Moral luck is the phenomenon which arises when luck makes a difference to a moral property. More precisely\, there is moral luck whenever two situations are similar in respects we ordinarily consider morally relevant &ndash\; such as an agent&rsquo\;s intention\, motives or control &ndash\; but differ in their moral evaluation. For instance\, if there is a moral difference between a case of attempted murder and similar case of (successful) murder\, then moral luck exists. Many questions can be asked about moral luck:
\n1- \; \; \; \; \; \; \;How pervasive is moral luck\, if it is? \;Is it restricted to deontic properties such as permissions and duties\, or does it extend to hypological notions like responsibility and blameworthiness\, or even to aretaic concepts such as generosity or cowardice?
\n2- \; \; \; \; \; \;How many kinds of moral luck are there? Thomas Nagel famously distinguished four kinds\; is that classification complete or even correct?
\n3- \; \; \; \; \; \;It is difficult to decide what should be held fixed between two cases when determining whether there is moral luck. For instance\, it is unacceptable not to hold fixed intentions in the comparison\, but it is acceptable not to hold fixed distant consequences. What about the (immediate) \;result \;of our actions?
\n4- \; \; \; \; \; \;The previous question shows that it could be that whether we accept moral luck or not depends on our account of what an action is. Are there accounts of action that make moral luck more or less hospitable? Impossible?
\nProgramme
\n15 May
\n\n1:45&ndash\;2:00 PM \;&ndash\; Welcome and opening remarks
\n
2:00&ndash\;3:15 PM \;&ndash\; Izabela Skoczeń
&ldquo\;Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction&rdquo\;
\n\n3:15&ndash\;3:30 PM \;&ndash\; Break
\n
3:30&ndash\;4:45 PM \;&ndash\; David Hunter
&ldquo\;Dilemmas and the Logic of Ideals&rdquo\;
\n
4:45&ndash\;5:00 PM \;&ndash\; Break
5:00&ndash\;6:15 PM \;&ndash\; Olle Blomberg
&ldquo\;Resultant moral luck and diachronic blameworthiness&rdquo\;
\n
7:30 PM \;&ndash\; Conference dinner
16 May
\n9:30&ndash\;10:45 AM \;&ndash\; Alexander Kaiserman \;
\nTBA
\n
10:45&ndash\;11:00 AM \;&ndash\; Break
11:00 AM&ndash\;12:15 PM \;&ndash\; Matthias Rolffs
&ldquo\;Equally Blameworthy\, But For Different Things&rdquo\;
\n
12:15&ndash\;2:00 PM \;&ndash\; Lunch
2:00&ndash\;3:15 PM \;&ndash\; Robin T. Bianchi
&ldquo\;Action\, Responsibility\, and Luck&rdquo\;
\n
3:15 PM \;&ndash\; Closing of the conference
List of Abstracts
\nIzabela Skoczé\;n &ndash\; Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction
\nLegal and moral luck goes against the basic principle of criminal law that responsibility ascriptions are based on the mental state of the perpetrator\, rather than merely the outcome of her action. If outcome should not play a decisive role in responsibility ascriptions\, the attempt \;versus \;perpetration distinction becomes more difficult to justify. One potential justification is that we never know whether the attempter would not have resigned from pursuing her criminal intent even at the last moment. However\, this paper argues that resigning from criminal intent and trying to stop the criminal outcome\, which is called the renunciation defense\, can be just as subject to outcome luck as the attempt \;versus \;perpetration distinction. And yet the availability of the renunciation defense in court is outcome dependent. I show with a series of experiments (N&thinsp\;=&thinsp\;479) that outcome dependence for the renunciation defense is perceived as unjust and discuss the implications for the renunciation defense as well as attempt \;versus \;perpetration distinction.
\n\nDavid Hunter &ndash\; Dilemmas and the Logic of Ideals
\nDifferent ideals seem to yield conflicting demands. As a chess player I ought to checkmate my opponent\, but as their father I ought to let the game continue. The moral ideal of a good person can&rsquo\;t be action-guiding\, one might think\, because its directives conflict with those that flow from other ideals. But in this paper I raise a doubt about whether such conflicts are really possible. I offer an account of the logic of ideals and directives that shows how the moral ideal can be action-guiding without being \;ad hoc. \;This can help us \;think about the significance of moral luck. \;And because the logic is the same for all ideals\, my account can help us see both what is special about morality and how it is continuous with ideals in other parts of our natural world.
\n\nOlle Blomberg &ndash\; Resultant moral luck and diachronic blameworthiness
\nI set up a challenge for those who reject resultant moral luck by appeal to considerations about fairness. My argument has two premises. The first premise is the conditional claim that if resultant luck can affect an agent&rsquo\;s subsequent (diachronic) blameworthiness for an earlier action\, then resultant luck can affect an agent&rsquo\;s initial (synchronic) blameworthiness for that action. The second premise is that those who reject resultant moral luck because they think such moral luck would be unfair have reasons (surprisingly\, perhaps) to accept that resultant luck can affect an agent&rsquo\;s subsequent blameworthiness for an earlier basic action that is morally wrong. The conclusion of the argument is that resultant moral luck cannot be unfair in way that supports anti-luckism. \;
\nAlexander Kaiserman &ndash\; TBA \;
\nMatthias Rolffs (joint work with Trenton Sewell) &ndash\; Equally Blameworthy\, But For Different Things \;
\n\;According to the Degree-Scope Reply (DSR)\, agents in resultant moral luck cases are blameworthy for different things while being equally blameworthy in degree. Despite its popularity\, the DSR&rsquo\;s commitments have not been carefully articulated. In particular\, it lacks both a clear account of what it is to be blameworthy \;for \;an object and a satisfactory explication of \;degrees \;of blameworthiness. This paper develops both. First\, we argue that being blameworthy for X is best understood as being worthy of blame-for-X&mdash\;i.e.\, blame whose intentional object is X. This account improves on grounding-based views\, on which to be blameworthy for X is to be blameworthy because of X. Second\, we distinguish between degrees of blameworthiness-for-X and overall degrees of blameworthiness. We argue that the DSR requires a partly non-additive approach to overall blameworthiness: adding the degree of blameworthiness for a basic action and for its outcome would amount to illegitimate double-counting. Finally\, we discuss two accounts of overall blameworthiness consistent with the DSR: one in terms of the fitting strength of blame\, and one in terms of deserved blame-related burdens. We then use this framework to clarify the relation between scope and degree of blameworthiness and to reject recent objections to the DSR.
\n\nRobin T. Bianchi &ndash\; Action\, Responsibility\, and Luck
\nThere seems to be a certain affinity between the view that there is no such thing as resultant moral luck and the view that all our actions are bodily or mental movements. In the first case\, what happens beyond our body or mind does not affect our responsibility\; in the second case\, it doesn&rsquo\;t affect our actions. The thought is that luck or factors external to our agency have no bearing on what &ldquo\;we really&rdquo\; do or on what we are responsible for. Some have moved from one of these ideas to the other. One could argue that\, since our actions are immune to resultant luck\, our moral responsibility for them is equally immune to resultant \;moral \;luck. I shall turn this line of reasoning on its head and explore the affinity between the view that there is resultant moral luck and the view that our actions extend beyond our body and mind. Since responsibility for our actions is not confined to bodily or mental events\, our actions are not immune to resultant luck. We do more than move our body or try.
\nProject's website: \;https://web1.unine.ch/the-defence-first-approach-to-responsibility/
ORGANIZER;CN=Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette;CN="Robin Timothée Bianchi";CN=Vincent Grandjean;CN="Patricia Sánchez Oliva";CN=Antoine Dang Van: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR