Discrimination remains a largely neglected topic in philosophy. This is surprising in several respects. Discrimination is of central relevance to a wide range of subdisciplines in philosophy. \;But since the emergence of anti-discrimination law in the \;late twentieth century\, almost all scholarship on discrimination theory has taken place in law journals\; these works mainly focus on matters of legal doctrine. Moreover\, several recent developments&mdash\;political changes (such as the recent weaponization of anti-discrimination norms and law)\, technological progress (such as the explosive growth of machine learning and AI in reshaping our social world)\, and theoretical developments (such as new work that presses on the conceptual boundaries of discriminatory action)&mdash\;make the topic more philosophically significant than ever. In light of this\, we are hosting a workshop for new work on discrimination theory. \;
\nAlong with the eight talks listed above\, there will be comments by:
- Shalom Chalson
- Hugo Cossette-Lefebvre
- Katie Creel
- Myracka D&rsquo\;Leeuwen
- Ying Huang
- Zinhle Mncube
- Christian Nakazawa\, and
- Meredith Sheeks.
Please see the link to the program below.
ORGANIZER;CN=Daniel Wodak;CN=Lily Hu: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260424T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260426T170000 SUMMARY:Chicago Talks on Agency UID:20260415T195758Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:Chicago\, United States DESCRIPTION:Chicago Talks on Agency \;(CTA) \;is a series of three annual conferences in the philosophy of action.
\nAn aim of the series is to promote dialogue and community among philosophers thinking about agency from a range of different perspectives.
ORGANIZER;CN=Mikayla Kelley;CN=Martin W. Niederl: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260430T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260430T234500 SUMMARY:Continental Philosophy of Action UID:20260415T195759Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:Europe/Madrid LOCATION:Faculty of Philology\, University City\, Pl. Menéndez Pelayo\, s/n\, Moncloa - Aravaca\, Madrid\, Spain\, 28040 DESCRIPTION:The purpose of this two-day international conference is to explore\, clarify and apply the resources of Continental thought about action and agency. Philosophy of action in the analytic tradition\, while not immune from internal disagreements\, can be thought of as a more-or-less coherent philosophical subfield. While there are exceptions\, Anglo-American philosophers of action tend to share metaphysical commitments (regarding event-causality\, for example\, or the existence of representational mental states)\, canonical references (Anscombe\, Davidson\, Bratman\, et al.)\, and sets of problems regarding action (eg\, &ldquo\;causal deviance&rdquo\;\, the so-called &ldquo\;disappearing agent&rdquo\; problem\, intentional omissions\, etc.). This situation can be \; \;prima facie \; \;contrasted to the scattered and varied approaches to action and agency one finds in the Continental philosophical tradition. Idealism\, Phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, poststructuralism\, new materialisms\, and critical theory\, to name just a few currents in contemporary Continental thought\, are distinguished from one another by seemingly distinct sets of philosophical concerns and vocabularies\, and by diverse metaphysical and methodological commitments. Given the treatment of action and agency in each of these currents is inseparable from specific sets of philosophical concerns and commitments\, it can seem that Continental philosophers do not share enough common ground to talk together about action and agency without talking past one another. In part\, then\, this conference wishes to clarify the extent to which one could meaningfully speak of &ldquo\;Continental philosophy of action.&rdquo\; But also\, working back down from these high-level\, general concerns\, the conference wishes to focus on specific\, field-defining problems of action and agency\, and the resources that might be drawn from Continental thought to address these problems in novel ways. Possible topics of interest might thus include:
\nFormat: Speakers will have 20 minutes to present their paper\, followed by 10 minutes for questions and discussion. \;Those interested in participating should send a 400-word abstract to cpa@ucm.es by 30 April\, 2026. The conference will be in English and attendance is free. \;More information can be found at: \;https://eventos.ucm.es/144182/detail/continental-philosophy-of-action-international-conference.html \; \;
\nConference organizers: Emma Ingala\, Gavin Rae (Complutense University of Madrid) and Sean Bowden (Deakin University\, Australia). \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Sean Bowden;CN=Emma Ingala;CN=Gavin Rae: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260508T130000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260508T133000 SUMMARY:“Moral Imagination for Moral Education” UID:20260415T195800Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:Sarasota\, United States DESCRIPTION:This groundbreaking event is designed to develop novel approaches to the human capacity for moral imagination. Drawing on Sø\;ren Kierkegaard&rsquo\;s claim that moral imagination is not just a human faculty but rather \;the \;faculty encompassing all others\, we intend to show how moral imagination decisively shapes knowing\, feeling\, and willing. The development of the moral imagination\, which allows us to know the experience of others\, feel what matters to others\, and choose possibilities that arise from outside our own horizons\, is essential to healing divisions within our body politic and forming individuals of character. What are the moral issues that arise from the exercise of imagination? What virtues are required to pursue the imaginative life? How does imagination enter into education and formation? What are the connections between ethics and aesthetics? \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Jeffrey Allan Hanson: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260510T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260510T090000 SUMMARY:"AI Agents: Choice\, Autonomy\, and the Concept of the Agency" (Special Issue\, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy) UID:20260415T195801Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Call for Papers \;&ndash\; Special Issue of:
\nInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
\nAI Agents: Choice\, Autonomy\, and the Concept of the Agency
\n
Submission deadline: May 10 2026 \;
---
\nInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy \;invites submissions for a Special Issue on the metaphysics and individuation of artificial systems\, edited by \;Herman Cappelen \;and \;John Hawthorne.
\nOverview
\nAre contemporary AI systems&mdash\;especially large language models&mdash\;agents? Can they make choices\, form intentions\, act for reasons\, or exercise something like autonomy? If the answer is yes (even in a deflated or partial sense)\, what does that reveal about the nature of agency\, freedom\, and responsibility? If the answer is no\, what explains the powerful pull of agentive description in practice&mdash\;and what conceptual or political work is it doing?
\nThis special issue invites papers that treat &ldquo\;AI agency&rdquo\; not only as a metaphysical or empirical question\, but also as a methodological and conceptual-engineering problem: when we apply &ldquo\;agency&rdquo\; to novel systems\, are we tracking a mind-independent fact\, negotiating a useful terminology\, or creating a legal/social fiction with downstream consequences? In many domains&mdash\;ethics\, governance\, product design\, and law&mdash\;we are not merely discovering the answer\; we are actively settling it.
\nGuiding questions
\nWhat is an agent? Necessary/sufficient conditions\; minimal vs robust agency\; action vs behavior\; reasons-responsiveness.
\nCan LLMs (or agentic AI systems) make choices? What would count as choosing\, intending\, planning\, or acting&mdash\;and what would rule it out?
\nAutonomy and free will: Are these coherent in artificial systems? Is &ldquo\;freedom&rdquo\; the wrong frame\, or a helpful one?
\nComparative models: Is AI agency more like corporate agency\, group agency\, tool use\, delegation\, or a legal fiction?
\nMethodology and concept application: Is there a truth of the matter about AI agency\, or are we deciding how to extend &ldquo\;agency&rdquo\; to new cases? What criteria should guide that decision (explanatory power\, predictive control\, moral risk\, legal administrability\, political legitimacy)?
\nSuggested topics (illustrative)
\nAccounts of agency (causal\, functionalist\, representational\, constitutive\, normative) and their implications for AI
\nChoice\, control\, and reasons: decision theory\, planning\, self-models\, &ldquo\;intention-like&rdquo\; states\, counterfactual robustness
\nAgency without consciousness? Agency without experience? (and vice versa)
\nTool vs agent framings in AI practice\; &ldquo\;agentic workflows&rdquo\;\; delegation and responsibility gaps
\nCorporate and collective agency as analogies (and disanalogies) for AI systems
\nLegal personhood\, liability\, and fiction: when is &ldquo\;the AI did it&rdquo\; a useful attribution vs a category mistake?
\nEvaluative and political dimensions: who benefits from agent-ascriptions (or denials)? how do attributions distribute blame\, credit\, and control?
\nOperationalization: tests\, benchmarks\, interpretability\, and auditing approaches that purport to measure agency-relevant capacities
\nCross-cultural perspectives on action\, autonomy\, and personhood (and how they reshape the agency debate)
\nSubmission details
\nQueries
For questions regarding the Special Issue\, please contact: \;inquiryeditorial@gmail.com
The division of theoretical and practical philosophy was codified by Kant\, who set aside the kingdom of natural necessity and the kingdom of moral ends. The last centuries saw gradual erosion of this neat distinction. Most of them are related to our understanding of rationality &ndash\; a concept that looms large in many branches of philosophy and provides opportunities for interdisciplinary research. We invite abstract submissions addressing any aspect of this concept\, e.g. related to
\; \; &bull\; epistemology
\; \; &bull\; philosophy of science
\; \; &bull\; decision theory
\; \; &bull\; rational/social choice
\; \; &bull\; philosophy of psychology
\; \; &bull\; philosophy of action
\; \; &bull\; normative ethics
All submissions are to be prepared for a double-blind review. Abstracts should not exceed 500 words. Please submit your abstract with a short biographical note attached in a separate document. All submissions should be suitable for presentation of approximately 20 minutes in length. After each presentation\, speakers will have 10 minutes for Q&\;A. Deadline for submissions: January 1st\, 2026. Notification of acceptance: until mid-February. Fees: 20 euro (faculty)\, 10 euro (students). \;
Please submit your proposal at: bsap.bg@gmail.com
Moral luck is the phenomenon which arises when luck makes a difference to a moral property. More precisely\, there is moral luck whenever two situations are similar in respects we ordinarily consider morally relevant &ndash\; such as an agent&rsquo\;s intention\, motives or control &ndash\; but differ in their moral evaluation. For instance\, if there is a moral difference between a case of attempted murder and similar case of (successful) murder\, then moral luck exists. Many questions can be asked about moral luck:
\n1- \; \; \; \; \; \; \;How pervasive is moral luck\, if it is? \;Is it restricted to deontic properties such as permissions and duties\, or does it extend to hypological notions like responsibility and blameworthiness\, or even to aretaic concepts such as generosity or cowardice?
\n2- \; \; \; \; \; \;How many kinds of moral luck are there? Thomas Nagel famously distinguished four kinds\; is that classification complete or even correct?
\n3- \; \; \; \; \; \;It is difficult to decide what should be held fixed between two cases when determining whether there is moral luck. For instance\, it is unacceptable not to hold fixed intentions in the comparison\, but it is acceptable not to hold fixed distant consequences. What about the (immediate) \;result \;of our actions?
\n4- \; \; \; \; \; \;The previous question shows that it could be that whether we accept moral luck or not depends on our account of what an action is. Are there accounts of action that make moral luck more or less hospitable? Impossible?
\nProject's website: \;https://web1.unine.ch/the-defence-first-approach-to-responsibility/
ORGANIZER;CN=Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette;CN="Robin Timothée Bianchi";CN=Vincent Grandjean;CN="Patricia Sánchez Oliva";CN=Antoine Dang Van: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260615T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20260619T170000 SUMMARY:Valencia Philosophy Lab Summer School: Mind and Rationality UID:20260415T195804Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:Europe/Madrid LOCATION:Av. Blasco Ibañez\, 30\, Valencia\, Spain DESCRIPTION:The Valencia Philosophy Lab organizes a Summer School on Mind and Rationality\, which will take place at the University of Valencia on June 15-19\, 2026.
\nThe Summer School is addressed to PhD students\, post-docs\, and early-career researchers. It will cover four sub-topics:
\n(1) self-knowledge\;
\n(2) agency\;
\n(3) inner speech\; and
\n(4) emotion and affect.
\nSummer School faculty:
\nPeter Carruthers (University of Maryland)
\nJosep Corbí\; (University of Valencia)
\nDaniel Gregory (University of Valencia)
\nNikola Kompa (University of Osnabrü\;ck)
\nKrista Lawlor (Stanford University)
\nMoritz Mü\;ller (University of Valencia)
\nMyrto Mylopoulos (Carleton University)
\nChon Tejedor (University of Valencia)
\nStructure:
\nMonday (15/6)\, Tuesday (16/6)\, Thursday (18/6)\, and Friday (19/6). Morning: two faculty presentations on one sub-topic. Afternoon: presentations by participants plus group discussion.
\nWednesday (17/6). Morning: presentations by faculty speakers and discussion about experience in the profession (including publishing\, jobs\, job applications\, and life in academia). Afternoon: free.
\nApplications:
\nPlease send the following to vlcphilosophylab@gmail.com (the subject line should read &ldquo\;SUMMER SCHOOL\, Your Name&rdquo\;):
\n1. your CV\;
\n2. a 500-word abstract (please specify the sub-topic your presentation falls into).
\nWe do not have strict constraints about what will be considered as &ldquo\;early career\,&rdquo\; but researchers up to three years post-PhD will be prioritized.
\nIf you would like to attend the Summer School without giving a presentation\, please just send a CV.
\nDeadline for applications: February 15\, 2026.
\nNotification of acceptance: March 16\, 2026.
\nFees and bursaries:
\nParticipation in the Summer School is free. We may be able to offer accommodation and an amount to offset travel expenses for participants who do not have any research funds. If you are interested in this\, please contact us after the selection process.
\nFor any inquiries or further information\, please contact vlcphilosophylab@gmail.com or anna.giustina@outlook.com.
\nOrganizers:
\nDaniel Gregory (University of Valencia)
\nAnna Giustina (University of Valencia)
\nCarlota Serrahima (University of Valencia)
\nScientific Committee:
\nAaró\;n Á\;lvarez-Gonzá\;lez (University of Valencia)
\nMarc Artiga (University of Valencia)
\nVirginia Ballesteros (University of Valencia)
\nFrancesco Consiglio (University of Valencia)
\nAnna Giustina (University of Valencia)
\nDaniel Gregory (University of Valencia)
\nFabian Hundertmark (University of Valencia)
\nCarlota Serrahima (University of Valencia)
\nFunding:
\nAutonomy as Address (CIPROM/2023/55)\, funded by Conselleria d&rsquo\; Innovació\;\, Universitats\, Ciè\;ncia i Societat Digital &ndash\; Generalitat Valenciana (PIs: Josep Corbí\; and Marc Artiga).
\nKnow Yourself: The Importance\, the Nature\, and the Applications of Introspective Self-Knowledge (PID2023-151949NA-I00)\, funded by Ministerio de Ciencia\, Innovació\;n y Universidades (PI: Anna Giustina).
\nDeceptive Representations (CISEJI/2023/51) funded by the Generalitat Valenciana\, Conselleria d&rsquo\;Educació\;\, Universitats i Ocupació\; (PI: Marc Artiga).
ORGANIZER;CN=Anna Giustina;CN=Daniel Gregory;CN=Carlota Serrahima: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260630T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260630T090000 SUMMARY:Call for Commentaries - Target Article: Carolina Sartorio\, “Causalism: A Framework for Moral Responsibility” UID:20260415T195805Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Call for Commentaries
\nCrí\;tica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofí\;a
\n\;
\nTarget Article: \;
\n\;
\nCarolina Sartorio\, &ldquo\;Causalism: A Framework for Moral Responsibility&rdquo\;
\n\;
\nEditors: Santiago Echeverri and Miguel Á\;ngel Rotter
\nWe invite submissions of commentaries for an article symposium on Carolina Sartorio&rsquo\;s &ldquo\;Causalism: A Framework for Moral Responsibility&rdquo\;. The symposium will feature invited commentaries \;by Sara Bernstein (UC Santa Cruz)\, Taylor Cyr (Samford University)\, Megan Griffith (Davidson College)\, Alex Kaiserman (University of Oxford)\, Mikayla Kelley (University of Chicago)\, Andrew Law (Pomona College)\, Michael McKenna (University of Arizona)\, Hannah Tierney (UC Davis)\, and Barbara Vetter (Freie Universitä\;t Berlin). \;
\nCommentaries should not exceed 2\,000 words\, excluding references\, and must be submitted in PDF to the following email address:
\nsantiago.echeverri@filosoficas.unam.mx.
\nAll commentaries should be written in English. The deadline for submission is \;June 30\, 2026. Authors seeking feedback on the suitability of a potential commentary are welcome to contact the Editors prior to submission.
\nPlease submit two versions of your manuscript:
\n1. \; \; \; \; \;A full version that includes the author&rsquo\;s name\, title of the contribution\, email address\, postal address (including phone number)\, and any acknowledgments.
\n2. \; \; \; \; \;An anonymous version prepared for blind review\, with all identifying information removed.
\nBoth files must include:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;The title of the contribution.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;An abstract of no more than 100 words.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;A list of five keywords not mentioned in the title.
\nIf possible\, the title\, abstract\, and keywords should be provided in both English and Spanish.
\nAbout \;Crí\;tica
\nCrí\;tica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofí\;a \;is a quarterly journal published by the Institute for Philosophical Research at UNAM in Mexico. It publishes articles\, discussion notes\, book symposia\, article symposia\, survey articles\, special issues\, and reviews in all areas of philosophy\, provided they fall within the analytic tradition broadly understood. \;Crí\;tica \;values conceptual clarity\, argumentative rigor\, and originality. Its primary readership consists of academic philosophers and philosophy students\, so authors are expected to clearly articulate how their work contributes to advancing ongoing philosophical debates.
\nFounded in 1967 by Alejandro Rossi\, Fernando Salmeró\;n\, and Luis Villoro\, \;Crí\;tica \;was the first journal in Latin America devoted to analytic philosophy. For decades\, it has maintained its status as a leading philosophical publication in the region and is widely respected in the international academic community\, particularly in the English-speaking world. \;
\nCrí\;tica \;has published work by many influential philosophers\, including:
\nCarlos Alchourró\;n\, G.E.M. Anscombe\, David M. Armstrong\, Eugenio Bulygin\, Hé\;ctor-Neri Castañ\;eda\, Donald Davidson\, Jon Elster\, R.M. Hare\, Gilbert Harman\, John L. Mackie\, Hugo Margá\;in\, John McDowell\, Thomas Nagel\, David F. Pears\, Arthur N. Prior\, Hilary Putnam\, W.V.O. Quine\, Richard Rorty\, Gilbert Ryle\, Sydney Shoemaker\, Thomas M. Simpson\, Ernest Sosa\, Peter F. Strawson\, Barry Stroud\, Bas C. van Fraassen\, and Georg H. von Wright.
\nFor more information\, please visit our website: \;
\nhttp://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260720T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260724T170000 SUMMARY:MCMP Summer School for Widening Participation in Mathematical Philosophy 2026 UID:20260415T195806Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Ludwigstr. 31\, Munich\, Germany\, 80539 DESCRIPTION:The Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) is organizing the third edition of the \;Summer School for Widening Participation in Mathematical Philosophy\, \;which will take place from the \;20th to 24th July 2026 \;in Munich\, Germany.
\nThe summer school continues a successful tradition\, which began in 2014 with eight editions of the summer school on mathematical philosophy for female students and was expanded in 2024 to underrepresented groups.
\nThe 2026 &ldquo\;Summer School for Widening Participation in Mathematical Philosophy&rdquo\; is open to women and members of other groups that are under-represented in mathematical philosophy. These groups include under-represented gender identities\, races and ethnicities\, people with disabilities\, people from low income and non-academic family backgrounds. The target level is master students and last year-bachelor students.
\nThe school's aim is to encourage students to engage with mathematical and scientific approaches to philosophical problems\, and thereby help to redress the under-representation of women and other marginalized groups in mathematical philosophy. It offers the opportunity for study in an informal and interdisciplinary setting\, for lively debate\, and for the development of a network of students and professors interested in the application of formal methods to philosophy.
\nThe 2026 edition of the summer school will feature:
\nQuestions can be directed to \;mathsummer@lrz.uni-muenchen.de \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Toby Charles Penhallurick Solomon: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260808T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260808T090000 SUMMARY:15th Annual Florida State University Free Will\, Moral Responsibility\, and Agency Conference UID:20260415T195807Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:Tallahassee\, United States\, 32304 DESCRIPTION:The Philosophy Graduate Student Association (PGSA) of Florida State University is now accepting submissions for their graduate conference on free will\, moral responsibility\, and agency.
\nThe conference will take place at Florida State University on October 15-16 2026.
\nKeynote speakers will be:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Zoë\; Johnson King\, Harvard University
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; David Shoemaker\, Cornell University
\nThe conference will be held in Dodd Hall Auditorium. Conference participants can access the auditorium via either stairs or ramps\, and wheelchair accessible tables as well as theater-style seats are available in the auditorium. Microphones will be available for presenters. The conference is currently planned to be held in-person.
\nThose interested in submitting papers related to free will\, moral responsibility\, or the wider notion of agency should email their submissions to fsupgsa@gmail.com. Papers should be submitted along with a cover page. The criteria for the paper submission and cover page are as follows:
\n \;
Paper Requirements:
·\; \; \; \; \; \; Prepared for anonymous review
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; No more than 4\,000 words
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Suitable for 25-minute presentation
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Preceded by an abstract of 150-250 words
\nCover Page Requirements:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Presenter&rsquo\;s name
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Institutional affiliation
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Contact information (email address or phone number)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Title of paper
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;150-250 word abstract of the paper \;
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Word count of the paper
\nThe deadline for submissions is August 8th\, 2026. We will notify those whose papers have been accepted no later than September 16\, 2026.
\nFor questions or further information\, please contact Justice Cabantangan (jac24m at fsu.edu). You may also visit the conference website at https://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference. (The website is currently under maintenance.)
ORGANIZER;CN=Justice Cabantangan: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260930T000000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260930T000000 SUMMARY:Hegel’s Philosophy of Action - CFP Open Philosophy UID:20260415T195808Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:CALL FOR PAPERS
\nfor a topical issue of \;Open Philosophy
\nHEGEL&rsquo\;S PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION
\nOpen Philosophy \;(https://www.degruyterbrill.com/journal/key/opphil/html) invites submissions for the topical issue &ldquo\;Hegel&rsquo\;s Philosophy of Action&rdquo\;\, edited by Bojana Jovićević (University of Ljubljana) and Gregor Schä\;fer (University of Basel/University of London).
\nDESCRIPTION
\n\;
\nThe topic of this issue is Hegel&rsquo\;s account of action. To act typically means to realize one&rsquo\;s goals through the exercise of one&rsquo\;s intention &ndash\; that is\, one acts upon reasons that justify one&rsquo\;s action as true and good. If one fails to act\, one&rsquo\;s reasons are obstructed &ndash\; either by external circumstances\, such as unfavourable conditions\, or by one&rsquo\;s inertia of intelligence\, the additional judgement required from the agent to translate one&rsquo\;s intention into concrete action.
\nOn this view\, action is understood as a predicate of ability: the power to act is conceived independently of its actual conditions. In this light\, whether an action is realized becomes irrelevant\, since its validity is not empirically verifiable. In other words\, if action is understood as mere potentiality &ndash\; prior to entering into relations with the empirical world &ndash\; its effects on others\, or how they judge it\, become entirely irrelevant. The agent\, in this sense\, retains the authority to insist that\, regardless of what one actually does\, one&rsquo\;s intention remains perfectly valid.
\nHegel criticizes this model. It may turn out that\, in acting from intention\, the agent is mistaken. Or even if one&rsquo\;s reasons are sound\, the outcome could still be wrong. For instance\, helping others may be a valid principle\, but the way it is employed could be flawed if those one intends to help are\, in fact\, hindered or harmed by one&rsquo\;s actions. In other words\, knowing that an action conforms to an ability (potentia) is never enough to rule out the possibility that something about it is wrong in the particular situation. That possibility could only be excluded if the content of the action were realized in its concrete exercise &ndash\; a notion that undermines the very idea of ability as such. Therefore\, Hegel insists that action cannot be separated from one&rsquo\;s concrete doing. On Hegel&rsquo\;s terms: the actuality of purpose is the purpose of acting. Because the consequences of action partake within the causality of the action itself\, as a result every action is\, by its very concept\, incongruent with the agent&rsquo\;s prior intention. Hegel&rsquo\;s prominent critique of moral action &ndash\; as an action that focuses solely on intentions and\, insofar as it takes place in the actual form of social and political life\, comes into conflict with its consequences &ndash\; is evidently connected with this structure.
\nIf no action can be separated from its actual consequences\, then what distinguishes a successful action from a failed one? And if action is mediated by the incongruence between intention and outcome\, what does this imply for the &ldquo\;truth&rdquo\; of the entire process of the action? What is &ndash\; from this perspective &ndash\; a &ldquo\;wrong&rdquo\; action\, what is a &ldquo\;true&rdquo\; action\, and how do they relate to each other in understanding the entire process of action? Moreover\, if action cannot be free from intention or validated by its outcome\, but both of them can be explained only through the whole of its process\, how then should we interpret the ethics of Hegel&rsquo\;s philosophy of action (as both a deontological and a utilitarian or pragmatist interpretation would be misleading)?
\nThe present issue aims to explore these questions and the nexus of related topics (e.g.\, virtuous action\, political action\, historical action) from varied perspectives\, all of which stem from the following conceptual tension: for Hegel\, action resides in one&rsquo\;s concrete doing &ndash\; there is no action outside of what one actually does\, and in this sense\, action cannot be validated by one&rsquo\;s intention in its entirety. Yet this does not mean that its validity depends on its consequences\; rather\, both intention and outcome are explained in light of knowledge discerned through action.
\nWhile Hegel&rsquo\;s understanding of action has gained growing interest in recent scholarship\, this aspect remains largely overlooked and underdeveloped. Beginning with the Phenomenology of Spirit\, traversing through the Science of Logic\, and culminating in the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of History\, this question remains highly relevant for Hegel&rsquo\;s entire practical philosophy. Specifically\, this issue aims to explore\, among others\, the following set of problems as articulated in Hegel&rsquo\;s practical philosophy:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; How is practical knowledge related to action\, and what grounds this relation?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; In what ways do intention and outcome figure within the causality of action\, and across different kinds of action (virtuous\, political\, historical\, etc.)?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; What is the relation between failed and successful action? Are these distinct or simply different aspects of one and the same concept of action?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; How can we distinguish action from the notions of ability\, power\, or disposition?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Is action independent of\, or dependent upon\, other competent subjects\, and does this imply that it is intersubjective and social in its origin?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; What does it mean to concretely exercise action within specific forms of social and political life?
\n
HOW TO SUBMIT
\nSubmissions will be collected from September 1 to September 30\, 2026. There are no specific length limitations.
\nTo submit an article for the special issue of Open Philosophy\, authors are asked to access the online submission system at:
\nhttp://www.editorialmanager.com/opphil/ \;
\nPlease choose as article type: Hegel&rsquo\;s Philosophy of Action
\nBefore submission the authors should carefully read over the Instruction for Authors\, available at: \;https://www.degruyter.com/publication/journal_key/OPPHIL/downloadAsset/OPPHIL_Instruction%20for%20Authors.pdf \;
\nAll contributions will undergo critical review before being accepted for publication.
\nFurther questions about this thematic issue can be addressed to Bojana Jovićević at \;bojana.jovicevic@ff.uni-lj.si and/or Gregor Schä\;fer at gregor.schaefer@unibas.ch. In case of technical problems with submission\, please write to Assistant.Managing.Editor@degruyterbrill.com \;
\nBecause \;Open Philosophy \;is published under an Open Access model\, as a rule\, publication costs should be covered by so called \;Article Publishing Charges \;(APC)\, paid by authors\, their affiliated institutions\, funders or sponsors.
\nAuthors without access to publishing funds are encouraged to discuss potential discounts or waivers with OA Portfolio Manager Magdalena Skoneczna (magdalena.skoneczna@degruyterbrill.com) before submitting their manuscripts.
\nFind us on facebook: https://www.facebook.com/DGOpenPhilosophy
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261001T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261002T170000 SUMMARY:Continental Philosophy of Action UID:20260415T195809Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:Europe/Madrid LOCATION:Faculty of Philology\, University City\, Pl. Menéndez Pelayo\, s/n\, Moncloa - Aravaca\, Madrid\, Spain\, 28040 DESCRIPTION:The aim of the two-day international conference is to explore\, clarify and apply the resources of Continental thought about action and agency. Philosophy of action in the analytic tradition\, while not immune from internal disagreements\, can be thought of as a more-or-less coherent philosophical subfield. While there are exceptions\, Anglo-American philosophers of action tend to share metaphysical commitments (regarding event-causality\, for example\, or the existence of representational mental states)\, canonical references (Anscombe\, Davidson\, Bratman\, et al.)\, and sets of problems regarding action (eg\, &ldquo\;causal deviance&rdquo\;\, the so-called &ldquo\;disappearing agent&rdquo\; problem\, intentional omissions\, etc.). This situation can be \; \;prima facie \; \;contrasted to the scattered and varied approaches to action and agency one finds in the Continental philosophical tradition. Idealism\, Phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, poststructuralism\, new materialisms\, and critical theory\, to name just a few currents in contemporary Continental thought\, are distinguished from one another by seemingly distinct sets of philosophical concerns and vocabularies\, and by diverse metaphysical and methodological commitments. Given the treatment of action and agency in each of these currents is inseparable from specific sets of philosophical concerns and commitments\, it can seem that Continental philosophers do not share enough common ground to talk together about action and agency without talking past one another. In part\, then\, this conference wishes to clarify the extent to which one could meaningfully speak of &ldquo\;Continental philosophy of action.&rdquo\; But also\, working back down from these high-level\, general concerns\, the conference wishes to focus on specific\, field-defining problems of action and agency\, and the resources that might be drawn from Continental thought to address these problems in novel ways. Possible topics of interest might thus include:
\nFormat: Speakers will have 20 minutes to present their paper\, followed by 10 minutes for questions and discussion. \;Those interested in participating should send a 400-word abstract to cpa@ucm.es by 30 April\, 2026. The conference will be in English and attendance is free. More information can be found at: \; \;https://eventos.ucm.es/go/continentalphilosophyofaction \; \;
\nConference organizers: Emma Ingala\, Gavin Rae (Complutense University of Madrid) and Sean Bowden (Deakin University\, Australia). \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Sean Bowden;CN=Emma Ingala;CN=Gavin Rae: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261016T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261017T170000 SUMMARY:15th Annual Florida State University Free Will\, Moral Responsibility\, and Agency Conference UID:20260415T195810Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:Tallahassee\, United States\, 32304 DESCRIPTION:The conference will take place at Florida State University on October 16-17\, 2026. The conference is open to any who is interested in attending. \;If you would like to attend and require further information\, please email \;Justice Cabantangan (jac24m at fsu.edu). The conference website (https://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference) \;is currently under maintenance.
\nhttps://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference ORGANIZER;CN=Justice Cabantangan: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261112T140000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261114T170000 SUMMARY:Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop\, CFA UID:20260415T195811Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Copenhagen\, Denmark DESCRIPTION:Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop
\nPhilosophers working on praise and praiseworthiness are invited to submit abstracts for a workshop on these topics\, to be held in Copenhagen in the fall of 2026\, specifically November 12-14. Abstracts on the nature \;of praise and the nature of praiseworthiness are especially welcome. (Submissions on other praise-related issues-- e.g. the morality of praise-- will be considered\, however.)
\nThe intention is to workshop papers for a praise-themed issue of \;Oxford Studies in Agency &\; Responsibility. \;Selected abstracts must be \;promised \;to this special themed issue of OSAR. They cannot be submitted elsewhere\, and if accepted\, they must be committed to OSAR.
\nWhile workshop dinners will be covered\, funds unfortunately are not available to assist with travel or accommodation.
\nThe timeline of important dates and deadlines is as follows:
\n-Abstract due (500-1000 words): April 30\, 2026
\n-Notification concerning acceptance: May 30\, 2026
\n-First draft due (to be circulated amongst workshop participants): October 21\, 2026
\n-Workshop dates: November 12-14\, 2026
\n-Revised draft due: sometime in February 2027
\nThe papers will then be sent out by OUP for vetting and\, once returned\, contributors may make further changes. The praise-themed edition of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is expected to be in print 2028. \;
\nAnonymized abstracts (of 500-1000 words) should be submitted to \;praiseworkshop2026@gmail.com \;by the end of April 30 (last time zone on Earth).
\n
Confirmed Presenters:
Jules Holroyd
\nKasper Lippert-Rasmussen
\nZoë\; Johnson King
\nVictoria McGeer
\nColeen Macnamara
\nLeo Menges and Leonie Eichhorn
\nDana Nelkin
\nDavid Shoemaker
\nDaniel Telech
\n
\;
Conference description
\nIt is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\, \; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.
\nThis conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency. We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.
\nWe invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.
\nPossible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Relational nature of personhood
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collectives and ontological unity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Categorisation of group agency
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective emotions
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective justice
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Groups and moral responsibility
\n·\; \; \; \; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience
\n\;
\nSubmission guidelines
\nSubmission deadline and acceptance notification
\nThe abstracts must be submitted by Monday 1st June 2026.
\nThe acceptance notifications might be expected after Tuesday 30th June 2026.
\nSubmission procedure
\nWe invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.
\nPlease write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.
\nThe abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com
\nPaper delivery
\nAll the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.
\nOther practicalities
\nPlease note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.
\nLunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.
\nOrganisers
\nThis conference is part of the research project &ldquo\;Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory&rdquo\; (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270601T000000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270601T000000 SUMMARY:Collective Agency in Classical and Continental Philosophy (Vilnius\, 2027) UID:20260415T195813Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:Europe/Vilnius LOCATION:Vilnius\, Lithuania DESCRIPTION:Conference description
\nIt is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\, \; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.
\nThis conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency. We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.
\nWe invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.
\nPossible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Relational nature of personhood
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collectives and ontological unity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Categorisation of group agency
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective emotions
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective justice
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Groups and moral responsibility
\n·\; \; \; \; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience
\n\;
\nSubmission guidelines
\nSubmission deadline and acceptance notification
\nThe abstracts must be submitted by Monday 1st June 2026.
\nThe acceptance notifications might be expected after Tuesday 30th June 2026.
\nSubmission procedure
\nWe invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.
\nPlease write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.
\nThe abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com
\nPaper delivery
\nAll the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.
\nOther practicalities
\nPlease note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.
\nLunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.
\nOrganisers
\nThis conference is part of the research project &ldquo\;Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory&rdquo\; (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260415T055126Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:29990101T033000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:29990201T120000 SUMMARY:POSTPONED - Creativity and Improvisation in Thought\, Practice\, and Mind: An Interdisciplinary Conference UID:20260415T195814Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:6001 Dodge Street\, Omaha\, United States\, 68182 DESCRIPTION:*Please note that this event has officially been postponed. More information will be made available asap in the near future*
\nMany human cognitive capacities and processes may be deployed creatively\, from unique choices made for oneself up through novel cultural shifts. Similarly\, large swaths of our daily lives are taken up with performing spontaneous\, on-the-fly\, and unplanned activities that are\, in a word\, improvised. \; Charting out the nature of both creativity and improvisation\, taken individually or together\, remains an open and pressing issue. In this conference\, we will delve into various philosophical\, theoretical\, empirical\, and interdisciplinary issues that are related to creativity and improvisation. A non-exhaustive list of related questions and themes for this topic include:
\n- What is the relationship between improvisation and creativity?
\n- What is the relationship between creative activity and well-being?
\n- What is the best way to model individual and collective creativity?
\n- Is creativity in the arts the same thing as in other domains\, such as in science or business?
\n- What are the pros and cons of different scientific operationalizations of creativity and improvisation?
\n- Provide a conceptual analysis of creativity and/or improvisation.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR