The Philosophy Graduate Student Association (PGSA) of Florida State University is now accepting submissions for their graduate conference on free will\, moral responsibility\, and agency.
\nThe conference will take place at Florida State University on October 16-17 2026.
\nKeynote speakers will be:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Zoë\; Johnson King\, Harvard University
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; David Shoemaker\, Cornell University
\nThe conference will be held in Dodd Hall Auditorium. Conference participants can access the auditorium via either stairs or ramps\, and wheelchair accessible tables as well as theater-style seats are available in the auditorium. Microphones will be available for presenters. The conference is currently planned to be held in-person.
\nThose interested in submitting papers related to free will\, moral responsibility\, or the wider notion of agency should email their submissions to fsupgsa@gmail.com. Papers should be submitted along with a cover page. The criteria for the paper submission and cover page are as follows:
\n \;
Paper Requirements:
·\; \; \; \; \; \; Prepared for anonymous review
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; No more than 4\,000 words
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Suitable for 25-minute presentation
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Preceded by an abstract of 150-250 words
\nCover Page Requirements:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Presenter&rsquo\;s name
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Institutional affiliation
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Contact information (email address or phone number)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Title of paper
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;150-250 word abstract of the paper \;
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \;Word count of the paper
\nThe deadline for submissions is August 8th\, 2026. We will notify those whose papers have been accepted no later than September 16\, 2026.
\nFor questions or further information\, please contact Justice Cabantangan (jac24m at fsu.edu). You may also visit the conference website at https://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference. (The website is currently under maintenance.)
ORGANIZER;CN=Justice Cabantangan: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260814T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260814T234500 SUMMARY:Cluelessness Critiques Competition UID:20260727T115844Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:The Effective Altruism Forum\, with prizes funded by Macroscopic Ventures\, is running an essay competition inviting critiques of the "unawareness argument" set out in Anthony DiGiovanni&rsquo\;s sequence The Challenge of Unawareness for Impartial Altruist Action Guidance. DiGiovanni argues that our evidence about the long-run consequences of our actions is too coarse to compare them: impact assessments\, whether precise expected-value estimates or informal best guesses\, should be severely indeterminate\, leaving the impartial altruist with no justified verdict on which action does more good.
\nEligible entries take one of three routes:
\nChallenge a premise &mdash\; argue that a specific premise (normative\, conceptual\, or empirical) is false or unmotivated.
\nChallenge the inference &mdash\; grant the premises but deny that the "no reason to prefer any action" conclusion follows.
\nOffer a constructive response &mdash\; grant the conclusion and say what the impartial altruist should do anyway\, defending an existing proposal (e.g. bracketing or wagering) or an original one.
\nThe strongest entries focus on a single\, clearly identified step of the argument rather than the whole. Length is open\, from roughly 200 to 5\,000 words. Read DiGiovanni&rsquo\;s summary post first to orient your entry.
\nPrizes (USD): $2\,500 / $1\,500 / $1\,000 for the top three essays\, plus up to $2\,000 in comment prizes during the discussion week (Week starting August 17th). An outlier prize of up to $50\,000 is on offer for a decisive critique or a genuinely original solution. A $250 referral prize is also available for those cited by a winner as the reason they entered the competition.
\nDeadline: 14 August 2026\, 23:59 anywhere on Earth. \;
\nEntries are submitted via the form linked from the announcement post. Eligible entries are published on the EA Forum during 17&ndash\;23 August\, with winners announced the week of 24 August. Open to academics\, students\, and anyone else aged 18 and over\; pieces published before the announcement are not eligible. Essay judges: Anthony DiGiovanni\, Andreas Mogensen (Oxford)\, and Jesse Clifton (Macroscopic Ventures).
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260820T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260821T170000 SUMMARY:Agential Capacities in Context UID:20260727T115845Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:Europe/Helsinki LOCATION:Turku\, Finland DESCRIPTION:The cognitive sciences have made significant progress in our understanding of core cognitive capacities like motivation\, self-regulation\, and working memory. Many questions remain at the interface of these capacities: How are they related? Can one of them explain others? What is their relationship to human agency? And how is their operation altered by the agent&rsquo\;s practical context\, such as structural conditions and social background? The two-day Agential Capacities Workshop will examine these questions. \;
\nAll speakers attend the event in-person\, but it will be possible to follow the talks online.
\nThere will be a pre-workshop\, "Mind in the Age of AI"\, on the 19th. The pre-workshop is in-person only.
\n
Full speaker line-up:
Denise de Ridder (Utrecht University)
\nMarina Milyavskaya (Carleton University)
\nSantiago Amaya (Rice University)
\nVeronika Job (University of Vienna)
\nDavid Barack (Carnegie Mellon University &\; University of Pittsburgh)
\nAngelica Kaufmann (University of Milan)
\nAnssi Bwalya (University of Turku)
\nFrederik Junker (University of Copenhagen)
\nJ-P Bermú\;dez (University of Southampton)
\nMarina Trakas (Universidade de Lisboa)
\nAndrea Hiott (University of Heidelberg)
\nMohsen Forghani (University of Warsaw)
\nSamuel Delorme (UC San Diego)
\nPhilipp Thamer (King's College London)
\n
For more information\, please see the event website: \;https://sites.utu.fi/agencyproject/2026-agential-capacities-in-context-workshop/
CALL FOR PAPERS
\nfor a topical issue of \;Open Philosophy
\nHEGEL&rsquo\;S PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION
\nOpen Philosophy \;(https://www.degruyterbrill.com/journal/key/opphil/html) invites submissions for the topical issue &ldquo\;Hegel&rsquo\;s Philosophy of Action&rdquo\;\, edited by Bojana Jovićević (University of Ljubljana) and Gregor Schä\;fer (University of Basel/University of London).
\nDESCRIPTION
\n\;
\nThe topic of this issue is Hegel&rsquo\;s account of action. To act typically means to realize one&rsquo\;s goals through the exercise of one&rsquo\;s intention &ndash\; that is\, one acts upon reasons that justify one&rsquo\;s action as true and good. If one fails to act\, one&rsquo\;s reasons are obstructed &ndash\; either by external circumstances\, such as unfavourable conditions\, or by one&rsquo\;s inertia of intelligence\, the additional judgement required from the agent to translate one&rsquo\;s intention into concrete action.
\nOn this view\, action is understood as a predicate of ability: the power to act is conceived independently of its actual conditions. In this light\, whether an action is realized becomes irrelevant\, since its validity is not empirically verifiable. In other words\, if action is understood as mere potentiality &ndash\; prior to entering into relations with the empirical world &ndash\; its effects on others\, or how they judge it\, become entirely irrelevant. The agent\, in this sense\, retains the authority to insist that\, regardless of what one actually does\, one&rsquo\;s intention remains perfectly valid.
\nHegel criticizes this model. It may turn out that\, in acting from intention\, the agent is mistaken. Or even if one&rsquo\;s reasons are sound\, the outcome could still be wrong. For instance\, helping others may be a valid principle\, but the way it is employed could be flawed if those one intends to help are\, in fact\, hindered or harmed by one&rsquo\;s actions. In other words\, knowing that an action conforms to an ability (potentia) is never enough to rule out the possibility that something about it is wrong in the particular situation. That possibility could only be excluded if the content of the action were realized in its concrete exercise &ndash\; a notion that undermines the very idea of ability as such. Therefore\, Hegel insists that action cannot be separated from one&rsquo\;s concrete doing. On Hegel&rsquo\;s terms: the actuality of purpose is the purpose of acting. Because the consequences of action partake within the causality of the action itself\, as a result every action is\, by its very concept\, incongruent with the agent&rsquo\;s prior intention. Hegel&rsquo\;s prominent critique of moral action &ndash\; as an action that focuses solely on intentions and\, insofar as it takes place in the actual form of social and political life\, comes into conflict with its consequences &ndash\; is evidently connected with this structure.
\nIf no action can be separated from its actual consequences\, then what distinguishes a successful action from a failed one? And if action is mediated by the incongruence between intention and outcome\, what does this imply for the &ldquo\;truth&rdquo\; of the entire process of the action? What is &ndash\; from this perspective &ndash\; a &ldquo\;wrong&rdquo\; action\, what is a &ldquo\;true&rdquo\; action\, and how do they relate to each other in understanding the entire process of action? Moreover\, if action cannot be free from intention or validated by its outcome\, but both of them can be explained only through the whole of its process\, how then should we interpret the ethics of Hegel&rsquo\;s philosophy of action (as both a deontological and a utilitarian or pragmatist interpretation would be misleading)?
\nThe present issue aims to explore these questions and the nexus of related topics (e.g.\, virtuous action\, political action\, historical action) from varied perspectives\, all of which stem from the following conceptual tension: for Hegel\, action resides in one&rsquo\;s concrete doing &ndash\; there is no action outside of what one actually does\, and in this sense\, action cannot be validated by one&rsquo\;s intention in its entirety. Yet this does not mean that its validity depends on its consequences\; rather\, both intention and outcome are explained in light of knowledge discerned through action.
\nWhile Hegel&rsquo\;s understanding of action has gained growing interest in recent scholarship\, this aspect remains largely overlooked and underdeveloped. Beginning with the Phenomenology of Spirit\, traversing through the Science of Logic\, and culminating in the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of History\, this question remains highly relevant for Hegel&rsquo\;s entire practical philosophy. Specifically\, this issue aims to explore\, among others\, the following set of problems as articulated in Hegel&rsquo\;s practical philosophy:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; How is practical knowledge related to action\, and what grounds this relation?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; In what ways do intention and outcome figure within the causality of action\, and across different kinds of action (virtuous\, political\, historical\, etc.)?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; What is the relation between failed and successful action? Are these distinct or simply different aspects of one and the same concept of action?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; How can we distinguish action from the notions of ability\, power\, or disposition?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Is action independent of\, or dependent upon\, other competent subjects\, and does this imply that it is intersubjective and social in its origin?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; What does it mean to concretely exercise action within specific forms of social and political life?
\n
HOW TO SUBMIT
\nSubmissions will be collected from September 1 to September 30\, 2026. There are no specific length limitations.
\nTo submit an article for the special issue of Open Philosophy\, authors are asked to access the online submission system at:
\nhttp://www.editorialmanager.com/opphil/ \;
\nPlease choose as article type: Hegel&rsquo\;s Philosophy of Action
\nBefore submission the authors should carefully read over the Instruction for Authors\, available at: \;https://www.degruyter.com/publication/journal_key/OPPHIL/downloadAsset/OPPHIL_Instruction%20for%20Authors.pdf \;
\nAll contributions will undergo critical review before being accepted for publication.
\nFurther questions about this thematic issue can be addressed to Bojana Jovićević at \;bojana.jovicevic@ff.uni-lj.si and/or Gregor Schä\;fer at gregor.schaefer@unibas.ch. In case of technical problems with submission\, please write to Assistant.Managing.Editor@degruyterbrill.com \;
\nBecause \;Open Philosophy \;is published under an Open Access model\, as a rule\, publication costs should be covered by so called \;Article Publishing Charges \;(APC)\, paid by authors\, their affiliated institutions\, funders or sponsors.
\nAuthors without access to publishing funds are encouraged to discuss potential discounts or waivers with OA Portfolio Manager Magdalena Skoneczna (magdalena.skoneczna@degruyterbrill.com) before submitting their manuscripts.
\nFind us on facebook: https://www.facebook.com/DGOpenPhilosophy
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261001T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261002T170000 SUMMARY:Continental Philosophy of Action UID:20260727T115848Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:Europe/Madrid LOCATION:Faculty of Philology\, University City\, Pl. Menéndez Pelayo\, s/n\, Moncloa - Aravaca\, Madrid\, Spain\, 28040 DESCRIPTION:The aim of the two-day international conference is to explore\, clarify and apply the resources of Continental thought about action and agency. Philosophy of action in the analytic tradition\, while not immune from internal disagreements\, can be thought of as a more-or-less coherent philosophical subfield. While there are exceptions\, Anglo-American philosophers of action tend to share metaphysical commitments (regarding event-causality\, for example\, or the existence of representational mental states)\, canonical references (Anscombe\, Davidson\, Bratman\, et al.)\, and sets of problems regarding action (eg\, &ldquo\;causal deviance&rdquo\;\, the so-called &ldquo\;disappearing agent&rdquo\; problem\, intentional omissions\, etc.). This situation can be \; \;prima facie \; \;contrasted to the scattered and varied approaches to action and agency one finds in the Continental philosophical tradition. Idealism\, Phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, poststructuralism\, new materialisms\, and critical theory\, to name just a few currents in contemporary Continental thought\, are distinguished from one another by seemingly distinct sets of philosophical concerns and vocabularies\, and by diverse metaphysical and methodological commitments. Given the treatment of action and agency in each of these currents is inseparable from specific sets of philosophical concerns and commitments\, it can seem that Continental philosophers do not share enough common ground to talk together about action and agency without talking past one another. In part\, then\, this conference wishes to clarify the extent to which one could meaningfully speak of &ldquo\;Continental philosophy of action.&rdquo\; But also\, working back down from these high-level\, general concerns\, the conference wishes to focus on specific\, field-defining problems of action and agency\, and the resources that might be drawn from Continental thought to address these problems in novel ways. Possible topics of interest might thus include:
\nFormat: Speakers will have 20 minutes to present their paper\, followed by 10 minutes for questions and discussion. \;Those interested in participating should send a 400-word abstract to cpa@ucm.es by 30 April\, 2026. The conference will be in English and attendance is free. More information can be found at: \; \;https://eventos.ucm.es/go/continentalphilosophyofaction \; \;
\nConference organizers: Emma Ingala\, Gavin Rae (Complutense University of Madrid) and Sean Bowden (Deakin University\, Australia). \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Sean Bowden;CN=Emma Ingala;CN=Gavin Rae: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261016T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261017T170000 SUMMARY:15th Annual Florida State University Free Will\, Moral Responsibility\, and Agency Conference UID:20260727T115849Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:Tallahassee\, United States\, 32304 DESCRIPTION:The conference will take place at Florida State University on October 16-17\, 2026. The conference is open to any who is interested in attending. \;If you would like to attend and require further information\, please email \;Justice Cabantangan (jac24m at fsu.edu). The conference website (https://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference) \;is currently under maintenance.
\nhttps://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference ORGANIZER;CN=Justice Cabantangan: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261029T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261030T170000 SUMMARY:Rational Action and Belief – Recognising and Responding to Reasons UID:20260727T115850Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Heidelberg\, Germany DESCRIPTION:Workshop: Rational Action and Belief &ndash\; Recognising and Responding to Reasons
\nDo rational actions and beliefs require us to recognise reasons as reasons? If so\, what does such recognition consist in\, and what role does it play in responding rationally to reasons? \;
\nKey Information
Date &\; Location: October 29&ndash\;30\, 2026\, Heidelberg University
Invited speakers: Carlotta Pavese (Oxford)\, Kurt Sylvan (Southampton)
There are up to six open contributor slots\, please see the related CFP and submit an abstract.
\nWorkshop Themes
\nDoes forming an intention or belief in a rational manner require recognising that the corresponding action or belief enjoys some form of rational support? Many action theorists and epistemologists answer this question affirmatively. For a doctor&rsquo\;s belief that the patient has measles to be rational\, it must be based on a suitable reason. That the patient has Koplik spots is such a reason. But it seems insufficient to rationalise the belief that the patient has measles\, unless the doctor recognises that Koplik spots support that belief. Similar examples for actions abound.
\nOn this view\, rational belief and rational action respond not only to reasons but also to their being reasons for those beliefs or actions. This idea is often captured by appeals to a \;taking condition\, or by the requirement that rational reasons must be \;treated as normative reasons. While such views have gained prominence in recent epistemology and action theory\, they raise pressing questions about the nature of responding to normative reasons. \;
\nWe invite contributions (see separate CFP) that explore the role of recognising\, taking\, or appreciating reasons in rational belief and action\, including critical perspectives.
\nTopics include (but are not limited to):
\n·\; Do rational action and belief require the recognition that the action or belief enjoys support\, for example that the evidence supports a particular conclusion?
\n·\; What does this recognition require? Does it require a doxastic state\, for example\, that the evidence supports p\, or is the recognition condition non-doxastic?
\n·\; If the recognition condition is non-doxastic\, then how does it operate? Does it involve the exercise of some non-doxastic skill\, is it a form of rule following\, or something else entirely? \;
\n·\; If the recognition condition is doxastic\, then how does it avoid regress problems? Can an appeal to additional non-doxastic factors block such regresses?
\n·\; Is recognising normative support sufficient for rational action or belief\, or does responding to that recognition introduce additional constraints?
\n·\; Can the basing of action or belief on reasons be analysed into constituent psychological states\, or does such analysis generate explanatory regresses? \;
\n·\; What is the correct semantic theory for linguistic expressions of acting and believing for reasons\, such as &ldquo\;therefore&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;because&rdquo\;?
\nPlease direct all queries to the organisers Andreas Mü\;ller (andreas.mueller.philosophie@em.uni-frankfurt.de) and Tobias Wilsch (tobias.wilsch@gmail.com). \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Tobias Wilsch;CN=Andy Mueller: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Brussels:20261029T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Brussels:20261030T170000 SUMMARY:Difficult Actions: Definition\, Value\, and Rationality UID:20260727T115851Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:Europe/Brussels LOCATION:De Boelelaan 1111\, Amsterdam\, Netherlands\, 1081 HV DESCRIPTION:The workshop aims to explore the growing research on "difficult actions" &ndash\; actions sometimes described as "against the odds". \; Such actions encompass a wide range of human endeavours\, from physically demanding feats to emotionally taxing decisions\, morally challenging dilemmas\, and epistemically uncertain undertakings. This workshop will delve into how these actions are conceived\, what makes them particularly challenging\, and the ethical and epistemic considerations involved in their pursuit. \;
\nThe workshop will address three core themes: \; 1) &lrm\;Defining Difficult Actions: \;We will \;seek \;to \;establish \;a robust definition of "difficult actions\," examining various philosophical accounts and exploring the commonalities and distinctions between different forms of difficulty in action. \; 2) Exploring the Value of Difficult Actions: \;We will delve into what - if anything - makes difficult actions valuable and under what conditions. 3) Exploring the Rationality of Difficult Actions: We will ask how it can be rational to pursue a difficult action. \;
\nCall for Abstracts: \; We invite submissions by scholars from various philosophical sub-disciplines as well as from psychology and economics (or related fields) to contribute to a deeper understanding of the definition\, value\, and rationality of such actions. \; Abstracts should be between 800&ndash\;1\,000 words and address any aspect of difficult actions\, broadly construed. \;We \;particularly welcome contributions from members of underrepresented demographics in philosophy and early career scholars. \; Please submit your abstract by June 07\, 2026 via this form: \;https://forms.gle/RyKGAevmQUzkkfeh7
ORGANIZER;CN=Lisa Bastian;CN=Annalisa Costella: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20261031T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20261031T234500 SUMMARY:Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions UID:20260727T115852Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:Europe/Vienna LOCATION:Graz\, Austria\, 8010 DESCRIPTION:CfP: \;Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions
\n\nThe notion of agency plays a central role across many areas of philosophy\, including philosophy of action\, ethics\, political philosophy\, epistemology\, feminist philosophy\, and phenomenology. \;While traditionally conceptualized in terms of intentional action\, rational control\, and autonomy\, our understanding of agency has recently come under intense scrutiny and is now being increasingly transformed. \;Feminist and phenomenological approaches\, in particular\, have emphasized the need for a richer and more fine-grained conception of agency&mdash\;one that takes seriously the social\, historical\, and relational contexts in which agents are situated. From this perspective\, agency cannot be adequately understood without acknowledging that agents are not only rational decision-makers\, but also emotional\, embodied\, desiring\, creative\, and affective beings.
\n\nThis conference invites new investigations into agency as it is lived and exercised under non-ideal conditions\, such as vulnerability\, dependency\, uncertainty\, coercion\, structural injustice\, affective ambivalence\, or crisis. Rather than presupposing idealized models of action and rational control\, the conference aims to analyze how agency isreconfigured \;under such conditions. We also particularly welcome contributions that examine how rational and virtuous agency should be rethought under non-ideal conditions and in times of crisis.
\n\nPossible questions include (but are not limited to):
\n\nIn addition to contemporary approaches\, we explicitly welcome historical-philosophical work\, including contributions engaging with the phenomenological tradition\, as well as those that critically engage with accounts of agency from marginalized figures and traditions in the history of philosophy.
\n\nContributions from early-career researchers are especially encouraged.
\n\nConfirmed \;speakers: Maria Alvarez\, Havi Carel\, Hanne Jacobs\, Quill Kukla\, Kristina Musholt and \;Caleb Ward.
\n\;
\nWe invite you to submit an anonymized abstract of up to 500 words \;by \;October 31\, 2026 \;to \;laurentia.adam@uni-graz.at
\n\nPlease include a separate file with your name\, email address\, the title of your talk\, and your affiliation (if any) and put &lsquo\;Rethinking Agency Graz 2027&rsquo\; in the subject line.
\n\;
\nOrganizing Team: Emanuela Carta\, Denis Dzanic\, and Daniel Neumann.
ORGANIZER;CN="Denis Džanić";CN=Emanuela Carta;CN=Daniel Neumann: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261112T140000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261114T170000 SUMMARY:Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop\, CFA UID:20260727T115853Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Copenhagen\, Denmark DESCRIPTION:Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop
\nPhilosophers working on praise and praiseworthiness are invited to submit abstracts for a workshop on these topics\, to be held in Copenhagen in the fall of 2026\, specifically November 12-14. Abstracts on the nature \;of praise and the nature of praiseworthiness are especially welcome. (Submissions on other praise-related issues-- e.g. the morality of praise-- will be considered\, however.)
\nThe intention is to workshop papers for a praise-themed issue of \;Oxford Studies in Agency &\; Responsibility. \;Selected abstracts must be \;promised \;to this special themed issue of OSAR. They cannot be submitted elsewhere\, and if accepted\, they must be committed to OSAR.
\nWhile workshop dinners will be covered\, funds unfortunately are not available to assist with travel or accommodation.
\nThe timeline of important dates and deadlines is as follows:
\n-Abstract due (500-1000 words): April 30\, 2026
\n-Notification concerning acceptance: May 30\, 2026
\n-First draft due (to be circulated amongst workshop participants): October 21\, 2026
\n-Workshop dates: November 12-14\, 2026
\n-Revised draft due: sometime in February 2027
\nThe papers will then be sent out by OUP for vetting and\, once returned\, contributors may make further changes. The praise-themed edition of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is expected to be in print 2028. \;
\nAnonymized abstracts (of 500-1000 words) should be submitted to \;praiseworkshop2026@gmail.com \;by the end of April 30 (last time zone on Earth).
\n
Confirmed Presenters:
Jules Holroyd
\nKasper Lippert-Rasmussen
\nZoë\; Johnson King
\nVictoria McGeer
\nColeen Macnamara
\nLeo Menges and Leonie Eichhorn
\nDana Nelkin
\nDavid Shoemaker
\nDaniel Telech
\n
\;
Conference description
\nIt is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\, \; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.
\nThis conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency. We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.
\nWe invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.
\nPossible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Relational nature of personhood
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collectives and ontological unity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Categorisation of group agency
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective emotions
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective justice
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Groups and moral responsibility
\n·\; \; \; \; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience
\nConfirmed keynote speakers:
\nThornton Lockwood (University of Florida)
\nSophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)
\n\nSubmission guidelines
\nSubmission deadline and acceptance notification
\nThe abstracts must be submitted by Monday 1st June 2026.
\nThe acceptance notifications might be expected after Tuesday 30th June 2026.
\nSubmission procedure
\nWe invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.
\nPlease write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.
\nThe abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com
\nPaper delivery
\nAll the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.
\nOther practicalities
\nPlease note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.
\nLunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.
\nOrganisers
\nThis conference is part of the research project &ldquo\;Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory&rdquo\; (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20270303T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20270305T170000 SUMMARY:Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions UID:20260727T115855Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:Europe/Vienna LOCATION:Graz\, Austria\, 8010 ORGANIZER;CN="Denis Džanić";CN=Emanuela Carta;CN=Daniel Neumann: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20270516T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20270523T170000 SUMMARY:The 2027 Annual Meeting of the American Comparative Literature Association UID:20260727T115856Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:4302 University Dr\, Houston\, United States\, 77004 DESCRIPTION:https://www.acla.org/annual-meeting\nhttps://www.acla.org/seminar/875d9da0-735b-4676-ab1f-fff5c023f669\nhttps://www.acla.org/cfp/70fe7418-c14a-468d-be1d-809e878f2e00/seminars\n ORGANIZER;CN=Vivien Jiaqian Zhu: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20270516T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20270523T170000 SUMMARY:The 2027 Annual Meeting of the American Comparative Literature Association UID:20260727T115857Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:4302 University Dr\, Houston\, United States\, 77004 DESCRIPTION:https://www.acla.org/annual-meeting https://www.acla.org/seminar/875d9da0-735b-4676-ab1f-fff5c023f669 https://www.acla.org/cfp/70fe7418-c14a-468d-be1d-809e878f2e00/seminars
ORGANIZER;CN=Vivien Jiaqian Zhu: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270601T000000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270601T000000 SUMMARY:Collective Agency in Classical and Continental Philosophy (Vilnius\, 2027) UID:20260727T115858Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:Europe/Vilnius LOCATION:Vilnius\, Lithuania DESCRIPTION:Conference description
\nIt is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\, \; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.
\nThis conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency. We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.
\nWe invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.
\nPossible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Relational nature of personhood
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collectives and ontological unity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Categorisation of group agency
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective emotions
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective justice
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Groups and moral responsibility
\n·\; \; \; \; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience
\nConfirmed keynote speakers:
\nThornton Lockwood (University of Florida)
\nSophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)
\n\nSubmission guidelines
\nSubmission deadline and acceptance notification
\nThe abstracts must be submitted by Monday 1st June 2026.
\nThe acceptance notifications might be expected after Tuesday 30th June 2026.
\nSubmission procedure
\nWe invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.
\nPlease write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.
\nThe abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com
\nPaper delivery
\nAll the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.
\nOther practicalities
\nPlease note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.
\nLunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.
\nOrganisers
\nThis conference is part of the research project &ldquo\;Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory&rdquo\; (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260727T043719Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:29990101T033000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:29990201T120000 SUMMARY:POSTPONED - Creativity and Improvisation in Thought\, Practice\, and Mind: An Interdisciplinary Conference UID:20260727T115859Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:854:79ff:fe66:5f4%3 TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:6001 Dodge Street\, Omaha\, United States\, 68182 DESCRIPTION:*Please note that this event has officially been postponed. More information will be made available asap in the near future*
\nMany human cognitive capacities and processes may be deployed creatively\, from unique choices made for oneself up through novel cultural shifts. Similarly\, large swaths of our daily lives are taken up with performing spontaneous\, on-the-fly\, and unplanned activities that are\, in a word\, improvised. \; Charting out the nature of both creativity and improvisation\, taken individually or together\, remains an open and pressing issue. In this conference\, we will delve into various philosophical\, theoretical\, empirical\, and interdisciplinary issues that are related to creativity and improvisation. A non-exhaustive list of related questions and themes for this topic include:
\n- What is the relationship between improvisation and creativity?
\n- What is the relationship between creative activity and well-being?
\n- What is the best way to model individual and collective creativity?
\n- Is creativity in the arts the same thing as in other domains\, such as in science or business?
\n- What are the pros and cons of different scientific operationalizations of creativity and improvisation?
\n- Provide a conceptual analysis of creativity and/or improvisation.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR