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METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260827T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260828T170000
SUMMARY:Just Theorising 2026
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TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Leeds\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<ul><li>\n<p>Main Event:&nbsp\;27th&nbsp\;August 2026</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Optional&nbsp\;Additional Session:&nbsp\;28th&nbsp\;August 2026</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Call for participants deadline:&nbsp\;Sunday 10th&nbsp\;May&nbsp\;23:59 GMT*</p>\n</li>\n<li><em>*Now accepting late applications due to a cancellation. Apply before <strong>Monday 17th August 23:59</strong></em></li>\n</ul>\n<p><u>Theme</u></p>\n<p>Many of us theorise about groups to which we do not belong\, and about issues which seriously impact groups to which we do not belong. In this workshop we will explore questions around how this theorising should be done\, and whether/when such research should be avoided.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Just Theorising is a reading workshop on responsible and responsive philosophical research. Participants will discuss the epistemological and methodological issues surrounding theorising across social difference.</p>\n<p>Participants will discuss texts from social epistemology\, applied ethics\, and by marginalised people writing outside academia &ndash\; all&nbsp\;of which suggest ways to approach (or not to approach)&nbsp\;theorising across social difference.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Our aim is to improve our&nbsp\;philosophical&nbsp\;practice by thinking together.&nbsp\;By approaching these questions collaboratively and openly\, we hope to improve the philosophical and ethical quality of&nbsp\;our&nbsp\;future work.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><u>Format</u></p>\n<p>This workshop involves one full day of discussions\, and an optional collaborative session the following morning.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The main event&nbsp\;will involve a series of&nbsp\;reading-group-style sessions\, where participants discuss existing texts on workshop themes.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;<br>On the second day\, the organiser will be holding an optional session\, where we will design an online resource to aid others who want to investigate these issues themselves or organise similar events.</p>\n<p><u>How to participate</u></p>\n<p>Because this workshop is discussion-based\, we are limited to 20 attendees. This means that if we have more than 20 interested&nbsp\;applicants&nbsp\;we will need to say &lsquo\;yes&rsquo\;&nbsp\;to some applicants and &lsquo\;no&rsquo\; to others.&nbsp\;We hope that we&nbsp\;won&rsquo\;t&nbsp\;have to turn anyone away\, but if we do\, this will be decided&nbsp\;based on&nbsp\;who will get the most out of the workshop&nbsp\;(not&nbsp\;who is the most successful philosopher!).&nbsp\;Therefore\, we ask applicants to&nbsp\;state&nbsp\;why the workshop is appealing to them\, and how they feel it will be useful to them.&nbsp\;We are looking for an honest statement of how the workshop might support your work\, we are not looking for&nbsp\;competitive statements of&nbsp\;academic credentials.&nbsp\;</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Deadline for applications:&nbsp\;Sunday 10th&nbsp\;May&nbsp\;23:59&nbsp\;GMT*</li>\n<li>*<em>Now accepting late applications due to a cancellation. Apply before <strong>Monday 17th August 23:59</strong></em></li>\n</ul>\n<p>Access Information</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Lunch and tea/coffee will be provided.&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>Dinner&nbsp\;on the&nbsp\;evening of&nbsp\;27th&nbsp\;August&nbsp\;will be partially subsidised &ndash\; we expect to be able to cover food\, but you will need to cover your own drinks.&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>We cannot cover the cost of flights\, but we intend to subside rail travel for those attendees without institutional funding available. We also intend to cover the cost of one night&rsquo\;s accommodation for those without institutional funding available.&nbsp\;Whether we can fully or partially subsidise rail travel will depend on how many people need it\, and we will let you know as soon as possible.&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>This will be an in-person event.</li>\n<li>The venue has a lift for wheelchair access.&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>The venue has accessible and gender-neutral toilets.</li>\n<li>Please let us know accessibility requirements when you register.</li>\n<li>We will&nbsp\;have a designated &lsquo\;quiet space&rsquo\; available.&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>We have a small budget for childcare\, please let us know when you register if you expect to require this to&nbsp\;participate.&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>AccessAble&nbsp\;link: https://www.accessable.co.uk/university-of-leeds/access-guides/17-blenheim-terrace#a3ccb561-9415-f34f-8291-585f2c690c15&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>We want academic conferences to be accessible and enjoyable for all of us. This event adopts a Safer Spaces Policy\, available here:&nbsp\;https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TemYNI_OitE9XaRaq83bOY5t8qi3vYS_93KpqJCpaLc/edit?usp=sharing&nbsp\;<br>Participants are expected to read this policy\, and act&nbsp\;in accordance with&nbsp\;it.&nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>This event was made possible by the Leverhulme Trust\, thanks to them for funding&nbsp\;an&nbsp\;Early Career Research Fellowship which includes this project. This event&nbsp\;revives the approach and goals of a 2018 event of the same name\, organised by Nadia Mehdi and Rosa Vince.&nbsp\;Thank you to Nadia for her hard work in the original workshop.</p>\n<p>Organising team: Rosa Vince\, Alethea Choo\, Anne-Marie McCallion\, Leonie Smith</p>\n<p>If you have any questions about this workshop\, please contact Dr Rosa Vince at r.vince@leeds.ac.uk</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Rosa Vince;CN=Leonie Smith;CN=Anne-Marie McCallion:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260831T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260831T120000
SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
UID:20260821T131748Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Abstracts on <em>Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical</em> (University of Zurich\, 18th-20th February 2027)</strong></p>\n<p>We invite the submission of <strong>extended abstracts</strong> (but no longer than <strong>1000 words</strong>) for presentations at the international conference on <strong>&ldquo\;Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical&rdquo\; </strong>that takes place at the <strong>University of Zurich</strong> from <strong>18th to 20th February 2027</strong>. The abstracts should be sent to <a href="mailto:sebastian.schmidt@uzh.ch"><strong>sebastian.schmidt@uzh.ch</strong></a> until <strong>August 31st 2026.</strong></p>\n<p>The conference will host a series of renowned experts from ethics and epistemology to discuss the role of relational normativity across philosophical disciplines. If your talk gets accepted\, travel expenses\, including up to three nights at a central hotel in Zurich\, flight and train tickets\, as well as lunch and dinner\, will be covered. We also plan a follow-up project such as an edited volume with a major publisher or a special issue for an academic journal. Accepted talks will be invited as contributions to this follow-up project.</p>\n<p>A recent trend in epistemology is to borrow ethical concepts to think about epistemic normativity. Maybe most notably\, the concept of epistemic injustice is meant to track the wrong that is done to someone in their capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007). More recently\, the idea that there is something we epistemically owe to each other (cf. Basu 2019) is taking hold. Epistemologists defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of accountability and blame (Kauppinen 2018\; Brown 2020\; Boult 2020\; 2024)\, that we expect each other to meet our epistemic obligations to believe or know (Goldberg 2018)\, and that we owe epistemic redress (Hull 2019)\, atonement (Woodard 2023)\, or reparations (Altanian 2022\; Lackey 2022) to those we epistemically wronged\, who might then decide to epistemically forgive us (Green 2024). This has led some epistemologists to propose more fundamentally social meta-epistemologies (Dyke 2022\; Fleisher 2024\; Hannon &amp\; Woodard 2025)\, even proposing that epistemic normativity has relational foundations (Boult 2024).</p>\n<p>While epistemologists take inspiration from the work of ethicists to develop their ideas on epistemic relationality\, the above literature develops largely in isolation from broader engagement with the recent ethical discussions on the relational structure of morality. Relational ethics has focused mostly on the explanation of our moral obligations to one another\, where obligations are typically understood as the correlates of rights or similar claims. To be under a moral obligation\, on this view\, is to be under a directed or second-personal duty to another person which is constitutively connected to the claim-right that this person has on you (e.g. Darwall 2006\, Wallace 2019\, Zylberman 2021). The relational understanding of morality illuminates the social significance of morality and the commonly held assumption that morality is grounded in relations of accountability and that moral wrongness warrants blame.</p>\n<p>The pioneering work and ongoing research by ethicists should be studied closely for the transposition of ethical concepts into epistemology to be intelligible and bear philosophical fruit. The aim of this conference is to bring together these two perspectives with a focus on discussing foundational issues surrounding relational normativity. Questions that will be discussed may include the following:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What grounds the authority of relational normativity? Do we have obligations towards one another simply in virtue of our nature as social creatures\, or is there something else that explains the authority of relational obligations?</li>\n<li>To what extent should relational normativity play a role in epistemology? Should it play a role only insofar as epistemologists are interested in moral questions pertaining to our beliefs\, or is there a distinctly epistemic kind of relational normativity?</li>\n<li>Can epistemic norms in general or in part be understood as relational duties? Maybe we owe it to others to comply with certain epistemic norms when others testify or when it comes to not wronging others with what we believe about them. Or maybe we have epistemic relational obligations in virtue of certain social roles\, such as being a scientific expert. Even so\, is there any hope in understanding epistemic normativity more broadly as relational? We do not seem to owe it to any concrete party to generally fit our beliefs to our evidence. Or do we?</li>\n<li>How can a relational perspective on epistemic normativity gain inspiration from and ground projects in social\, feminist\, and decolonial philosophy? For decades\, feminist epistemologists and ethicists have attended to how we relate to one another under conditions of oppression. While meta-normative discussions tend to pass over this more applied literature\, feminist philosophers tend to focus on the concrete contexts rather than meta-normative theory building. Can we get them into conversation?</li>\n<li>What are the relevant relations between a) practical agents and b) epistemic agents? Are these the same relations and if so on what grounds are these relations built? Or do these relations differ? What can we learn from legal relations on the one hand and personal relationships like friendship on the other hand when thinking about how to best conceive of the relevant relations?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Speakers who accepted our invitation to present at the conference include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College\, California\, USA)</li>\n<li>Monika Betzler (LMU Munich\, Germany)</li>\n<li>Cameron Boult (Brandon University\, Canada)</li>\n<li>Stephen Darwall (Yale University\, Connecticut\, USA)</li>\n<li>Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University\, Illinois\, USA)</li>\n<li>Antti Kauppinen (University of Helsinki\, Finland)</li>\n<li>Fabienne Peter (University of Warwick\, England\, UK)</li>\n<li>R. Jay Wallace (University of Berkeley\, California\, USA)</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We are very much looking forward to receiving your abstracts\,</p>\n<p>Jonas Vandieken (LMU Munich) &amp\; Sebastian Schmidt (University of Zurich)</p>\n<p>This conference is part of the Swiss National Science Foundation project on Relational Epistemology (<a  href="https://data.snf.ch/grants/grant/223891"  target="_blank">https://data.snf.ch/grants/grant/223891</a>).</p>\n<p>&nbsp\;<a href="https://zegra.ch/events/event/relational-normativity-epistemic-and-practical/">Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260901T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260903T170000
SUMMARY:Fourth Austrian Summer School in Phenomenology
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Austrian Society for Phenomenology launches its fouth international summer school. Our objective is to promote the research of young scholars (bachelor\, master\, and doctoral students) that sheds new phenomenological light on current debates in epistemology\, metaethics\, and metaphysics. The descriptive analysis of lived experience\, the eidetic study of the various modes of intentionality\, and the epistemic role and normative dimensions ascribed to experience constitute the cornerstones of phenomenological research. In particular\, Husserl&rsquo\;s conceptions of originary givenness\, evaluative experience\, and eidetic intuition are among the various seminal contributions we find in the phenomenological tradition. Currently\, promising research is done that utilizes such conceptions in order to develop phenomenological perspectives on experiential justification\, the debate between epistemic internalism and externalism\, the theory of value\, (moral) emotions\, moral epistemology\, issues surrounding metaphysical realism and anti-realism\, as well as the epistemology and metaphysics of essence\, modality\, and metaphysical dependence relations. We would like to encourage students to develop phenomenological insights and teachings systematically and in view of contemporary debates in philosophy. Our ambition is to promote such phenomenological research by providing a platform to connect with\, discuss with\, and receive feedback from peers and experts. Each conference day is devoted to one of the subtopics of the event.</p>\n<p>The conference will be an&nbsp\;<strong>online event.</strong>&nbsp\;If you wish to participate in the summer school but not to give a talk\, please provide a short statement of motivation (not more than 150 words) and specify your name\, affiliation\, and research interests.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p>If you wish to participate in the summer school and give a talk\, please apply with an (extended) abstract of the paper you wish to present. Submissions <strong>should not exceed 500 words</strong>\, must be written in <strong>English</strong> (conference language)\, and should be prepared for <strong>blind review</strong>.</p>\n<p><strong>The submission deadline is July 15\, 2026.</strong></p>\n<p>Please send your applications/submissions and general inquiries to: <strong>laurentia</strong>[dot]<strong>adam</strong>[at]<strong>uni-graz</strong>[dot]<strong>at</strong></p>\n<p>Women and members of other traditionally underrepresented groups are especially encouraged to apply.</p>\n<p><strong>Preliminary schedule</strong></p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>1</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological Approaches to </em><em>Metaethics</em></p>\n<p><strong>Nicolas de Warren</strong> (Penn State University): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (University of Graz)</p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>2</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological </em><em>Approaches to</em><em> </em><em>Epistemology</em></p>\n<p><strong>Mirja Hartimo</strong> (University of Helsinki): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Philipp Berghofer (University of Graz)</p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>3</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological </em><em>Approaches to</em><em> Metaphysics</em></p>\n<p><strong>Kit Fine</strong> (New York University): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Michael Wallner (University of Graz)</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Philipp Berghofer;CN=Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl;CN=Michael Wallner:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260902T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260904T170000
SUMMARY:British Society for the Theory of Knowledge Biennial Conference 2026
UID:20260821T131750Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Walton St\, Oxford\, United Kingdom\, OX1 2HG
DESCRIPTION:<p>The British Society for the Theory of Knowledge is a registered charity (SC050235) dedicated to furthering philosophical research in epistemology.</p>\n<p>Every two years\, the British Socitey for the Theory of Knowledge holds a major conference on themes in epistemology. For more information about the BSTK and previous conferences\, see here:&nbsp\;https://bstk.org.uk/events.html&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Call for Abstracts</p>\n<p>BSTK invites contributions to the conference.</p>\n<p>Eligibility</p>\n<p>The call for abstracts is open to philosophers at all career stages. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Submission details</p>\n<p>Please submit a title and abstract (400-500 words\,&nbsp\;<strong>suitable for blind review</strong>)<a name="abstract-submission-contact"></a>&nbsp\;to&nbsp\;<a name="abstract-submission-deadline"></a>info@bstk.org.uk.</p>\n<p>&nbsp\;Abstract submission deadline:</p>\n<p>30 April 2026</p>\n<p><em>&nbsp\;</em>Notification of result:</p>\n<p>30 May 2026</p>\n<p><em>Registration</em></p>\n<p>Open. Participation in the conference is conditional on paying a registration fee of &pound\;240. Payments can be made via this link: https://bstk.org.uk/bstk-biennial-conference.html Deadline: August 15 2026. The registration fee covers coffee/tea\, lunches\, and drinks receptions for all conference days\, as well as the conference dinner (September 2nd\, Dining Hall\, Exeter College\, Turl Street). Registered participants also benefit from access to booking College accommodation in Oxford as special\, low rates (approx. &pound\;80/night).&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Bernhard Salow;CN=Mona Simion:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260902T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260904T170000
SUMMARY:MANCEPT Workshop - Epistemic Injustice and Backlash
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TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Manchester\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>MANCEPT Workshop - Epistemic Injustice and Backlash: Call for Abstracts &nbsp\; Recent years have been characterized by significant backlash to progressive social movements and social changes such as the #MeToo movement\, the Black Lives Matter movement\, and the increased visibility of trans people in public life. Dimensions to this backlash include the electoral &ndash\; i.e.\, the rise of far-right political parties\; the legal &ndash\; legislation\, executive orders and judicial decisions e.g. overturning rights to abortion and gender-affirming healthcare\, banning affirmative action and DEI initiatives\, and excluding trans people from participation in sport\; and the necropolitical &ndash\; e.g. the misogynistic murder of Ren&eacute\;e Good and the rising tide of anti-trans violence. A further important dimension to this backlash is the epistemic &ndash\; e.g. the widespread repudiation of the testimonies of Christine Blasey Ford and Amber Heard\, the ridiculing of slogans such as &lsquo\;defund the police&rsquo\;\, and the growing dissemination of myths and disinformation concerning trans people. This dimension to the backlash has recently begun to receive philosophical attention\, with aspects of it being theorized variously as 'hermeneutical backlash' (George &amp\; Goguen 2021)\, 'hermeneutical sabotage' (Edgoose 2024)\, and 'hermeneutical disarmament' (Morgan 2025) &ndash\; all phenomena thought either to constitute or to result in epistemic injustices. It has also been argued that previously proposed strategies for preventing epistemic injustices are frequently ineffective when confronted by backlash\, prompting a search for other strategies which might be pursued more effectively towards this end (Clanchy forthcoming). Much work on epistemic injustice and backlash remains to be done\, however &ndash\; especially in light of the epistemic injustice literature&rsquo\;s &lsquo\;methodological commitment to the primacy of the nonideal&rsquo\; (Medina 2013: 11). The aim of this workshop is to provide a space for the development of such work.<br><br> We invite submissions of abstracts of up to 500 words to a MANCEPT workshop on this topic. Abstracts should be submitted by&nbsp\;<strong>May 1st</strong>&nbsp\;and should be sent to&nbsp\;<u>han.edgoose@glasgow.ac.uk</u> <br>Questions that papers may address include\, but are not limited to:<br>&bull\;How is the epistemic dimension related to other dimensions of backlash?<br>&bull\;To what kinds of epistemic injustice does backlash give rise? What strategies can be most effectively pursued to prevent epistemic injustices in times of backlash? What kinds of epistemic agency can be exercised by members of targeted groups (Pohlhaus 2020)?<br>&bull\;Does 'epistemic injustice' (Fricker 2007) in fact provide an adequate framework for thinking about these issues? What about these issues might this framework miss or distort but the frameworks provided by e.g. 'epistemic oppression' (Dotson 2014) or 'epistemologies of ignorance' (Mills 2007) capture?<br>&bull\;How should previous work on epistemic injustice and e.g. the #MeToo movement (e.g. Jackson 2018) or the Black Lives Matter movement (e.g. Anderson 2017) be developed or rethought in light of the current backlash?<br>&bull\;What practical lessons can be drawn for the present moment from a study of the epistemic dimension of previous backlashes (e.g. Faludi 1991)?<br>&bull\;Who bears responsibility\, in both backward- and forward-looking senses (Young 2011)\, for the epistemic dimension of backlash?<br>&bull\;How can thinking about epistemic injustice and backlash inform methodological debates concerning the relative merits of ideal and nonideal theory? &nbsp\; The panel will take place in-person at the University of Manchester\, between September 2nd&nbsp\;and September 4th&nbsp\;2026. Further details about the MANCEPT workshops can be<br>found here:&nbsp\;<u>MANCEPT Workshops 2026 - Research Explorer The University of Manchester</u> &nbsp\; Han Edgoose and Nick Clanchy (organisers) &nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Han Edgoose;CN=Nick Clanchy:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Budapest:20260904T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Budapest:20260905T170000
SUMMARY:Early Modern Naturalisms: Spinozist and Humean
UID:20260821T131752Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Budapest
LOCATION:Budapest\, Hungary
DESCRIPTION:<p>While both Hume and Spinoza have been claimed as paradigmatic naturalists\, it is far from clear that they are naturalists in the same sense. Further\, it is not obvious that the label applies to either without qualification. Spinoza&rsquo\;s and Hume&rsquo\;s projects moved in markedly different directions\, so we propose a workshop with the aim of examining what is at stake in calling either thinker a naturalist.</p>\n<p>By placing Spinoza and Hume in conversation on this topic\, the conference seeks to illuminate two distinct (purported) strands of early modern naturalism: one expansive and metaphysical\, the other cautious and anthropological. Are these differences merely a matter of emphasis and scale\, or do they represent fundamentally incompatible conceptions of nature and its significance? Does calling them naturalists collapse their distinct philosophies into a single tradition? And what\, if anything\, is gained by framing the early modern naturalist field in terms of &ldquo\;Spinozist&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;Humean&rdquo\; trajectories rather than the more traditional &ldquo\;rationalist&rdquo\; vs. &ldquo\;empiricist&rdquo\; divide?</p>\n<p>We want to revisit early modern naturalism\, not merely as a retrospective label\, but as a philosophical option characterised by contested outlines. Contributors are invited to explore these and related questions for the purpose of critically reevaluating the categories through which early modern thought is often organised\, and reimagining naturalism as a central thread both connecting and dividing the period&rsquo\;s major figures.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Harmon;CN=Tamas Demeter:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260910T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260911T170000
SUMMARY:The Given
UID:20260821T131753Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Karen Blixens Plads 8\, Copenhagen\, Denmark\, 2300
DESCRIPTION:<p>Perceptual experiences seem to present\, make manifest\, or &lsquo\;give&rsquo\; the world to us. Such experiences have &lsquo\;presentational phenomenology&rsquo\;\, or &lsquo\;presentational feel&rsquo\;\; they seem to offer &lsquo\;scene immediacy&rsquo\; or &lsquo\;givenness in-the-flesh&rsquo\;. And perhaps perceptual experiences are not unique in this regard: similar expressions have been used to articulate\, for instance\, mathematical intuitions\, and certain religious experiences. However\, most attempts to characterize presentational phenomenology revolve around striking yet unexplained metaphors. The aim of this conference is to move beyond metaphor\, exploring presentational phenomenology in a variety of different contexts and from a variety of different perspectives\, including epistemology\, philosophy of perception\, philosophy of religion\, psychopathology\, and VR research.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN="Søren Overgaard";CN=Laura Oppi;CN="Kasper Møller Nielsen";CN=Mads G. Henriksen:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260910T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260911T170000
SUMMARY:Religious Language and Communication
UID:20260821T131754Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Frankfurt am Main\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p><br>In contemporary philosophy of religion\, there is a lively debate about interreligious disagreement and interreligious dialogue. Likewise\, reflections in the philosophy of language on the semantics of the word "God"\, on the possibility of adequately describing a transcendent reality with our human languages\, and on the fundamental nature of religious language in general form central topics in the philosophy of religion. Up to now\, however\, these areas of inquiry have rarely been systematically connected\, even though they are in fact closely intertwined on a substantive level: both the possibility of genuine disagreement in the religious domain and the possibility of genuine understanding in dialogue depend on certain assumptions in the philosophy of language concerning the semantic content and referential properties of religiously used expressions. By deepening the linguistic dimension of the discussion about disagreement and dialogue\, the conference aims to help close this gap in research. Central questions to be addressed include: Is there something distinctive about religious language? If so\, what is the nature of religious language and discourse? What does the word "God" mean\, and how do assumptions about its meaning shape religious dialogue? What consequences do apophatic approaches have for religious dialogue? How should we respond to the fact that some of our religious or scientific peers do not share our beliefs? What consequences do fictionalist\, expressivist\, or realist interpretations of religious language have for interreligious dialogue? What role do the semantics of religious language play in conversations between adherents of religious and secular worldviews?</p>\n<p>Speakers:</p>\n<p>Amber L. Griffioen</p>\n<p>Jacob Hesse</p>\n<p>Lorraine J. Keller</p>\n<p>Winfried L&ouml\;ffler</p>\n<p>Eva Schmidt</p>\n<p>Michael Scott</p>\n<p>Mikael Stenmark</p>\n<p>&Aring\;ke Wahlberg</p>\n<p>Oliver J. Wiertz</p>\n<p>Participation is free. Please register via email by September 3rd: ake.wahlberg@sankt-georgen.de</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Jacob Hesse;CN="Åke Wahlberg":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260910T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260911T170000
SUMMARY:Workshop “What is Good Reasoning?”
UID:20260821T131755Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Bern\, Switzerland
DESCRIPTION:<p>The aim of the workshop is to investigate the nature of good reasoning and its place within the normative domain. We will explore how good reasoning should be understood and how it relates to other central normative notions\, such as reasons\, ought\, value\, and fittingness. The workshop seeks to foster discussion of questions including: What are the norms and aims of reasoning? Can we explain what it means to reason well in terms of other normative or non-normative notions? And what roles do normative reasons play in good reasoning?</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Lussi;CN="Andreas Müller":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260911T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260911T090000
SUMMARY:Special Issue of the Journal of Philosophy in Schools: Aesthetic Education
UID:20260821T131756Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Journal of Philosophy in Schools (JPS) is seeking articles for inclusion in a special issue entitled Aesthetic Education and Philosophy in Schools.</p>\n<p>Aesthetic education is often treated as a concern of the arts curriculum alone &mdash\; a matter of what happens in the music room\, the drama studio\, or the visual arts classroom. Yet the claim that education has an aesthetic dimension is older and broader than this narrower usage suggests. From Schiller's argument that beauty is the condition under which the human being becomes whole\, to Dewey's insistence that aesthetic experience is not a separate domain but the consummatory quality of any experience undergone with attention\, to Maxine Greene's reminder that imagination is the passport to the "as if\," the tradition has long held that the aesthetic is implicated wherever learners are asked to perceive carefully\, feel responsively\, and judge with discernment.</p>\n<p>This raises questions that sit close to the heart of philosophy in schools. What is the relationship between aesthetic experience and the formation of judgment? Can the school\, which often prioritizes reasoning and dialogue\, also be understood as a site of aesthetic formation &mdash\; a place where attention\, receptivity\, and imaginative response are cultivated alongside argument? If so\, how might practitioners understand what they are already doing\, and what further possibilities might open up? Finally\, how might these questions be addressed using philosophical pedagogies?</p>\n<p>This special issue invites contributions that examine the intersection of aesthetic education and philosophy with school-aged children\, across and beyond the arts curriculum. We welcome submissions from various philosophical traditions\, as well as historical recoveries of figures whose work remains generative for contemporary practice. We particularly welcome scholars who approach aesthetics in a crossdisciplinary way &ndash\; calling upon figures from various traditions to formulate their philosophical argument.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Papers could address the following questions or pursue additional lines of inquiry:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>The Facilitator as Artist: How might the role of the teacher or facilitator in a philosophical inquiry be understood as an aesthetic practice or performance?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Embodiment &amp\; Environment (Place &amp\; Play): What is the relationship between aesthetic experience\, physical play\, and embodied cognition in philosophical inquiry? How do the physical classroom environment\, outdoor settings\, or digital spaces influence the aesthetic dimension of philosophical inquiry with children?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>The Role of Attention\, Perception\, and/or Imagination: What role does aesthetic attention\, perception\, or imagination play in philosophical inquiry with children\, and how might this be cultivated? How can the school be a place for aesthetic philosophical practice\, and what would such a reframing change in pedagogical terms?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Educative Aesthetic Experience: What distinguishes an aesthetic experience that is genuinely educative from one that is merely pleasant\, passive\, or even distracting within the context of philosophical inquiry? How can aesthetics be engaged without instrumentalizing works of art?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Educating the Aesthetic Dimension: What does it mean to educate the aesthetic dimension of a young person's experience or cultivate aesthetic sensibility\, and how does this differ from\, or complement\, the cultivation of critical reasoning?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Creative Thinking and Aesthetics: How does "creative thinking" function within philosophical inquiry with children\, and what is its relationship to critical and caring thinking? How might an aesthetic perspective illuminate the distinctiveness of creative thinking and its compatibility with critical reasoning in philosophical dialogue?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Aesthetics and Flourishing: In what ways do aesthetic experiences in the philosophy classroom foster a sense of meaning\, connection\, and student growth? What specific qualities\, structures\, or pedagogical conditions must an aesthetic experience possess to facilitate philosophical learning and student growth? How does engaging the aesthetic dimension within philosophical inquiry contribute to student well-being\, eudaimonia\, and the holistic flourishing of the child?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Theoretically-Grounded Aesthetic Intuition: What theoretical resources are needed to make sense of practitioner intuitions that the best philosophy classrooms have an aesthetic quality that exceeds their argumentative content?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Empirical Research and Implications: How do aesthetic considerations bear on ethical\, civic\, and epistemic education\, and what are the implications for classroom practice? How might empirical research illuminate the presence and significance of aesthetic experience in classroom philosophical dialogue?&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Diverse Aesthetic Traditions: What can non-Western aesthetic traditions or Indigenous perspectives on beauty and experience bring to philosophy in schools? What aesthetic injustices have occurred because of the emphasis on beauty and other Western aesthetic traditions? What barriers to entry are generated by the perceived &ldquo\;gatekeeping&rdquo\; of Western concepts of aesthetics?&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We invite extended abstracts (500-700 words) to be considered for inclusion in this special issue. Please include a brief bio indicating any relevant affiliations.</p>\n<p>Procedures and Timelines</p>\n<p>Your extended abstract and proposed title\, along with your name\, affiliation\, and bios\, should be submitted via email to the guest editors: Rebecca Taylor (rt2904@tc.columbia.edu) and Michael Quinn (m.quinn2@research.gla.ac.uk).</p>\n<p>Abstracts due: Friday\, September 11\, 2026. Authors will be notified by early October 2026 as to whether their submission has been accepted.</p>\n<p>Full papers (4000-6000 words)will be due February 1\, 2027\, for double-blind peer review.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Author Guidelines can be found here:https://jps.bham.ac.uk/about/submissions/</p>\n<p>JPS is a peer-reviewed\, open-access online journal dedicated to research in philosophy with school-aged children. This special issue will be published in the June/July or&nbsp\; November/December 2027.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260911T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260912T170000
SUMMARY:18th Midwest Epistemology Workshop
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TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:The Ohio State University\, Columbus\, United States
ORGANIZER;CN=Declan Smithies:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260915T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260917T170000
SUMMARY:Critical Political Epistemology
UID:20260821T131758Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Freiburg\, Germany\, 79098
DESCRIPTION:<p>International conference organized by&nbsp\;the<strong> Professorship for Epistemology &amp\; Theory of Science (University College Freiburg)</strong>\, in collaboration with the <strong>Critical Political Epistemology Network (CPEN)</strong>.</p>\n<p>Programme</p>\n<p><strong><em>15 September 2026</em></strong></p>\n<p><strong>9:00&ndash\;9:30 Registration and Welcome</strong></p>\n<p><strong>9:30&ndash\;11:00 Keynote 1 -&nbsp\;</strong><a  href="https://www.geisteswissenschaften.fu-berlin.de/we01/institut/mitarbeiter/mitarbeiter-drittmittel/muehlebach/index.html"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://www.geisteswissenschaften.fu-berlin.de/we01/institut/mitarbeiter/mitarbeiter-drittmittel/muehlebach/index.html">Deborah M&uuml\;hlebach</a> (Institut f&uuml\;r Philosophie\, Freie Universit&auml\;t Berlin):&nbsp\;<em>The Epistemic Life of Critique</em></p>\n<p><strong>11:30&ndash\;13:00 Session 1</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li><a  href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/government/people/academic-staff/andreas-johann-sorger"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://www.lse.ac.uk/government/people/academic-staff/andreas-johann-sorger">Andreas Sorger</a> (Department of Government\, London School of Economics and Political Science):&nbsp\;<em>Propaganda\, Ideology\, and Ideology Critique</em>&nbsp\;</li>\n<li><a  href="https://www.miu.ac.jp/about/teacher/international/archives/19620/"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://www.miu.ac.jp/about/teacher/international/archives/19620/">Thomas J. Spiegel</a> (School of International Liberal Arts\, Miyazaki International University):<em>Epistemic Class Struggle</em></li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>14:30&ndash\;16:00 Session 2</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li><a  href="https://www.ife.uzh.ch/de/research/felder/mitarbeitende/felderfranziska.html"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://www.ife.uzh.ch/de/research/felder/mitarbeitende/felderfranziska.html">Franziska Felder</a> (Institut f&uuml\;r Erziehungswissenschaft\, Universit&auml\;t Z&uuml\;rich):&nbsp\;<em>From Moral Pain to Tactical Resistance: Epistemic Agency and Counter-Knowledge in Disability Activism</em>&nbsp\;</li>\n<li><a  href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/people/arlene-lo"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://www.lse.ac.uk/people/arlene-lo">Arlene Lo</a> (Department of Philosophy\, Logic and Scientific Method\, London School of Economics and Political Science):&nbsp\;<em>Epistemic Epidemic: A Fanonian Antidote</em></li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>16:30&ndash\;18:00 Session 3</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li><a  href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/people/jack-wilkinson"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://www.lse.ac.uk/people/jack-wilkinson">Jack Wilkinson</a> (Department of Government\, London School of Economics and Political Science):&nbsp\;<em>L&rsquo\;Ordine Nuovo and the Stakes of Political Epistemology</em></li>\n<li><a  href="https://www.uni-bremen.de/philosophie/personen/alphabetische-liste/profil/idm/496347?cHash=4219310e7621a8c583de9f0e79703b73"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://www.uni-bremen.de/philosophie/personen/alphabetische-liste/profil/idm/496347?cHash=4219310e7621a8c583de9f0e79703b73">Rose Troll</a> (Institut f&uuml\;r Philosophie\, Universit&auml\;t Bremen):&nbsp\;<em>On Epistemological Dimensions of Alienation</em></li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong><em>16 September 2026</em></strong></p>\n<p><strong>9:30&ndash\;11:00 Keynote 2 -&nbsp\;</strong><a  href="https://sira.ub.edu/static/fitxes/Filosofia.html?id=j.serrano-zamora.ub.edu&amp\;lang=en"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://sira.ub.edu/static/fitxes/Filosofia.html?id=j.serrano-zamora.ub.edu&amp\;lang=en">Just Serrano-Zamora</a> (Faculty of Philosophy\, Universitat de Barcelona):&nbsp\;<em>Disembodied Embodiment: Expression and Knowledge in Far-Right Extremism</em></p>\n<p><strong>11:30&ndash\;13:00 Session 4</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li><a  href="https://www4.uib.no/finn-ansatte/ane.engelstad"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://www4.uib.no/finn-ansatte/ane.engelstad">Ane Engelstad</a> (Department of Philosophy\, University of Bergen):&nbsp\;<em>The Personal is Epistemological</em></li>\n<li>Pierce Robertson-Voth (Department of Philosophy\, University of Warwick):&nbsp\;<em>Mediated Ignorance: Propaganda\, Institutional Entfremdung\, and the Political Ontology of Knowledge</em></li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>14:30&ndash\;16:00 Session 5</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Anisha Patnaik (University of Delhi):&nbsp\;<em>Epistemic Violence in India: The Criminal Tribes Act and Its Afterlife</em></li>\n<li>Dexter Martin (Humanities Department\, Universidad Aut&oacute\;noma del Estado de Morelos\, UAEM Mexico):&nbsp\;<em>Letters from Madness (and Sanity): Psychiatry\, Law\, and De-subjectivation in Nineteenth Century Mexico</em></li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>16:30&ndash\;18:00 CPEN Meeting</strong></p>\n<p><strong><em>17 September 2026</em></strong></p>\n<p><strong>9:30&ndash\;11:00 Keynote 3 -&nbsp\;</strong><a  href="https://www.unilu.ch/fakultaeten/kultur-und-sozialwissenschaftliche-fakultaet/institute/philosophisches-seminar/mitarbeitende/prof-dr-nadja-el-kassar/#tab=c144744"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://www.unilu.ch/fakultaeten/kultur-und-sozialwissenschaftliche-fakultaet/institute/philosophisches-seminar/mitarbeitende/prof-dr-nadja-el-kassar/#tab=c144744">Nadja El Kassar</a> (Philosophisches Seminar\, Universit&auml\;t Luzern):&nbsp\;<em>Rethinking Ignorance in Critical Political Epistemology</em></p>\n<p><strong>11:30&ndash\;13:00 Session 6</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Kelly Agra (Philosophy\, University of the Philippines Baguio):&nbsp\;<em>Whisper Networks and Hidden Transcripts: The Infrapolitics of Feminist Knowledge</em></li>\n<li>Stephanie Deig (Philosophy\, University of Amsterdam):&nbsp\;<em>Defiant Rights Claiming Practices in the Ni Una Menos Movement</em></li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>14:30&ndash\;16:00 Session 7</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Vasiliki Polykarpou (Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences):&nbsp\;<em>Coalitional Politics\, Situated Knowledges\, and Epistemic Resistance: Insights from an Ethnographic Study in Athens</em></li>\n<li><a  href="https://www.trafo-k.at/about/"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://www.trafo-k.at/about/">Simon Nagy</a> (trafo.K\, Wien):&nbsp\;<em>Everyone&rsquo\;s a Critic: Radical Art Education as Practice of Democratisation</em></li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>16:30&ndash\;18:00 Keynote 4 -&nbsp\;</strong><a  href="https://professeurs.uqam.ca/professeur/catala.amandine/"  rel="noreferrerdata-type=" data-id="https://professeurs.uqam.ca/professeur/catala.amandine/">Amandine Catala</a> (Philosophy Department\, UQAM &ndash\; Universit&eacute\; du Qu&eacute\;bec &agrave\; Montr&eacute\;al):&nbsp\;<em>A Systematic Account of Epistemic Repair</em></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Melanie Altanian;CN=Frieder Vogelmann;CN=Sonja Riegler;CN=Anna Klieber;CN=Resa-Philip Lunau:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260915T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260915T163000
SUMMARY:A Puzzle Concerning Reason and the Emotions
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TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Lillehammer\, Norway
DESCRIPTION:<p>More details TBA&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260915T140000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260915T140000
SUMMARY:3rd Duke/UNC Epistemology Workshop
UID:20260821T131800Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Duke University\, Durham\, United States\, 27712
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Papers: 3rd Duke-UNC Epistemology Workshop</strong></p>\n<p>Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill invite graduate students and early career scholars to submit extended abstracts in any area of epistemology for presentation at the 3rd&nbsp\; Duke-UNC Epistemology Workshop. The workshop will be held in person at Duke University on December 4th/5th 2026.</p>\n<p>The current list of confirmed speakers is as follows\,</p>\n<p>Laura Callahan (Notre Dame)</p>\n<p>Ben Holguin (Johns Hopkins)</p>\n<p>Tom Kelly (Princeton)</p>\n<p>Zoe Jenkin (Rutgers)</p>\n<p>Mike Titelbaum (UW Madison)</p>\n<p>Please submit abstracts in .doc or .pdf format prepared for blind review. Submissions should include an extended abstract of up to 500 words with the paper&rsquo\;s title as the first page. Papers should be suitable for a 45-minute presentation. Some partial funding may be available to defray travel costs for presenters.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Submissions should be sent as email attachments to dukeuncepistemology@gmail.com.</p>\n<p><strong>Submission Deadline:</strong> September 15th\, 2026&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>If you have any questions\, please contact the conference organizers at dukeuncepistemology@gmail.com</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Benjamin Eva;CN=Reuben Stern;CN=Ram Neta:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260917T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260917T170000
SUMMARY:Belief\, and Other Influences on Behaviour 
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TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:University of Liverpool\, Liverpool\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>The first workshop of the Liverpool/Luxembourg project\, <strong>The Role of Cognitive Experience in Decision and Action\, </strong>will be hosted at the University of Liverpool on 17th Sept\, 9am-5pm. The workshop will explore ways in which beliefs\, biases\, and non-doxastic states\, influence our behaviour and decision-making. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Speakers and Titles</strong></p>\n<p>Stephen Gadsby (Antwerp) - The Sense of Insight: Some Philosophical Questions</p>\n<p>William Hornett (Cambridge) - What the Habit-Bearer Knows</p>\n<p>Kathleen Murphy-Hollies (Birmingham) - Believing What Resonates</p>\n<p>Jack Shardlow (Liverpool) - Time Biases\, Pain\, and Memory</p>\n<p>Ema Sullivan-Bissett (Birmingham) - Belief\, All Else Equal &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Registration</strong>. If you would like to attend\, please register by 28th August\, by emailing Jack Shardlow (<u>shardlow@liverpool.ac.uk</u>) with &lsquo\;Workshop Registration&rsquo\; in the subject line of the email. Lunch and tea/coffee will be provided\, but please do let us know if you have any access or dietary requirements. Attendees may also express their interest in attending the workshop dinner (at their own expense). &nbsp\; More information and abstracts for the talks will be circulated among registered attendees in early September.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Jack Shardlow;CN=Laura Gow:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Athens:20260924T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Athens:20260925T170000
SUMMARY:Contemporary Philosophy meets Philosophy of Science: Trends and Perspectives: IV
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TZID:Europe/Athens
LOCATION:48 Akadimias Street\, Athens\, Greece\, 105 62
DESCRIPTION:<p>The&nbsp\;MA Program in Contemporary Philosophy/Philosophy of Science&nbsp\;of the&nbsp\;Department of History and Philosophy of Science&nbsp\;is pleased to announce its 4th Annual Conference on 24th and 25th September 2026 at the&nbsp\;National and Kapodistrian University of Athens</p>\n<p><strong>"Contemporary Philosophy meets Philosophy of Science: Trends and Perspectives: IV"</strong></p>\n<p>Conference Venue:&nbsp\;Kostis Palamas building</p>\n<p>(Attendance is free but places are limited and registration is required)</p>\n<p>Speakers:</p>\n<p><strong>Monika Betzler&nbsp\;</strong>(University of Munich)<strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Anjan Chakravartty&nbsp\;</strong>(University of Miami)</p>\n<p><strong>Gerhard&nbsp\;</strong><strong>Heinzmann&nbsp\;</strong>(Universit&eacute\; de Lorraine\, Nancy)</p>\n<p><strong>Doukas Kapantais&nbsp\;</strong>(Academy of Athens\, Research Centre for Greek Philosophy)<strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Chrysostomos Mantzavinos&nbsp\;</strong>(University of Athens)</p>\n<p><strong>Evgenia Mylonaki&nbsp\;</strong>(University of Athens)</p>\n<p><strong>Yannis Stephanou&nbsp\;</strong>(University of Athens)<strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Stelios Virvidakis</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Athens)</p>\n<p>---</p>\n<p>Programme &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Thursday 24th September</strong></p>\n<p>10.00&ndash\;11.00&nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Gerhard Heinzmann&nbsp\;</strong>&mdash\;<strong>&nbsp\;</strong><em>A Dialogical Account of Epistemic Intuition</em></p>\n<p><em>&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Coffee break until 11.30</em></p>\n<p>11.30&ndash\;12.30&nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Yannis Stephanou&nbsp\;</strong>&mdash\;<strong>&nbsp\;</strong><em>Against Classical Logic</em></p>\n<p><em>&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Lunch Break until 14.30</em></p>\n<p>14.30&ndash\;15.30&nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Doukas Kapantais&nbsp\;</strong>&mdash\;<strong>&nbsp\;</strong><em>The Ontological Basis of the Algorithmic Operations in the&nbsp\;</em>Prior Analytics</p>\n<p><em>&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Coffee break until 16.00</em></p>\n<p>16.00-17.00&nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Anjan Chakravartty&nbsp\;</strong>&mdash\;<strong>&nbsp\;</strong><em>Universalism and Multiculturalism in Science Education\, Revisited</em></p>\n<p><strong>Friday 25th September</strong></p>\n<p>10.00&ndash\;11.00&nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Monika Betzler&nbsp\;</strong>&mdash\;<strong>&nbsp\;</strong><em>Identity-Shaping as a Relational Wrong</em></p>\n<p><em>&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Coffee break until 11.30</em></p>\n<p>11.30&ndash\;12.30&nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Stelios Virvidakis &mdash\;&nbsp\;</strong><em>On the Relation between Epistemic and Moral Virtues: The Aristotelian Legacy and Contemporary Virtue Epistemology</em></p>\n<p><em>&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Lunch Break until 14.30</em></p>\n<p>14.30&ndash\;15.30&nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Evgenia Mylonaki&nbsp\;</strong>&mdash\;<strong>&nbsp\;</strong><em>Moral Growth</em></p>\n<p><em>&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Coffee break until 16.00</em></p>\n<p>16.00-17.00&nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Roundtable Discussion: Monika Betzler\, Gerhard Heinzmann\, Chrysostomos Mantzavinos&nbsp\;</strong>&mdash\;<strong>&nbsp\;</strong><em>Dialogue as a Philosophical Genre</em></p>\n<p><em>----</em></p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20260925T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20260925T170000
SUMMARY:Philosophy\, Evidence and Policymaking
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TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
LOCATION:Rijnstraat 50\, Den Haag\, Netherlands
DESCRIPTION:<p>This workshop brings together researchers working on the theory and philosophy of science and evidence in policymaking as well as practitioners such as knowledge-brokers\, policymakers and policy advisors. It is organised by researchers at University of Antwerp\, University of Groningen and the VU Amsterdam in collaboration with the Science for Policy project at the Netherlands&rsquo\; Ministry of Education\, Culture &amp\; Science.</p>\n<p>The workshop is aimed at both early-career and senior researchers who are interested in the theory and the practice of evidence generation for and use in policymaking and the interaction between science and policy. This field of research addresses questions such as: What type of evidence should one use to develop policies? What should the role of scientific advisors be in policymaking? Does it make sense to rank evidence in hierarchies? How should policymakers deal with scientific expert disagreement? What does an appropriate role for non-epistemic values look like in evidence and science for policy?</p>\n<p>We invite you to send abstracts on the abovementioned topics\, as well as on related ones. Abstracts should:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Not exceed 300 words (references excluded)\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Be sent in an anonymised document to the following email address: ebpolicy.network@gmail.com\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Be suitable for a 30-minute presentation (+15 minutes of Q&amp\;A)\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>Be sent by the deadline: 3 August 2026 (notification of acceptance in the beginning of August 2026)\;</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Participation in the workshop without sending an abstract is possible by filling out the registration form no later than 15 August 2026.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The first part of the workshop will include a keynote lecture by Dr. Donal Khosrowi (University of Hannover) and\, after\, presentations of the selected abstracts. After the lunch break\, the second part of the workshop will include a keynote lecture by Dr. Jaakko Kuosmanen (Finnish Academy of Science and Letters) and structured dialogues in break-out groups with practitioners\, aimed at making participants reflect together on various topics related to evidence and policy.</p>\n<p>Moreover\, the workshop aims to encourage interaction between researchers and practitioners. Therefore\, the workshop will also include sessions in which there is structured dialogue between participating researchers and practitioners from the Netherlands&rsquo\; government.</p>\n<p>Questions can be sent to&nbsp\;ebpolicy.network@gmail.com</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Geertjan Holtrop;CN=Kato Van Roey;CN=Helena R. Slanickova;CN=Paride Del Grosso:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260930T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260930T234500
SUMMARY:Argumenta: THE EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE RESEARCH PROGRAMME: DEGENERATIVE OR PROGRESSIVE?
UID:20260821T131804Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>The notion of epistemic injustice introduced by Miranda Fricker in 2007 raised interest in the harmful effects of prejudice within analytic philosophy and beyond. It inspired various projects linking ethics and epistemology. The notion\, originally used to capture the epistemic disadvantage that people experience for their race or gender\, has been applied to an increasing number of domains.</p>\n<p>In recent years\, several objections have been raised to the application of epistemic injustice. Here are some of the issues discussed in the literature:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>the problems of silencing and sidelining minorities cannot be solved at the level of interpersonal relationships but have institutional and societal dimensions\;</li>\n<li>the effects of power asymmetries on knowledge exchanges should not be framed in terms of justice or injustice\, but in other terms (such as oppression or exclusion)\;</li>\n<li>remedies to the phenomena described as epistemic injustice need to be systemic and the exercise of individual virtues is not sufficient to address them\;</li>\n<li>&nbsp\;the construct of epistemic injustice has not been adequately validated\, and there has been little empirical testing\, so we cannot know whether the phenomenon of epistemic injustice is as pervasive in our practices as it is claimed.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>In this topical collection\, we gather contributions to the debate about the strengths and limitations of the epistemic injustice research programme.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261001T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261002T170000
SUMMARY:1st Critical AI Safety Workshop
UID:20260821T131805Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Copenhagen\, Denmark
DESCRIPTION:<p>This workshop aims to bring together scholars from different disciplines who are working to characterize\, map\, and critique the field of AI Safety and AI Existential Risk research.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Main questions include\, but are not limited to:<br>- What is the landscape of AI safety and existential risk communities and research\, and what are the tensions within those?<br>- Can AI safety or AI existential risk be described as an ideology?<br>- What assumptions about cognitive science\, economics\, sociology\, society\, or power\, amongst others\, underlie and confound AI Safety? <br>- What are the formal methods of the field\, and how can they be improved?<br>- What are the funding flows in the field? How easy is it for individuals to receive funding\, and what factors are considered in funding decisions?<br>- What policy proposals does the AI safety community lobby for\, and through what channels?<br>- How is the community established\, what are their recruiting strategies\, and what makes them so successful?<br>- How tightly interlinked is the research philosophy with other non-scientific fields\, like science fiction\, hype\, speculation\, and imagination?</p>\n<p>&nbsp\; For more information\, please see the CfP:&nbsp\;https://philevents.org/event/show/149737</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Ninell Oldenburg;CN=Nina Rajcic;CN="Anders Søgaard";CN=Bokar N'Diaye;CN=Filippos Stamatiou:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Belgrade:20261001T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Belgrade:20261002T170000
SUMMARY:Future of Forecasting: Collective and Artificial Intelligence 
UID:20260821T131806Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Belgrade
LOCATION:Terminal 2\, Rijeka\, Croatia\, 51000
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Future of Forecasting: Collective and Artificial Intelligence Workshop</strong></p>\n<p>The workshop brings together experts across multiple disciplines &mdash\; cognitive science\, social science\, behavioural economics\, and the humanities &mdash\; to explore the evolving role of forecasting in the coming age of artificial intelligence.</p>\n<p>A central theme is the concept of collective intelligence and wisdom of crowd &mdash\; the idea that the aggregated judgments of groups can outperform individuals\, even the experts. This underpins modern applications such as prediction markets\, political forecasting\, and large-scale decision systems.</p>\n<p>A key topic of the workshop will be the integration of AI into forecasting processes as well as decision-making processes in general. While AI has the potential to democratize forecasting and decision-making tools and enhance predictive accuracy\, it also raises important questions about information diversity\, bias\, and reliability. The workshop will feature distinguished researchers\, including:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Dražen Prelec\, Economics\, Brain and Cognitive Sciences\, and Sloan School\, MIT &ndash\; permanent fellow</strong></li>\n<li><strong>Steve Fleming\, Computational Neuroscience and the Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry\, University College London &ndash\; visiting fellow</strong></li>\n<li><strong>Yonatan Loewenstein\, The Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences\, Hebrew University of Jerusalem &ndash\; visiting fellow</strong></li>\n<li><strong>John McCoy\, Wharton School\, University of Pennsylvania &ndash\; visiting fellow</strong></li>\n<li><strong>Rava da Silveira\, Mathematical Cognitive Science\, University of Zurich and University of Basel &ndash\; visiting fellow</strong></li>\n<li><strong>&Eacute\;mile Servan-Schreiber\, School of Collective Intelligence\, University Mohammed VI Polytechnic &ndash\; visiting fellow</strong></li>\n</ul>\n<p>The workshop will also feature a keynote by <strong>Themistoklis P. Sapsis\,</strong> MIT &mdash\; William I. Koch Professor of Mechanical and Ocean Engineering\; Director of the Center for Ocean Engineering.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261005T113000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261130T170000
SUMMARY:Computational Social Philosophy of AI Seminars (CSPAIS 2026)
UID:20260821T131807Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>Computational methods and simulations have become a fruitful methodology for philosophers\, particularly for understanding how social relations\, norms\, and communicative structures could and should shape inquiry. Work in computational social philosophy has illuminated phenomena ranging from the epistemic value of diversity and the dynamics of epistemic belonging to the emergence and erosion of norms and processes of polarization.</p>\n<p>Generative and agentic AI tools stand to profoundly reshape computational social philosophy in at least two ways:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>As objects of study for computational social philosophy. Generative and agentic AI are increasingly embedded in epistemic life: as sources of information\, interlocutors\, surrogates for social participants\, gatekeepers within epistemic communities\, and even partially autonomous epistemic actors. This should motivate a broadening of purview in social epistemology\, which has tended to focus primarily on personal\, interpersonal\, and institutional factors that impact inquiry\, but comparatively less on technological factors.&nbsp\;</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p>As tools of study for computational social philosophy. These systems can lower the technical barriers to computational work. More interestingly\, they may expand the range of social phenomena philosophers can model\, including richer representations of agents&rsquo\; beliefs and behavior\, more complex interactions and environments\, and even digital-twin-style models of particular communities or institutions.</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>This cluster brings together philosophers working in\, or seriously engaging with\, computational social philosophy. We are eager to gather a cohort who can bring rigor\, clarity\, and intellectual generosity to advancing understanding in relation to the above themes.</p>\n<p>We&rsquo\;re particularly interested in philosophical contributions that engage one or more of the following cross-cutting threads:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Modeling of AI systems as socio-epistemic phenomena</strong>: How might explicitly modeling the effects of AI systems within social epistemic processes challenge\, deepen\, or expand existing understanding in social epistemology and philosophy of science?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Modeling of socio-epistemic phenomena with AI-based tools</strong>: What new forms of social epistemological phenomena can AI-based tools help us represent and investigate beyond traditional methods\, such as typical agent-based models?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Understanding aims and tradeoffs</strong>: How should we think about the tradeoffs between promises of AI-based tools (e.g.\, flexibility\, expressive power\, scale) and other desiderata (e.g.\, robustness\, justification\, tractability\, understanding) that have long been central to computational social philosophy? What can we learn about these issues from the use of AI-based tools in other disciplines such as computational social science?</p>\n</li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Methodological standards</strong>: What standards should guide reliable\, reproducible\, and more generally epistemically and ethically responsible philosophical inquiry using AI-based methods in computational social philosophy?</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Please note that\, while we welcome expressions of interest from all disciplines\, this is not a general workshop about AI or AI-based simulations. It is a workshop about how deeper engagement with AI systems as objects of modeling studies and as a modeling tool can ultimately enrich and expand philosophical inquiry.</p>\n<p><strong>Format</strong></p>\n<p>The series will consist of bi-weekly virtual meetings\, in the style of CSPS\, starting in October 2026.The meetings are on Mondays at 11:30am ET.</p>\n<p><strong>Applications</strong></p>\n<p>You can submit your application to join the seminars by using this application form: https://forms.gle/SC2iqbZUBU6iB52v6&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The application form includes:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Basic details: Your name\, email address\, affiliation\, career stage</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>Extended abstracts of up to 750 words and prepared for anonymous review (no identifying information in the abstract itself).</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The submission deadline for applications is <strong>July 27th\, 2026.</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Organizers</strong></p>\n<p>Sina Fazelpour (Northeastern)</p>\n<p>Luca Garzino Demo (UPenn)&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Please direct inquiries to lgarzino@sas.upenn.edu</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sina Fazelpour;CN=Luca Garzino Demo:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261006T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261007T170000
SUMMARY:The Nature of Social Identities: Metaphysics\, Epistemology\, and Politics
UID:20260821T131808Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Prague
LOCATION:Arna Nováka 1\, Brno \, Czech Republic\, 60200
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Department of Philosophy\, Faculty of Arts\, Masaryk University in Brno\, Czech Republic\, invites submissions for a conference on the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of social identities\, organised within the research project Identity Politics: Metaphysics and Epistemology.</p>\n<p><strong>Conference Theme</strong></p>\n<p>In recent decades\, political and social debates have increasingly focused on identity-based groups defined by characteristics such as race\, gender\, sexual orientation\, disability\, class\, religion\, or age. These developments have generated extensive discussion in political philosophy and social theory. However\, many of the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions underlying identity politics remain insufficiently examined.</p>\n<p>This conference aims to investigate the nature\, constitution\, and epistemic role of social identities. In particular\, we seek to explore the mechanisms through which identities emerge as robust social and political entities\, and the ways in which identity-related features&mdash\;such as lived experience\, self-identification\, social recognition\, and shared narratives&mdash\;contribute to their formation and persistence.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Another central aim is to examine whether different identities (for example\, race\, gender\, sexual orientation\, or class) are constituted through similar or distinct metaphysical and epistemic mechanisms. Comparative approaches that analyse similarities and differences across identities are especially welcome.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The conference will also address the epistemological aspects of social identities\, including questions concerning situated knowledge\, epistemic authority\, intersectionality\, and conflicts among different socially situated perspectives.</p>\n<p><strong>Topics</strong></p>\n<p>Possible topics include\, but are not limited to:</p>\n<p>Metaphysics of Social and Political Identities</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Social construction of identity categories</li>\n<li>Relations between biological facts and socially constructed identities</li>\n<li>The &ldquo\;reality&rdquo\; of socially constructed kinds</li>\n<li>Narrative coherence and the unity of political identities</li>\n<li>Self-identification\, authenticity\, and identity formation</li>\n<li>Identity boundaries and the possibility of passing</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Epistemology of Social Identity</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Epistemic authority of lived experience</li>\n<li>Insider/outsider epistemology</li>\n<li>Epistemic injustice and social bias</li>\n<li>Intersectionality and epistemic norms</li>\n<li>Argumentation and epistemic authority</li>\n<li>Incommensurability between identity-based perspectives</li>\n<li>Identity as epistemic authority</li>\n<li>The rights and responsibilities of epistemic communities.&nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Submissions from metaphysics\, epistemology\, social philosophy\, feminist philosophy\, philosophy of race\, and related areas are welcome.</p>\n<p><strong>Keynote speaker</strong>: Kristina Rolin (Tampere University)</p>\n<p><strong>Submission Guidelines</strong></p>\n<p>Please submit an anonymous abstract of 400&ndash\;500 words.</p>\n<p>The submission should be attached to the email in .pdf format and prepared for blind review. Please include the following information separately in the body of the email: your name(s)\, affiliation(s)\, contact information\, the title of your talk.</p>\n<p><strong>Important Dates</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Abstract submission deadline</strong>: June 20\, 2026</li>\n<li><strong>Notification of acceptance</strong>: July 30\, 2026</li>\n<li><strong>Conference dates</strong>: October 6&ndash\;7\, 2026</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Conference Details</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Location</strong>: Department of Philosophy\, Faculty of Arts\, Masaryk University\, Brno\, Czech Republic (Arna Nov&aacute\;ka 1\, 602 00 Brno)</li>\n<li><strong>Format</strong>: in-person</li>\n<li><strong>Language of the conference</strong>: English</li>\n<li><strong>Conference fee</strong>: 50 EUR. The conference fee is intended solely to cover catering costs during the event (coffee breaks and refreshments) and the conference dinner. The venue is provided by the host department\, and all conference materials will be distributed electronically. Participants who wish to attend only the talks\, not the conference dinner\, may contact the organisers to arrange a reduced fee.</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Submission</strong></p>\n<p>Please send submissions to: belohrad@phil.muni.cz</p>\n<p><strong>Contact</strong></p>\n<p>For inquiries\, please contact: Radim Bělohrad\, Ph.D. (belohrad@phil.muni.cz)</p>\n<p><strong>Organizing committee</strong></p>\n<p>Radim Bělohrad\, Ph.D.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Zdeňka Jastrzembsk&aacute\;\, Ph.D.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Marek Picha\, Ph.D.</p>\n<p>Dagmar Pichov&aacute\;\, Ph.D.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Radim Belohrad:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261007T234500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261007T234500
SUMMARY:9th Annual Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop
UID:20260821T131809Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Caldwell Hall\, Chapel Hill\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>We invite submissions of abstracts for the 2027 Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop\, to be held on March 26-27\, 2027. (Please note that this year's workshop\, unfortunately and unavoidably\, conflicts with the Pacific APA.) Abstracts should be between 750-1000 words (inclusive of footnotes but exclusive of any bibliography) and should summarize a paper that can be presented in no more than 40 minutes. The title of the paper should be included <strong>within </strong>the document above the abstract. Please prepare your abstract for anonymous review\, and submit it in .pdf or .docx form to <a href="mailto:chnormativity@gmail.com">chnormativity@gmail.com</a> by October 7th\, 2026.</p>\n<p>We will consider papers on any aspect of normativity\, construed broadly to include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>The traditional questions of metaethics</li>\n<li>The nature of other (possible) kinds of normativity (prudential\, epistemic\, aesthetic\, political\, legal\, etc.)</li>\n<li>More abstract and general questions within first-order normative theory</li>\n<li>Theories of reasons\, rationality\, and reasoning</li>\n<li>The semantics and pragmatics of normative language</li>\n<li>The psychology of normative judgment</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Those who presented papers at the last two Normativity Workshops (the 8th annual workshop\, held in 2026\; and the 7th annual workshop\, held in 2025) are not eligible to submit papers this year. Those who chaired/commented at the last two workshops\, or who presented at previous workshops\, <em>are</em> eligible to submit. There is a limit of one submission per person\; co-authored papers count toward this limit.</p>\n<p>For the eighth workshop running\, papers accepted to the workshop will be eligible for publication in a special issue of <em>Philosophical Studies</em>. Authors of accepted papers are encouraged\, but not required\, to submit their papers to the special issue.</p>\n<p>The authors of the seven best abstracts <em>not</em> selected for the workshop will be invited to chair a session at the workshop and\, as part of that\, to act as a "mini-commentator"\, asking an extended (3-5 minute) first question. In order to facilitate this\, we will ask authors of accepted papers to send their chair-commentators a draft of their full paper by March 1st.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Chris Howard;CN=Margaret Shea;CN=Alex Worsnip:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T090000
SUMMARY:Arkete: Philosophy of Perception: Representation\, Reality\, and Cognitive Structure
UID:20260821T131810Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Arkete</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Special Issue 2025</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Philosophy of Perception: Representation\, Reality\, and Cognitive Structure</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Editors:</strong> Mariano Bianca (University of Siena) and Paolo Piccari (University of Siena)</p>\n<p>Philosophical reflection on perception has returned to the centre of contemporary debates in philosophy of mind\, epistemology\, and metaphysics. Questions concerning perceptual content\, representational structure\, and the relation between experience and reality have gained renewed prominence in light of current discussions on cognition\, conceptual capacities\, and the epistemic role of perception.</p>\n<p>At the same time\, the field remains divided between competing models: representationalist accounts\, relational theories\, disjunctivism\, and naturalistic approaches that attempt to explain perception through cognitive or computational frameworks. These debates raise a deeper philosophical question: whether perception should be understood primarily as an internal mental state or rather as a structured form of access to an objective world.</p>\n<p>This special issue aims to gather contributions that investigate perception as a cognitive and conceptual phenomenon with epistemic and metaphysical implications. Particular attention will be devoted to approaches that combine analytic rigour with broader theoretical ambition\, exploring how perceptual experience contributes to the constitution of knowledge and to the articulation of reality.</p>\n<p>We welcome contributions addressing these questions\, preferably grounded in concrete cases and/or examples that help clarify and support philosophical analysis.</p>\n<p><strong>Topics for Submission (including\, but not limited to)</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>The nature of perceptual representation</li>\n<li>Conceptual vs. non-conceptual content</li>\n<li>Perceptual content and cognitive architecture</li>\n<li>Perception and realism</li>\n<li>Relationalism\, representationalism\, and disjunctivism</li>\n<li>Perceptual justification and epistemic normativity</li>\n<li>Perception and ordinary knowledge</li>\n<li>Similarity and structural models of representation</li>\n<li>Perception\, categorisation\, and concept formation</li>\n<li>Perception and mental representation in cognitive science</li>\n<li>Illusion\, hallucination\, and theories of error</li>\n<li>The metaphysical implications of perceptual theories</li>\n<li>Perception and the structure of reality</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Submission Guidelines</strong></p>\n<p>Submissions must be original and unpublished\, written in English or Italian\, and formatted according to the journal&rsquo\;s editorial guidelines. All manuscripts will undergo double-blind peer review.</p>\n<p>The 2025 issue of <em>Arkete</em> will be dedicated to these questions. The volume will include articles selected through this Call for Papers as well as invited contributions by national and international scholars.</p>\n<p>All submissions must be sent no later than <strong>30 September 2026</strong> to the Editors at:</p>\n<p>mariano.bianca@unisi.it<br> paolo.piccari@unisi.it</p>\n<p>Manuscripts must conform to the editorial guidelines available at:<br> <a target="_new">https://www.arkete.it</a></p>\n<p>Accepted languages: English and Italian.</p>\n<p>Maximum length: <strong>40\,000 characters</strong> (including spaces\, footnotes\, references\, and abstract).</p>\n<p>Each submission must include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>an abstract (max. 150 words\, in English)</li>\n<li>5&ndash\;6 keywords (in English)</li>\n<li>the anonymised manuscript prepared for blind review</li>\n</ul>\n<p>In a separate file attached to the same email\, authors must provide:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>name and surname</li>\n<li>institutional affiliation</li>\n<li>email address</li>\n<li>title of the paper</li>\n<li>abstract and keywords</li>\n</ul>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T234500
SUMMARY:Postdoctoral Position in Logic\, Probability\, and Rationality CLE–UNICAMP\, Brazil
UID:20260821T131811Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:Call for Applications\nThe Centre for Logic\, Epistemology and the History of Science (CLE) at\nUNICAMP. Brazil\, invites applications for a postdoctoral position\,\nfunded by FAPESP\, under the supervision of Prof. Walter Carnielli. The\nposition is linked to the FAPESP Thematic Project "Rationality\, Logic\nand Probability &ndash\; RatioLog" (Process 2020/16353-3).\n&nbsp\;\nInternational candidates\, regardless of nationality or any other\ncondition\, are welcome to apply.\n&nbsp\;\nCLE-UNICAMP is one of the first and highest-ranked academic\ninstitutions in Latin America fully dedicated to the areas of Logic\,\nEpistemology\, Philosophy\, and the History of Science\, promoting\ninterdisciplinary research through seminars and scientific meetings\,\npublications\, and academic exchange with research groups and\ninstitutions in Brazil and around the world.\n&nbsp\;\nProject: Logic\, Probability and Rationality: Tools for Robust Reasoning\n&nbsp\;\nThis project develops a unified framework combining logic\,\nprobability\, and causal inference to support robust models of rational\nreasoning. It aims to integrate paraconsistent and paracomplete logics\n(particularly Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Logics of Evidence\nand Truth) with Bayesian inference and Pearl's causal models\,\naddressing reasoning under contradiction\, uncertainty\, and\nintervention.\nMain objectives:\n&nbsp\;\n--Develop semantic frameworks combining non-classical logics with\nprobabilistic reasoning and causal inference\n-- Extend Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and Logics of Evidence\nand Truth (LETs) with probabilistic and causal operators\n--Formalize rational argumentation involving contradictory\, uncertain\,\nand counterfactual reasoning\n-- Implement prototype software integrating logical\, probabilistic\,\nand causal inference tools\n- To organize\,  and participate\, in seminars\, conferences and  workshops\, and  maintain a  high   rate of publications\n&nbsp\;\nCandidate requirements:\n&nbsp\;\nApplicants should have a strong publication record in international\njournals and demonstrated expertise in at least three of the following\nareas:\n&nbsp\;\n1)Non-classical logics\, including their semantics and proof methods\n2)Probability theory and its mathematical and philosophical foundations\n3)Foundations of AI\n4)Theoretical and/or applied computer science\n5)Abstract algebraic logic\n&nbsp\;\nCandidates must hold a PhD in Logic\, Mathematics\, Computer Science\, or\nPhilosophy\; the thesis must be in the area of Logic and must be\nofficially approved at the time of application.\n&nbsp\;\nRequired documentation:\n1)A research project along the lines described above (up to 10 pages\,\nexcluding bibliographical references)\n2)A complete CV\, including a list of publications\n3)A Curricular Summary\, following FAPESP's required format:\nhttps://fapesp.br/6351/instructions-for-the-elaboration-of-a-curricular-summary\n4)Certificate of Completion of the Doctoral Degree\n5) At least one recommendation letter\n&nbsp\;\nHow to apply:\nAll applications must be sent by e-mail with the subject line "PD\nPosition at CLE/FAPESP Project RatioLog" to:\nProf. Walter Carnielli walterac@unicamp.br>\nwith a copy to:\nMr. Rodrigo Cesar da Silva (CLE administrative assistant) rcsilva2@unicamp.br>\n&nbsp\;\nFellowship benefits:\n- Duration: 12 months\, renewable for 12 months\n- Stipend: BRL 12\,570.00 per month (approx. US$ 2\,450.00 per month)\, tax-free\n- Technical Reserve (additional funding for scientific activities such\nas conferences\, academic visits\, equipment\, books\, etc.): BRL\n15\,000.00 per year (approx. US$ 2\,900.00 per year)\, tax-free\n- Possibility of a 6-month research stay abroad at a renowned\ninstitution (Research Internship Abroad\, RIA)\, subject to specific\nconditions\, upon approval by FAPESP and by the supervisor.\n&nbsp\;\nApplication deadline: October 15th\, 2026\, 23:59 (S&atilde\;o Paulo time)\nEstimated project start date: January 30th\, 2027\n&nbsp\;\nFor more information\, visit the RatioLog project website:\nhttps://groupfortheoreticalandappliedlogic.my.canva.site/ratiolog2\n&nbsp\;\nFor additional information\, please contact: Walter Carnielliwalterac@unicamp.br>\n&nbsp\;
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261015T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261015T170000
SUMMARY:JAM (Junkyard Anniversary Meeting) - Philosophy of Imagination Conference
UID:20260821T131812Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/Los_Angeles
LOCATION:The Kravis Center\, Claremont\, United States\, 91711
DESCRIPTION:<p>A philosophy of imagination conference to commemorate the 10th anniversary of The Junkyard blog. In addition to the invited speakers\, there will be a number of contributed sessions.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p>JAM will include parallel sessions for submitted papers selected via an open call. Papers should be anonymized and no more than 3000 words (not including references). Philosophical papers on all topics concerning imagination are welcome. The submission deadline is <strong>October 15</strong>. Notification of paper status will be provided by December 1. A limited number of partial travel stipends are available for early career researchers and scholars residing outside the United States.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Symposium Proposals</strong></p>\n<p>JAM also has limited spots for submitted symposia selected via an open call. Symposia on all philosophical themes concerning imagination are welcome. The submission deadline is <strong>October 15</strong>. Notification of proposal status will be provided by December 1. A symposium should contain 3 papers and may also include up to two discussants and a chair (if you do not specify a chair\, one will be assigned to you).&nbsp\;&nbsp\;Symposium proposals should be anonymized\, and they should&nbsp\;explain the theme of the symposium and include extended abstracts of each of the three symposium papers (1000 words each).&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Amy Kind:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261016T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261017T170000
SUMMARY:13th Biennial Graduate Epistemology Conference\, University of Rochester
UID:20260821T131813Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Rochester\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Conference Details</strong></p>\n<p>The University of Rochester Department of Philosophy invites graduate students to submit to the 13th Biennial Graduate Epistemology Conference. We welcome submissions in the field of analytic epistemology\, broadly construed. Such submissions can include papers that address epistemological issues in philosophy of science\, ethics\, philosophy of mind\, philosophy of language\, philosophy of religion\, or metaphysics.</p>\n<p><strong>Contact</strong></p>\n<p>For questions\, comments\, and concerns\, please message the organizers at <a href="mailto:rochestergec@gmail.com">rochestergec@gmail.com</a>.</p>\n<p>The conference call for papers can be found at:&nbsp\;<a href="../show/150733">CFP: 13th Biennial Graduate Epistemology Conference\, University of Rochester - PhilEvents</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Harry Golborn;CN=Adam DeDobbelaere;CN=Evan Lopes;CN=Zane Duzant:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261019T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261019T180000
SUMMARY:TBA
UID:20260821T131814Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are pleased to announce our monthly&nbsp\;<em>online</em>&nbsp\;talk series on "<strong>Inferences &amp\; Capacities</strong>."<br><br>Our next speaker is:<br><br></p>\n<p><strong>Eva Schmidt</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund)<br><strong>TBA</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Oct 19</strong>:<em>&nbsp\;11am (Buenos Aires)\, 10am (New York)\, 4pm (Berlin).</em><br></p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:</strong> TBA</p>\n\n<p><strong>How to participate</strong>:&nbsp\;Please\, send an email to <strong>Alfredo Vernazzani</strong> at:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>alfredo-vernazzani AT protonmail.com</p>\n<p>_______</p>\n<ul>\n<li>About&nbsp\;<strong>Inferences &amp\; Capacities</strong>:</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The series brings together work on inferential capacities\, rationality\, normativity\, and cognition &mdash\; across both human and non-human animals &mdash\; with the aim of fostering discussion on the nature and limits of the cognitive sphere. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>2026 line-up: &nbsp\;<br><br></p>\n<p>April 27:&nbsp\;<strong>Angelica Kaufmann</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Milan): "Mind Blanking as Mental Imagery."&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>May 18:&nbsp\;<strong>Federico Burdman</strong>&nbsp\;(Universidad Alberto Hurtado) "Constrained choices: addiction\, attention\, and reasons-responsiveness."&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>June 22:&nbsp\;<strong>Susanna Schellenberg</strong>&nbsp\;(Rutgers): TBA&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>July 20:&nbsp\;<strong>Cameron Buckner</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Florida): "Chains-of-Thought\, Inner Speech\, and Artificial Epistemic Agency."</p>\n<p>September 7:&nbsp\;<strong>Ulf Hlobil</strong>&nbsp\;(Concordia University): TBA &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>October 19:<strong>&nbsp\;Eva Schmidt</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund): TBA&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>November 16:&nbsp\;<strong>Hans-Johann Glock</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Z&uuml\;rich): "Is Ascribing Inferences to Brains or Non-human Animals a Fallacy?"&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>December 14:&nbsp\;<strong>Emma Borg</strong>&nbsp\;(SAS\, University of London): "Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: The Scope of Common-Sense Psychology."&nbsp\;<br><br></p>\n<p>Each talk lasts c. 40 minutes followed by 40 minutes open Q&amp\;A. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The series is co-organized by:</p>\n\n<p><strong>Mariela Aguilera</strong>&nbsp\;(University of C&oacute\;rdoba)</p>\n<p><strong>Mat&iacute\;as Osta-V&eacute\;lez</strong>&nbsp\;(Universidad de la Rep&uacute\;blica)</p>\n<p><strong>Alfredo Vernazzani</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund\; Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg).</p>\n\n<p>Visit our website:&nbsp\;</p>\n<br>
ORGANIZER;CN=Alfredo Vernazzani;CN=Mariela Aguilera;CN="Matías Osta":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261021T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261021T170000
SUMMARY:Deep Disagreement and the Limits of Argumentation
UID:20260821T131815Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Prague
LOCATION:Klemensova 19\, Bratislava\, Slovakia\, 81109
DESCRIPTION:<p>We invite submissions of abstracts for a one-day symposium exploring the nature and consequences of deep disagreement for argumentation theory. When interlocutors lack shared premises\, standards of evidence\, or even criteria for what counts as a good argument\, what &mdash\; if anything &mdash\; can argumentation still accomplish?</p>\n<p>Keynote Speaker: Scott F. Aikin (Vanderbilt University) &mdash\; "Deep Disagreement and the Owl of Minerva Problem"</p>\n<p>Topics of interest include:</p>\n<p>- The nature and scope of deep disagreement</p>\n<p>- Epistemic and argumentative responses to fundamental disagreement</p>\n<p>- The limits of rational persuasion</p>\n<p>- Deep disagreement in political\, moral\, and religious contexts</p>\n<p>- The role of argumentation in polarized discourse</p>\n<p>- Argumentation and epistemic agency under conditions of disagreement</p>\n<p>Submission Guidelines: Please submit an abstract of 300&ndash\;500 words to deepdisagreement2026@gmail.com by June 30\, 2026. Include your name\, affiliation\, and contact details in the body of the email.</p>\n<p>Notification of acceptance: August 1\, 2026.</p>\n<p>There is no registration fee.</p>\n<p>Organizer: Tom&aacute\;&scaron\; Koll&aacute\;rik (Institute of Philosophy\, Slovak Academy of Sciences)</p>\n<p>Contact: deepdisagreement2026@gmail.com</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Tomas Kollarik:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261022T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261024T170000
SUMMARY:Rationality and Normativity Conference
UID:20260821T131816Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Prague
LOCATION:nám. Svobody 331/2\, Hradec Králové\, Czech Republic
DESCRIPTION:<p>The conference is on the nature of rationality and its relation to normativity\, especially on how rationality and reasons generate norms for what to believe\, trust or doubt. Rationality provides norms governing our thinking\, not only in general (do not form incoherent beliefs)\, but also in specific cases (do not trust that obvious conman). Which reasons the agent does or does not possess\, and their quality\, is also important. This conference aims at bringing together experts on these topics and shed light on these phenomena.</p>\n<p>Getting a clear picture of what rationality and reasons are and what norms they place on our thinking can aid with applied philosophical issues as well. For example\, is conspiracy thinking\, distrust towards scientific experts or falling for fake news irrational? If so\, which rational norms are violated exactly\, and under which circumstances? What does the rational standing of people who engage in these potentially irrational processes teach us about why they engage in them\, and what if anything we should do to combat these phenomena?</p>\n<p>Organization</p>\n<p>Organization committee:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Auke Montessori\, Jaroslav Mal&iacute\;k\, Zuzana Votavov&aacute\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Contact:</p>\n<p>https://ff.uhk.cz/rationalityandnorms/#contact&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>This conference is organized by the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences\, Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Hradec Kr&aacute\;lov&eacute\;\, as part of the project:</p>\n<p>Knowledge in the Age of Distrust</p>\n<p>Funded by the Ministry of Education\, Youth and Sports (Czech Republic). Co-funded by the European Union.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Auke Montessori:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261029T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261030T170000
SUMMARY:Rational Action and Belief – Recognising and Responding to Reasons
UID:20260821T131817Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Heidelberg\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Workshop: Rational Action and Belief &ndash\; Recognising and Responding to Reasons</strong></p>\n<p>Do rational actions and beliefs require us to recognise reasons as reasons? If so\, what does such recognition consist in\, and what role does it play in responding rationally to reasons?&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Key Information<br></strong>Date &amp\; Location: October 29&ndash\;30\, 2026\, Heidelberg University<br>Invited speakers: Carlotta Pavese (Oxford)\, Kurt Sylvan (Southampton)</p>\n<p>There are up to six open contributor slots\, please see the related CFP and submit an abstract.</p>\n<p><strong>Workshop Themes</strong></p>\n<p>Does forming an intention or belief in a rational manner require recognising that the corresponding action or belief enjoys some form of rational support? Many action theorists and epistemologists answer this question affirmatively. For a doctor&rsquo\;s belief that the patient has measles to be rational\, it must be based on a suitable reason. That the patient has Koplik spots is such a reason. But it seems insufficient to rationalise the belief that the patient has measles\, unless the doctor recognises that Koplik spots support that belief. Similar examples for actions abound.</p>\n<p>On this view\, rational belief and rational action respond not only to reasons but also to their being reasons for those beliefs or actions. This idea is often captured by appeals to a&nbsp\;<em>taking condition</em>\, or by the requirement that rational reasons must be&nbsp\;<em>treated as normative reasons</em>. While such views have gained prominence in recent epistemology and action theory\, they raise pressing questions about the nature of responding to normative reasons.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>We invite contributions (see separate CFP) that explore the role of recognising\, taking\, or appreciating reasons in rational belief and action\, including critical perspectives.</p>\n<p>Topics include (but are not limited to):</p>\n<p>&middot\; Do rational action and belief require the recognition that the action or belief enjoys support\, for example that the evidence supports a particular conclusion?</p>\n<p>&middot\; What does this recognition require? Does it require a doxastic state\, for example\, that the evidence supports p\, or is the recognition condition non-doxastic?</p>\n<p>&middot\; If the recognition condition is non-doxastic\, then how does it operate? Does it involve the exercise of some non-doxastic skill\, is it a form of rule following\, or something else entirely?&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&middot\; If the recognition condition is doxastic\, then how does it avoid regress problems? Can an appeal to additional non-doxastic factors block such regresses?</p>\n<p>&middot\; Is recognising normative support sufficient for rational action or belief\, or does responding to that recognition introduce additional constraints?</p>\n<p>&middot\; Can the basing of action or belief on reasons be analysed into constituent psychological states\, or does such analysis generate explanatory regresses?&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&middot\; What is the correct semantic theory for linguistic expressions of acting and believing for reasons\, such as &ldquo\;therefore&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;because&rdquo\;?</p>\n<p>Please direct all queries to the organisers Andreas M&uuml\;ller (andreas.mueller.philosophie@em.uni-frankfurt.de) and Tobias Wilsch (tobias.wilsch@gmail.com).&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Tobias Wilsch;CN=Andy Mueller:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261029T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261030T170000
SUMMARY:Difficult Actions: Definition\, Value\, and Rationality
UID:20260821T131818Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
LOCATION:De Boelelaan 1111\, Amsterdam\, Netherlands\, 1081 HV
DESCRIPTION:<p>The workshop aims to explore the growing research on "difficult actions" &ndash\; actions sometimes described as "against the odds".&nbsp\; Such actions encompass a wide range of human endeavours\, from physically demanding feats to emotionally taxing decisions\, morally challenging dilemmas\, and epistemically uncertain undertakings. This workshop will delve into how these actions are conceived\, what makes them particularly challenging\, and the ethical and epistemic considerations involved in their pursuit.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The workshop will address three core themes:&nbsp\; 1) &lrm\;Defining Difficult Actions:&nbsp\;We will&nbsp\;seek&nbsp\;to&nbsp\;establish&nbsp\;a robust definition of "difficult actions\," examining various philosophical accounts and exploring the commonalities and distinctions between different forms of difficulty in action.&nbsp\; 2) Exploring the Value of Difficult Actions:&nbsp\;We will delve into what - if anything - makes difficult actions valuable and under what conditions. 3) Exploring the Rationality of Difficult Actions: We will ask how it can be rational to pursue a difficult action.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Call for Abstracts:&nbsp\; We invite submissions by scholars from various philosophical sub-disciplines as well as from psychology and economics (or related fields) to contribute to a deeper understanding of the definition\, value\, and rationality of such actions.&nbsp\; Abstracts should be between 800&ndash\;1\,000 words and address any aspect of difficult actions\, broadly construed.&nbsp\;We&nbsp\;particularly welcome contributions from members of underrepresented demographics in philosophy and early career scholars.&nbsp\; Please submit your abstract by June 07\, 2026 via this form:&nbsp\;https://forms.gle/RyKGAevmQUzkkfeh7</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Lisa Bastian;CN=Annalisa Costella:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261031T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261031T090000
SUMMARY:Special Issue of Análisis Filosófico: “Oppressive Argumentation: Silencing and Oppressive Speech in Argumentation”
UID:20260821T131819Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p>Special Issue of An&aacute\;lisis Filos&oacute\;fico: &ldquo\;Oppressive Argumentation: Silencing and Oppressive Speech in Argumentation&rdquo\;</p>\n<p>This special issue aims to collect original articles in Spanish and English devoted to the analysis of oppressive discourses within our argumentative practices\, with a particular emphasis on those commonly found in Latin American contexts. Informal logic\, epistemology\, and gender studies will serve as the central&mdash\;though not exclusive&mdash\;perspectives guiding this special issue.</p>\n<p>We may understand &ldquo\;oppressive discourse&rdquo\; as a speech act that harms a person or group\, whose consequences contribute to the perpetuation of their conditions of subordination. One way in which oppression manifests itself is by depriving such individuals or groups of credibility (and\, consequently\, of epistemic authority)\, thereby reproducing discriminatory forms of subordination. This (epistemic) form of oppression typically accounts for the silencing of certain marginalized groups. This special issue will place particular emphasis on analyzing these forms of oppression\, as well as the discursive and argumentative mechanisms that sustain them.</p>\n<p>Language is a powerful force\, deeply intertwined with social practices and ways of life: harmful stereotypes about individuals or groups are forged and reinforced through discursive activities. Thus\, in order to prevent epistemic injustices\, it is necessary to intervene in the discursive domain of power by critically reflecting on its influence on credibility\, epistemic authority\, and the prejudices associated with epistemic agents\, as well as on the fallacies and argumentative errors committed by those who produce oppressive discourses. Informal logic\, epistemology\, and gender studies have much to contribute to this area\, and this issue seeks to highlight contributions from these philosophical fields by examining recurring forms of discussion and argumentation in cases and examples drawn from everyday life. As a final outcome\, this collection aims to show how philosophical argumentation can both help mitigate situations of epistemic injustice and contribute to identifying and dismantling harmful prejudices that promote discrimination.</p>\n<p>Submissions are invited on topics including\, but not limited to:</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Discursive silencing and epistemic exclusion in argumentative contexts</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Epistemic injustice in practices of debate and deliberation</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Epistemic authority in argumentation</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Fallacies and argumentative errors in oppressive discourses</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Relations between social power\, language\, and argumentation</p>\n<p>●&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Philosophical analysis of oppressive speech in Latin American contexts</p>\n<p>Submissions must be made through the An&aacute\;lisis Filos&oacute\;fico website (https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/about/submissions)\, following the author guidelines (https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/guia-autores). When submitting the manuscript\, authors should include a note in the &ldquo\;Comments for the Editor&rdquo\; field indicating that the submission is intended for this special issue. All submissions will undergo double-blind peer review by external referees. The deadline for submissions is <strong><u>October 31\, 2026.</u></strong> For inquiries\, please contact:pyrosuarezcaro@gmail.com.</p>\n<p>The guest editorial team is composed of Pyro Suarez (lead editor)\, Pamela Lastres (editorial supervisor)\, and Luz Mu&ntilde\;oz (editorial assistant)\, all members of the research project &ldquo\;Silencing and Discourses of Oppression in Peru: Intersections between Informal Logic\, Epistemology\, and Gender Studies&rdquo\; at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261101T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261101T234500
SUMMARY:Epistemic Injustice and AI
UID:20260821T131820Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
LOCATION:Nijmegen\, Netherlands
DESCRIPTION:<p>AI systems now play a role in many practices through which people are heard\, interpreted\, assessed\, and trusted. This raises questions that are not just ethical or political\, but also epistemic in nature: whose testimony is treated as credible\, whose experiences are made intelligible\, and who is able to participate in shared practices of knowledge production? The workshop focuses on these questions by bringing work on epistemic injustice into conversation with current debates about AI\, including debates about algorithmic bias\, transparency\, linguistic exclusion\, trust\, institutional decision-making\, and the distribution of epistemic authority. We welcome contributions on the philosophical\, ethical\, social\, and political dimensions of epistemic injustice and AI.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Topics include\, but are not limited to:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Algorithmic bias and values in AI</li>\n<li>Testimonial and hermeneutical injustice</li>\n<li>Epistemic agency and epistemic trust</li>\n<li>Transparency and explainability in AI</li>\n<li>Injustices linked to linguistic exclusion and issues of communication</li>\n<li>Bridges between epistemic and distributive injustice</li>\n<li>Applications to domains such as medicine\, education\, and law</li>\n<li>Applications to policy and institutional contexts</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We welcome abstracts of <u>up to 500 words</u>\, excluding references. Submissions should be anonymised\, argumentative\, and clearly engage with the workshop theme.</p>\n<p>The workshop will feature both oral presentations and a poster session\; all presentations must be in person.</p>\n<p>We encourage submissions from students and early-career researchers.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Important dates</strong>:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Submission deadline: 1 November 2026</li>\n<li>Notification of acceptance: 1 December 2026</li>\n<li>Workshop dates: 23-24 March 2027 &nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Further information and submission details can be found on the workshop website.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Corien Bary;CN=Eline Ensinck;CN=Harmen Ghijsen;CN=Bob van Tiel;CN=Nina Poth:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Shanghai:20261114T090000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Shanghai:20261115T170000
SUMMARY:Asian Epistemology Network Meeting 2026
UID:20260821T131821Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Asia/Shanghai
LOCATION:Yuhangtang Road 866\, Hangzhou\, China
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are pleased to announce the inaugural meeting of the Asian Epistemology Network\, to be held on November 14&ndash\;15\, 2026\, at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou\, China. This meeting aims to bring together epistemologists working in and with the Asian region to foster collaboration\, exchange ideas\, and advance research in all areas of epistemology.</p>\n<p><strong>Keynote Speakers</strong></p>\n<p>Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford)</p>\n<p>Lei Zhong (Chinese University of Hong Kong)</p>\n<p>Jennifer Nado (University of Hong Kong)</p>\n<p>Simon Goldstein (University of Hong Kong)</p>\n<p><strong>Confirmed Speakers</strong></p>\n<p>Nikolaj Pedersen (Yonsei University)</p>\n<p>Jing Zhu (Xiamen University)</p>\n<p>Bo Chen (Wuhan University)</p>\n<p>Ru Ye (Chinese University of Hong Kong)</p>\n<p>Weng Hong Tang (National University of Singapore)</p>\n<p>Masashi Kasaki (Nagoya University)</p>\n<p><strong>Submission Guidelines</strong></p>\n<p>We invite submissions of abstracts in English\, prepared for blind review. Abstracts of 400-500 words should be sent to submission@asianepistemology.com&nbsp\;\, by June 30\, 2026.<br><br></p>\n<p><strong>Contact</strong></p>\n<p>For any inquiries\, please contact: submission@asianepistemology.com&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Jie Gao;CN=Davide Fassio;CN=Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen;CN=Masashi Kasaki;CN=Weng Hong Tang:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261119T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261120T170000
SUMMARY:Normative Reasons and Morality 
UID:20260821T131822Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Norbert-Wollheim-Platz 1\, Frankfurt am Main\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p>While the concept of a normative reason is often taken to provide a common currency across different domains of normativity\, its role and nature within the moral domain continue to raise a number of difficult and intriguing questions. Some philosophers have argued that moral reasons are distinctive in virtue of their stringency or overridingness\; others question whether the notion of a normative reason provides the most illuminating framework for understanding moral demands at all. More generally\, the relationship between morality and normative reasons remains contested\, both with respect to the nature of moral reasons and their place within moral thought and practice. This workshop aims to examine these issues from a variety of perspectives and to explore the significance of reasons-based approaches for contemporary moral philosophy.</p>\n<p>We welcome contributions addressing questions including (but not limited to):</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What is the relationship between moral reasons and moral obligations?</li>\n<li>What distinguishes moral reasons from other kinds of reasons\, such as prudential or epistemic reasons?</li>\n<li>How should conflicts between moral reasons and other normative reasons be understood?</li>\n<li>How should cases of supererogation be understood within a reasons-based account of morality?</li>\n<li>Are moral reasons agent-relative or agent-neutral?</li>\n<li>What role do moral advice and moral testimony play in moral thought and practice?</li>\n<li>How should moral uncertainty affect the reasons we have for action?</li>\n<li>How should we understand the relationship between moral reasons and moral reasoning?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>A limited number of slots are available through an open call for abstracts. Please send your abstract\, prepared for anonymous review\, as a PDF file to si [dot] behrens [at] em [dot] uni [hyphen] frankfurt [dot] de (subject line: &ldquo\;Morality and Reasons&rdquo\;). Abstracts should be between 500 and 1\,000 words (including notes but excluding bibliography). Papers should be suitable for a 40-minute presentation. The deadline for submissions is<strong>&nbsp\;July 15\, 2026.&nbsp\;</strong>Applicants will be notified of the outcome by July 31\, 2026.</p>\n<p>We particularly encourage Ph.D. students and individuals from underrepresented groups to submit.</p>\n\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Singa Behrens:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261127T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Madrid:20261127T234500
SUMMARY:Kant\, la nature\, la physique
UID:20260821T131823Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Madrid
LOCATION:Avinguda Blasco Ibáñez\, 30\, Valencia\, Spain
DESCRIPTION:<p>Le th&egrave\;me retenu est &laquo\; Kant\, la nature\, la physique &raquo\;. Il s&rsquo\;agit de mettre l&rsquo\;accent sur la conception kantienne de la physique et la mani&egrave\;re dont celle-ci cr&eacute\;e un cadre philosophique compatible avec la perspective de la physique quantique. Cela &eacute\;tant dit\, les contributions sur tout autre aspect de l&rsquo\;&oelig\;uvre kantienne\, de ses sources et de sa projection contemporaine sont &eacute\;galement les bienvenues. Outre le programme acad&eacute\;mique\, un programme culturel ax&eacute\; principalement sur la musique et &eacute\;troitement li&eacute\; au th&egrave\;me de la conf&eacute\;rence sera propos&eacute\;.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN="Pedro Jesús Teruel":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261204T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261205T170000
SUMMARY:3rd Duke/UNC Epistemology Workshop
UID:20260821T131824Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Duke University\, Durham\, United States\, 27712
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Papers: 3rd Duke-UNC Epistemology Workshop</strong></p>\n<p>Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill invite graduate students and early career scholars to submit extended abstracts in any area of epistemology for presentation at the 3rd&nbsp\; Duke-UNC Epistemology Workshop. The workshop will be held in person at Duke University on December 4th/5th 2026.</p>\n<p>The current list of confirmed speakers is as follows\,</p>\n<p>Laura Callahan (Notre Dame)</p>\n<p>Ben Holguin (Johns Hopkins)</p>\n<p>Tom Kelly (Princeton)</p>\n<p>Zoe Jenkin (Rutgers)</p>\n<p>Mike Titelbaum (UW Madison)</p>\n<p>Please submit abstracts in .doc or .pdf format prepared for blind review. Submissions should include an extended abstract of up to 500 words with the paper&rsquo\;s title as the first page. Papers should be suitable for a 45-minute presentation. Some partial funding may be available to defray travel costs for presenters.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Submissions should be sent as email attachments to dukeuncepistemology@gmail.com.</p>\n<p><strong>Submission Deadline:</strong> September 15th\, 2026&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>If you have any questions\, please contact the conference organizers at dukeuncepistemology@gmail.com</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Benjamin Eva;CN=Reuben Stern;CN=Ram Neta:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20261231T234500
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20261231T234500
SUMMARY:4th Inquiry Network Workshop
UID:20260821T131825Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:2000 North Pkwy\, Memphis\, United States\, 38112
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Inquiry Network is hosting a workshop on inquiry at Rhodes College in Memphis\, TN\, April 2-3\, 2027.</p>\n<p>This meeting will be held in conjunction with the annual Mid-South Philosophy Conference.</p>\n<p>We invite submissions of anonymized abstracts (up to 1\,000 words) on any topic related to the philosophy of inquiry. For example\, papers might address topics such as:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Norms of inquiry.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; The relationship between inquiry and interrogative attitudes such as curiosity and suspension of judgment.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; The relationship between inquiry and attention or salience.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; The semantics and pragmatics of questions.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Virtues and vices of inquiry.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Inquiry in specific domains\, such as scientific inquiry or philosophical inquiry.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Historical approaches to inquiry (for example\, work on the American Pragmatists\, ancient Pyrrhonians\, etc.).</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Ethics of inquiry.</p>\n<p>Please submit anonymized abstracts (up to 1\,000 words) by <strong>EOD&nbsp\;</strong><strong>December 31</strong><strong>\, 2026&nbsp\;</strong>to inquirynetworkgroup@gmail.com.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Thorstad;CN=Jared A. Millson:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Indiana/Indianapolis:20270115T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/Indiana/Indianapolis:20270115T000000
SUMMARY:Notre Dame Summer Seminars in Philosophy of Religion
UID:20260821T131826Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/Indiana/Indianapolis
LOCATION:Notre Dame\, United States\, 46556
DESCRIPTION:<p>Recent PhDs (no more than 3 years post PhD as of June 30\, 2027) and current graduate students in philosophy\, with interest in the philosophy of religion\, are invited to apply to the 2027 Notre Dame Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion. The seminar will be held at the University of Notre Dame from June 28 - July 9\, 2027. Participants will receive a stipend of $2000 as well as room and board\, with some additional family support available as well. The theme of this year&rsquo\;s seminar is "Disagreement\, Humility\, and Polarization." More information on the summer seminars and the application process can be found below.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><br></p>\n<p><strong>Summer Seminar Series Overview:&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>Analytic philosophy of religion has flourished and matured in recent decades\, fostering original research drawing on metaphysics\, epistemology\, ethics\, mind\, and language\, while also cultivating the new discipline of "analytic theology." Philosophers of religion have contributed to a flowering of scholarship in these areas\, founding new peer-reviewed journals\, publishing numerous academic books\, impacting the academy\, ministry\, and lay readers\, and building deep connections with work in theology and the sciences as well as philosophy. Yet most PhD students in philosophy have little opportunity to study recent work in philosophy of religion in their graduate programs\, and early career faculty often find little support for pursuing scholarly research in these areas.&nbsp\;The Notre Dame Summer Seminars in Philosophy of Religion aim to fill this gap by (1) bringing together graduate students and early career scholars for intensive study of contemporary topics in philosophy of religion taught by leading figures in philosophy and related disciplines\, and (2) creating an extended mentorship program for all participants to be able to work with senior philosophers of religion to advance their writing and receive guidance in their early years in the profession. The seminars run for 2 weeks over three summers (2027\, 2028\, and 2029) on the campus of the University of Notre Dame. </p>\n<p><br></p>\n<p><strong>Summer 2027 Theme: "Disagreement\, Humility\, and Polarization"</strong> </p>\n\n<p>Religion is often political and divisive. Should this matter\, for how we think about God or\, indeed\, the propriety of religious belief? How could we know God or have faith in a world where religious traditions disagree sharply about what God is like - and where those divisions themselves contribute to unrest and hatred? Further questions connected with this theme include: how do particular theological traditions encode prescriptions for engaging with disagreement? How do these recommendations fare when evaluated for epistemic and practical rationality\, or their compatibility with just political systems? Is something like humility sufficient to save us from fueling religious division\, and if so\, what is humility like and how could we cultivate it at scale? Would a humbler approach to religion favor certain spiritual or theological traditions over others - for example\, is there a relationship between humility and agnosticism or apophaticism? How shall we understand the character traits of humility\, empathy\, and love for others given polarizing issues of politics or doctrine? What insights are there from sociology and psychology on religious communities\, belonging\, and changing values in a polarized era?</p>\n<p><br></p>\n<p><strong>Application Process:</strong></p>\n\n<p>Applications are due by January 15\, 2027 and must consist of the following: 1. A statement of interest in the Seminar of no more than 500 words\; 2. A complete CV\; 3. A writing sample (which need not engage the Seminar theme) which can serve as a default project to discuss with an assigned faculty mentor.&nbsp\;</p>\n\n<p>Application materials must be submitted electronically to philreligion@nd.edu. Application materials 1-3 above must be submitted as a single PDF in the order listed. The PDF must be titled in the following manner: Last Name\, First Name. Application materials must be received by January 15\, 2027 to assure full consideration. We anticipate notifying selected applicants by April 1\, 2027.</p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Matthew A. Benton;CN=Laura Frances Callahan;CN=Michael Rea:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270128T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270130T170000
SUMMARY:Collective Agency in Classical and Continental Philosophy (Vilnius\, 2027)
UID:20260821T131827Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Vilnius
LOCATION:Vilnius\, Lithuania
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Conference description</strong></p>\n<p>It is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\,&nbsp\; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.</p>\n<p>This conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency<strong>.</strong> We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.</p>\n<p>We invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.</p>\n<p>Possible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Relational nature of personhood</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collectives and ontological unity</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Categorisation of group agency</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective emotions</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective justice</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Groups and moral responsibility</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Confirmed keynote speakers:</strong></p>\n<p>Thornton Lockwood (University of Florida)</p>\n<p>Sophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)</p>\n\n<p><strong>Submission guidelines</strong></p>\n<p><u>Submission deadline and acceptance notification</u></p>\n<p>The abstracts must be submitted by <strong>Monday 1st June 2026</strong>.</p>\n<p>The acceptance notifications might be expected after <strong>Tuesday 30th June 2026</strong>.</p>\n<p><u>Submission procedure</u></p>\n<p>We invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.</p>\n<p>Please write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.</p>\n<p>The abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com</p>\n<p><u>Paper delivery</u></p>\n<p>All the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.</p>\n<p><u>Other practicalities</u></p>\n<p>Please note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.</p>\n<p>Lunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.</p>\n<p><strong>Organisers</strong></p>\n<p>This conference is part of the research project <em>&ldquo\;</em><strong>Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory</strong><em>&rdquo\;</em> (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Pacific/Auckland:20270210T090000
DTEND;TZID=Pacific/Auckland:20270212T170000
SUMMARY:Conspiracies\, Facts\, and Truth III
UID:20260821T131828Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Pacific/Auckland
LOCATION:Knighton Road Hamilton 3240\, Hamilton\, New Zealand
DESCRIPTION:<p>In February of 2027 we (Joe Ulatowski [University of Waikato] and myself\, M R. X. Dentith [Beijing Normal University]) will be running the third "Conspiracies\, Facts\, and Truth&rdquo\; workshop at the University of Waikato\, Aotearoa New Zealand.</p>\n<p>Dates: February 10\, 2026 - February 12\, 2027</p>\n<p>The aim of this workshop series is to share new work on the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory\, the value of truth and facts in public discourse more generally\, and related topics. We are interested in philosophical talks (both full presentations as well as shorter work-in-progress talks) concerning conspiracy theory theory\, fake news\, post truth\, mis-\, dis- and malinformation (and other related subjects).</p>\n<p>We are accepting proposals for both in person and online presentations\, with a preference towards in person talks.</p>\n<p>If you are interested in joining us and sharing your work\, please email either Joe Ulatowski (joe.ulatowski@waikato.ac.nz) or M R. X. Dentith (m.dentith@bnu.edu.cn) with the title and short 150-word abstract of your work\, as well as an indication as to whether this is a full paper or a work-in-progress\, by the 1st December\, 2026. Space is limited\, so please contact the organisers as soon as possible.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=M R. X. Dentith;CN=Joseph Ulatowski:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270218T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270220T170000
SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
UID:20260821T131829Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006
DESCRIPTION:<p><a href="https://zegra.ch/events/event/relational-normativity-epistemic-and-practical/">Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Lima:20270222T080000
DTEND;TZID=America/Lima:20270228T170000
SUMMARY:CAELO 1: First Andean Congress for Epistemology and Logic
UID:20260821T131830Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/Lima
LOCATION:Lima\, Peru
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>CAELO 1: First Andean Congress for Epistemology and Logic</strong>*\, organised by Peru&rsquo\;s&nbsp\;<em>Society for Epistemology and Logic</em>&nbsp\;(SEPLO)\, will take place in Lima\, Peru\, from&nbsp\;22 to 28 February 2027.</p>\n<p>This inaugural congress marks the beginning of a planned series dedicated to the study of epistemology and logic\, bringing together scholars\, researchers\, and students from diverse backgrounds. The event offers a space for rigorous discussion and exchange on topics including logic\, epistemology\, philosophy of science\, analytic philosophy\, metaphysics\, social philosophy\, empirically informed approaches\, and both philosophically and scientifically oriented studies. Participants will have the opportunity to engage in talks and workshops that foster interdisciplinary dialogue and critical reflection. Contributions from all levels of experience are welcome\, from established researchers to early-career scholars and students. Proposed sessions and workshops include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Beyond Loyalty and Disloyalty: The Social and Political Commitements of Science</li>\n<li>El Lunarejo: The Legacy of Juan de Espinosa Medrano</li>\n<li>From Science to AI\, and Backwards: Interactions between AI\, Science\, and Philosophy</li>\n<li>Ifs\, Thens\, and Otherwises: New Perspectives on the Logic of Conditionals</li>\n<li>Logic\, Reality\, and Beyond: Logical Approaches to Metaphysics</li>\n<li>Noise\, Errors\, and Flaws: Approaches to Defective Science</li>\n<li>Many Logics\, Many Reasons? The Meaning of Logical Monism and Pluralism</li>\n<li>Scientific Publishing and Publishing Scientifically: Academic Publishing under Scrutiny</li>\n<li>Scientists as Subjects: The Sociology and Historiography of Science</li>\n<li>The Shape of Thought: Diagrams in Philosophy and Science</li>\n<li>This Workshop Is about This Workshop: Self-Referential Expressions</li>\n<li>Ways of Knowing: The Philosophy of Methodology and Heuristics&nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n\n<p>*This event was formerly called <em>Epilog 1: 1st Congress of Epistemology and Logic</em>.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Luis F. Bartolo Alegre:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20270323T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20270324T170000
SUMMARY:Epistemic Injustice and AI
UID:20260821T131831Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
LOCATION:Nijmegen\, Netherlands
DESCRIPTION:<p>AI systems now play a role in many practices through which people are heard\, interpreted\, assessed\, and trusted. This raises questions that are not just ethical or political\, but also epistemic in nature: whose testimony is treated as credible\, whose experiences are made intelligible\, and who is able to participate in shared practices of knowledge production? The workshop focuses on these questions by bringing work on epistemic injustice into conversation with current debates about AI\, including debates about algorithmic bias\, transparency\, linguistic exclusion\, trust\, institutional decision-making\, and the distribution of epistemic authority. We welcome contributions on the philosophical\, ethical\, social\, and political dimensions of epistemic injustice and AI.&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Corien Bary;CN=Eline Ensinck;CN=Harmen Ghijsen;CN=Bob van Tiel;CN=Nina Poth:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20270326T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20270327T170000
SUMMARY:9th Annual Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop
UID:20260821T131832Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Caldwell Hall\, Chapel Hill\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>The ninth annual Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop will be held in Chapel Hill on <strong>March 26 -- 27\, 2027</strong>.</p>\n<p>The workshop aims to provide a forum for stimulating and constructive exchange among philosophers currently working on issues concerning normativity\, broadly construed to include: the traditional questions of metaethics (and analogous questions about other normative domains)\; more abstract and general questions within first-order normative theory\; theories of reasons\, rationality and reasoning\; the semantics and pragmatics of normative language\; the psychology of normative judgment\; and the nature of epistemic normativity. The hope is to showcase cutting-edge work in these and related areas\, providing speakers with useful feedback\, and other participants with lively presentations and conversation.</p>\n<p>There will be eight talks in total\, seven of which will be selected via an open call for abstracts and an anonymous review process\, plus a keynote by Sarah McGrath (Princeton). For the eighth workshop running\, papers accepted to this year's workshop will be eligible for publication in a special issue of <em>Philosophical Studies</em>.</p>\n<p>We very much hope you'll join us in sunny and beautiful Chapel Hill next spring for the workshop's ninth year. In addition to excellent presentations\, there will be plenty of opportunities for socializing with fellow normativity folks at a selection of Chapel Hill's lovely restaurants and bars on each night of the event.</p>\n<p>Many thanks to the UNC Department of Philosophy and Parr Center for Ethics for their generous support of the event.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Chris Howard;CN=Margaret Shea;CN=Alex Worsnip:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20270402T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20270403T170000
SUMMARY:4th Inquiry Network Workshop
UID:20260821T131833Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:2000 North Pkwy\, Memphis\, United States\, 38112
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Inquiry Network is hosting a workshop on inquiry at Rhodes College in Memphis\, TN\, April 2-3\, 2027.</p>\n<p>This meeting will be held in conjunction with the annual Mid-South Philosophy Conference.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Please see the CFP for more information\, or contact inquriynetworkgroup@gmail.com with any questions.</p>\n<p>For more information about the Inquiry Network\, see&nbsp\;https://inquirynetwork.weebly.com/.&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Thorstad;CN=Jared A. Millson:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20270402T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20270404T170000
SUMMARY:JAM (Junkyard Anniversary Meeting) - Philosophy of Imagination Conference
UID:20260821T131834Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:America/Los_Angeles
LOCATION:The Kravis Center\, Claremont\, United States\, 91711
DESCRIPTION:<p>A philosophy of imagination conference to commemorate the 10th anniversary of The Junkyard blog. In addition to the invited speakers\, there will be also be a book symposium on Luke Roelofs'&nbsp\;<em>Empathic Reason</em>\, with commentaries from Heidi Maibom\, Colin Marshall\, and Eric Peterson.&nbsp\; There will also be contributed papers selected via a CFP.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Amy Kind:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270601T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270601T000000
SUMMARY:Collective Agency in Classical and Continental Philosophy (Vilnius\, 2027)
UID:20260821T131835Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/Vilnius
LOCATION:Vilnius\, Lithuania
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Conference description</strong></p>\n<p>It is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\,&nbsp\; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.</p>\n<p>This conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency<strong>.</strong> We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.</p>\n<p>We invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.</p>\n<p>Possible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Relational nature of personhood</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collectives and ontological unity</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Categorisation of group agency</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective emotions</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective justice</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Groups and moral responsibility</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Confirmed keynote speakers:</strong></p>\n<p>Thornton Lockwood (University of Florida)</p>\n<p>Sophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)</p>\n\n<p><strong>Submission guidelines</strong></p>\n<p><u>Submission deadline and acceptance notification</u></p>\n<p>The abstracts must be submitted by <strong>Monday 1st June 2026</strong>.</p>\n<p>The acceptance notifications might be expected after <strong>Tuesday 30th June 2026</strong>.</p>\n<p><u>Submission procedure</u></p>\n<p>We invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.</p>\n<p>Please write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.</p>\n<p>The abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com</p>\n<p><u>Paper delivery</u></p>\n<p>All the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.</p>\n<p><u>Other practicalities</u></p>\n<p>Please note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.</p>\n<p>Lunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.</p>\n<p><strong>Organisers</strong></p>\n<p>This conference is part of the research project <em>&ldquo\;</em><strong>Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory</strong><em>&rdquo\;</em> (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260821T131351Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Hong_Kong:20270618T000000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Hong_Kong:20270620T170000
SUMMARY:Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW) 
UID:20260821T131836Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Asia/Hong_Kong
LOCATION:4.36 Run Run Shaw Tower\, Hong Kong\, Hong Kong
DESCRIPTION:<p>https://sites.google.com/view/few2027/</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Boris Babic:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR