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DTSTAMP:20260826T213554Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260929T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260929T130000
SUMMARY: Mike Hicks - Pragmatic Realism about Modality\, Natural and Metaphysical
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TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION: University of Pittsburgh\, 4200 Fifth Avenue\, Pittsburgh\, United States\, 15260
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh invites you to join us for our Lunch Time Talk. Attend in person at 1117 Cathedral of Learning or visit our live stream on YouTube at <a rel="noopenerdata-cke-saved-href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg</a>.</p>\n\n<p><strong>LTT: <a data-cke-saved-href="https://sites.pitt.edu/~dmw121/">M</a><a data-cke-saved-href="https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/hicks-michael/">ike Hicks</a></strong></p>\n\n<p>Tuesday\, September 29th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST</p>\n\n<p><strong>Title:</strong> <strong>Pragmatic Realism about Modality\, Natural and Metaphysical</strong></p>\n\n<p><strong>Abstract:</strong></p>\n<p>Modal notions&mdash\;which deal with necessity\, possibility\, and counterfactually robust conditionals&ndash\;are central to our explanatory\, predictive\, and practical decision-making activities. In this talk\, I will focus on two distinct types of modality: first\, natural modality\, the sort associated with causation\, laws of nature\, and scientific explanation\; and second\, metaphysical modality\, of the sort associated with essences\, semantic externalism\, and grounding explanation. I will present and defend a first-order realist\, higher-order pragmatist view of these modal notions. On this view\, modal notions are backed by real\, in the world relations: invariant regularities in the case of natural modals\, and identity-like relations in the case of metaphysical modals. What makes these relations modal\, however\, are facts about our inferential practices. A relation is modally robust\, on this view\, just in case (and because) it is suitable to back a pattern of truth-conducive deductive inferences. I argue that this higher-order pragmatic explanation of the modality of these relations doesn&rsquo\;t challenge the view&rsquo\;s first-order realism\, but does provide the view with the resources to solve some of realism&rsquo\;s more intractable normative and epistemic problems.</p>\n<p>This talk will also be available live streamed on:</p>\n<p>Zoom at <a data-cke-saved-href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94260602832">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94260602832</a></p>\n<p>YouTube at <a data-cke-saved-href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg</a>.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Edouard Machery:
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