CALL FOR PAPERS
\nfor a topical issue of \;Open Philosophy
\nHEGEL&rsquo\;S PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION
\nOpen Philosophy \;(https://www.degruyterbrill.com/journal/key/opphil/html) invites submissions for the topical issue &ldquo\;Hegel&rsquo\;s Philosophy of Action&rdquo\;\, edited by Bojana Jovićević (University of Ljubljana) and Gregor Schä\;fer (University of Basel/University of London).
\nDESCRIPTION
\n\;
\nThe topic of this issue is Hegel&rsquo\;s account of action. To act typically means to realize one&rsquo\;s goals through the exercise of one&rsquo\;s intention &ndash\; that is\, one acts upon reasons that justify one&rsquo\;s action as true and good. If one fails to act\, one&rsquo\;s reasons are obstructed &ndash\; either by external circumstances\, such as unfavourable conditions\, or by one&rsquo\;s inertia of intelligence\, the additional judgement required from the agent to translate one&rsquo\;s intention into concrete action.
\nOn this view\, action is understood as a predicate of ability: the power to act is conceived independently of its actual conditions. In this light\, whether an action is realized becomes irrelevant\, since its validity is not empirically verifiable. In other words\, if action is understood as mere potentiality &ndash\; prior to entering into relations with the empirical world &ndash\; its effects on others\, or how they judge it\, become entirely irrelevant. The agent\, in this sense\, retains the authority to insist that\, regardless of what one actually does\, one&rsquo\;s intention remains perfectly valid.
\nHegel criticizes this model. It may turn out that\, in acting from intention\, the agent is mistaken. Or even if one&rsquo\;s reasons are sound\, the outcome could still be wrong. For instance\, helping others may be a valid principle\, but the way it is employed could be flawed if those one intends to help are\, in fact\, hindered or harmed by one&rsquo\;s actions. In other words\, knowing that an action conforms to an ability (potentia) is never enough to rule out the possibility that something about it is wrong in the particular situation. That possibility could only be excluded if the content of the action were realized in its concrete exercise &ndash\; a notion that undermines the very idea of ability as such. Therefore\, Hegel insists that action cannot be separated from one&rsquo\;s concrete doing. On Hegel&rsquo\;s terms: the actuality of purpose is the purpose of acting. Because the consequences of action partake within the causality of the action itself\, as a result every action is\, by its very concept\, incongruent with the agent&rsquo\;s prior intention. Hegel&rsquo\;s prominent critique of moral action &ndash\; as an action that focuses solely on intentions and\, insofar as it takes place in the actual form of social and political life\, comes into conflict with its consequences &ndash\; is evidently connected with this structure.
\nIf no action can be separated from its actual consequences\, then what distinguishes a successful action from a failed one? And if action is mediated by the incongruence between intention and outcome\, what does this imply for the &ldquo\;truth&rdquo\; of the entire process of the action? What is &ndash\; from this perspective &ndash\; a &ldquo\;wrong&rdquo\; action\, what is a &ldquo\;true&rdquo\; action\, and how do they relate to each other in understanding the entire process of action? Moreover\, if action cannot be free from intention or validated by its outcome\, but both of them can be explained only through the whole of its process\, how then should we interpret the ethics of Hegel&rsquo\;s philosophy of action (as both a deontological and a utilitarian or pragmatist interpretation would be misleading)?
\nThe present issue aims to explore these questions and the nexus of related topics (e.g.\, virtuous action\, political action\, historical action) from varied perspectives\, all of which stem from the following conceptual tension: for Hegel\, action resides in one&rsquo\;s concrete doing &ndash\; there is no action outside of what one actually does\, and in this sense\, action cannot be validated by one&rsquo\;s intention in its entirety. Yet this does not mean that its validity depends on its consequences\; rather\, both intention and outcome are explained in light of knowledge discerned through action.
\nWhile Hegel&rsquo\;s understanding of action has gained growing interest in recent scholarship\, this aspect remains largely overlooked and underdeveloped. Beginning with the Phenomenology of Spirit\, traversing through the Science of Logic\, and culminating in the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of History\, this question remains highly relevant for Hegel&rsquo\;s entire practical philosophy. Specifically\, this issue aims to explore\, among others\, the following set of problems as articulated in Hegel&rsquo\;s practical philosophy:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; How is practical knowledge related to action\, and what grounds this relation?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; In what ways do intention and outcome figure within the causality of action\, and across different kinds of action (virtuous\, political\, historical\, etc.)?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; What is the relation between failed and successful action? Are these distinct or simply different aspects of one and the same concept of action?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; How can we distinguish action from the notions of ability\, power\, or disposition?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Is action independent of\, or dependent upon\, other competent subjects\, and does this imply that it is intersubjective and social in its origin?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; What does it mean to concretely exercise action within specific forms of social and political life?
\n
HOW TO SUBMIT
\nSubmissions will be collected from September 1 to September 30\, 2026. There are no specific length limitations.
\nTo submit an article for the special issue of Open Philosophy\, authors are asked to access the online submission system at:
\nhttp://www.editorialmanager.com/opphil/ \;
\nPlease choose as article type: Hegel&rsquo\;s Philosophy of Action
\nBefore submission the authors should carefully read over the Instruction for Authors\, available at: \;https://www.degruyter.com/publication/journal_key/OPPHIL/downloadAsset/OPPHIL_Instruction%20for%20Authors.pdf \;
\nAll contributions will undergo critical review before being accepted for publication.
\nFurther questions about this thematic issue can be addressed to Bojana Jovićević at \;bojana.jovicevic@ff.uni-lj.si and/or Gregor Schä\;fer at gregor.schaefer@unibas.ch. In case of technical problems with submission\, please write to Assistant.Managing.Editor@degruyterbrill.com \;
\nBecause \;Open Philosophy \;is published under an Open Access model\, as a rule\, publication costs should be covered by so called \;Article Publishing Charges \;(APC)\, paid by authors\, their affiliated institutions\, funders or sponsors.
\nAuthors without access to publishing funds are encouraged to discuss potential discounts or waivers with OA Portfolio Manager Magdalena Skoneczna (magdalena.skoneczna@degruyterbrill.com) before submitting their manuscripts.
\nFind us on facebook: https://www.facebook.com/DGOpenPhilosophy
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261001T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261002T170000 SUMMARY:Continental Philosophy of Action UID:20260925T194740Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:Europe/Madrid LOCATION:Faculty of Philology\, University City\, Pl. Menéndez Pelayo\, s/n\, Moncloa - Aravaca\, Madrid\, Spain\, 28040 DESCRIPTION:The aim of the two-day international conference is to explore\, clarify and apply the resources of Continental thought about action and agency. Philosophy of action in the analytic tradition\, while not immune from internal disagreements\, can be thought of as a more-or-less coherent philosophical subfield. While there are exceptions\, Anglo-American philosophers of action tend to share metaphysical commitments (regarding event-causality\, for example\, or the existence of representational mental states)\, canonical references (Anscombe\, Davidson\, Bratman\, et al.)\, and sets of problems regarding action (eg\, &ldquo\;causal deviance&rdquo\;\, the so-called &ldquo\;disappearing agent&rdquo\; problem\, intentional omissions\, etc.). This situation can be \; \;prima facie \; \;contrasted to the scattered and varied approaches to action and agency one finds in the Continental philosophical tradition. Idealism\, Phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, poststructuralism\, new materialisms\, and critical theory\, to name just a few currents in contemporary Continental thought\, are distinguished from one another by seemingly distinct sets of philosophical concerns and vocabularies\, and by diverse metaphysical and methodological commitments. Given the treatment of action and agency in each of these currents is inseparable from specific sets of philosophical concerns and commitments\, it can seem that Continental philosophers do not share enough common ground to talk together about action and agency without talking past one another. In part\, then\, this conference wishes to clarify the extent to which one could meaningfully speak of &ldquo\;Continental philosophy of action.&rdquo\; But also\, working back down from these high-level\, general concerns\, the conference wishes to focus on specific\, field-defining problems of action and agency\, and the resources that might be drawn from Continental thought to address these problems in novel ways. Possible topics of interest might thus include:
\nFormat: Speakers will have 20 minutes to present their paper\, followed by 10 minutes for questions and discussion. \;Those interested in participating should send a 400-word abstract to cpa@ucm.es by 30 April\, 2026. The conference will be in English and attendance is free. More information can be found at: \; \;https://eventos.ucm.es/go/continentalphilosophyofaction \; \;
\nConference organizers: Emma Ingala\, Gavin Rae (Complutense University of Madrid) and Sean Bowden (Deakin University\, Australia). \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Sean Bowden;CN=Emma Ingala;CN=Gavin Rae: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Brussels:20261001T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Brussels:20261002T170000 SUMMARY:Subjectivity Workshop no. 3 Liège-Luxembourg UID:20260925T194741Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:Europe/Brussels LOCATION:Esch-sur-Alzette\, Luxembourg DESCRIPTION:This is the third in a series of workshops on subjectivity co-organized by the Philosophy Departments of the University of Liè\;ge (Arnaud Dewalque) and the University of Luxembourg (Frank Hofmann). We aim to investigate the nature and value of subjectivity in all of its forms and aspects. Of course\, both phenomenal and self-consciousness are included\, and we want to improve our understanding of semantic\, epistemic\, and metaphysical questions surrounding subjectivity.
\nSpeakers: \; \;
\nSophia Arbeiter\, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero\, Lé\;a Salje\, Michela \;Summa\, Ingrid Vendrell Ferran\, Jacopo Pallagrosi\, Valentina Martinis\, Arnaud Dewalque\, Thomas Raleigh\, Frank Hofmann
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261016T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261017T170000 SUMMARY:15th Annual Florida State University Free Will\, Moral Responsibility\, and Agency Conference UID:20260925T194742Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:Tallahassee\, United States\, 32304 DESCRIPTION:The conference will take place at Florida State University on October 16-17\, 2026. The conference is open to any who is interested in attending. \;If you would like to attend and require further information\, please email \;Justice Cabantangan (jac24m at fsu.edu). The conference website (https://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference) \;is currently under maintenance.
\nhttps://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference ORGANIZER;CN=Justice Cabantangan: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261029T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261030T170000 SUMMARY:Difficult Actions: Definition\, Value\, and Rationality UID:20260925T194743Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:Europe/Amsterdam LOCATION:De Boelelaan 1109\, Amsterdam\, Netherlands\, 1081 HV DESCRIPTION:The workshop aims to explore the growing research on "difficult actions" &ndash\; actions sometimes described as "against the odds". \; Such actions encompass a wide range of human endeavours\, from physically demanding feats to emotionally taxing decisions\, morally challenging dilemmas\, and epistemically uncertain undertakings. This workshop will delve into how these actions are conceived\, what makes them particularly challenging\, and the ethical and epistemic considerations involved in their pursuit. \;
\nThe workshop will address three core themes: \; 1) &lrm\;Defining Difficult Actions: \;We will \;seek \;to \;establish \;a robust definition of "difficult actions\," examining various philosophical accounts and exploring the commonalities and distinctions between different forms of difficulty in action. \; 2) Exploring the Value of Difficult Actions: \;We will delve into what - if anything - makes difficult actions valuable and under what conditions. 3) Exploring the Rationality of Difficult Actions: We will ask how it can be rational to pursue a difficult action. \;
\nCall for Abstracts: \; We invite submissions by scholars from various philosophical sub-disciplines as well as from psychology and economics (or related fields) to contribute to a deeper understanding of the definition\, value\, and rationality of such actions. \; Abstracts should be between 800&ndash\;1\,000 words and address any aspect of difficult actions\, broadly construed. \;We \;particularly welcome contributions from members of underrepresented demographics in philosophy and early career scholars. \; Please submit your abstract by June 07\, 2026 via this form: \;https://forms.gle/RyKGAevmQUzkkfeh7
ORGANIZER;CN=Lisa Bastian;CN=Annalisa Costella: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261029T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261030T170000 SUMMARY:Rational Action and Belief – Recognising and Responding to Reasons UID:20260925T194744Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Heidelberg\, Germany DESCRIPTION:Workshop: Rational Action and Belief &ndash\; Recognising and Responding to Reasons
\nDo rational actions and beliefs require us to recognise reasons as reasons? If so\, what does such recognition consist in\, and what role does it play in responding rationally to reasons? \;
\nKey Information
Date &\; Location: October 29&ndash\;30\, 2026\, Heidelberg University
Invited speakers: Carlotta Pavese (Oxford)\, Kurt Sylvan (Southampton)
There are up to six open contributor slots\, please see the related CFP and submit an abstract.
\nWorkshop Themes
\nDoes forming an intention or belief in a rational manner require recognising that the corresponding action or belief enjoys some form of rational support? Many action theorists and epistemologists answer this question affirmatively. For a doctor&rsquo\;s belief that the patient has measles to be rational\, it must be based on a suitable reason. That the patient has Koplik spots is such a reason. But it seems insufficient to rationalise the belief that the patient has measles\, unless the doctor recognises that Koplik spots support that belief. Similar examples for actions abound.
\nOn this view\, rational belief and rational action respond not only to reasons but also to their being reasons for those beliefs or actions. This idea is often captured by appeals to a \;taking condition\, or by the requirement that rational reasons must be \;treated as normative reasons. While such views have gained prominence in recent epistemology and action theory\, they raise pressing questions about the nature of responding to normative reasons. \;
\nWe invite contributions (see separate CFP) that explore the role of recognising\, taking\, or appreciating reasons in rational belief and action\, including critical perspectives.
\nTopics include (but are not limited to):
\n·\; Do rational action and belief require the recognition that the action or belief enjoys support\, for example that the evidence supports a particular conclusion?
\n·\; What does this recognition require? Does it require a doxastic state\, for example\, that the evidence supports p\, or is the recognition condition non-doxastic?
\n·\; If the recognition condition is non-doxastic\, then how does it operate? Does it involve the exercise of some non-doxastic skill\, is it a form of rule following\, or something else entirely? \;
\n·\; If the recognition condition is doxastic\, then how does it avoid regress problems? Can an appeal to additional non-doxastic factors block such regresses?
\n·\; Is recognising normative support sufficient for rational action or belief\, or does responding to that recognition introduce additional constraints?
\n·\; Can the basing of action or belief on reasons be analysed into constituent psychological states\, or does such analysis generate explanatory regresses? \;
\n·\; What is the correct semantic theory for linguistic expressions of acting and believing for reasons\, such as &ldquo\;therefore&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;because&rdquo\;?
\nPlease direct all queries to the organisers Andreas Mü\;ller (andreas.mueller.philosophie@em.uni-frankfurt.de) and Tobias Wilsch (tobias.wilsch@gmail.com). \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Tobias Wilsch;CN=Andy Mueller: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20261031T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20261031T234500 SUMMARY:Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions UID:20260925T194745Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:Europe/Vienna LOCATION:Graz\, Austria\, 8010 DESCRIPTION:CfP: \;Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions
\nConfirmed \;speakers: Maria Alvarez\, Havi Carel\, Hanne Jacobs\, Quill Kukla\, Kristina Musholt and \;Caleb Ward.
\n\nThe notion of agency plays a central role across many areas of philosophy\, including philosophy of action\, ethics\, political philosophy\, epistemology\, feminist philosophy\, and phenomenology. \;While traditionally conceptualized in terms of intentional action\, rational control\, and autonomy\, our understanding of agency has recently come under intense scrutiny and is now being increasingly transformed. \;Feminist and phenomenological approaches\, in particular\, have emphasized the need for a richer and more fine-grained conception of agency&mdash\;one that takes seriously the social\, historical\, and relational contexts in which agents are situated. From this perspective\, agency cannot be adequately understood without acknowledging that agents are not only rational decision-makers\, but also emotional\, embodied\, desiring\, creative\, and affective beings.
\nThis conference invites new investigations into agency as it is lived and exercised under non-ideal conditions\, such as vulnerability\, dependency\, uncertainty\, coercion\, structural injustice\, affective ambivalence\, or crisis. Rather than presupposing idealized models of action and rational control\, the conference aims to analyze how agency isreconfigured \;under such conditions. We also particularly welcome contributions that examine how rational and virtuous agency should be rethought under non-ideal conditions and in times of crisis.
\nPossible questions include (but are not limited to):
\nIn addition to contemporary approaches\, we explicitly welcome historical-philosophical work\, including contributions engaging with the phenomenological tradition\, as well as those that critically engage with accounts of agency from marginalized figures and traditions in the history of philosophy.
\nContributions from early-career researchers are especially encouraged.
\nThe conference is planned as an in-person event only.
\n\;
\nWe invite you to submit an anonymized abstract of up to 500 words \;by \;October 31\, 2026 \;to \;laurentia.adam@uni-graz.at
\nPlease include a separate file with your name\, email address\, the title of your talk\, and your affiliation (if any) and put &lsquo\;Rethinking Agency Graz 2027&rsquo\; in the subject line.
\n\;
\nOrganizing Team: Emanuela Carta\, Denis Dzanic\, and Daniel Neumann.
ORGANIZER;CN="Denis Džanić";CN=Emanuela Carta;CN=Daniel Neumann: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261111T170000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261111T180000 SUMMARY:The Side-Effect Effect and “Intentionally” UID:20260925T194746Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:We are delighted to announce the next series of UK XPHI Online. This is a monthly online workshop devoted to discussion of work in progress in experimental philosophy (broadly construed). We feature work from all areas of experimental philosophy\, by researchers at all career stages\, from the UK and all over the world. The workshop meets once a month on Teams\, typically the second Wednesday of each month (16:00-18:00 UK time)\, for a two-hour session that typically features two talks (each 40 minutes plus 15 minutes Q&\;A). \;
\n\;Talk 1
\nTalk 2
\nOct 14\, 16-18 UK
\nRedesigning Ethical Thought Experiments: Reassessing the Experimental Challenge to Moral Intuition\, Pietro Tunesi (Trinity College Dublin)
\nWhat people (don't) want to know in the moral domain\, Jordan Wylie (Cornell University)\, Nathan Liang (Cornell University)\, and Charlotte Austin (Cornell University)
\nNov 11\, 16-18 UK
\nMoral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging: An Experimental Investigation\, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (Aarhus University)\, Kevin Reuter (University of Gothenburg)\, Somogy Varga (Aarhus University)\,
\nThe Side-Effect Effect and &ldquo\;Intentionally&rdquo\;\, Lilian O&rsquo\;Brien (Tampere University\, University of Helsinki)\, Svetlana Vetchinnikova (University of Helsinki).
\nDec 9\, 16-18 UK
\nMischaracterization Objection 2.0\, David Bordonaba-Plou (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)\, Krzysztof Sękowski (University of Warsaw)
\nFrom Thought Experiments to Experimental Evidence: Transparency and Quality of Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Bartosz Maćkiewicz (University of Warsaw)\, Katarzyna Kuś (University of Warsaw)\, Joanna Gęgotek (University of Warsaw)\, Monika Gurak (University of Warsaw)\, and Franciszek Kittel (University of Warsaw).
\nJan 13\, 16-18 UK
\nNARRABODY: Narrative and Body in Post-Stroke Selfhood. A Longitudinal Qualitative Study\, Camille Lé\;pingle (ENS de Lyon)
\nA cross-cultural\, qualitative study on HPV vaccination intention\, Konrad Henne (University of Heidelberg)\, Alejandra Petino Zappala (Ruhr University Bochum)\, Nora Heinzelmann (University of Heidelberg)
\nFeb 10\, 16-18 UK
\nDo subjects have revelation intuitions?\, Marcus Ashby (King&rsquo\;s College London)
\nCorrect\, incorrect\, or does it depend? Demonstrating and explaining variation in folk metanormative judgment\, Mikló\;s Kü\;rthy (University of Graz)\, Geoffrey Goodwin (University of Pennsylvania)\, Paulo Sousa (Queen's University Belfast).
\nTo submit for future series\, please email the organizers an abstract of up to 500 words by Dec 15\, 2026 to james.andow@manchester.ac.uk.
\nThis series is organised by:
\nEugen Fischer (UEA)
\nJoanna Demaree-Cotton (Oxford)
\nJames Andow (Manchester)
ORGANIZER;CN=James Andow;CN=Joanna Demaree-Cotton;CN=Eugen Fischer: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261112T140000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261114T170000 SUMMARY:Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop\, CFA UID:20260925T194747Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Copenhagen\, Denmark DESCRIPTION:Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop
\nPhilosophers working on praise and praiseworthiness are invited to submit abstracts for a workshop on these topics\, to be held in Copenhagen in the fall of 2026\, specifically November 12-14. Abstracts on the nature \;of praise and the nature of praiseworthiness are especially welcome. (Submissions on other praise-related issues-- e.g. the morality of praise-- will be considered\, however.)
\nThe intention is to workshop papers for a praise-themed issue of \;Oxford Studies in Agency &\; Responsibility. \;Selected abstracts must be \;promised \;to this special themed issue of OSAR. They cannot be submitted elsewhere\, and if accepted\, they must be committed to OSAR.
\nWhile workshop dinners will be covered\, funds unfortunately are not available to assist with travel or accommodation.
\nThe timeline of important dates and deadlines is as follows:
\n-Abstract due (500-1000 words): April 30\, 2026
\n-Notification concerning acceptance: May 30\, 2026
\n-First draft due (to be circulated amongst workshop participants): October 21\, 2026
\n-Workshop dates: November 12-14\, 2026
\n-Revised draft due: sometime in February 2027
\nThe papers will then be sent out by OUP for vetting and\, once returned\, contributors may make further changes. The praise-themed edition of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is expected to be in print 2028. \;
\nAnonymized abstracts (of 500-1000 words) should be submitted to \;praiseworkshop2026@gmail.com \;by the end of April 30 (last time zone on Earth).
\n
Confirmed Presenters:
Jules Holroyd
\nKasper Lippert-Rasmussen
\nZoë\; Johnson King
\nVictoria McGeer
\nColeen Macnamara
\nLeo Menges and Leonie Eichhorn
\nDana Nelkin
\nDavid Shoemaker
\nDaniel Telech
\n
\;
CALL FOR PAPERS
The Philosophy of Animal Minds and Behaviour Association (PAMBA) invites submissions of abstracts for its 2027 biennial meeting\, which will be held at the University of Warwick on April 27th-29th 2027. Abstracts can be on any topics in the field of philosophy of animal minds to be presented as a paper or poster. Abstracts must be fully anonymized\, no longer than 1000 words and submitted by January 7th 2027 to PAMBA.Warwick@gmail.com.
All submissions will be considered for both talk and poster presentations. If you do not wish your submission to be considered for one of the formats\, please make this clear in your submission email. \;
The subject line of your email must read 'PAMBA abstract submission'.
If you qualify for the PAMBA Prize and also wish to submit a full paper\, please follow the instructions below. \;
PAMBA PRIZE
We are also pleased to invite submissions for the PAMBA Prize essay in any area of the philosophy of animal minds. The winning essay will be published in Biology &\; Philosophy and the winner will be awarded an invitation to present the paper as a keynote talk at the PAMBA meeting at Warwick. We will additionally cover travel expenses of up to £\;1500 to offset travel costs to the PAMBA conference. The paper must be under 10\,000 words and meet the Biology &\; Philosophy submission guidelines.
The competition is open to early-career researchers\, defined as PhD students or those who are within five years of receiving their PhDs (i.e.\, the PhD should have been received in January 2020 or later).
Submissions on all aspects of the philosophy of animal minds are welcome. \;
Please send submissions with the subject line 'PAMBA Prize submission' to PAMBA.Warwick@gmail.com. For any questions\, please email us at the same address. \;
If you want your PAMBA prize submission to be considered for a poster or talk at the PAMBA conference\, please also submit an abstract to the main conference email as above.
The deadline is by January 7th 2027.
Conference description
\nIt is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\, \; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.
\nThis conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency. We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.
\nWe invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.
\nPossible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Relational nature of personhood
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collectives and ontological unity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Categorisation of group agency
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective emotions
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective justice
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Groups and moral responsibility
\n·\; \; \; \; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience
\nConfirmed keynote speakers:
\nThornton Lockwood (University of Florida)
\nSophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)
\n\nSubmission guidelines
\nSubmission deadline and acceptance notification
\nThe abstracts must be submitted by Monday 1st June 2026.
\nThe acceptance notifications might be expected after Tuesday 30th June 2026.
\nSubmission procedure
\nWe invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.
\nPlease write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.
\nThe abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com
\nPaper delivery
\nAll the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.
\nOther practicalities
\nPlease note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.
\nLunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.
\nOrganisers
\nThis conference is part of the research project &ldquo\;Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory&rdquo\; (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20270303T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20270305T170000 SUMMARY:Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions UID:20260925T194750Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:Europe/Vienna LOCATION:Graz\, Austria\, 8010 ORGANIZER;CN="Denis Džanić";CN=Emanuela Carta;CN=Daniel Neumann: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20270516T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20270523T170000 SUMMARY:The 2027 Annual Meeting of the American Comparative Literature Association UID:20260925T194751Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:4302 University Dr\, Houston\, United States\, 77004 DESCRIPTION:https://www.acla.org/annual-meeting\nhttps://www.acla.org/seminar/875d9da0-735b-4676-ab1f-fff5c023f669\nhttps://www.acla.org/cfp/70fe7418-c14a-468d-be1d-809e878f2e00/seminars\n ORGANIZER;CN=Vivien Jiaqian Zhu: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20270516T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20270523T170000 SUMMARY:The 2027 Annual Meeting of the American Comparative Literature Association UID:20260925T194752Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:4302 University Dr\, Houston\, United States\, 77004 DESCRIPTION:https://www.acla.org/annual-meeting https://www.acla.org/seminar/875d9da0-735b-4676-ab1f-fff5c023f669 https://www.acla.org/cfp/70fe7418-c14a-468d-be1d-809e878f2e00/seminars
ORGANIZER;CN=Vivien Jiaqian Zhu: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183254Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270601T000000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270601T000000 SUMMARY:Collective Agency in Classical and Continental Philosophy (Vilnius\, 2027) UID:20260925T194753Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:Europe/Vilnius LOCATION:Vilnius\, Lithuania DESCRIPTION:Conference description
\nIt is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\, \; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.
\nThis conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency. We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.
\nWe invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.
\nPossible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Relational nature of personhood
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collectives and ontological unity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Categorisation of group agency
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective emotions
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective justice
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Groups and moral responsibility
\n·\; \; \; \; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience
\nConfirmed keynote speakers:
\nThornton Lockwood (University of Florida)
\nSophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)
\n\nSubmission guidelines
\nSubmission deadline and acceptance notification
\nThe abstracts must be submitted by Monday 1st June 2026.
\nThe acceptance notifications might be expected after Tuesday 30th June 2026.
\nSubmission procedure
\nWe invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.
\nPlease write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.
\nThe abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com
\nPaper delivery
\nAll the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.
\nOther practicalities
\nPlease note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.
\nLunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.
\nOrganisers
\nThis conference is part of the research project &ldquo\;Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory&rdquo\; (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260925T183255Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:29990101T033000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:29990201T120000 SUMMARY:POSTPONED - Creativity and Improvisation in Thought\, Practice\, and Mind: An Interdisciplinary Conference UID:20260925T194754Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:6001 Dodge Street\, Omaha\, United States\, 68182 DESCRIPTION:*Please note that this event has officially been postponed. More information will be made available asap in the near future*
\nMany human cognitive capacities and processes may be deployed creatively\, from unique choices made for oneself up through novel cultural shifts. Similarly\, large swaths of our daily lives are taken up with performing spontaneous\, on-the-fly\, and unplanned activities that are\, in a word\, improvised. \; Charting out the nature of both creativity and improvisation\, taken individually or together\, remains an open and pressing issue. In this conference\, we will delve into various philosophical\, theoretical\, empirical\, and interdisciplinary issues that are related to creativity and improvisation. A non-exhaustive list of related questions and themes for this topic include:
\n- What is the relationship between improvisation and creativity?
\n- What is the relationship between creative activity and well-being?
\n- What is the best way to model individual and collective creativity?
\n- Is creativity in the arts the same thing as in other domains\, such as in science or business?
\n- What are the pros and cons of different scientific operationalizations of creativity and improvisation?
\n- Provide a conceptual analysis of creativity and/or improvisation.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR