When: Tuesday\, Nov. 10\, 11am in Houston/18h00 in Liè\;ge
\nWhere: \;https://riceuniversity.zoom.us/j/95097231463?pwd=MJPessWBzOphk7kDax5u6D2NpiB6In.1
\nWho: \;Jacopo \;Pallagrosi
\nWhat: \;"Introspective Acquaintance and Cognitive Achievement"
Abstract \;
Debates in epistemology have almost exclusively focused on propositional knowledge (knowing that p). However\, the idea that there is a distinct \;non-propositional \;kind of knowledge has gained momentum: \;knowledge by acquaintance \;is standardly conceived of as a kind of knowledge that does not involve any cognitive attitude towards a proposition and only depends on suitably direct awareness of our experiences. Yet\, as ordinarily construed\, acquaintance seems to be at odds with some central features that are typically attributed to knowledge. For knowledge involves a \;cognitive \;achievement. But it is hard to see how acquaintance\, construed as passive\, automatic\, and non-agential awareness\, can constitute any cognitive achievement. In this paper\, I develop an account of knowledge by acquaintance that vindicates its epistemic significance by construing it as a genuine cognitive achievement. On the view I propose\, the epistemic significance of acquaintance depends on the exercise of introspective attention\, and knowledge by acquaintance is understood as an epistemic success attributable to cognitive agency. \;