BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194828Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261005T113000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261130T170000
SUMMARY:Computational Social Philosophy of AI Seminars (CSPAIS 2026)
UID:20261013T044001Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>Computational methods and simulations have become a fruitful methodology for philosophers\, particularly for understanding how social relations\, norms\, and communicative structures could and should shape inquiry. Work in computational social philosophy has illuminated phenomena ranging from the epistemic value of diversity and the dynamics of epistemic belonging to the emergence and erosion of norms and processes of polarization.</p>\n<p>Generative and agentic AI tools stand to profoundly reshape computational social philosophy in at least two ways:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>As objects of study for computational social philosophy. Generative and agentic AI are increasingly embedded in epistemic life: as sources of information\, interlocutors\, surrogates for social participants\, gatekeepers within epistemic communities\, and even partially autonomous epistemic actors. This should motivate a broadening of purview in social epistemology\, which has tended to focus primarily on personal\, interpersonal\, and institutional factors that impact inquiry\, but comparatively less on technological factors.&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>As tools of study for computational social philosophy. These systems can lower the technical barriers to computational work. More interestingly\, they may expand the range of social phenomena philosophers can model\, including richer representations of agents&rsquo\; beliefs and behavior\, more complex interactions and environments\, and even digital-twin-style models of particular communities or institutions.</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>This cluster brings together philosophers working in\, or seriously engaging with\, computational social philosophy. We are eager to gather a cohort who can bring rigor\, clarity\, and intellectual generosity to advancing understanding in relation to the above themes.</p>\n<p>We&rsquo\;re particularly interested in philosophical contributions that engage one or more of the following cross-cutting threads:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Modeling of AI systems as socio-epistemic phenomena</strong>: How might explicitly modeling the effects of AI systems within social epistemic processes challenge\, deepen\, or expand existing understanding in social epistemology and philosophy of science?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Modeling of socio-epistemic phenomena with AI-based tools</strong>: What new forms of social epistemological phenomena can AI-based tools help us represent and investigate beyond traditional methods\, such as typical agent-based models?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Understanding aims and tradeoffs</strong>: How should we think about the tradeoffs between promises of AI-based tools (e.g.\, flexibility\, expressive power\, scale) and other desiderata (e.g.\, robustness\, justification\, tractability\, understanding) that have long been central to computational social philosophy? What can we learn about these issues from the use of AI-based tools in other disciplines such as computational social science?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Methodological standards</strong>: What standards should guide reliable\, reproducible\, and more generally epistemically and ethically responsible philosophical inquiry using AI-based methods in computational social philosophy?</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Please note that\, while we welcome expressions of interest from all disciplines\, this is not a general workshop about AI or AI-based simulations. It is a workshop about how deeper engagement with AI systems as objects of modeling studies and as a modeling tool can ultimately enrich and expand philosophical inquiry.</p>\n<p><strong>Format</strong></p>\n<p>The series will consist of bi-weekly virtual meetings\, in the style of CSPS\, starting in October 2026.The meetings are on Mondays at 11:30am ET.</p>\n<p><strong>Applications</strong></p>\n<p>You can submit your application to join the seminars by using this application form: https://forms.gle/SC2iqbZUBU6iB52v6&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The application form includes:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Basic details: Your name\, email address\, affiliation\, career stage</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Extended abstracts of up to 750 words and prepared for anonymous review (no identifying information in the abstract itself).</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The submission deadline for applications is <strong>July 27th\, 2026.</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Organizers</strong></p>\n<p>Sina Fazelpour (Northeastern)</p>\n<p>Luca Garzino Demo (UPenn)&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Please direct inquiries to lgarzino@sas.upenn.edu</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sina Fazelpour;CN=Luca Garzino Demo:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261006T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261007T170000
SUMMARY:The Nature of Social Identities: Metaphysics\, Epistemology\, and Politics
UID:20261013T044002Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Prague
LOCATION:Arna Nováka 1\, Brno \, Czech Republic\, 60200
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Department of Philosophy\, Faculty of Arts\, Masaryk University in Brno\, Czech Republic\, invites submissions for a conference on the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of social identities\, organised within the research project Identity Politics: Metaphysics and Epistemology.</p>\n<p><strong>Conference Theme</strong></p>\n<p>In recent decades\, political and social debates have increasingly focused on identity-based groups defined by characteristics such as race\, gender\, sexual orientation\, disability\, class\, religion\, or age. These developments have generated extensive discussion in political philosophy and social theory. However\, many of the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions underlying identity politics remain insufficiently examined.</p>\n<p>This conference aims to investigate the nature\, constitution\, and epistemic role of social identities. In particular\, we seek to explore the mechanisms through which identities emerge as robust social and political entities\, and the ways in which identity-related features&mdash\;such as lived experience\, self-identification\, social recognition\, and shared narratives&mdash\;contribute to their formation and persistence.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Another central aim is to examine whether different identities (for example\, race\, gender\, sexual orientation\, or class) are constituted through similar or distinct metaphysical and epistemic mechanisms. Comparative approaches that analyse similarities and differences across identities are especially welcome.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The conference will also address the epistemological aspects of social identities\, including questions concerning situated knowledge\, epistemic authority\, intersectionality\, and conflicts among different socially situated perspectives.</p>\n<p><strong>Topics</strong></p>\n<p>Possible topics include\, but are not limited to:</p>\n<p>Metaphysics of Social and Political Identities</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Social construction of identity categories</li>\n<li>Relations between biological facts and socially constructed identities</li>\n<li>The &ldquo\;reality&rdquo\; of socially constructed kinds</li>\n<li>Narrative coherence and the unity of political identities</li>\n<li>Self-identification\, authenticity\, and identity formation</li>\n<li>Identity boundaries and the possibility of passing</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Epistemology of Social Identity</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Epistemic authority of lived experience</li>\n<li>Insider/outsider epistemology</li>\n<li>Epistemic injustice and social bias</li>\n<li>Intersectionality and epistemic norms</li>\n<li>Argumentation and epistemic authority</li>\n<li>Incommensurability between identity-based perspectives</li>\n<li>Identity as epistemic authority</li>\n<li>The rights and responsibilities of epistemic communities.&nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Submissions from metaphysics\, epistemology\, social philosophy\, feminist philosophy\, philosophy of race\, and related areas are welcome.</p>\n<p><strong>Keynote speaker</strong>: Kristina Rolin (Tampere University)</p>\n<p><strong>Submission Guidelines</strong></p>\n<p>Please submit an anonymous abstract of 400&ndash\;500 words.</p>\n<p>The submission should be attached to the email in .pdf format and prepared for blind review. Please include the following information separately in the body of the email: your name(s)\, affiliation(s)\, contact information\, the title of your talk.</p>\n<p><strong>Important Dates</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Abstract submission deadline</strong>: June 20\, 2026</li>\n<li><strong>Notification of acceptance</strong>: July 30\, 2026</li>\n<li><strong>Conference dates</strong>: October 6&ndash\;7\, 2026</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Conference Details</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Location</strong>: Department of Philosophy\, Faculty of Arts\, Masaryk University\, Brno\, Czech Republic (Arna Nov&aacute\;ka 1\, 602 00 Brno)</li>\n<li><strong>Format</strong>: in-person</li>\n<li><strong>Language of the conference</strong>: English</li>\n<li><strong>Conference fee</strong>: 50 EUR. The conference fee is intended solely to cover catering costs during the event (coffee breaks and refreshments) and the conference dinner. The venue is provided by the host department\, and all conference materials will be distributed electronically. Participants who wish to attend only the talks\, not the conference dinner\, may contact the organisers to arrange a reduced fee.</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Submission</strong></p>\n<p>Please send submissions to: belohrad@phil.muni.cz</p>\n<p><strong>Contact</strong></p>\n<p>For inquiries\, please contact: Radim Bělohrad\, Ph.D. (belohrad@phil.muni.cz)</p>\n<p><strong>Organizing committee</strong></p>\n<p>Radim Bělohrad\, Ph.D.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Zdeňka Jastrzembsk&aacute\;\, Ph.D.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Marek Picha\, Ph.D.</p>\n<p>Dagmar Pichov&aacute\;\, Ph.D.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Radim Belohrad:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261007T234500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261007T234500
SUMMARY:9th Annual Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop
UID:20261013T044003Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Caldwell Hall\, Chapel Hill\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>We invite submissions of abstracts for the 2027 Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop\, to be held on March 26-27\, 2027. (Please note that this year's workshop\, unfortunately and unavoidably\, conflicts with the Pacific APA.) Abstracts should be between 750-1000 words (inclusive of footnotes but exclusive of any bibliography) and should summarize a paper that can be presented in no more than 40 minutes. The title of the paper should be included <strong>within </strong>the document above the abstract. Please prepare your abstract for anonymous review\, and submit it in .pdf or .docx form to <a href="mailto:chnormativity@gmail.com">chnormativity@gmail.com</a> by October 7th\, 2026.</p>\n<p>We will consider papers on any aspect of normativity\, construed broadly to include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>The traditional questions of metaethics</li>\n<li>The nature of other (possible) kinds of normativity (prudential\, epistemic\, aesthetic\, political\, legal\, etc.)</li>\n<li>More abstract and general questions within first-order normative theory</li>\n<li>Theories of reasons\, rationality\, and reasoning</li>\n<li>The semantics and pragmatics of normative language</li>\n<li>The psychology of normative judgment</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Those who presented papers at the last two Normativity Workshops (the 8th annual workshop\, held in 2026\; and the 7th annual workshop\, held in 2025) are not eligible to submit papers this year. Those who chaired/commented at the last two workshops\, or who presented at previous workshops\, <em>are</em> eligible to submit. There is a limit of one submission per person\; co-authored papers count toward this limit.</p>\n<p>For the eighth workshop running\, papers accepted to the workshop will be eligible for publication in a special issue of <em>Philosophical Studies</em>. Authors of accepted papers are encouraged\, but not required\, to submit their papers to the special issue.</p>\n<p>The authors of the seven best abstracts <em>not</em> selected for the workshop will be invited to chair a session at the workshop and\, as part of that\, to act as a "mini-commentator"\, asking an extended (3-5 minute) first question. In order to facilitate this\, we will ask authors of accepted papers to send their chair-commentators a draft of their full paper by March 1st.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Chris Howard;CN=Margaret Shea;CN=Alex Worsnip:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261009T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261009T181500
SUMMARY:Making Room for Voluntary Belief: Belief\, Choice\, and Epistemic Options
UID:20261013T044004Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Newark\, United States
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T090000
SUMMARY:Arkete: Philosophy of Perception: Representation\, Reality\, and Cognitive Structure
UID:20261013T044005Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Arkete</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Special Issue 2026</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Philosophy of Perception: Representation\, Reality\, and Cognitive Structure</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Editors:</strong> Mariano Bianca (University of Siena) and Paolo Piccari (University of Siena)</p>\n<p>Philosophical reflection on perception has returned to the centre of contemporary debates in philosophy of mind\, epistemology\, and metaphysics. Questions concerning perceptual content\, representational structure\, and the relation between experience and reality have gained renewed prominence in light of current discussions on cognition\, conceptual capacities\, and the epistemic role of perception.</p>\n<p>At the same time\, the field remains divided between competing models: representationalist accounts\, relational theories\, disjunctivism\, and naturalistic approaches that attempt to explain perception through cognitive or computational frameworks. These debates raise a deeper philosophical question: whether perception should be understood primarily as an internal mental state or rather as a structured form of access to an objective world.</p>\n<p>This special issue aims to gather contributions that investigate perception as a cognitive and conceptual phenomenon with epistemic and metaphysical implications. Particular attention will be devoted to approaches that combine analytic rigour with broader theoretical ambition\, exploring how perceptual experience contributes to the constitution of knowledge and to the articulation of reality.</p>\n<p>We welcome contributions addressing these questions\, preferably grounded in concrete cases and/or examples that help clarify and support philosophical analysis.</p>\n<p><strong>Topics for Submission (including\, but not limited to)</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>The nature of perceptual representation</li>\n<li>Conceptual vs. non-conceptual content</li>\n<li>Perceptual content and cognitive architecture</li>\n<li>Perception and realism</li>\n<li>Relationalism\, representationalism\, and disjunctivism</li>\n<li>Perceptual justification and epistemic normativity</li>\n<li>Perception and ordinary knowledge</li>\n<li>Similarity and structural models of representation</li>\n<li>Perception\, categorisation\, and concept formation</li>\n<li>Perception and mental representation in cognitive science</li>\n<li>Illusion\, hallucination\, and theories of error</li>\n<li>The metaphysical implications of perceptual theories</li>\n<li>Perception and the structure of reality</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Submission Guidelines</strong></p>\n<p>Submissions must be original and unpublished\, written in English or Italian\, and formatted according to the journal&rsquo\;s editorial guidelines. All manuscripts will undergo double-blind peer review.</p>\n<p>The 2025 issue of <em>Arkete</em> will be dedicated to these questions. The volume will include articles selected through this Call for Papers as well as invited contributions by national and international scholars.</p>\n<p>All submissions must be sent no later than <strong>15 October 2026</strong> to the Editors at:</p>\n<p>mariano.bianca@unisi.it<br> paolo.piccari@unisi.it</p>\n<p>Manuscripts must conform to the editorial guidelines available at:<br> <a target="_new">https://www.arkete.it</a></p>\n<p>Accepted languages: English and Italian.</p>\n<p>Maximum length: <strong>40\,000 characters</strong> (including spaces\, footnotes\, references\, and abstract).</p>\n<p>Each submission must include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>an abstract (max. 150 words\, in English)</li>\n<li>5&ndash\;6 keywords (in English)</li>\n<li>the anonymised manuscript prepared for blind review</li>\n</ul>\n<p>In a separate file attached to the same email\, authors must provide:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>name and surname</li>\n<li>institutional affiliation</li>\n<li>email address</li>\n<li>title of the paper</li>\n<li>abstract and keywords</li>\n</ul>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T234500
SUMMARY:Postdoctoral Position in Logic\, Probability\, and Rationality CLE–UNICAMP\, Brazil
UID:20261013T044006Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:Call for Applications\nThe Centre for Logic\, Epistemology and the History of Science (CLE) at\nUNICAMP. Brazil\, invites applications for a postdoctoral position\,\nfunded by FAPESP\, under the supervision of Prof. Walter Carnielli. The\nposition is linked to the FAPESP Thematic Project "Rationality\, Logic\nand Probability &ndash\; RatioLog" (Process 2020/16353-3).\n&nbsp\;\nInternational candidates\, regardless of nationality or any other\ncondition\, are welcome to apply.\n&nbsp\;\nCLE-UNICAMP is one of the first and highest-ranked academic\ninstitutions in Latin America fully dedicated to the areas of Logic\,\nEpistemology\, Philosophy\, and the History of Science\, promoting\ninterdisciplinary research through seminars and scientific meetings\,\npublications\, and academic exchange with research groups and\ninstitutions in Brazil and around the world.\n&nbsp\;\nProject: Logic\, Probability and Rationality: Tools for Robust Reasoning\n&nbsp\;\nThis project develops a unified framework combining logic\,\nprobability\, and causal inference to support robust models of rational\nreasoning. It aims to integrate paraconsistent and paracomplete logics\n(particularly Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Logics of Evidence\nand Truth) with Bayesian inference and Pearl's causal models\,\naddressing reasoning under contradiction\, uncertainty\, and\nintervention.\nMain objectives:\n&nbsp\;\n--Develop semantic frameworks combining non-classical logics with\nprobabilistic reasoning and causal inference\n-- Extend Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and Logics of Evidence\nand Truth (LETs) with probabilistic and causal operators\n--Formalize rational argumentation involving contradictory\, uncertain\,\nand counterfactual reasoning\n-- Implement prototype software integrating logical\, probabilistic\,\nand causal inference tools\n- To organize\,  and participate\, in seminars\, conferences and  workshops\, and  maintain a  high   rate of publications\n&nbsp\;\nCandidate requirements:\n&nbsp\;\nApplicants should have a strong publication record in international\njournals and demonstrated expertise in at least three of the following\nareas:\n&nbsp\;\n1)Non-classical logics\, including their semantics and proof methods\n2)Probability theory and its mathematical and philosophical foundations\n3)Foundations of AI\n4)Theoretical and/or applied computer science\n5)Abstract algebraic logic\n&nbsp\;\nCandidates must hold a PhD in Logic\, Mathematics\, Computer Science\, or\nPhilosophy\; the thesis must be in the area of Logic and must be\nofficially approved at the time of application.\n&nbsp\;\nRequired documentation:\n1)A research project along the lines described above (up to 10 pages\,\nexcluding bibliographical references)\n2)A complete CV\, including a list of publications\n3)A Curricular Summary\, following FAPESP's required format:\nhttps://fapesp.br/6351/instructions-for-the-elaboration-of-a-curricular-summary\n4)Certificate of Completion of the Doctoral Degree\n5) At least one recommendation letter\n&nbsp\;\nHow to apply:\nAll applications must be sent by e-mail with the subject line "PD\nPosition at CLE/FAPESP Project RatioLog" to:\nProf. Walter Carnielli walterac@unicamp.br>\nwith a copy to:\nMr. Rodrigo Cesar da Silva (CLE administrative assistant) rcsilva2@unicamp.br>\n&nbsp\;\nFellowship benefits:\n- Duration: 12 months\, renewable for 12 months\n- Stipend: BRL 12\,570.00 per month (approx. US$ 2\,450.00 per month)\, tax-free\n- Technical Reserve (additional funding for scientific activities such\nas conferences\, academic visits\, equipment\, books\, etc.): BRL\n15\,000.00 per year (approx. US$ 2\,900.00 per year)\, tax-free\n- Possibility of a 6-month research stay abroad at a renowned\ninstitution (Research Internship Abroad\, RIA)\, subject to specific\nconditions\, upon approval by FAPESP and by the supervisor.\n&nbsp\;\nApplication deadline: October 15th\, 2026\, 23:59 (S&atilde\;o Paulo time)\nEstimated project start date: January 30th\, 2027\n&nbsp\;\nFor more information\, visit the RatioLog project website:\nhttps://groupfortheoreticalandappliedlogic.my.canva.site/ratiolog2\n&nbsp\;\nFor additional information\, please contact: Walter Carnielliwalterac@unicamp.br>\n&nbsp\;
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261015T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261015T170000
SUMMARY:JAM (Junkyard Anniversary Meeting) - Philosophy of Imagination Conference
UID:20261013T044007Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Los_Angeles
LOCATION:The Kravis Center\, Claremont\, United States\, 91711
DESCRIPTION:<p>A philosophy of imagination conference to commemorate the 10th anniversary of The Junkyard blog. In addition to the invited speakers\, there will be a number of contributed sessions.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p>JAM will include parallel sessions for submitted papers selected via an open call. Papers should be anonymized and no more than 3000 words (not including references). Philosophical papers on all topics concerning imagination are welcome. The submission deadline is <strong>October 15</strong>. Notification of paper status will be provided by December 1. A limited number of partial travel stipends are available for early career researchers and scholars residing outside the United States.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Symposium Proposals</strong></p>\n<p>JAM also has limited spots for submitted symposia selected via an open call. Symposia on all philosophical themes concerning imagination are welcome. The submission deadline is <strong>October 15</strong>. Notification of proposal status will be provided by December 1. A symposium should contain 3 papers and may also include up to two discussants and a chair (if you do not specify a chair\, one will be assigned to you).&nbsp\;&nbsp\;Symposium proposals should be anonymized\, and they should&nbsp\;explain the theme of the symposium and include extended abstracts of each of the three symposium papers (1000 words each).&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Amy Kind:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261016T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261017T170000
SUMMARY:13th Biennial Graduate Epistemology Conference\, University of Rochester
UID:20261013T044008Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Rochester\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Conference Details</strong></p>\n<p>The University of Rochester Department of Philosophy invites graduate students to submit to the 13th Biennial Graduate Epistemology Conference. We welcome submissions in the field of analytic epistemology\, broadly construed. Such submissions can include papers that address epistemological issues in philosophy of science\, ethics\, philosophy of mind\, philosophy of language\, philosophy of religion\, or metaphysics.</p>\n<p><strong>Contact</strong></p>\n<p>For questions\, comments\, and concerns\, please message the organizers at <a href="mailto:rochestergec@gmail.com">rochestergec@gmail.com</a>.</p>\n<p>The conference call for papers can be found at:&nbsp\;<a href="../show/150733">CFP: 13th Biennial Graduate Epistemology Conference\, University of Rochester - PhilEvents</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Harry Golborn;CN=Adam DeDobbelaere;CN=Evan Lopes;CN=Zane Duzant:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261019T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261019T180000
SUMMARY:Reasons are States of Affairs
UID:20261013T044009Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are pleased to announce our monthly&nbsp\;<em>online</em>&nbsp\;talk series on "<strong>Inferences &amp\; Capacities</strong>."<br><br>Our next speaker is:<br><br></p>\n<p><strong>Eva Schmidt</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund)<br><strong>Reasons are States of Affairs</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Oct 19</strong>:<em>&nbsp\;11am (Buenos Aires)\, 10am (New York)\, 4pm (Berlin).</em></p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:</strong>&nbsp\;Reasons have a double role\, a normative role: they count in favor of belief or action\; and an explanatory role: they provide a rational explanation of a subject&rsquo\;s beliefs or actions. These roles pull in different directions regarding the question of the metaphysical nature of reasons&ndash\; are they states of affairs or (true) propositions? Here\, we support the states of affairs view. We <em>first</em> present an argument starting from the particular case of reasons which are available to semantically unsophisticated subjects who do not possess any semantic concepts (such as &ldquo\;truth&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;reference&rdquo\;). We argue that the reasons to which such subjects respond are states of affairs\, and that\, by extension\,&nbsp\; so are the reasons of more sophisticated subjects. <em>Second</em>\, we undermine arguments for the claim that reasons are propositions &ndash\; or specifically\, fine-grained Fregean propositions. Such arguments appeal to specific cases in which epistemic justification or reason explanation differs in fine-grained ways\, apparently corresponding to differences between the Fregean propositions that are the reasons in these cases. Further arguments appeal to the need of a content-relation between reasons and the supported responses\, which apparently only Fregean propositions can explain and to the nature of (inferential) justification.</p>\n\n<p><strong>How to participate</strong>:&nbsp\;Please\, send an email to <strong>Alfredo Vernazzani</strong> at:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>alfredo-vernazzani AT protonmail.com</p>\n<p>_______</p>\n<ul>\n<li>About&nbsp\;<strong>Inferences &amp\; Capacities</strong>:</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The series brings together work on inferential capacities\, rationality\, normativity\, and cognition &mdash\; across both human and non-human animals &mdash\; with the aim of fostering discussion on the nature and limits of the cognitive sphere. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>2026 line-up: &nbsp\;<br><br></p>\n<p>April 27:&nbsp\;<strong>Angelica Kaufmann</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Milan): "Mind Blanking as Mental Imagery."&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>May 18:&nbsp\;<strong>Federico Burdman</strong>&nbsp\;(Universidad Alberto Hurtado) "Constrained choices: addiction\, attention\, and reasons-responsiveness."&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>June 22:&nbsp\;<strong>Susanna Schellenberg</strong>&nbsp\;(Rutgers): TBA&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>July 20:&nbsp\;<strong>Cameron Buckner</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Florida): "Chains-of-Thought\, Inner Speech\, and Artificial Epistemic Agency."</p>\n<p>September 7:&nbsp\;<strong>Ulf Hlobil</strong>&nbsp\;(Concordia University): TBA &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>October 19:<strong>&nbsp\;Eva Schmidt</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund): TBA&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>November 16:&nbsp\;<strong>Hans-Johann Glock</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Z&uuml\;rich): "Is Ascribing Inferences to Brains or Non-human Animals a Fallacy?"&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>December 14:&nbsp\;<strong>Emma Borg</strong>&nbsp\;(SAS\, University of London): "Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: The Scope of Common-Sense Psychology."&nbsp\;<br><br></p>\n<p>Each talk lasts c. 40 minutes followed by 40 minutes open Q&amp\;A. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The series is co-organized by:</p>\n<p><strong>Mariela Aguilera</strong>&nbsp\;(University of C&oacute\;rdoba)</p>\n<p><strong>Mat&iacute\;as Osta-V&eacute\;lez</strong>&nbsp\;(Universidad de la Rep&uacute\;blica)</p>\n<p><strong>Alfredo Vernazzani</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund\; Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg).</p>\n<p>Visit our website:&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Alfredo Vernazzani;CN=Mariela Aguilera;CN="Matías Osta Vélez":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261021T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261021T170000
SUMMARY:Deep Disagreement and the Limits of Argumentation
UID:20261013T044010Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Prague
LOCATION:Klemensova 19\, Bratislava\, Slovakia\, 81109
DESCRIPTION:<p>We invite submissions of abstracts for a one-day symposium exploring the nature and consequences of deep disagreement for argumentation theory. When interlocutors lack shared premises\, standards of evidence\, or even criteria for what counts as a good argument\, what &mdash\; if anything &mdash\; can argumentation still accomplish?</p>\n<p>Keynote Speaker: Scott F. Aikin (Vanderbilt University) &mdash\; "Deep Disagreement and the Owl of Minerva Problem"</p>\n<p>Topics of interest include:</p>\n<p>- The nature and scope of deep disagreement</p>\n<p>- Epistemic and argumentative responses to fundamental disagreement</p>\n<p>- The limits of rational persuasion</p>\n<p>- Deep disagreement in political\, moral\, and religious contexts</p>\n<p>- The role of argumentation in polarized discourse</p>\n<p>- Argumentation and epistemic agency under conditions of disagreement</p>\n<p>Submission Guidelines: Please submit an abstract of 300&ndash\;500 words to deepdisagreement2026@gmail.com by June 30\, 2026. Include your name\, affiliation\, and contact details in the body of the email.</p>\n<p>Notification of acceptance: August 1\, 2026.</p>\n<p>There is no registration fee.</p>\n<p>Organizer: Tom&aacute\;&scaron\; Koll&aacute\;rik (Institute of Philosophy\, Slovak Academy of Sciences)</p>\n<p>Contact: deepdisagreement2026@gmail.com</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Tomas Kollarik:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261022T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261024T170000
SUMMARY:Rationality and Normativity Conference
UID:20261013T044011Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Prague
LOCATION:nám. Svobody 331/2\, Hradec Králové\, Czech Republic
DESCRIPTION:<p>The conference is on the nature of rationality and its relation to normativity\, especially on how rationality and reasons generate norms for what to believe\, trust or doubt. Rationality provides norms governing our thinking\, not only in general (do not form incoherent beliefs)\, but also in specific cases (do not trust that obvious conman). Which reasons the agent does or does not possess\, and their quality\, is also important. This conference aims at bringing together experts on these topics and shed light on these phenomena.</p>\n<p>Getting a clear picture of what rationality and reasons are and what norms they place on our thinking can aid with applied philosophical issues as well. For example\, is conspiracy thinking\, distrust towards scientific experts or falling for fake news irrational? If so\, which rational norms are violated exactly\, and under which circumstances? What does the rational standing of people who engage in these potentially irrational processes teach us about why they engage in them\, and what if anything we should do to combat these phenomena?</p>\n<p>Organization</p>\n<p>Organization committee:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Auke Montessori\, Jaroslav Mal&iacute\;k\, Zuzana Votavov&aacute\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Contact:</p>\n<p>https://ff.uhk.cz/rationalityandnorms/#contact&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>This conference is organized by the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences\, Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Hradec Kr&aacute\;lov&eacute\;\, as part of the project:</p>\n<p>Knowledge in the Age of Distrust</p>\n<p>Funded by the Ministry of Education\, Youth and Sports (Czech Republic). Co-funded by the European Union.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Auke Montessori:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261029T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261030T170000
SUMMARY:Difficult Actions: Definition\, Value\, and Rationality
UID:20261013T044012Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
LOCATION:De Boelelaan 1109\, Amsterdam\, Netherlands\, 1081 HV
DESCRIPTION:<p>The workshop aims to explore the growing research on "difficult actions" &ndash\; actions sometimes described as "against the odds".&nbsp\; Such actions encompass a wide range of human endeavours\, from physically demanding feats to emotionally taxing decisions\, morally challenging dilemmas\, and epistemically uncertain undertakings. This workshop will delve into how these actions are conceived\, what makes them particularly challenging\, and the ethical and epistemic considerations involved in their pursuit.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The workshop will address three core themes:&nbsp\; 1) &lrm\;Defining Difficult Actions:&nbsp\;We will&nbsp\;seek&nbsp\;to&nbsp\;establish&nbsp\;a robust definition of "difficult actions\," examining various philosophical accounts and exploring the commonalities and distinctions between different forms of difficulty in action.&nbsp\; 2) Exploring the Value of Difficult Actions:&nbsp\;We will delve into what - if anything - makes difficult actions valuable and under what conditions. 3) Exploring the Rationality of Difficult Actions: We will ask how it can be rational to pursue a difficult action.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Call for Abstracts:&nbsp\; We invite submissions by scholars from various philosophical sub-disciplines as well as from psychology and economics (or related fields) to contribute to a deeper understanding of the definition\, value\, and rationality of such actions.&nbsp\; Abstracts should be between 800&ndash\;1\,000 words and address any aspect of difficult actions\, broadly construed.&nbsp\;We&nbsp\;particularly welcome contributions from members of underrepresented demographics in philosophy and early career scholars.&nbsp\; Please submit your abstract by June 07\, 2026 via this form:&nbsp\;https://forms.gle/RyKGAevmQUzkkfeh7</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Lisa Bastian;CN=Annalisa Costella:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261029T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261030T170000
SUMMARY:Rational Action and Belief – Recognising and Responding to Reasons
UID:20261013T044013Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Heidelberg\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Workshop: Rational Action and Belief &ndash\; Recognising and Responding to Reasons</strong></p>\n<p>Do rational actions and beliefs require us to recognise reasons as reasons? If so\, what does such recognition consist in\, and what role does it play in responding rationally to reasons?&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Key Information<br></strong>Date &amp\; Location: October 29&ndash\;30\, 2026\, Heidelberg University<br>Invited speakers: Carlotta Pavese (Oxford)\, Kurt Sylvan (Southampton)</p>\n<p>There are up to six open contributor slots\, please see the related CFP and submit an abstract.</p>\n<p><strong>Workshop Themes</strong></p>\n<p>Does forming an intention or belief in a rational manner require recognising that the corresponding action or belief enjoys some form of rational support? Many action theorists and epistemologists answer this question affirmatively. For a doctor&rsquo\;s belief that the patient has measles to be rational\, it must be based on a suitable reason. That the patient has Koplik spots is such a reason. But it seems insufficient to rationalise the belief that the patient has measles\, unless the doctor recognises that Koplik spots support that belief. Similar examples for actions abound.</p>\n<p>On this view\, rational belief and rational action respond not only to reasons but also to their being reasons for those beliefs or actions. This idea is often captured by appeals to a&nbsp\;<em>taking condition</em>\, or by the requirement that rational reasons must be&nbsp\;<em>treated as normative reasons</em>. While such views have gained prominence in recent epistemology and action theory\, they raise pressing questions about the nature of responding to normative reasons.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>We invite contributions (see separate CFP) that explore the role of recognising\, taking\, or appreciating reasons in rational belief and action\, including critical perspectives.</p>\n<p>Topics include (but are not limited to):</p>\n<p>&middot\; Do rational action and belief require the recognition that the action or belief enjoys support\, for example that the evidence supports a particular conclusion?</p>\n<p>&middot\; What does this recognition require? Does it require a doxastic state\, for example\, that the evidence supports p\, or is the recognition condition non-doxastic?</p>\n<p>&middot\; If the recognition condition is non-doxastic\, then how does it operate? Does it involve the exercise of some non-doxastic skill\, is it a form of rule following\, or something else entirely?&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&middot\; If the recognition condition is doxastic\, then how does it avoid regress problems? Can an appeal to additional non-doxastic factors block such regresses?</p>\n<p>&middot\; Is recognising normative support sufficient for rational action or belief\, or does responding to that recognition introduce additional constraints?</p>\n<p>&middot\; Can the basing of action or belief on reasons be analysed into constituent psychological states\, or does such analysis generate explanatory regresses?&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&middot\; What is the correct semantic theory for linguistic expressions of acting and believing for reasons\, such as &ldquo\;therefore&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;because&rdquo\;?</p>\n<p>Please direct all queries to the organisers Andreas M&uuml\;ller (andreas.mueller.philosophie@em.uni-frankfurt.de) and Tobias Wilsch (tobias.wilsch@gmail.com).&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Tobias Wilsch;CN=Andy Mueller:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261031T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261031T090000
SUMMARY:Special Issue of Análisis Filosófico: “Oppressive Argumentation: Silencing and Oppressive Speech in Argumentation”
UID:20261013T044014Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p>Special Issue of An&aacute\;lisis Filos&oacute\;fico: &ldquo\;Oppressive Argumentation: Silencing and Oppressive Speech in Argumentation&rdquo\;</p>\n<p>This special issue aims to collect original articles in Spanish and English devoted to the analysis of oppressive discourses within our argumentative practices\, with a particular emphasis on those commonly found in Latin American contexts. Informal logic\, epistemology\, and gender studies will serve as the central&mdash\;though not exclusive&mdash\;perspectives guiding this special issue.</p>\n<p>We may understand &ldquo\;oppressive discourse&rdquo\; as a speech act that harms a person or group\, whose consequences contribute to the perpetuation of their conditions of subordination. One way in which oppression manifests itself is by depriving such individuals or groups of credibility (and\, consequently\, of epistemic authority)\, thereby reproducing discriminatory forms of subordination. This (epistemic) form of oppression typically accounts for the silencing of certain marginalized groups. This special issue will place particular emphasis on analyzing these forms of oppression\, as well as the discursive and argumentative mechanisms that sustain them.</p>\n<p>Language is a powerful force\, deeply intertwined with social practices and ways of life: harmful stereotypes about individuals or groups are forged and reinforced through discursive activities. Thus\, in order to prevent epistemic injustices\, it is necessary to intervene in the discursive domain of power by critically reflecting on its influence on credibility\, epistemic authority\, and the prejudices associated with epistemic agents\, as well as on the fallacies and argumentative errors committed by those who produce oppressive discourses. Informal logic\, epistemology\, and gender studies have much to contribute to this area\, and this issue seeks to highlight contributions from these philosophical fields by examining recurring forms of discussion and argumentation in cases and examples drawn from everyday life. As a final outcome\, this collection aims to show how philosophical argumentation can both help mitigate situations of epistemic injustice and contribute to identifying and dismantling harmful prejudices that promote discrimination.</p>\n<p>Submissions are invited on topics including\, but not limited to:</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Discursive silencing and epistemic exclusion in argumentative contexts</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Epistemic injustice in practices of debate and deliberation</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Epistemic authority in argumentation</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Fallacies and argumentative errors in oppressive discourses</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Relations between social power\, language\, and argumentation</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Philosophical analysis of oppressive speech in Latin American contexts</p>\n<p>Submissions must be made through the An&aacute\;lisis Filos&oacute\;fico website (https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/about/submissions)\, following the author guidelines (https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/guia-autores). When submitting the manuscript\, authors should include a note in the &ldquo\;Comments for the Editor&rdquo\; field indicating that the submission is intended for this special issue. All submissions will undergo double-blind peer review by external referees. The deadline for submissions is <strong><u>October 31\, 2026.</u></strong> For inquiries\, please contact:pyrosuarezcaro@gmail.com.</p>\n<p>The guest editorial team is composed of Pyro Suarez (lead editor)\, Pamela Lastres (editorial supervisor)\, and Luz Mu&ntilde\;oz (editorial assistant)\, all members of the research project &ldquo\;Silencing and Discourses of Oppression in Peru: Intersections between Informal Logic\, Epistemology\, and Gender Studies&rdquo\; at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261101T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261101T234500
SUMMARY:Epistemic Injustice and AI
UID:20261013T044015Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
LOCATION:Nijmegen\, Netherlands
DESCRIPTION:<p>AI systems now play a role in many practices through which people are heard\, interpreted\, assessed\, and trusted. This raises questions that are not just ethical or political\, but also epistemic in nature: whose testimony is treated as credible\, whose experiences are made intelligible\, and who is able to participate in shared practices of knowledge production? The workshop focuses on these questions by bringing work on epistemic injustice into conversation with current debates about AI\, including debates about algorithmic bias\, transparency\, linguistic exclusion\, trust\, institutional decision-making\, and the distribution of epistemic authority. We welcome contributions on the philosophical\, ethical\, social\, and political dimensions of epistemic injustice and AI.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Topics include\, but are not limited to:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Algorithmic bias and values in AI</li>\n<li>Testimonial and hermeneutical injustice</li>\n<li>Epistemic agency and epistemic trust</li>\n<li>Transparency and explainability in AI</li>\n<li>Injustices linked to linguistic exclusion and issues of communication</li>\n<li>Bridges between epistemic and distributive injustice</li>\n<li>Applications to domains such as medicine\, education\, and law</li>\n<li>Applications to policy and institutional contexts</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We welcome abstracts of <u>up to 500 words</u>\, excluding references. Submissions should be anonymised\, argumentative\, and clearly engage with the workshop theme.</p>\n<p>The workshop will feature both oral presentations and a poster session\; all presentations must be in person.</p>\n<p>We encourage submissions from students and early-career researchers.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Important dates</strong>:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Submission deadline: 1 November 2026</li>\n<li>Notification of acceptance: 1 December 2026</li>\n<li>Workshop dates: 23-24 March 2027 &nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Further information and submission details can be found on the workshop website.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Corien Bary;CN=Eline Ensinck;CN=Harmen Ghijsen;CN=Bob van Tiel;CN=Nina Poth:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261107T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261108T170000
SUMMARY:Responsible Trusting without Prejudice Workshop 2
UID:20261013T044016Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:University of Stirling\, Stirling\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>The <em>Responsible Trusting without Prejudice</em> project is jointly hosted by the University of Stirling and the University of Edinburgh\, and is funded by the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Our first in-person workshop will take place on the University of Stirling campus on the 7th and 8th of November 2026.</p>\n<p>In addition to a number of invited speakers (TBA)\, we are pleased to invite the submission of extended abstracts to be considered for presentation at this workshop. Abstracts should include a short bibliography\, should be no longer than 800 words in total\, and should be anonymised for review. Abstracts should be sent to Sharon Coull thoughtmanagingeditor@gmail.com\, by the end of day on <strong>Wednesday</strong> <strong>30th of September</strong>\, 2026. Proposed presentations can be on any aspect of the project\, though we particularly invite abstracts on what is involved in being a responsible epistemic agent\, and whether epistemic responsibility raises any distinctive issues not already raised by responsibility for action in general. Following review\, selected authors will be invited to attend the workshop and give a presentation based on their submissions\, with 2-3 nights of accommodation and the workshop dinner paid for by the project (unfortunately\, we are unable to cover the cost of travel to Stirling).</p>\n<p>Overview</p>\n<p>One lesson of Wittgenstein&rsquo\;s <em>On Certainty</em> is that responsible inquiry requires that we take certain things on trust rather than seeking evidence in their favour\, and yet\, accepting things without evidence can be a manifestation of prejudice. How can we distinguish cases in which accepting something without evidence is demanded of us as responsible epistemic agents from those in which it must be avoided? What steps might we take as an epistemic community to promote responsible inquiry\, given the risks of falling into prejudicial thinking?</p>\n<p>These questions have particular urgency in the present social context\, in which real social harm is caused both by unjustified doubts&mdash\;such as climate change denial\, distrust of experts etc. &mdash\;and unjustified acceptances&mdash\;as seen in the phenomenon of online echo chambers\, the proliferation of conspiracy theories etc. &nbsp\;This project will clarify what it takes to be a responsible inquirer in a world that is so uncooperative\, and where the consequences of lapsing into prejudicial thinking are so harmful.</p>\n<p>Some issues to be explored draw on and evaluate hints and insights from <em>On Certainty</em> and views advanced in the extensive literature of what has come to be known as <em>hinge epistemology</em>. What should be included in the range of presuppositions that inquiring rational agents cannot but &lsquo\;take for granted&rsquo\; as background to the responsible formation of belief&mdash\;for example\, propositions about the effectiveness of their own cognitive capacities and the suitability of the circumstances in which they are deployed for the effective function of those capacities. Some of these propositions will admit of independent investigation\, but that of course will rest upon a further set of propositions.</p>\n<p>More specific questions to be addressed at the workshop include:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What are the nature and limits of rationally unavoidable epistemic trust?</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What is the nature of epistemic responsibility?</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What are the conditions for the effective transmission of reliable information?</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What is the significance of &lsquo\;inherited&rsquo\; backgrounds and echo chambers.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Why are people susceptible to disinformation?</p>\n<p>For additional information go tohttps://crispinjwright.com/rtwp_workshop/&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Aidan McGlynn;CN=Alan Millar:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261107T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261108T170000
SUMMARY:Responsible Trusting without Prejudice Workshop 2
UID:20261013T044017Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:University of Stirling\, Stirling\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>The <em>Responsible Trusting without Prejudice</em> project is jointly hosted by the University of Stirling and the University of Edinburgh\, and is funded by the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Our first in-person workshop will take place on the University of Stirling campus on the 7th and 8th of November 2026.</p>\n<p>In addition to a number of invited speakers (TBA)\, we are pleased to invite the submission of extended abstracts to be considered for presentation at this workshop. Abstracts should include a short bibliography\, should be no longer than 800 words in total\, and should be anonymised for review. Abstracts should be sent to Sharon Coull thoughtmanagingeditor@gmail.com\, by the end of day on <strong>Wednesday</strong> <strong>30th of September</strong>\, 2026. Proposed presentations can be on any aspect of the project\, though we particularly invite abstracts on what is involved in being a responsible epistemic agent\, and whether epistemic responsibility raises any distinctive issues not already raised by responsibility for action in general. Following review\, selected authors will be invited to attend the workshop and give a presentation based on their submissions\, with 2-3 nights of accommodation and the workshop dinner paid for by the project (unfortunately\, we are unable to cover the cost of travel to Stirling).</p>\n<p>Overview</p>\n<p>One lesson of Wittgenstein&rsquo\;s <em>On Certainty</em> is that responsible inquiry requires that we take certain things on trust rather than seeking evidence in their favour\, and yet\, accepting things without evidence can be a manifestation of prejudice. How can we distinguish cases in which accepting something without evidence is demanded of us as responsible epistemic agents from those in which it must be avoided? What steps might we take as an epistemic community to promote responsible inquiry\, given the risks of falling into prejudicial thinking?</p>\n<p>These questions have particular urgency in the present social context\, in which real social harm is caused both by unjustified doubts&mdash\;such as climate change denial\, distrust of experts etc. &mdash\;and unjustified acceptances&mdash\;as seen in the phenomenon of online echo chambers\, the proliferation of conspiracy theories etc. &nbsp\;This project will clarify what it takes to be a responsible inquirer in a world that is so uncooperative\, and where the consequences of lapsing into prejudicial thinking are so harmful.</p>\n<p>Some issues to be explored draw on and evaluate hints and insights from <em>On Certainty</em> and views advanced in the extensive literature of what has come to be known as <em>hinge epistemology</em>. What should be included in the range of presuppositions that inquiring rational agents cannot but &lsquo\;take for granted&rsquo\; as background to the responsible formation of belief&mdash\;for example\, propositions about the effectiveness of their own cognitive capacities and the suitability of the circumstances in which they are deployed for the effective function of those capacities. Some of these propositions will admit of independent investigation\, but that of course will rest upon a further set of propositions.</p>\n<p>More specific questions to be addressed at the workshop include:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What are the nature and limits of rationally unavoidable epistemic trust?</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What is the nature of epistemic responsibility?</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What are the conditions for the effective transmission of reliable information?</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What is the significance of &lsquo\;inherited&rsquo\; backgrounds and echo chambers.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Why are people susceptible to disinformation?</p>\n<p>For additional information go tohttps://crispinjwright.com/rtwp_workshop/&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Aidan McGlynn;CN=Alan Millar:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261111T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261111T170000
SUMMARY:Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging: An Experimental Investigation
UID:20261013T044018Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are delighted to announce the next series of UK XPHI Online. This is a monthly online workshop devoted to discussion of work in progress in experimental philosophy (broadly construed). We feature work from all areas of experimental philosophy\, by researchers at all career stages\, from the UK and all over the world. The workshop meets once a month on Teams\, typically the second Wednesday of each month (16:00-18:00 UK time)\, for a two-hour session that typically features two talks (each 40 minutes plus 15 minutes Q&amp\;A).&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&nbsp\;Talk 1</p>\n<p>Talk 2</p>\n<p>Oct 14\, 16-18 UK</p>\n<p>Redesigning Ethical Thought Experiments: Reassessing the Experimental Challenge to Moral Intuition\, <strong>Pietro Tunesi</strong> (Trinity College Dublin)</p>\n<p>What people (don't) want to know in the moral domain\, <strong>Jordan Wylie</strong> (Cornell University)\, <strong>Nathan Liang</strong> (Cornell University)\, and <strong>Charlotte Austin</strong> (Cornell University)</p>\n<p>Nov 11\, 16-18 UK</p>\n<p>Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging: An Experimental Investigation\, <strong>Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen</strong> (Aarhus University)\, <strong>Kevin Reuter</strong> (University of Gothenburg)\, <strong>Somogy Varga</strong> (Aarhus University)\,</p>\n<p>The Side-Effect Effect and &ldquo\;Intentionally&rdquo\;\, <strong>Lilian O&rsquo\;Brien</strong> (Tampere University\, University of Helsinki)\, <strong>Svetlana Vetchinnikova</strong> (University of Helsinki).</p>\n<p>Dec 9\, 16-18 UK</p>\n<p>Mischaracterization Objection 2.0\, <strong>David Bordonaba-Plou</strong> (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)\, <strong>Krzysztof Sękowski</strong> (University of Warsaw)</p>\n<p>From Thought Experiments to Experimental Evidence: Transparency and Quality of Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: <strong>Bartosz Maćkiewicz</strong> (University of Warsaw)\, <strong>Katarzyna Kuś</strong> (University of Warsaw)\, <strong>Joanna Gęgotek</strong> (University of Warsaw)\, <strong>Monika Gurak</strong> (University of Warsaw)\, and <strong>Franciszek Kittel</strong> (University of Warsaw).</p>\n<p>Jan 13\, 16-18 UK</p>\n<p>NARRABODY: Narrative and Body in Post-Stroke Selfhood. A Longitudinal Qualitative Study\, <strong>Camille L&eacute\;pingle</strong> (ENS de Lyon)</p>\n<p>A cross-cultural\, qualitative study on HPV vaccination intention\, <strong>Konrad Henne </strong>(University of Heidelberg)\, <strong>Alejandra Petino Zappala</strong> (Ruhr University Bochum)\, <strong>Nora Heinzelmann</strong> (University of Heidelberg)</p>\n<p>Feb 10\, 16-18 UK</p>\n<p>Do subjects have revelation intuitions?\, <strong>Marcus Ashby</strong> (King&rsquo\;s College London)</p>\n<p>Correct\, incorrect\, or does it depend? Demonstrating and explaining variation in folk metanormative judgment\, <strong>Mikl&oacute\;s K&uuml\;rthy</strong> (University of Graz)\, <strong>Geoffrey Goodwin</strong> (University of Pennsylvania)\, <strong>Paulo Sousa</strong> (Queen's University Belfast).</p>\n<p>To submit for future series\, please <strong>email the organizers an abstract of up to 500 words by July 15\, 2026</strong> to james.andow@manchester.ac.uk.</p>\n<p>This series is organised by:</p>\n<p>Eugen Fischer (UEA)</p>\n<p>Joanna Demaree-Cotton (Oxford)</p>\n<p>James Andow (Manchester)</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=James Andow;CN=Joanna Demaree-Cotton;CN=Eugen Fischer:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Shanghai:20261114T090000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Shanghai:20261115T170000
SUMMARY:Asian Epistemology Network Meeting 2026
UID:20261013T044019Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Asia/Shanghai
LOCATION:Yuhangtang Road 866\, Hangzhou\, China
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are pleased to announce the inaugural meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network\, to be held on November 14&ndash\;15\, 2026\, at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou\, China. This meeting aims to bring together epistemologists working in and with the Asian region to foster collaboration\, exchange ideas\, and advance research in all areas of epistemology.</p>\n<p><strong>Keynote Speakers</strong></p>\n<p>Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford)</p>\n<p>Lei Zhong (Chinese University of Hong Kong)</p>\n<p>Jennifer Nado (University of Hong Kong)</p>\n<p>Simon Goldstein (University of Hong Kong)</p>\n<p><strong>Confirmed Speakers</strong></p>\n<p>Nikolaj Pedersen (Yonsei University)</p>\n<p>Jing Zhu (Xiamen University)</p>\n<p>Bo Chen (Wuhan University)</p>\n<p>Ru Ye (Chinese University of Hong Kong)</p>\n<p>Weng Hong Tang (National University of Singapore)</p>\n<p>Masashi Kasaki (Nagoya University)</p>\n<p><strong>Submission Guidelines</strong></p>\n<p>We invite submissions of abstracts in English\, prepared for blind review. Abstracts of 400-500 words should be sent to submission@asianepistemology.com&nbsp\;\, by June 30\, 2026.<br><br></p>\n<p><strong>Contact</strong></p>\n<p>For any inquiries\, please contact: submission@asianepistemology.com&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Jie Gao;CN=Davide Fassio;CN=Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen;CN=Masashi Kasaki;CN=Weng Hong Tang:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261119T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261120T170000
SUMMARY:Normative Reasons and Morality 
UID:20261013T044020Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Norbert-Wollheim-Platz 1\, Frankfurt am Main\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p>While the concept of a normative reason is often taken to provide a common currency across different domains of normativity\, its role and nature within the moral domain continue to raise a number of difficult and intriguing questions. Some philosophers have argued that moral reasons are distinctive in virtue of their stringency or overridingness\; others question whether the notion of a normative reason provides the most illuminating framework for understanding moral demands at all. More generally\, the relationship between morality and normative reasons remains contested\, both with respect to the nature of moral reasons and their place within moral thought and practice. This workshop aims to examine these issues from a variety of perspectives and to explore the significance of reasons-based approaches for contemporary moral philosophy.</p>\n<p>We welcome contributions addressing questions including (but not limited to):</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What is the relationship between moral reasons and moral obligations?</li>\n<li>What distinguishes moral reasons from other kinds of reasons\, such as prudential or epistemic reasons?</li>\n<li>How should conflicts between moral reasons and other normative reasons be understood?</li>\n<li>How should cases of supererogation be understood within a reasons-based account of morality?</li>\n<li>Are moral reasons agent-relative or agent-neutral?</li>\n<li>What role do moral advice and moral testimony play in moral thought and practice?</li>\n<li>How should moral uncertainty affect the reasons we have for action?</li>\n<li>How should we understand the relationship between moral reasons and moral reasoning?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>A limited number of slots are available through an open call for abstracts. Please send your abstract\, prepared for anonymous review\, as a PDF file to si [dot] behrens [at] em [dot] uni [hyphen] frankfurt [dot] de (subject line: &ldquo\;Morality and Reasons&rdquo\;). Abstracts should be between 500 and 1\,000 words (including notes but excluding bibliography). Papers should be suitable for a 40-minute presentation. The deadline for submissions is<strong>&nbsp\;July 15\, 2026.&nbsp\;</strong>Applicants will be notified of the outcome by July 31\, 2026.</p>\n<p>We particularly encourage Ph.D. students and individuals from underrepresented groups to submit.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Singa Behrens:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261127T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261127T234500
SUMMARY:Kant\, la nature\, la physique
UID:20261013T044021Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Madrid
LOCATION:Avinguda Blasco Ibáñez\, 30\, Valencia\, Spain
DESCRIPTION:<p>Le th&egrave\;me retenu est &laquo\; Kant\, la nature\, la physique &raquo\;. Il s&rsquo\;agit de mettre l&rsquo\;accent sur la conception kantienne de la physique et la mani&egrave\;re dont celle-ci cr&eacute\;e un cadre philosophique compatible avec la perspective de la physique quantique. Cela &eacute\;tant dit\, les contributions sur tout autre aspect de l&rsquo\;&oelig\;uvre kantienne\, de ses sources et de sa projection contemporaine sont &eacute\;galement les bienvenues. Outre le programme acad&eacute\;mique\, un programme culturel ax&eacute\; principalement sur la musique et &eacute\;troitement li&eacute\; au th&egrave\;me de la conf&eacute\;rence sera propos&eacute\;.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN="Pedro Jesús Teruel":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261204T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261205T170000
SUMMARY:3rd Duke/UNC Epistemology Workshop
UID:20261013T044022Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Duke University\, Durham\, United States\, 27712
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Papers: 3rd Duke-UNC Epistemology Workshop</strong></p>\n<p>Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill invite graduate students and early career scholars to submit extended abstracts in any area of epistemology for presentation at the 3rd&nbsp\; Duke-UNC Epistemology Workshop. The workshop will be held in person at Duke University on December 4th/5th 2026.</p>\n<p>The current list of confirmed speakers is as follows\,</p>\n<p>Laura Callahan (Notre Dame)</p>\n<p>Ben Holguin (Johns Hopkins)</p>\n<p>Tom Kelly (Princeton)</p>\n<p>Zoe Jenkin (Rutgers)</p>\n<p>Mike Titelbaum (UW Madison)</p>\n<p>Please submit abstracts in .doc or .pdf format prepared for blind review. Submissions should include an extended abstract of up to 500 words with the paper&rsquo\;s title as the first page. Papers should be suitable for a 45-minute presentation. Some partial funding may be available to defray travel costs for presenters.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Submissions should be sent as email attachments to dukeuncepistemology@gmail.com.</p>\n<p><strong>Submission Deadline:</strong> September 15th\, 2026&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>If you have any questions\, please contact the conference organizers at dukeuncepistemology@gmail.com</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Benjamin Eva;CN=Reuben Stern;CN=Ram Neta:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Edmonton:20261216T004500
DTEND;TZID=America/Edmonton:20261216T004500
SUMMARY:1st Interpersonal Philosophy Network Workshop
UID:20261013T044023Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Edmonton
LOCATION:Lethbridge\, Canada
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>1st Interpersonal Philosophy Network Workshop 2027</strong></p>\n<p><strong>University of Lethbridge | 2-3 April 2027</strong></p>\n<p>The <a href="https://www.interpersonalphilosophy.com/"><strong>Interpersonal Philosophy Network (IPN)</strong></a>\, in collaboration with the <a href="https://sites.ulethbridge.ca/ctce-lab/"><strong>Critical Thinking &amp\; Civic Engagement Lab</strong></a>&nbsp\;at the University of Lethbridge\, invite abstracts submissions for a two-day workshop exploring philosophical questions concerning interpersonal relations.</p>\n<p>The workshop aims to bring together researchers working on the nature\, value\, and normative significance of our relations with others. We welcome contributions from a wide range of philosophical traditions and subfields.</p>\n<p><strong>Keynote Speakers</strong></p>\n<p>(1) Kimberly Brownlee (University of British Columbia)</p>\n<p>(2) TBC.</p>\n<p><strong>Abstract Submission</strong></p>\n<p>We invite submissions on any topic related to the philosophy of interpersonal relations\, though we are particularly interested in the epistemology\, ethics\, and politics of interpersonal relations. For example\, papers might address topics such as:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Love\, friendship\, and care</li>\n<li>Shared agency and collective intentionality</li>\n<li>Collective or shared inquiry and epistemic cooperation</li>\n<li>Solidarity\, belonging\, and community</li>\n<li>Relational autonomy and freedom</li>\n<li>The ethics and politics of human relationships</li>\n<li>Interpersonal approaches to personhood and the self.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Please submit an anonymised PDF abstract (up to 1000 words) through the following form by <strong>15 December\, 2026</strong>: <a href="https://forms.gle/jXPRqdNE2dzSQnEW7">https://forms.gle/jXPRqdNE2dzSQnEW7</a></p>\n<p><strong>Further Details</strong></p>\n<p>The workshop will feature:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Two keynote talks</li>\n<li>Eight contributed papers</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Presentations should be suitable for a <strong>30-40 minute talk</strong>\, followed by discussion.</p>\n<p>Accepted speakers will receive a <strong>CAD $300 honorarium</strong> to help offset travel and accommodation expenses.</p>\n<p>Participants are warmly invited to join an informal excursion to <strong>Waterton Lakes National Park</strong> on <strong>Sunday\, 4 April 2027</strong>.</p>\n<p>If you have any questions please contact <a href="mailto:adham.elshazly@uleth.ca">adham.elshazly@uleth.ca</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Adham El Shazly;CN=Facundo Rodriguez;CN=Paloma Morales:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20261231T234500
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20261231T234500
SUMMARY:4th Inquiry Network Workshop
UID:20261013T044024Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:2000 North Pkwy\, Memphis\, United States\, 38112
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Inquiry Network is hosting a workshop on inquiry at Rhodes College in Memphis\, TN\, April 2-3\, 2027.</p>\n<p>This meeting will be held in conjunction with the annual Mid-South Philosophy Conference.</p>\n<p>We invite submissions of anonymized abstracts (up to 1\,000 words) on any topic related to the philosophy of inquiry. For example\, papers might address topics such as:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Norms of inquiry.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; The relationship between inquiry and interrogative attitudes such as curiosity and suspension of judgment.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; The relationship between inquiry and attention or salience.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; The semantics and pragmatics of questions.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Virtues and vices of inquiry.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Inquiry in specific domains\, such as scientific inquiry or philosophical inquiry.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Historical approaches to inquiry (for example\, work on the American Pragmatists\, ancient Pyrrhonians\, etc.).</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Ethics of inquiry.</p>\n<p>Please submit anonymized abstracts (up to 1\,000 words) by <strong>EOD&nbsp\;</strong><strong>December 31</strong><strong>\, 2026&nbsp\;</strong>to inquirynetworkgroup@gmail.com.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Thorstad;CN=Jared A. Millson:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Brussels:20270104T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Brussels:20270104T234500
SUMMARY:CREPH Seminar "Attention and Consciousness: New Directions"
UID:20261013T044025Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Brussels
LOCATION:Pl. du Vingt Août 7\, Liège\, Belgium\, 4000
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: NEW DIRECTIONS</strong><br> CREPH Research Seminar in Phenomenology <br>University of Li&egrave\;ge\, Belgium 10&ndash\;14 May 2027</p>\n<p>The Centre de Recherches Ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologiques (CREPH) at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Li&egrave\;ge (Belgium) is pleased to announce the next CREPH Research Seminar in Phenomenology\, devoted to attention and consciousness\, which will take place from <strong>Monday 10 May to Friday 14 May 2027.</strong></p>\n<p>The CREPH Seminar is a week-long event held every two years\, each edition exploring a specific topic in phenomenology and philosophy of mind\, broadly understood. The program will include invited talks and contributed papers selected through a call for abstracts.</p>\n<p>Over the past two decades\, the relationship between attention and phenomenal consciousness has attracted renewed philosophical interest\, giving rise to an increasingly rich and differentiated literature. Yet\, despite increasingly refined arguments and mappings of the logical space\, foundational questions remain debated. Is attention necessary\, or even both necessary and sufficient\, for phenomenal consciousness? What kind of necessity is at stake? If experience overflows attention\, what is the nature of this unattended phenomenology? Is it fully determinate and specific\, or does attention contribute to making it so?</p>\n<p>Alongside these questions about the dependence relations between attention and consciousness\, a further line of inquiry concerns attention&rsquo\;s contribution to the character and organization of experience. This includes its effects on our overall experience and the precise nature of the structural role often attributed to it. It also concerns whether attention contributes uniformly across different kinds of experience or plays distinctive roles in different experiential domains such as\, for example\, emotional and cognitive phenomenology.</p>\n<p>These issues also have epistemic consequences\, particularly concerning attention&rsquo\;s contribution to the acquisition of perceptual and introspective knowledge. Debate centres on whether attention facilitates such knowledge\, whether it is indispensable to it\, and whether its effects can sometimes be disruptive - for instance\, when attending to an experience essentially modifies the very phenomenon we seek to understand. Clarifying these possibilities requires examining how attention&rsquo\;s contribution to conscious experience bears on its capacity to be knowledge-conducive.</p>\n<p>The seminar aims to explore these questions by bringing contemporary debates into dialogue with historical accounts of attention. We welcome contributions from phenomenology\, philosophy of mind\, epistemology\, as well as historical investigations addressing these themes.</p>\n<p><strong>Invited Speakers</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Natalie Depraz (Paris Nanterre)&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Anna Giustina (Valencia)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Hanne Jacobs (Tilburg)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Hamid Taieb (Humboldt)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Juliette Vazard (Zurich)</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Call for Abstracts</strong></p>\n<p>We welcome submissions addressing the themes of the seminar from contemporary or historical perspectives. A non-exhaustive list of possible questions includes:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Is attention necessary or even necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness? Can consciousness occur without attention? Is there unconscious attention?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Does attention act as a gatekeeper for conscious experience\, or does phenomenal consciousness overflow the limits of attention? Is the phenomenology overflowing attention fully determinate and specific or is it indeterminate or generic?&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>How does attention modify the phenomenal character of experience? What implications does this have for theories of consciousness (e.g.\, representationalist views)?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>What structural role\, if any\, does attention play in the organisation of the phenomenal field?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Does attention play sui generis phenomenal and/or epistemic roles in particular experiential types (e.g.\, emotional phenomenology\, cognitive phenomenology\, agential phenomenology\, etc.)?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>What is the epistemic import of attention with respect to perceptual and introspective knowledge acquisition? Is attention necessary to have propositional and/or doxastic justification? What role does attention play in inquiry?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Can the so-called phenomenal modification problem be overcome?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>What is the relationship between attention and inner awareness?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>How have historical accounts of attention addressed these issues\, and what can they contribute to contemporary debates?</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Those interested in presenting at the seminar are invited to submit <strong>an anonymized abstract of no more than one page&nbsp\;(excluding references) in either English or French</strong> to both jacopopallagrosi@gmail.com and vmartinis@uliege.be (please include both addresses&nbsp\;in the email).</p>\n<p>Each speaker will have a one-hour slot\, so presentations should ideally last around <strong>30&ndash\;40 minutes</strong>\, followed by Q&amp\;A. The presentation itself may also be given<strong> in either English or French</strong>.</p>\n<p><strong>Submission deadline</strong>:<strong> <u>4 January 2027</u></strong><br>Notification of acceptance: 15 January 2027</p>\n<p>Organizers: Arnaud Dewalque\, Valentina Martinis\, Jacopo Pallagrosi.</p>\n<p>Scientific Committee: Christian Blanco\, Alexis Delamare\, Arnaud Dewalque\, Ethan Field\, Quentin Hosch\, Bruno Leclercq\, Francesca Maffettone\, Valentina Martinis\, Jacopo Pallagrosi\, Denis Seron.</p>\n<p>Contact:jacopopallagrosi@gmail.com\;vmartinis@uliege.be&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Permalink:http://www.pheno.ulg.ac.be/sem/?num_id=19&amp\;page=1&amp\;lang=fr</p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Jacopo Pallagrosi;CN=Arnaud Dewalque;CN=Valentina Martinis:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Indiana/Indianapolis:20270115T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/Indiana/Indianapolis:20270115T000000
SUMMARY:Notre Dame Summer Seminars in Philosophy of Religion
UID:20261013T044026Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Indiana/Indianapolis
LOCATION:Notre Dame\, United States\, 46556
DESCRIPTION:<p>Recent PhDs (no more than 3 years post PhD as of June 30\, 2027) and current graduate students in philosophy\, with interest in the philosophy of religion\, are invited to apply to the 2027 Notre Dame Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion. The seminar will be held at the University of Notre Dame from June 28 - July 9\, 2027. Participants will receive a stipend of $2000 as well as room and board\, with some additional family support available as well. The theme of this year&rsquo\;s seminar is "Disagreement\, Humility\, and Polarization." More information on the summer seminars and the application process can be found below.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><br></p>\n<p><strong>Summer Seminar Series Overview:&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>Analytic philosophy of religion has flourished and matured in recent decades\, fostering original research drawing on metaphysics\, epistemology\, ethics\, mind\, and language\, while also cultivating the new discipline of "analytic theology." Philosophers of religion have contributed to a flowering of scholarship in these areas\, founding new peer-reviewed journals\, publishing numerous academic books\, impacting the academy\, ministry\, and lay readers\, and building deep connections with work in theology and the sciences as well as philosophy. Yet most PhD students in philosophy have little opportunity to study recent work in philosophy of religion in their graduate programs\, and early career faculty often find little support for pursuing scholarly research in these areas.&nbsp\;The Notre Dame Summer Seminars in Philosophy of Religion aim to fill this gap by (1) bringing together graduate students and early career scholars for intensive study of contemporary topics in philosophy of religion taught by leading figures in philosophy and related disciplines\, and (2) creating an extended mentorship program for all participants to be able to work with senior philosophers of religion to advance their writing and receive guidance in their early years in the profession. The seminars run for 2 weeks over three summers (2027\, 2028\, and 2029) on the campus of the University of Notre Dame. </p>\n<p><br></p>\n<p><strong>Summer 2027 Theme: "Disagreement\, Humility\, and Polarization"</strong> </p>\n\n<p>Religion is often political and divisive. Should this matter\, for how we think about God or\, indeed\, the propriety of religious belief? How could we know God or have faith in a world where religious traditions disagree sharply about what God is like - and where those divisions themselves contribute to unrest and hatred? Further questions connected with this theme include: how do particular theological traditions encode prescriptions for engaging with disagreement? How do these recommendations fare when evaluated for epistemic and practical rationality\, or their compatibility with just political systems? Is something like humility sufficient to save us from fueling religious division\, and if so\, what is humility like and how could we cultivate it at scale? Would a humbler approach to religion favor certain spiritual or theological traditions over others - for example\, is there a relationship between humility and agnosticism or apophaticism? How shall we understand the character traits of humility\, empathy\, and love for others given polarizing issues of politics or doctrine? What insights are there from sociology and psychology on religious communities\, belonging\, and changing values in a polarized era?</p>\n<p><br></p>\n<p><strong>Application Process:</strong></p>\n\n<p>Applications are due by January 15\, 2027 and must consist of the following: 1. A statement of interest in the Seminar of no more than 500 words\; 2. A complete CV\; 3. A writing sample (which need not engage the Seminar theme) which can serve as a default project to discuss with an assigned faculty mentor.&nbsp\;</p>\n\n<p>Application materials must be submitted electronically to philreligion@nd.edu. Application materials 1-3 above must be submitted as a single PDF in the order listed. The PDF must be titled in the following manner: Last Name\, First Name. Application materials must be received by January 15\, 2027 to assure full consideration. We anticipate notifying selected applicants by April 1\, 2027.</p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Matthew A. Benton;CN=Laura Frances Callahan;CN=Michael Rea:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20270115T234500
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20270115T234500
SUMMARY:SLACRR 2027
UID:20261013T044027Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:6177 Delmar Ave\, Saint Louis\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality provides a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason\, broadly construed. In addition to two invited speakers\, the other speakers will be chosen from submitted abstracts.This will be the 17th SLACRR.</p>\n<p>Invited speakers: Jennifer Nagel (Toronto) and Sergio Tenenbaum (Toronto)</p>\n<p>Hosted by UMSL\, WUSTL\, and SLU</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270128T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270130T170000
SUMMARY:Collective Agency in Classical and Continental Philosophy (Vilnius\, 2027)
UID:20261013T044028Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Vilnius
LOCATION:Vilnius\, Lithuania
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Conference description</strong></p>\n<p>It is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\,&nbsp\; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.</p>\n<p>This conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency<strong>.</strong> We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.</p>\n<p>We invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.</p>\n<p>Possible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Relational nature of personhood</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collectives and ontological unity</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Categorisation of group agency</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective emotions</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective justice</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Groups and moral responsibility</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Confirmed keynote speakers:</strong></p>\n<p>Thornton Lockwood (University of Florida)</p>\n<p>Sophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)</p>\n\n<p><strong>Submission guidelines</strong></p>\n<p><u>Submission deadline and acceptance notification</u></p>\n<p>The abstracts must be submitted by <strong>Monday 1st June 2026</strong>.</p>\n<p>The acceptance notifications might be expected after <strong>Tuesday 30th June 2026</strong>.</p>\n<p><u>Submission procedure</u></p>\n<p>We invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.</p>\n<p>Please write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.</p>\n<p>The abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com</p>\n<p><u>Paper delivery</u></p>\n<p>All the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.</p>\n<p><u>Other practicalities</u></p>\n<p>Please note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.</p>\n<p>Lunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.</p>\n<p><strong>Organisers</strong></p>\n<p>This conference is part of the research project <em>&ldquo\;</em><strong>Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory</strong><em>&rdquo\;</em> (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Pacific/Auckland:20270210T090000
DTEND;TZID=Pacific/Auckland:20270212T170000
SUMMARY:Conspiracies\, Facts\, and Truth III
UID:20261013T044029Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Pacific/Auckland
LOCATION:Knighton Road Hamilton 3240\, Hamilton\, New Zealand
DESCRIPTION:<p>In February of 2027 we (Joe Ulatowski [University of Waikato] and myself\, M R. X. Dentith [Beijing Normal University]) will be running the third "Conspiracies\, Facts\, and Truth&rdquo\; workshop at the University of Waikato\, Aotearoa New Zealand.</p>\n<p>Dates: February 10\, 2026 - February 12\, 2027</p>\n<p>The aim of this workshop series is to share new work on the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory\, the value of truth and facts in public discourse more generally\, and related topics. We are interested in philosophical talks (both full presentations as well as shorter work-in-progress talks) concerning conspiracy theory theory\, fake news\, post truth\, mis-\, dis- and malinformation (and other related subjects).</p>\n<p>We are accepting proposals for both in person and online presentations\, with a preference towards in person talks.</p>\n<p>If you are interested in joining us and sharing your work\, please email either Joe Ulatowski (joe.ulatowski@waikato.ac.nz) or M R. X. Dentith (m.dentith@bnu.edu.cn) with the title and short 150-word abstract of your work\, as well as an indication as to whether this is a full paper or a work-in-progress\, by the 1st December\, 2026. Space is limited\, so please contact the organisers as soon as possible.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=M R. X. Dentith;CN=Joseph Ulatowski:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270215T230000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270215T230000
SUMMARY:TOPOI Special issue: Deep Disagreement and the Limits of Argumentation
UID:20261013T044030Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>For the broader intellectual community\, reflecting on the current fractious intellectual climate\, the notion of deep disagreement is a fecund concept. What was originally a limit idea for informal logicians\, in Fogelin&rsquo\;s framing\, has become a heuristic and explanatory tool for accounts of civilizational clash\, metaphilosophical skepticism\, political polarization\, and the intellectual malaise of (post)modernity.</p>\n<p>Here\, we wish to collect the work of leading scholars in argumentation theory\, social epistemology\, and political philosophy on the questions of deep disagreement. The issue returns to the question named in its title: what becomes of the norms of argumentation at the point where argument seems to run out.</p>\n<p>Possible topics include (but are not limited to):</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Theories of rational irresolvability</li>\n<li>Developments of hinge epistemology</li>\n<li>Implications of deep disagreement in politics</li>\n<li>Deep disagreement theory as metaphilosophy</li>\n<li>Deep disagreement and argumentative injustice</li>\n<li>Case studies of deep disagreements</li>\n<li>The role of bias in deep disagreement</li>\n<li>Implications of deep disagreement optimism</li>\n<li>Implications of deep disagreement pessimism</li>\n</ul>\n<p>CONTACT: For any questions\, please directly contact the editors:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Tom&aacute\;&scaron\; Koll&aacute\;rik\, <a href="mailto:tomas.kollarik@proton.me">tomas.kollarik@proton.me</a></li>\n<li>Scott Aikin\, <a href="mailto:scott.aikin@vanderbilt.edu">scott.aikin@vanderbilt.edu</a></li>\n</ul>\n<p>Find further information for submission at the dedicated site at the journal website for the special collection below:&nbsp\;</p>\n
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270218T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270220T170000
SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
UID:20261013T044031Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006
DESCRIPTION:<p><a href="https://zegra.ch/events/event/relational-normativity-epistemic-and-practical/">Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Lima:20270222T080000
DTEND;TZID=America/Lima:20270228T170000
SUMMARY:CAELO 1: First Andean Congress for Epistemology and Logic
UID:20261013T044032Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Lima
LOCATION:Lima\, Peru
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>CAELO 1: First Andean Congress for Epistemology and Logic</strong>*\, organised by Peru&rsquo\;s&nbsp\;<em>Society for Epistemology and Logic</em>&nbsp\;(SEPLO)\, will take place in Lima\, Peru\, from&nbsp\;22 to 28 February 2027.</p>\n<p>This inaugural congress marks the beginning of a planned series dedicated to the study of epistemology and logic\, bringing together scholars\, researchers\, and students from diverse backgrounds. The event offers a space for rigorous discussion and exchange on topics including logic\, epistemology\, philosophy of science\, analytic philosophy\, metaphysics\, social philosophy\, empirically informed approaches\, and both philosophically and scientifically oriented studies. Participants will have the opportunity to engage in talks and workshops that foster interdisciplinary dialogue and critical reflection. Contributions from all levels of experience are welcome\, from established researchers to early-career scholars and students. Proposed sessions and workshops include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Beyond Loyalty and Disloyalty: The Social and Political Commitements of Science</li>\n<li>El Lunarejo: The Legacy of Juan de Espinosa Medrano</li>\n<li>From Science to AI\, and Backwards: Interactions between AI\, Science\, and Philosophy</li>\n<li>Ifs\, Thens\, and Otherwises: New Perspectives on the Logic of Conditionals</li>\n<li>Logic\, Reality\, and Beyond: Logical Approaches to Metaphysics</li>\n<li>Noise\, Errors\, and Flaws: Approaches to Defective Science</li>\n<li>Many Logics\, Many Reasons? The Meaning of Logical Monism and Pluralism</li>\n<li>Scientific Publishing and Publishing Scientifically: Academic Publishing under Scrutiny</li>\n<li>Scientists as Subjects: The Sociology and Historiography of Science</li>\n<li>The Shape of Thought: Diagrams in Philosophy and Science</li>\n<li>This Workshop Is about This Workshop: Self-Referential Expressions</li>\n<li>Ways of Knowing: The Philosophy of Methodology and Heuristics&nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>*This event was formerly called <em>Epilog 1: 1st Congress of Epistemology and Logic</em>.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Luis F. Bartolo Alegre:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Lima:20270222T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Lima:20270228T170000
SUMMARY:Thinking the Unthinkable: The Logic and Philosophy of Paradox
UID:20261013T044033Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Lima
LOCATION:Lima\, Peru
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Thinking the Unthinkable</strong> is a session within <strong>CAELO 1</strong> (Lima\, 22&ndash\;28 February 2027) dedicated to the logical and philosophical study of paradox. This symposium will explore the nature\, origins\, and significance of paradoxes across logic\, philosophy\, mathematics\, language\, and the sciences. Particular attention will be given to the ways in which paradoxes challenge established notions of truth\, consistency\, rationality\, meaning\, and inference\, as well as to the formal and philosophical strategies developed to understand\, resolve\, or accommodate them.</p>\n<p>The session aims to bring together formal\, philosophical\, and historical approaches to paradox\, fostering dialogue on the role of paradox in the development of logic and its broader philosophical significance.</p>\n<p>To learn more about <strong>CAELO 1</strong> and discover its other special sessions\, please visit the main event website.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20270323T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20270324T170000
SUMMARY:Epistemic Injustice and AI
UID:20261013T044034Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
LOCATION:Nijmegen\, Netherlands
DESCRIPTION:<p>AI systems now play a role in many practices through which people are heard\, interpreted\, assessed\, and trusted. This raises questions that are not just ethical or political\, but also epistemic in nature: whose testimony is treated as credible\, whose experiences are made intelligible\, and who is able to participate in shared practices of knowledge production? The workshop focuses on these questions by bringing work on epistemic injustice into conversation with current debates about AI\, including debates about algorithmic bias\, transparency\, linguistic exclusion\, trust\, institutional decision-making\, and the distribution of epistemic authority. We welcome contributions on the philosophical\, ethical\, social\, and political dimensions of epistemic injustice and AI.&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Corien Bary;CN=Eline Ensinck;CN=Harmen Ghijsen;CN=Bob van Tiel;CN=Nina Poth:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20270326T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20270327T170000
SUMMARY:9th Annual Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop
UID:20261013T044035Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Caldwell Hall\, Chapel Hill\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>The ninth annual Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop will be held in Chapel Hill on <strong>March 26 -- 27\, 2027</strong>.</p>\n<p>The workshop aims to provide a forum for stimulating and constructive exchange among philosophers currently working on issues concerning normativity\, broadly construed to include: the traditional questions of metaethics (and analogous questions about other normative domains)\; more abstract and general questions within first-order normative theory\; theories of reasons\, rationality and reasoning\; the semantics and pragmatics of normative language\; the psychology of normative judgment\; and the nature of epistemic normativity. The hope is to showcase cutting-edge work in these and related areas\, providing speakers with useful feedback\, and other participants with lively presentations and conversation.</p>\n<p>There will be eight talks in total\, seven of which will be selected via an open call for abstracts and an anonymous review process\, plus a keynote by Sarah McGrath (Princeton). For the eighth workshop running\, papers accepted to this year's workshop will be eligible for publication in a special issue of <em>Philosophical Studies</em>.</p>\n<p>We very much hope you'll join us in sunny and beautiful Chapel Hill next spring for the workshop's ninth year. In addition to excellent presentations\, there will be plenty of opportunities for socializing with fellow normativity folks at a selection of Chapel Hill's lovely restaurants and bars on each night of the event.</p>\n<p>Many thanks to the UNC Department of Philosophy and Parr Center for Ethics for their generous support of the event.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Chris Howard;CN=Margaret Shea;CN=Alex Worsnip:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20270402T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20270403T170000
SUMMARY:4th Inquiry Network Workshop
UID:20261013T044036Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:2000 North Pkwy\, Memphis\, United States\, 38112
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Inquiry Network is hosting a workshop on inquiry at Rhodes College in Memphis\, TN\, April 2-3\, 2027.</p>\n<p>This meeting will be held in conjunction with the annual Mid-South Philosophy Conference.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Please see the CFP for more information\, or contact inquriynetworkgroup@gmail.com with any questions.</p>\n<p>For more information about the Inquiry Network\, see&nbsp\;https://inquirynetwork.weebly.com/.&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Thorstad;CN=Jared A. Millson:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Edmonton:20270402T100000
DTEND;TZID=America/Edmonton:20270403T180000
SUMMARY:1st Interpersonal Philosophy Network Workshop
UID:20261013T044037Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Edmonton
LOCATION:Lethbridge\, Canada
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Interpersonal Philosophy Network is holding its first workshop at the University of Lethbridge\, AB\, Canada\, 2-3 April 2027.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Please see the CFP for more information\, or contact adham.elshazly@uleth.ca with any questions.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>For more information about the Interpersonal Philosophy Network see</p>\n<p>https://www.interpersonalphilosophy.com/</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Adham El Shazly;CN=Facundo Rodriguez;CN=Paloma Morales:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20270402T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20270404T170000
SUMMARY:JAM (Junkyard Anniversary Meeting) - Philosophy of Imagination Conference
UID:20261013T044038Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Los_Angeles
LOCATION:The Kravis Center\, Claremont\, United States\, 91711
DESCRIPTION:<p>A philosophy of imagination conference to commemorate the 10th anniversary of The Junkyard blog. In addition to the invited speakers\, there will be also be a book symposium on Luke Roelofs'&nbsp\;<em>Empathic Reason</em>\, with commentaries from Heidi Maibom\, Colin Marshall\, and Eric Peterson.&nbsp\; There will also be contributed papers selected via a CFP.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Amy Kind:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Brussels:20270510T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Brussels:20270514T170000
SUMMARY:CREPH Seminar "Attention and Consciousness: New Directions"
UID:20261013T044039Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Brussels
LOCATION:Pl. du Vingt Août 7\, Liège\, Belgium\, 4000
DESCRIPTION:<p>ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: NEW DIRECTIONS CREPH Research Seminar in Phenomenology University of Li&egrave\;ge\, Belgium 10&ndash\;14 May 2027</p>\n<p>The Centre de Recherches Ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologiques (CREPH) at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Li&egrave\;ge (Belgium) is pleased to announce the next CREPH Research Seminar in Phenomenology\, devoted to attention and consciousness\, which will take place from Monday 10 May to Friday 14 May 2027.</p>\n<p>The CREPH Seminar is a week-long event held every two years\, each edition exploring a specific topic in phenomenology and philosophy of mind\, broadly understood. The program will include invited talks and contributed papers selected through a call for abstracts.</p>\n<p>Over the past two decades\, the relationship between attention and phenomenal consciousness has attracted renewed philosophical interest\, giving rise to an increasingly rich and differentiated literature. Yet\, despite increasingly refined arguments and mappings of the logical space\, foundational questions remain debated. Is attention necessary\, or even both necessary and sufficient\, for phenomenal consciousness? What kind of necessity is at stake? If experience overflows attention\, what is the nature of this unattended phenomenology? Is it fully determinate and specific\, or does attention contribute to making it so?</p>\n<p>Alongside these questions about the dependence relations between attention and consciousness\, a further line of inquiry concerns attention&rsquo\;s contribution to the character and organization of experience. This includes its effects on our overall experience and the precise nature of the structural role often attributed to it. It also concerns whether attention contributes uniformly across different kinds of experience or plays distinctive roles in different experiential domains such as\, for example\, emotional and cognitive phenomenology.</p>\n<p>These issues also have epistemic consequences\, particularly concerning attention&rsquo\;s contribution to the acquisition of perceptual and introspective knowledge. Debate centres on whether attention facilitates such knowledge\, whether it is indispensable to it\, and whether its effects can sometimes be disruptive - for instance\, when attending to an experience essentially modifies the very phenomenon we seek to understand. Clarifying these possibilities requires examining how attention&rsquo\;s contribution to conscious experience bears on its capacity to be knowledge-conducive.</p>\n<p>The seminar aims to explore these questions by bringing contemporary debates into dialogue with historical accounts of attention. We welcome contributions from phenomenology\, philosophy of mind\, epistemology\, as well as historical investigations addressing these themes.</p>\n<p>Invited Speakers</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Natalie Depraz (Paris Nanterre)&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Anna Giustina (Valencia)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Hanne Jacobs (Tilburg)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Hamid Taieb (Humboldt)</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Juliette Vazard (Zurich)</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Organizers: Arnaud Dewalque\, Valentina Martinis\, Jacopo Pallagrosi.</p>\n<p>Scientific Committee: Christian Blanco\, Alexis Delamare\, Arnaud Dewalque\, Ethan Field\, Quentin Hosch\, Bruno Leclercq\, Francesca Maffettone\, Valentina Martinis\, Jacopo Pallagrosi\, Denis Seron.</p>\n<p>Contact:jacopopallagrosi@gmail.com\;vmartinis@uliege.be&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Permalink:http://www.pheno.ulg.ac.be/sem/?num_id=19&amp\;page=1&amp\;lang=fr</p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Jacopo Pallagrosi;CN=Arnaud Dewalque;CN=Valentina Martinis:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20270523T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20270525T170000
SUMMARY:SLACRR 2027
UID:20261013T044040Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:6177 Delmar Ave\, Saint Louis\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality provides a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason\, broadly construed. In addition to two invited speakers\, the other speakers will be chosen from submitted abstracts.This will be the 17th SLACRR.</p>\n<p>Invited speakers: Jennifer Nagel (Toronto) and Sergio Tenenbaum (Toronto)</p>\n<p>Hosted by UMSL\, WUSTL\, and SLU</p>\nhttps://www.umsl.edu/~slacrr/index.html</a>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270601T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270601T000000
SUMMARY:Collective Agency in Classical and Continental Philosophy (Vilnius\, 2027)
UID:20261013T044041Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Vilnius
LOCATION:Vilnius\, Lithuania
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Conference description</strong></p>\n<p>It is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\,&nbsp\; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.</p>\n<p>This conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency<strong>.</strong> We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.</p>\n<p>We invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.</p>\n<p>Possible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Relational nature of personhood</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collectives and ontological unity</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Categorisation of group agency</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective emotions</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective justice</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Groups and moral responsibility</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Confirmed keynote speakers:</strong></p>\n<p>Thornton Lockwood (University of Florida)</p>\n<p>Sophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)</p>\n\n<p><strong>Submission guidelines</strong></p>\n<p><u>Submission deadline and acceptance notification</u></p>\n<p>The abstracts must be submitted by <strong>Monday 1st June 2026</strong>.</p>\n<p>The acceptance notifications might be expected after <strong>Tuesday 30th June 2026</strong>.</p>\n<p><u>Submission procedure</u></p>\n<p>We invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.</p>\n<p>Please write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.</p>\n<p>The abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com</p>\n<p><u>Paper delivery</u></p>\n<p>All the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.</p>\n<p><u>Other practicalities</u></p>\n<p>Please note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.</p>\n<p>Lunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.</p>\n<p><strong>Organisers</strong></p>\n<p>This conference is part of the research project <em>&ldquo\;</em><strong>Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory</strong><em>&rdquo\;</em> (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Hong_Kong:20270618T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Hong_Kong:20270620T170000
SUMMARY:Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW) 
UID:20261013T044042Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Asia/Hong_Kong
LOCATION:4.36 Run Run Shaw Tower\, Hong Kong\, Hong Kong
DESCRIPTION:<p>https://sites.google.com/view/few2027/</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Boris Babic:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20270628T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20270630T170000
SUMMARY:‘The Ethics of Empty Beliefs: Conversations with Buddhist Philosophy’
UID:20261013T044043Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Vienna
LOCATION:Dominikanerbastei 16\, Vienna\, Austria\, 1010
DESCRIPTION:<p>As part of a Starting Grant funded by the European Research Council\, I am pleased to invite proposals for participation in a conference on &lsquo\;The Ethics of Empty Beliefs: Conversations with Buddhist Philosophy&rsquo\; scheduled to be held at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (IKGA)\, part of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (OEAW)\, in Vienna on 28-30 June 2027.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Paper proposals are invited from philosophers working with Western and/or Buddhist sources on any topic concerned with the ethics of belief\, broadly understood. Thus\, for example\, papers may be proposed regarding topics such as (but not limited to) the nature of belief\, the norms of belief and&nbsp\;normativity in relation to belief\,&nbsp\;evidence and evidentialism\, and the epistemic basing relation.&nbsp\;Discussions concerning the relationship of belief (including in terms of its&nbsp\;formation\, maintenance\, and/or relinquishment)&nbsp\;to notions such as&nbsp\;credence\, view\, judgment\, assent\, conviction\, faith\, trust\, hope\, and knowledge (or their analogues in Buddhist sources)&nbsp\;are welcome\, as are those concerning&nbsp\;the relationship of&nbsp\;belief (and its ethics) to faculties such as consciousness\, cognition\, discernment\, conceptualization\, view-holding\, volition\, sensation\, and emotion (or their analogues in Buddhist sources).</p>\n<p>The research project of which this conference forms part is titled&nbsp\;<em>The Ethics of Empty Beliefs: Chinese Buddhist Philosophy in the &lsquo\;Period of Disunity&rsquo\;</em>&nbsp\;(ChinBuddhPhil)\; for more information\, see&nbsp\;https://www.oeaw.ac.at/projects/chinbuddhphil. The project aims to bring Buddhist philosophical sources into conversation with Western ones\, on the understanding that Buddhist philosophers merit consideration not only as historical artifacts but as genuinely interesting and insightful contributors to live philosophical problems. As such\, the conference is intended to be dialogical\, with specialists of relevant Western and Buddhist philosophical materials engaging in debate regarding overlapping topics\, positions\, and arguments.</p>\n<p>Philosophers specializing in Western sources from any of the ancient\, medieval\, modern\, or contemporary philosophical canons are welcome to apply\; they need possess no prior knowledge of relevant Buddhist materials or debates.</p>\n<p>As for philosophers specializing in Buddhist sources\, in line with the overall focus of the ChinBuddhPhil project on the Sanlun&nbsp\;三論&nbsp\;school of Chinese Buddhist philosophy\, those proposing papers on Sanlun are especially welcome to apply. More broadly\, however\, the call is open to philosophers specializing in Chinese Buddhist sources beyond Sanlun\, and more broadly still to those specializing in sources from any other among the Buddhist traditions spanning diverse geographical regions and temporal periods. Philosophers specializing in Buddhist sources need possess no prior knowledge of relevant Western materials or debates.</p>\n<p>Edited volumes based on two prior project conferences have already been submitted to Oxford University Press. An edited book comprised of chapters based on the papers presented at this conference is also planned\, and potential speakers should keep in mind that they will be invited to submit a written chapter (6\,000-9\,000 words) based on their oral presentation. Each participant will also be invited to prepare a short response to another paper (1\,000-2\,000 words)\, thereby allowing philosophers working with Western sources to engage\, from within their own sphere of expertise\, with Buddhist materials\, and vice-versa. Draft papers will thus be pre-circulated to respondents.</p>\n<p>Timeline:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;1 June 2026: Deadline for submission of paper proposals.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;1 July 2026: Announcement of accepted papers.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;1 April 2027: Deadline for submission of draft papers.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;28-30 June 2027: In-person conference in Vienna.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;1 September 2027: Deadline for submission of final papers.</p>\n<p>Those interested in taking part are welcome to send 1) a paper abstract of circa 500 words\, and 2) a CV or link to a professional profile\, to&nbsp\;rafal.stepien@oeaw.ac.at&nbsp\;by the&nbsp\;1st&nbsp\;of June 2026. Requests for further information are also welcome. In a dedicated effort to counteract long-standing discrimination\, women and members of other identity-groups still under-represented in academe are especially encouraged to apply. This is an in-person conference\; accommodation in Vienna for participants will be funded by the organizers\, and funds are also foreseen to be available to offset travel costs to and from Vienna for those participants with no alternative sources of funding.</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Rafal K. Stepien</strong></p>\n<p>Principal Researcher\, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia\, Austrian Academy of Sciences.</p>\n<p>Principal Investigator\, &lsquo\;The Ethics of Empty Beliefs: Chinese Buddhist Philosophy in the &ldquo\;Period of Disunity&rdquo\;&rsquo\;\, European Research Council.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Rafal Stepien:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20270628T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20270630T170000
SUMMARY:The Ethics of Empty Beliefs: Conversations with Buddhist Philosophy
UID:20261013T044044Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Vienna
LOCATION:Dominikanerbastei 16\, Vienna\, Austria\, 1010
DESCRIPTION:<p>As part of a Starting Grant funded by the European Research Council\, I am pleased to invite proposals for participation in a conference on &lsquo\;The Ethics of Empty Beliefs: Conversations with Buddhist Philosophy&rsquo\; scheduled to be held at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (IKGA)\, part of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (OEAW)\, in Vienna on 28-30 June 2027.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Paper proposals are invited from philosophers working with Western and/or Buddhist sources on any topic concerned with the ethics of belief\, broadly understood. Thus\, for example\, papers may be proposed regarding topics such as (but not limited to) the nature of belief\, the norms of belief and&nbsp\;normativity in relation to belief\,&nbsp\;evidence and evidentialism\, and the epistemic basing relation.&nbsp\;Discussions concerning the relationship of belief (including in terms of its&nbsp\;formation\, maintenance\, and/or relinquishment)&nbsp\;to notions such as&nbsp\;credence\, view\, judgment\, assent\, conviction\, faith\, trust\, hope\, and knowledge (or their analogues in Buddhist sources)&nbsp\;are welcome\, as are those concerning&nbsp\;the relationship of&nbsp\;belief (and its ethics) to faculties such as consciousness\, cognition\, discernment\, conceptualization\, view-holding\, volition\, sensation\, and emotion (or their analogues in Buddhist sources).</p>\n<p>The research project of which this conference forms part is titled&nbsp\;<em>The Ethics of Empty Beliefs: Chinese Buddhist Philosophy in the &lsquo\;Period of Disunity&rsquo\;</em>&nbsp\;(ChinBuddhPhil)\; for more information\, see&nbsp\;https://www.oeaw.ac.at/projects/chinbuddhphil. The project aims to bring Buddhist philosophical sources into conversation with Western ones\, on the understanding that Buddhist philosophers merit consideration not only as historical artifacts but as genuinely interesting and insightful contributors to live philosophical problems. As such\, the conference is intended to be dialogical\, with specialists of relevant Western and Buddhist philosophical materials engaging in debate regarding overlapping topics\, positions\, and arguments.</p>\n<p>Philosophers specializing in Western sources from any of the ancient\, medieval\, modern\, or contemporary philosophical canons are welcome to apply\; they need possess no prior knowledge of relevant Buddhist materials or debates.</p>\n<p>As for philosophers specializing in Buddhist sources\, in line with the overall focus of the ChinBuddhPhil project on the Sanlun&nbsp\;三論&nbsp\;school of Chinese Buddhist philosophy\, those proposing papers on Sanlun are especially welcome to apply. More broadly\, however\, the call is open to philosophers specializing in Chinese Buddhist sources beyond Sanlun\, and more broadly still to those specializing in sources from any other among the Buddhist traditions spanning diverse geographical regions and temporal periods. Philosophers specializing in Buddhist sources need possess no prior knowledge of relevant Western materials or debates.</p>\n<p>Edited volumes based on two prior project conferences have already been submitted to Oxford University Press. An edited book comprised of chapters based on the papers presented at this conference is also planned\, and potential speakers should keep in mind that they will be invited to submit a written chapter (6\,000-9\,000 words) based on their oral presentation. Each participant will also be invited to prepare a short response to another paper (1\,000-2\,000 words)\, thereby allowing philosophers working with Western sources to engage\, from within their own sphere of expertise\, with Buddhist materials\, and vice-versa. Draft papers will thus be pre-circulated to respondents.</p>\n<p>Timeline:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;1 June 2026: Deadline for submission of paper proposals.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;1 July 2026: Announcement of accepted papers.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;1 April 2027: Deadline for submission of draft papers.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;28-30 June 2027: In-person conference in Vienna.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;1 September 2027: Deadline for submission of final papers.</p>\n<p>Those interested in taking part are welcome to send 1) a paper abstract of circa 500 words\, and 2) a CV or link to a professional profile\, to&nbsp\;rafal.stepien@oeaw.ac.at&nbsp\;by the&nbsp\;1st&nbsp\;of June 2026. Requests for further information are also welcome. In a dedicated effort to counteract long-standing discrimination\, women and members of other identity-groups still under-represented in academe are especially encouraged to apply. This is an in-person conference\; accommodation in Vienna for participants will be funded by the organizers\, and funds are also foreseen to be available to offset travel costs to and from Vienna for those participants with no alternative sources of funding.</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Rafal K. Stepien</strong></p>\n<p>Principal Researcher\, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia\, Austrian Academy of Sciences.</p>\n<p>Principal Investigator\, &lsquo\;The Ethics of Empty Beliefs: Chinese Buddhist Philosophy in the &ldquo\;Period of Disunity&rdquo\;&rsquo\;\, European Research Council.</p>\n<p>https://www.oeaw.ac.at/projects/chinbuddhphil/conferences&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Rafal Stepien:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Indiana/Indianapolis:20270628T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Indiana/Indianapolis:20270709T170000
SUMMARY:Notre Dame Summer Seminars in Philosophy of Religion
UID:20261013T044045Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Indiana/Indianapolis
LOCATION:Notre Dame\, United States\, 46556
DESCRIPTION:<p>The first of three Notre Dame Summer Seminars in Philosophy of Religion\, this two-week intensive will feature speakers from philosophy\, psychology\, and theology\, and up to 20 graduate student or early career participants (see separate Call for Applications). Confirmed speakers: Yuval Avnur (Scripps College)\,&nbsp\;Olivia Bailey (Berkeley)\,&nbsp\;Nathan Ballantyne (Arizona State)\, Emily Dumler-Winckler (Theology\, St Louis Univ)\,&nbsp\;Amy Floweree (Texas Tech)\,&nbsp\;Sandy Goldberg (Northwestern)\,&nbsp\;Megan Haggard (Psychology\, Francis Marion Univ)\, Tom Kelly (Princeton)\, Ruth Mayo (Psychology\, Hebrew Univ Jerusalem)\, and Tenelle Porter (Psychology\, Rowan Univ).</p>\n<p>The 2027 Seminar theme is "Disagreement\, Humility\, and Polarization": Religion is often political and divisive. Should this matter\, for how we think about God or\, indeed\, the propriety of religious belief? How could we know God or have faith in a world where religious traditions disagree sharply about what God is like - and where those divisions themselves contribute to unrest and hatred? Further questions connected with this theme include: how do particular theological traditions encode prescriptions for engaging with disagreement? How do these recommendations fare when evaluated for epistemic and practical rationality\, or their compatibility with just political systems? Is something like humility sufficient to save us from fueling religious division\, and if so\, what is humility like and how could we cultivate it at scale? Would a humbler approach to religion favor certain spiritual or theological traditions over others - for example\, is there a relationship between humility and agnosticism or apophaticism?&nbsp\;How shall we understand the character traits of humility\, empathy\, and love for others given polarizing issues of politics or doctrine? What insights are there from sociology and psychology on religious communities\, belonging\, and changing values in a polarized era? Etc.</p>\n<p>Sponsored by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Matthew A. Benton;CN=Laura Frances Callahan;CN=Michael Rea:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20271013T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20271015T170000
SUMMARY:Kant\, la nature\, la physique
UID:20261013T044046Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/Madrid
LOCATION:Avinguda Blasco Ibáñez\, 30\, Valencia\, Spain
DESCRIPTION:<p>La Soci&eacute\;t&eacute\; internationale d&rsquo\;&Eacute\;tudes Kantiennes de Langue Fran&ccedil\;aise (SiEKLF) tiendra son XVIIIe Congr&egrave\;s &agrave\; la facult&eacute\; de philosophie de l&rsquo\;Universit&eacute\; de Valence\, du 13 au 15 d&rsquo\;octobre 2027. Le th&egrave\;me retenu est &laquo\; Kant\, la nature\, la physique &raquo\;. Il s&rsquo\;agit de mettre l&rsquo\;accent sur la conception kantienne de la physique et la mani&egrave\;re dont celle-ci cr&eacute\;e un cadre philosophique compatible avec la perspective de la physique quantique. Cela &eacute\;tant dit\, les contributions sur tout autre aspect de l&rsquo\;&oelig\;uvre kantienne\, de ses sources et de sa projection contemporaine sont &eacute\;galement les bienvenues. Outre le programme acad&eacute\;mique\, un programme culturel ax&eacute\; principalement sur la musique et &eacute\;troitement li&eacute\; au th&egrave\;me de la conf&eacute\;rence sera propos&eacute\;.</p>\n<p>Les personnes int&eacute\;ress&eacute\;es &agrave\; participer au congr&egrave\;s ont jusqu&rsquo\;au 27 novembre 2026 pour envoyer un titre et un r&eacute\;sum&eacute\; de 100 mots maximum\, en indiquant leur affiliation acad&eacute\;mique\, &agrave\; l&rsquo\;adresse &eacute\;lectronique suivante : kv2027sieklf@uv.es. Chaque intervenant disposera de 30 minutes pour son expos&eacute\;\, suivi de 20 minutes de d&eacute\;bat.</p>\n<p>La langue principale du congr&egrave\;s sera le fran&ccedil\;ais. Des propositions de conf&eacute\;rences en castillan\, en allemand\, en anglais seront prises en consid&eacute\;ration\, mais dans une proportion limit&eacute\;e. L&rsquo\;exposition sera accompagn&eacute\;e d&rsquo\;une traduction en fran&ccedil\;ais (imprim&eacute\;e ou projet&eacute\; sur l&rsquo\;&eacute\;cran) ou\, au moins\, d&rsquo\;un r&eacute\;sum&eacute\; de cinq pages en langue fran&ccedil\;aise.</p>\n<p>Le r&eacute\;sultat de l&rsquo\;&eacute\;valuation (acceptation ou refus) de la proposition sera communiqu&eacute\; au plus tard le 31 d&eacute\;cembre 2026.&nbsp\;</p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN="Pedro Jesús Teruel":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20300531T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20300531T090000
SUMMARY:Phenomenologies of Religious Experience
UID:20261013T044047Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>This series invites proposals in classical phenomenology\, French phenomenology\, pre- and post-phenomenologies\, and in methodologies that bridge phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The relation between phenomenology and religious experience can be considered in a variety of modes: epistemic (phenomenology as a "rigorous science" of religious experience in Husserl's sense)\; ontic (phenomenology as a way to access the core motive\, or regulative ideal\, of religion)\; analogical (phenomenological experience as a secular version of religious experience)\; generalizing (religious experience turning into phenomenological experience when stripped from its dogmatic frame)\, etc. Proposals can take critical\, descriptive\, theoretical\, comparative\, historical\, or other approaches\, and they can focus on the interplay between religious or spiritual experience and assorted theoretical approaches\, or proceed from such experience towards building a new theory. In accord with Husserl&rsquo\;s original intent\, the series welcomes attempts to locate spiritual or religious experience within a broader theory of the sciences (Wissenschaftslehre) and to expand phenomenology towards transcendental philosophy and metaphysics.<br><br>The series covers five areas:<br>1) Clarifications of religious and spiritual experience\, its formal phenomenological research\, and its relationships to art\, textuality\, culture\, anthropology\, politics\, and comparative religion\;<br>2) Metaphysical extensions of the phenomenology of religious and spiritual experience\;<br>3) Existential and psychological analyses\, in different traditions\, of religious and spiritual experience\;<br>4) Theologies of religious experience\, with or beyond a specific focus on ritual and liturgy\, including liberation theologies\, feminist theologies\, theologies at the intersection of religious experience and race\, social status\, etc.\;<br>5) The phenomenology of religious and spiritual experience as applied to and/ or examined within medicine\, nursing\, and the health sciences and the natural and social sciences.<br><br>The series is published in cooperation with the Society for the Phenomenology of Religious Experience\,&nbsp\;www.sophere.org.<br><br><br>Editors:&nbsp\;Michael Barber (michael.barber@slu.edu)\, Peter Costello (PCOSTELL@providence.edu)\, Olga Louchakova-Schwartz (founding editor\,&nbsp\;olouch@ucdavis.edu)\, and Martin Nitsche (nitsche@flu.cas.cz)</p>\n\n<p><br>Advisory Board:&nbsp\;Jason Alvis (University of Vienna)\, Angela Ales Bello (Pontifical Lateran University)\, Michel Bitbol (The French National Center for Scientific Research)\, Carla Canullo (University of Macerata)\, David Ciavatta (Ryerson University)\, Crina Gschwandtner (Fordham University)\, Neal DeRoo (The King&rsquo\;s University)\, Thomas Fuchs (University of Heidelberg)\, James G. Hart (University of Indiana)\, Richard Kearney (Boston College)\, Jeff McCurry (Duquesne University)\, Felix O&rsquo\;Murchadha (National University of Ireland\, Galway)\, Dermot Moran (Boston College)\, Tom Nenon (The University of Memphis)\, Ryōsuke Ōhashi (Universities of Kyoto and Osaka)\, Vincent Pastro (Jesuit School of Theology of Santa Clara University and Aquinas Institute of Theology\, St Louis)\, Hans Rainer Sepp (Charles University)\, Michel Staudigl (University of Vienna)\, Claudia Welz (Aarhus University)<br>Staff editorial contact:&nbsp\;Jana Hodges-Kluck (jhodges-kluck@rowman.com)&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261005T194829Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:29990101T033000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:29990201T120000
SUMMARY:POSTPONED - Creativity and Improvisation in Thought\, Practice\, and Mind:  An Interdisciplinary Conference
UID:20261013T044048Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:c81e:70ff:fee7:7e34%3
TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:6001 Dodge Street\, Omaha\, United States\, 68182
DESCRIPTION:<p>*Please note that this event has officially been<em><strong> postponed</strong></em>. More information will be made available asap in the near future*</p>\n<p>Many human cognitive capacities and processes may be deployed creatively\, from unique choices made for oneself up through novel cultural shifts. Similarly\, large swaths of our daily lives are taken up with performing spontaneous\, on-the-fly\, and unplanned activities that are\, in a word\, improvised.&nbsp\; Charting out the nature of both creativity and improvisation\, taken individually or together\, remains an open and pressing issue. In this conference\, we will delve into various philosophical\, theoretical\, empirical\, and interdisciplinary issues that are related to creativity and improvisation. A non-exhaustive list of related questions and themes for this topic include:</p>\n<p>- What is the relationship between improvisation and creativity?</p>\n<p>- What is the relationship between creative activity and well-being?</p>\n<p>- What is the best way to model individual and collective creativity?</p>\n<p>- Is creativity in the arts the same thing as in other domains\, such as in science or business?</p>\n<p>- What are the pros and cons of different scientific operationalizations of creativity and improvisation?</p>\n<p>- Provide a conceptual analysis of creativity and/or improvisation.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
