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DTSTAMP:20260930T065701Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261007T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261007T183000
SUMMARY:How moods represent future prospects?
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DESCRIPTION:<p>We are pleased to invite you to the next session of the<strong> Empirically Informed Philosophy of Mind online Seminar&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Who:</strong> St&eacute\;phane Lemaire (University of Rennes)<br><strong>When:</strong> Wednesday\, October 7th\, 2026 &mdash\; <strong>5&ndash\;6:30</strong> pm (CET)<br><strong>Where:</strong> Online via Zoom:<br><a target="_blank">https://pantheonsorbonne.zoom.us/j/92782580594?pwd=a5p3WfunQQxJICrjJaUenFJFzmllbx.1</a><br><strong>What:</strong> <em>How moods represent future prospects?</em></p>\n<p><br></p>\n<p>It has been argued by several philosophers\, psychologists and neuroscientists that moods represent future prospects. I believe this idea is correct. But how should we understand this representation? In order to respond to this question\, I first characterize the functional role of moods\, how they are triggered\, what are their influences on actions\, emotions\, and cognition. Hence\, I argue that if moods represent future prospects\, this content is neither perceived nor the result of a cognitive unconscious appraisal that would have a componential structure. But if this is correct\, is there a sense to say that moods represent future prospects? I argue that there is one. Moods may be said representing future prospects within the teleosemantic framework. However\, these representations don&rsquo\;t satisfy a more severe constraints of constancy akin to what Burge requires of perceptual representations. I argue that this is due to the fact that these representations are plausibly realized by neurotransmitters levels rather than neural states. To this extent\, the content of mood constitutes an interesting case at the margin of cognition which sheds light on the fact that moods represent and contribute to rationalize actions and emotions while being so recalcitrant to cognition.</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>For any questions\, please contact:</strong><br>Sacha Behrend &mdash\; sachabehrend1991@gmail.com<br>Elodie Boissard &mdash\; elodie.boissard@umpv.fr</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Program</strong></p>\n<p><strong>September 30</strong> &mdash\; Christophe Heintz (Central European University)<br><em>When Do People Trust What They Are Told? </em><em>Studies on Epistemic Vigilance</em></p>\n<p><strong>October 7</strong> &mdash\; St&eacute\;phane Lemaire (Universit&eacute\; de Rennes)<br><em>How Do Moods Represent Future Prospects?</em></p>\n<p><strong>November 6</strong> &mdash\; Charlotte Gauvry (King&rsquo\;s College London)<br><em>TBA</em></p>\n<p><strong>December 17</strong> &mdash\; Fr&eacute\;d&eacute\;rique de Vignemont (Institut Jean Nicod)<br><em>TBA</em></p>\n<p><strong>Organizers:</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Sacha Behrend</strong><br>Postdoctoral Researcher\, University of Hradec Kr&aacute\;lov&eacute\;\, Czech Republic<br>Affiliated Researcher\, Institut d&rsquo\;histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques (IHPST)\, Universit&eacute\; Paris 1 Panth&eacute\;on-Sorbonne</p>\n<p><strong>Elodie Boissard</strong><br>Ma&icirc\;tresse de conf&eacute\;rences en philosophie de la m&eacute\;decine<br>Universit&eacute\; de Montpellier Paul Val&eacute\;ry</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sacha Behrend;CN=Elodie Boissard:
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