effort in improving the common-sense and formal reasoning capacities of transformer-based models through reinforcement learning and similar techniques. This has led to a generation of 'large reasoning models&rsquo\; that perform well on various benchmarks of reasoning problems. Still\, questions remain about how we should interpret these capacities. Do large reasoning models really engage in reasoning\, or merely in a statistical approximation of reasoning? What accounts of reasoning are available in the philosophical literature\, and are these accounts applicable to LLMs? Do LLMs fare differently with respect different kinds of reasoning (e.g. common-sense reasoning\, practical reasoning or counterfactual reasoning)? What are the risks of over-attributing reasoning capacities to LLMs? This workshop brings together philosophers who work on these and related questions.

Speakers:

Gregor Betz\, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Jaroslav Malik\, \;University of Hradec Krá\;lové\;

Mirco Sambrotta\, University of Vienna

Cordelia Berz\, LMU Munich

Leonard Dung\, Ruhr-University Bochum

Thom-Felix Thormann\, Ruhr-University Bochum

Joris Graff\, TU Dortmund

The schedule and book of abstracts are attached.

Attendance is open to anyone interested\, but we would like to ask attendants to register in \;advance by sending an email to joris.graff@tu-dortmund.de. Registration is possible until October 26th. \;

ORGANIZER;CN=Joris Graff: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261022T232411Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261116T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261116T180000 SUMMARY:Is ascribing inferences to brains or non-human animals a fallacy? UID:20261025T084702Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:e8eb:30ff:feda:226%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:

We are pleased to announce our monthly \;online \;talk series on "Inferences &\; Capacities."

Our next speaker is:

Hans-Johann Glock \;(University of Zü\;rich)
"Is ascribing inferences to brains or non-human animals a fallacy?"

Nov 16: \;12am (Buenos Aires)\, 10am (New York)\, 4pm (Berlin).

Abstract: TBA

How to participate: \;Please\, send an email to Alfredo Vernazzani at: \;

alfredo-vernazzani AT protonmail.com

_______

About \;Inferences &\; Capacities:

The series brings together work on inferential capacities\, rationality\, normativity\, and cognition &mdash\; across both human and non-human animals &mdash\; with the aim of fostering discussion on the nature and limits of the cognitive sphere. \;

2026 line-up: \;

April 27: \;Angelica Kaufmann \;(University of Milan): "Mind Blanking as Mental Imagery." \;

May 18: \;Federico Burdman \;(Universidad Alberto Hurtado) "Constrained choices: addiction\, attention\, and reasons-responsiveness." \;

June 22: \;Susanna Schellenberg \;(Rutgers): TBA \;

July 20: \;Cameron Buckner \;(University of Florida): "Chains-of-Thought\, Inner Speech\, and Artificial Epistemic Agency."

September 7: \;Ulf Hlobil \;(Concordia University): TBA \;

October 19: \;Eva Schmidt \;(TU Dortmund): TBA \;

November 16: \;Hans-Johann Glock \;(University of Zü\;rich): "Is Ascribing Inferences to Brains or Non-human Animals a Fallacy?" \;

December 14: \;Emma Borg \;(SAS\, University of London): "Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: The Scope of Common-Sense Psychology." \;

Each talk lasts c. 40 minutes followed by 40 minutes open Q&\;A. \;

The series is co-organized by:

Mariela Aguilera \;(University of Có\;rdoba)

Matí\;as Osta-Vé\;lez \;(Universidad de la Repú\;blica)

Alfredo Vernazzani \;(TU Dortmund\; Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg).

Visit our website: \;

ORGANIZER;CN=Alfredo Vernazzani;CN=Mariela Aguilera;CN="Matías Osta Vélez": METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261022T232411Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261214T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261214T180000 SUMMARY:Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: Exploring the scope of common-sense psychology UID:20261025T084703Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:e8eb:30ff:feda:226%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:

We are pleased to announce our monthly \;online \;talk series on "Inferences &\; Capacities."

Our last speaker for 2026 is:

Emma Borg \;(SAS\, University of London)
"Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: Exploring the scope of common-sense psychology"

December 14: \;12am (Buenos Aires)\, 10am (New York)\, 4pm (Berlin).

Abstract: A standard philosophical view holds that human action is typically intentional\, i.e. reasons-responsive\, driven by what a subject believes\, desires\, and intends. This picture of human action seems crucial to many things we care about (e.g. underpinning reactive moral attitudes). However\, recently questions have been asked about the scope of what Fodor 1987 called &lsquo\;good old common sense belief/desire psychology&rsquo\;: is the assumption that human behaviour is typically reasons-responsive right? According to various scope-based challenges\, although the reasons-based approach holds for occurrently considered\, consciously-willed actions\, most of what humans do is not like this. In particular\, fidgets\, habits\, and skills have all been argued to fall beyond the reach of the common-sense framework. Yet if this is right\, then the reasons-based model turns out to be less interesting or impressive than we might once have thought\, since it accounts for only a tiny sliver of human action\, ignoring vast swathes of what people do. My aim in this talk is to defend common-sense psychology from various incarnations of the scope challenge. I&rsquo\;ll argue that\, at heart\, the challenge rests on a background picture of different\, fully encapsulated systems for thought and action\, a picture we have reason to resist.

How to participate: \;Please\, send an email to Alfredo Vernazzani at: \;