https://coolhunting.com/link-about-it/does-this-soup-taste-ambivalent/
\nhttps://dajf.org.uk/event/the-art-of-soup-a-taste-of-fukushima
\nhttps://ocula.com/magazine/conversations/ei-arakawa-frieze-presentation/
\nhttps://nomadit.co.uk/conference/eajs2026/paper/101689
\nhttps://research.berkeley.edu/surf-fellows/jiaqian-zhu/
\nhttps://nomadit.co.uk/conference/eajs2026/pp/101689
\nPaper short abstract In the wake of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami\, artists attempt to explore ways to present the motif of &ldquo\;3/11&rdquo\; beyond geographic confinement&mdash\;beyond Japan. Given restricted access to the nuclear zone\, how do artists respond to &ldquo\;3/11&rdquo\; without direct physical proximity to Fukushima? Paper long abstract
\nIn the wake of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami\, artists attempt to explore ways to present the motif of &ldquo\;3/11&rdquo\; beyond geographic confinement&mdash\;beyond Japan. Given restricted access to the nuclear zone\, how do artists respond to &ldquo\;3/11&rdquo\; without direct physical proximity to Fukushima? How do overseas Japanese artists represent what took place back in their homeland? How do people outside Japan gain the access to experience and respond to &ldquo\;3/11&rdquo\;? To grapple with this representational dilemma of &ldquo\;here and there\,&rdquo\; this paper looks at the performance art of the contemporary Japanese artist Ei Arakawa&mdash\;Does This Soup Taste Ambivalent? (2014). In this conceptual project\, he attempted to mediate a geographic gap between New York (where he works) and Fukushima (where he comes from). He also intended to reach a geographical balance between Fukushima and the international audience by bringing his family to Frieze London. In dialogue with Does This Soup Taste Ambivalent?\, this paper brings comparative examples of Rirkrit Tiravanija&rsquo\;s installation Untitled (Free/Still) (2007) and the socially engaged art piece Conflict Kitchen (2010). This paper attempts to extend the metaphor of a geographic boundary to invisible yet crucial boundaries among people\, and to further spatialize what Nicolas Bourriaud regards as relational aesthetics. Visual representations of &ldquo\;here and there&rdquo\; can thus be thematically translated into a rendering of boundaries between artists and spectators/participants\, between social environment and human beings and between different ethnic groups. Moreover\, this paper examines the instrumental role of food in performance art. With the same incorporation of food\, these works take advantage of the taste to unite people from different backgrounds\, and to provide a corporeal medium to raise concerns for nuclear radiation and safety. The remediation of food\, in art practice and social media\, further produces a micro-social and micro-political narrative to think of food safety\, human safety\, and community conflicts.
\nAbstract in Japanese (if needed): 「あちらとこちら」：現代パフォーマンス・アートにおける食、安全、そしてコミュニティ 要旨では、2011年の東日本大震災と津波のあと、アーティストたちが 「3/11」を日本の外でどう表現するか を考える研究だと説明されています。特に、福島に直接近づけない状況で、アーティストはどう反応するのか、海外にいる日本人アーティストは故郷で起きたことをどう表すのか、日本の外にいる人はどうやってその出来事に触れ、応答するのか、という問いが立てられています。中心事例として扱われるのは、Ei Arakawa の Does This Soup Taste Ambivalent? (2014) です。要旨によれば、この作品は ニューヨークと福島の地理的な隔たりを媒介しようとした企画として読まれています。比較される例として、Rirkrit Tiravanija の Untitled (Free/Still) (2007) と、社会参加型アートの Conflict Kitchen (2010) も挙げられています。福島の出来事を、食べ物を使ったアートで世界の人にどう伝えるかを考える発表です。 そして、食べ物は人をつなぐだけでなく、安全や不安、社会の対立について考えさせる力を持つ、というのがポイントです。
\n\nhttps://www.academia.edu/73785101/Xu_Weis_Melon_and_Vine ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20260901T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20260903T170000 SUMMARY:Joint AMAMI-SIFA Midterm Conference UID:20260811T204459Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/Rome LOCATION:Sestiere Dorsoduro\, 3246\, Venice\, Italy\, 30123 DESCRIPTION:The joint Mid-Term Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy (SIFA) and the Association of Analytic Metaphysics in the Italian-Speaking World (AMAMI) will take place at Ca&rsquo\; Foscari University of Venice on \;September 1-3\, 2026 \;and will bring together scholars working across metaphysics broadly construed.
\nThe event will feature keynote lectures by
\n- Kathrin Koslicki (University of Neuchâ\;tel)
\n- Alyssa Ney (LMU Munich)
\n- Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers University)
\n- Achille Varzi (Columbia University)
\n\nProgram
\nhttps://www.amami-philo.com/programme-2/ \;
\n\nRegistration
\nThose who have not yet registered can do so by following the link on this page by \;August 10.
\nMembership in both SIFA and AMAMI is required for participation. Those who already hold a valid 2026&ndash\;27 membership in SIFA and/or AMAMI are eligible for a reduced conference registration fee\, as detailed below.
\nConference registration fees
\nFaculty: \;&euro\;120 (standard conference fee\; includes 2026&ndash\;27 membership in both SIFA and AMAMI) | &euro\;70 (current member of either SIFA or AMAMI) | &euro\;20 (current member of both SIFA and AMAMI)
\nNon-faculty / PhD / Postdoc: \;&euro\;70 (standard conference fee\; includes 2026&ndash\;27 membership in both SIFA and AMAMI) | &euro\;45 (current member of either SIFA or AMAMI) | &euro\;20 (current member of both SIFA and AMAMI)
\nUndergraduate: \;&euro\;40 (standard conference fee\; includes 2026&ndash\;27 membership in both SIFA and AMAMI) | &euro\;30 (current member of either SIFA or AMAMI) | &euro\;20 (current member of both SIFA and AMAMI)
\nPayment must be made by \;August 25 \;via bank transfer to:
\nSocietà\; Italiana di Filosofia Analitica \;
\nCariparma Cré\;dit Agricole \;
\nVia Armorari 4\, 20123 Milan \;
\nIBAN: IT07H0623001627000045841814
\nA single invoice for the full amount paid will be issued after the event.
\nConference dinner
\nAttendees who are not presenting a paper and wish to reserve a seat at the conference dinner are kindly asked to contact the organizers in advance at \;midtermsifa26@gmail.com.
\nFor all inquiries\, please write to \;midtermsifa26@gmail.com. We look forward to welcoming you to Venice.
\nBest wishes\,
\nThe Organizing Committee \;
\nClaudio Calosi (chair)\, Daniele Bondioli\, Samuele Iaquinto\, Priscilla Pallante\, Sofia Sgarbi\, Giuliano Torrengo\, Alessandro Torza.
ORGANIZER;CN=Claudio Calosi;CN=Alessandro Torza;CN=Daniele Bondioli;CN=Samuele Iaquinto;CN=Sofia Sgarbi;CN=Giuliano Torrengo: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260901T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260903T170000 SUMMARY:Fourth Austrian Summer School in Phenomenology UID:20260811T204500Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:The Austrian Society for Phenomenology launches its fouth international summer school. Our objective is to promote the research of young scholars (bachelor\, master\, and doctoral students) that sheds new phenomenological light on current debates in epistemology\, metaethics\, and metaphysics. The descriptive analysis of lived experience\, the eidetic study of the various modes of intentionality\, and the epistemic role and normative dimensions ascribed to experience constitute the cornerstones of phenomenological research. In particular\, Husserl&rsquo\;s conceptions of originary givenness\, evaluative experience\, and eidetic intuition are among the various seminal contributions we find in the phenomenological tradition. Currently\, promising research is done that utilizes such conceptions in order to develop phenomenological perspectives on experiential justification\, the debate between epistemic internalism and externalism\, the theory of value\, (moral) emotions\, moral epistemology\, issues surrounding metaphysical realism and anti-realism\, as well as the epistemology and metaphysics of essence\, modality\, and metaphysical dependence relations. We would like to encourage students to develop phenomenological insights and teachings systematically and in view of contemporary debates in philosophy. Our ambition is to promote such phenomenological research by providing a platform to connect with\, discuss with\, and receive feedback from peers and experts. Each conference day is devoted to one of the subtopics of the event.
\nThe conference will be an \;online event. \;If you wish to participate in the summer school but not to give a talk\, please provide a short statement of motivation (not more than 150 words) and specify your name\, affiliation\, and research interests.
\nCall for Papers
\nIf you wish to participate in the summer school and give a talk\, please apply with an (extended) abstract of the paper you wish to present. Submissions should not exceed 500 words\, must be written in English (conference language)\, and should be prepared for blind review.
\nThe submission deadline is July 15\, 2026.
\nPlease send your applications/submissions and general inquiries to: laurentia[dot]adam[at]uni-graz[dot]at
\nWomen and members of other traditionally underrepresented groups are especially encouraged to apply.
\nPreliminary schedule
\nSeptember 1
\nPhenomenological Approaches to Metaethics
\nNicolas de Warren (Penn State University): TBA
\n3 student presentations commented on by Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (University of Graz)
\nSeptember 2
\nPhenomenological Approaches to Epistemology
\nMirja Hartimo (University of Helsinki): TBA
\n3 student presentations commented on by Philipp Berghofer (University of Graz)
\nSeptember 3
\nPhenomenological Approaches to Metaphysics
\nKit Fine (New York University): TBA
\n3 student presentations commented on by Michael Wallner (University of Graz)
ORGANIZER;CN=Philipp Berghofer;CN=Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl;CN=Michael Wallner: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260901T234500 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260901T234500 SUMMARY:The Metaphysical Society of America UID:20260811T204501Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:America/Los_Angeles LOCATION:702 E. Desmet Ave.\, Spokane\, United States DESCRIPTION:The 2027 conference of the MSA invites submissions on the theme of the &ldquo\;metaphysics of habit\,&rdquo\; understood both as a subjective and objective genitive. Contributors may explore the metaphysical underpinnings of habit or investigate habit as a metaphysical principle in its own right. Topics of interest include\, but are not necessarily limited to\, the following questions:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit a pragmatic device for assuaging epistemological impasses\, as in Hume\, or can it have a genuine metaphysical function? If so\, how\, when and under what conditions?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit conscious or unconscious\, intelligent or blind? Is it a sign of rational consistency or the erosion of thought into blind compulsion? Is it learned or inherited\, adaptive or mechanical\, spontaneous or rote\, proactive or reactive? Is habit a result of repetition or the propensity to repeat? Or\, does habit subvert these dichotomies altogether?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Are practice\, routine\, custom\, tics and neuroses distinct in kind from habit itself or only various degrees or intensities of habit? Or\, is habit a species of one of these categories?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Must habit be relegated to psychology or is habit operative at other\, or even all\, domains of being? What of motricity or motor habit? Are instinct and inertia species of habit? Is habit a metaphysical principle underpinning various notions of evolution? Might it underwrite scientific theories\, e.g. quantum theory? Could habit account for the lawfulness of nature itself? What is the metaphysics of social and collective habits? Could there be a theology of habit?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit an attribute or might it constitute substantiality itself? Do individuals possess habits or is the self but a nexus of habits? Are some kinds of beings inherently habitual and others impervious to habit? Can a rock acquire a habit? Can artificial intelligence?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit an effect\, a cause or the very principle of causality itself? Is habit antecedent to its effects or simultaneous with them? Is habit a result consequent to its cause(s) or simultaneous with it? Or\, is it temporalization itself?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Can habit perform the functions Kant allotted to transcendental structures &ndash\; synthesis\, identity\, regularity\, temporal contraction? If so\, are traditions that make habit into a metaphysical principle\, e.g. French Spiritualism and American Pragmatism\, post-Kantian? Or\, are they instead post-Humean or post-Leibnizian?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Can habit be simultaneously empirical and contingent\, yet also universal? Is habit a priori or a posteriori\, transcendental or empirically real? Could habit ground a &ldquo\;metaphysical empiricism\,&rdquo\; &ldquo\;transcendental empiricism&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;critical realism&rdquo\;?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit dyadic and chiasmatic? Does habit have more to do with the Dyad or the One?
\nAbstracts that address these and related questions and issues in original ways are especially encouraged and will be prioritized. Submissions of abstracts for papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome.
\nGuidelines for the Submission of Abstracts
\nDeadline: September 1\, 2026
\nSubmit to: Jessica Wahman\, Vice President of the MSA (msamarch2027@gmail.com)
\nFormat: Word documents of no more than 600 words. Late abstracts and those shorter than 400 words or longer than 600 words will not be considered. To facilitate double-anonymous review\, an abstract should not contain the author&rsquo\;s name or otherwise identify the author. In the email to which the abstract is attached\, authors should indicate full name\, institutional affiliation (if any)\, and abstract title. The email subject-line should read: \; 2027 MSA Submission [last name of author)] -- for example: 2027 MSA Submission Leibniz.
\nAristotle Prize
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s annual Aristotle Prize\, which is only awarded if a submission is deemed worthy of the prize\, is open to current students without a Ph.D. The Aristotle Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with costs for attending the annual meeting.
\nPersons who wish to be considered for this prize must a) clearly state (in an email message accompanying their submission) their eligibility for this prize and their desire to be considered for it\, and b) submit a full\, final paper in addition to the abstract by the September 1\, 2026 deadline. The body of the text (as is proposed to be read at the meeting) must be no longer than 3\,750 words.
\nPlato Prize
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s annual Plato Prize\, which is only awarded if a submission is deemed worthy of the prize\, is open to persons who have received their first Ph.D. in the last six years&mdash\;thus (for the 2027 meeting) in 2021 or more recently. The Plato Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with costs for attending the annual meeting.
\nPersons who wish to be considered for this prize must a) clearly state (in an email message accompanying their submission) their eligibility for this prize and their desire to be considered for it\, and b) submit a full\, final paper in addition to the abstract by the September 1\, 2026 deadline. The body of the text (as is proposed to be read at the meeting) must be no longer than 3\,750 words.
\nTravel Grants
\nThanks to the generous support of past MSA Presidents\, Society members\, and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot Fund for Systematic Philosophy\, the MSA is pleased to be able to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $400 to current graduate students and post-doctoral researchers within two years of their first PhD whose submissions are selected for the conference program. Persons who wish to receive such reimbursements must state their eligibility in their submission email and\, at the conference\, provide the MSA with all relevant expense receipts. (Invoices are not acceptable.)
\nAcceptance decisions will be announced by November 20\, 2026.
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s Executive Council (https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/about.htm) operates as the vetting committee. Those accepted for the conference must submit completed papers by February 20\, 2027 to allow review by session chairs. Papers may not exceed 3\,750 words. Eligibility to present at the conference requires payment of both membership and registration fees (https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/membership.htm).
ORGANIZER;CN=Tyler Tritten: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Budapest:20260904T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Budapest:20260905T170000 SUMMARY:Early Modern Naturalisms: Spinozist and Humean UID:20260811T204502Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/Budapest LOCATION:Budapest\, Hungary DESCRIPTION:While both Hume and Spinoza have been claimed as paradigmatic naturalists\, it is far from clear that they are naturalists in the same sense. Further\, it is not obvious that the label applies to either without qualification. Spinoza&rsquo\;s and Hume&rsquo\;s projects moved in markedly different directions\, so we propose a workshop with the aim of examining what is at stake in calling either thinker a naturalist.
\nBy placing Spinoza and Hume in conversation on this topic\, the conference seeks to illuminate two distinct (purported) strands of early modern naturalism: one expansive and metaphysical\, the other cautious and anthropological. Are these differences merely a matter of emphasis and scale\, or do they represent fundamentally incompatible conceptions of nature and its significance? Does calling them naturalists collapse their distinct philosophies into a single tradition? And what\, if anything\, is gained by framing the early modern naturalist field in terms of &ldquo\;Spinozist&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;Humean&rdquo\; trajectories rather than the more traditional &ldquo\;rationalist&rdquo\; vs. &ldquo\;empiricist&rdquo\; divide?
\nWe want to revisit early modern naturalism\, not merely as a retrospective label\, but as a philosophical option characterised by contested outlines. Contributors are invited to explore these and related questions for the purpose of critically reevaluating the categories through which early modern thought is often organised\, and reimagining naturalism as a central thread both connecting and dividing the period&rsquo\;s major figures.
ORGANIZER;CN=David Harmon;CN=Tamas Demeter: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260915T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260915T234500 SUMMARY:Decentering Design: Technology Through the Maintenance Lens UID:20260811T204503Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Proposed Collected Volume:
\nDecentering Design: Technology Through the Maintenance Lens
\nEditors: Mark Thomas Young (University of Paderborn) &\; Andrea Gammon (TU Delft)
\nRecent work on maintenance in philosophy of technology reflects a growing interest in approaching artifacts and systems as dynamic processes extended through time. As such\, it highlights a shift in focus that is currently underway - away from the traditional concern with how things are initially designed and produced - and towards an examination of the way technologies are often continually re-produced through time by practices of adjustment\, tuning and adaptation.
\nAs a growing body of literature now demonstrates\, approaching technology through the lens of maintenance is crucial\, not only for delineating the environmental\, political and social significance of technologies\, but also for apprehending their ontological\, epistemological and ethical aspects. However\, much work remains to be done in clarifying the conceptual and methodological implications of this growing body of work for philosophy of technology. \;
\nThe proposed volume aims to develop and consolidate the theoretical contribution of maintenance to philosophy of technology by advancing existing discussions and establishing new lines of enquiry around topics which have yet to be considered in relation to maintenance. \;As such\, this call for papers stands as a invitation for researchers to consider how reflecting on the ways in which the technologies they study are sustained over time may further enrich philosophical understandings of technological maintenance. We welcome contributions that address the maintenance of technologies across a range of kinds and scales: from individual artifacts to systems\, networks and infrastructures\, from crafted objects to digital systems\, robotics and autonomous agents. While we are specifically interested in theoretical and empirical contributions which advance the growing discussion on maintenance in philosophy of technology\, studies which aim to so by drawing upon the perspectives and resources of related fields\, such as STS and Media Studies are welcome\, as are critical approaches which highlight limitations in existing conceptual or methodological approaches to the study of maintenance. \;
\nSuggested topics include but are not limited to:
\nWe invite submissions of 300 word abstracts for proposed chapter by September 15th 2026 \;emailed directly to the editors: \;mark [at] markthomasyoung [dot] net &\; A.R.Gammon [at] tudelft [dot] nl
\nAuthors will be notified of acceptance within two weeks of the abstract submission deadline. Accepted contributions will receive an invitation to a chapter development workshop to be held at the University of Paderborn in January 2027 generously funded by the Society for Philosophy of Technology (SPT). Contributions are expected to range from 6000-8000 words (not including references). Those who would like to discuss potential contributions are encouraged to get in contact with the editors. \;
\nAnticipated Timeframe
\nThis workshop explores new directions in the recent debate on ontological indeterminacy. There has been a long-standing debate about whether fundamental physics leads to indeterminacy. Recently\, however\, the idea that there may be other types of worldly indeterminacy as well is receiving growing attention. Eddy Keming Chen argues that there may be nomic indeterminacy. Other arguments suggest that there may be causal indeterminacy and that future indeterminacy is not just due to epistemic limitations\, but a real feature of the world.
The goal of this workshop is to determine where indeterminacy exists in the world and what this implies for our interpretation of fundamental physics and broader topics in metaphysics and the philosophy of science\, such as theories of the laws of nature\, theories of causation\, and time and the future.
Philosophica is an analytic philosophy conference series hosted by the Institute of Philosophy at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University. The theme of this edition of the conference is words and language\, engaging with philosophical work addressing the nature of expressions\, meaning\, and natural language more broadly construed.
\nWe invite contributions on topics like the ontology of words\, word individuation\, pragmatic features of expressions\, meaning in natural language (metasemantics)\, or the relationship between words and language\, among others.
\nTopics broadly related to natural language are welcome\; contributions do not need to place special emphasis on words as such\, though this is welcome.
\nInterdisciplinary perspectives drawing on linguistics\, semantics\, metaphysics\, and other relevant areas are also welcome.
\nThe event will take place exclusively in person\; it is open to both regular faculty and students.
\nThe conference will run from 17/09/2026 to 18/09/2026. \;
\nSubmissions through EasyChair (see also our CFP for details): \;https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=philosophica2
ORGANIZER;CN=Kamil Lemanek: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260920T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260920T090000 SUMMARY:Special Issue on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles UID:20260811T204506Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Call for Papers
\nSpecial Issue on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles
\nManuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy invites submissions in English for a special issue devoted to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII).
\nGuest Editor: Leonardo G. S. Videira (University of Sã\;o Paulo &ndash\; FAPESP)
\nThe Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII)\, in its most widespread formulation\, states that any two things sharing all the same properties are in fact identical\; in other words\, no two distinct things share all their properties. Despite its apparent simplicity\, the principle has remained one of the most contested theses in the history of metaphysics. Classical and contemporary counterexamples &ndash\; such as Kant&rsquo\;s droplets\, Black&rsquo\;s spheres\, and entangled bosons &ndash\; appear to involve numerically distinct yet indiscernible entities\, thereby challenging the principle's truth.
\nDebates concerning the PII extend well beyond the question of its truth or falsity\, however. They encompass issues regarding the interpretation of its constituent notions\, the modal status of the principle\, and the nature of the necessity\, if any\, that underwrites it. Moreover\, the PII plays a central role in a wide range of philosophical discussions\, including the dispute between bundle and substratum theories\, the ontology of quantum mechanics\, the metaphysics of mathematical objects\, and the relationship between indiscernibility and identity.
\nThe last two decades have witnessed significant developments in these debates. This special issue aims to bring together contributions that advance our understanding of the PII\, its implications\, and its applications across different areas of philosophy.
\nConfirmed Contributors
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Dé\;cio Krause (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Jonas R. B. Arenhart (Federal University of Santa Catarina)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Raoni Arroyo (Federal University of Santa Catarina)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Rafael de Clercq (Lingnan University)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Olimpia Lombardi (University of Buenos Aires &ndash\; CONICET)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;F. A. Muller (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
\n\nTopics of Interest
\nSubmissions may address\, but are not limited to\, the following topics:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Historical approaches to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Arguments for and against the PII
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Interpretations of the notions involved in the formulation of the PII
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;The modal status of the PII
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;The PII and the grounding of identity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Epistemological aspects of indiscernibility and identity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;The PII in the philosophy of physics
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;The PII in the philosophy of mathematics
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;The PII in the philosophy of religion
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Assessments of actual and fictional counterexamples to the PII
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Connections between the PII and contemporary theories of objects\, properties\, and individuation
\nSubmission Information
\nDeadline for submissions: September 20\, 2026
\nAccepted papers will be published in late 2026 or early 2027.
\nAuthor guidelines are available at:
\nhttp://www.scielo.br/revistas/man/iinstruc.htm
\nSubmissions should be made through the Manuscrito Editorial Manager:
\nhttps://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/man-scielo
\nPlease indicate in your submission that the manuscript is intended for the special issue on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles.
\nContact
\nFor further information\, please contact:
\nLeonardo G. S. Videira
\nleonardo.soutello@gmail.com
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20260922T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20260923T170000 SUMMARY:Between Christian and Post-Christian Worldviews UID:20260811T204507Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/Warsaw LOCATION:Kopernika 26\, Kraków\, Poland DESCRIPTION:Christian Philosophy: Between Christian and Post-Christian Worldviews (2026)
\n4th \;International Conference:
\nChristian \;Philosophy: Between Christian \;and Post-Christian \;Worldviews
\nIgnatianum University in Krakow\, 22-23 September 2026 (Tuesday-Wednesday)
\nThe term &lsquo\;post-Christian&rsquo\; is increasingly appearing in philosophical and cultural discourse\, employed to describe various phenomena that supposedly follow on after Christianity. Most often\, the term is used to describe a contemporary world in which Christianity either is no longer the dominant religion or is not recognised as such in the way that it was until recently. At the same time\, although there is a post-Christian world\, the Christian world has not ended. The problem of the &lsquo\;post-Christian picture of reality&rsquo\; therefore provokes discussion amongst both supporters and opponents of Christianity &ndash\; especially because what is &lsquo\;post-Christian&rsquo\; cannot be understood in isolation from Christianity itself.
\nIn a globalised world\, we are witnessing a clash between Christian and post-Christian images of the world. While some recognise the permanence and validity of the picture of reality founded on the Christian religion\, others are convinced that this has\, for various reasons\, been deformed or destroyed and belongs to an irreversible past\, both in terms of cognition and at the level of social practice.
\nWhile within Western civilisation broadly construed a post-Christian worldview founded on ecological\, gender-based or technological naturalism would seem to be dominating\, in other parts of the globe the Christian worldview is only just gaining ground.
\nThe situation in which Christian and post-Christian worldviews clash within culture and social life poses a serious challenge for philosophy. Christianity-inspired philosophy must define its place in relation to not only worldviews\, but also phenomena\, trends and concepts with anti-Christian overtones. At the same time\, the post-Christian worldview raises many questions that need to be addressed. Proposals We invite proposals that address the problems of Christian and post-Christian worldviews.
\n\nOur interests lie especially in the following topics and questions\, but are not limited to them: \;
\n&bull\; What are the main historical and systematic problems of the Christian worldview?
\n&bull\; Is an evolution of the Christian worldview possible\, or even necessary?
\n&bull\; What is the difference between post-Christian worldviews and non-Christian or postreligious worldviews?
\n&bull\; What are the main aspects and characteristics of the relationship between Christian and post-Christian worldviews?
\n&bull\; Is the transition between Christianity and post-Christianity itself an irreversible phenomenon?
\n&bull\; In what way is post-Christianity influencing debates in ethics and/or politics?
\n&bull\; Does the post-Christian worldview lead to a dissolution of our deep need for religious truths or values?
\n&bull\; Why is the post-Christian worldview mostly dominated by materialistic and relativistic perspectives that reject God as a person and the spiritual values of Christianity?
\n&bull\; What kind of personal identity and individual existence is being presented within the post-Christian worldview?
\n&bull\; Why is it that\, in the post-Christian world\, religion is becoming a tool of political mobilisation and/or manipulation?
\n&bull\; What is the function of religion within the Christian and post-Christian worldviews?
\n&bull\; Is the very meaning of Christianity dissolved in the post-Christian worldview into a set of broad ideals about human behaviour and society?
\n&bull\; What is the position of the Christian and post-Christian worldviews on the truth-falsehood opposition?
\n\nSubmissions:
\nPlease submit a 500-word abstract of your paper (in PDF format) by March 31\, 2026\, via EasyChair\, using the following link:
\nhttps://easychair.org/conferences?conf=chp26
\nLanguage: only proposals in English will be accepted for consideration.
\nWe will be delighted to encounter all participants in person here at Ignatianum University in Cracow. However\, the organisers plan to conduct this conference in hybrid mode\, combining both online and on-site elements. Each conference participant will receive a certificate indicating also the mode of participation.
\n\nWe are pleased to announce that the following individuals have agreed to give a lecture or participate in a panel discussion during the conference:
\nJeffrey Bloechl &ndash\; Boston College\,
\nUSA Chantal Delsol &ndash\; University of Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallé\;e\,
\nFrance Piotr Gutowski &ndash\; John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin\,
\nPoland John Milbank &ndash\; University of Nottingham\, UK
\nLinda Trinkaus Zagzebski &ndash\; University of Oklahoma\, USA
\n\nFees
\nThe conference is open to the public (also via social media). Presenting participants will be charged a fee to help cover costs (materials\, dinner\, coffee breaks\, etc.). For the exact amount of the conference fee\, see below.
\nEarly submission (up to December 31\, 2025) will attract a reduced fee (so-called &lsquo\;Early Bird registration&rsquo\;).
\nRegular participants 60/80/100 EUR (Early Birds/PhD Students/Regular Participants).
\nOnline participants 30/40/50 EUR (Early Birds/PhD Students/Regular Participants)
\n\nWe plan to record all presentations and then publish them on conference YouTube chanel and on the conference Facebook fanpage. After the conference we plan to publish a special issue in a philosophical journal\, containing articles based on the conference presentations. With this in mind\, speakers are encouraged to prepare a paper (up to 10\,000 words) and submit it by December 31\, 2026. Each article will be subject to a process of doubleblind peer review. Forum Philosophicum\, an international journal for philosophy (listed in SCOPUS)\, has already agreed to publish a special issue in 2026 including materials from the conference. However\, we are also open to collaboration with other journals.
\n\nDeadlines
\n&bull\; Submission of Proposals (Early Birds): December 31\, 2025
\n&bull\; Submission of Proposals: March 31\, 2026
\n&bull\; Notification of Acceptance: April 30\, 2026
\n&bull\; Registration Deadline and Payment: June 30\, 2026
\n&bull\; Conference Dates: September 22&ndash\;23\, 2026
\n&bull\; Paper Submission Deadline: December 31\, 2026
ORGANIZER;CN="Andrzej Skupień";CN="Jacek Poznański": METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260925T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260926T170000 SUMMARY:Logic of Metaphysics UID:20260811T204508Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Am Neuen Palais 10\, Potsdam\, Germany\, 14469 DESCRIPTION:The history of analytic philosophy is essentially told as a history of the development and application of logic on the one hand\, and as a continuous discussion of the question of the possibility of metaphysics on the other hand. While logical empiricism believed that metaphysical questions could be exposed as pseudo-problems using the tools of formal logic\, developments in modal logic and model theory were partly responsible for the renaissance of metaphysics that we can still observe today. In short\, since formal logic is an essential tool and distinguishing feature of analytic philosophy\, logic is also crucial in the historical and contemporary discourse on the possibility of metaphysics. In this context\, the question arises as to what functions logic fulfills in metaphysics and what questions it enables or prevents. \;
\nThe aim of the conference is to shed light on the relationship between analytic metaphysics and its logical toolkit and to trace the historical development of analytic philosophy from a fundamentally anti-metaphysical to a philosophical movement\, which is decidedly open towards metaphysics. An examination of the second area of interest is closely linked to the role that logic plays in the dissolution and reformulation of metaphysical problems. This may take the form of systematic contributions to current debates or reviews of historical positions.
\nCALL FOR ABSTRACTS
\nWe encourage BA\, MA\, and M.Ed. students to submit abstracts on the above topic in English. Submissions should include a brief description of the topic (approximately two to three sentences) and an abstract of no more than 400 words for a blind review. Each presenter will have 45 minutes for their presentation\, 20 minutes for the talk\, and 25 minutes for a Q&\;A. \;
\nThe deadline for submissions is 30.05.26.. Please submit your application as a PDF to logicandmetaphysics@protonmail.com. Documents need to be anonymized for blind review. Please make sure to use &ldquo\;Abstract Logic of Metaphysics Potsdam 2026&rdquo\;as the subject of the Email.
\nWe particularly encourage students from underrepresented and marginalized groups to submit presentations in order to support diversity and equality at universities. \;
\nAll submissions will undergo a blind review. All applicants will be notified by email by 22.06.26.regardless of whether their presentation has been selected. We will contact you for further organizational steps if your presentation is selected.
\nWe are working on financing the conference\, however currently we cannot guarantee a full (or even a partial) reimbursement of travel and accommodation costs. Should you be unable to finance your accommodation\, please indicate this in your email. A limited number of participants can be accommodated by the local student body.
\n
If you have any questions\, please contact the organizers logicandmetaphysics@protonmail.com. We look forward to receiving your abstracts!
CALL FOR PAPERS
\nfor a topical issue of \;Open Philosophy
\nHEGEL&rsquo\;S PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION
\nOpen Philosophy \;(https://www.degruyterbrill.com/journal/key/opphil/html) invites submissions for the topical issue &ldquo\;Hegel&rsquo\;s Philosophy of Action&rdquo\;\, edited by Bojana Jovićević (University of Ljubljana) and Gregor Schä\;fer (University of Basel/University of London).
\nDESCRIPTION
\n\;
\nThe topic of this issue is Hegel&rsquo\;s account of action. To act typically means to realize one&rsquo\;s goals through the exercise of one&rsquo\;s intention &ndash\; that is\, one acts upon reasons that justify one&rsquo\;s action as true and good. If one fails to act\, one&rsquo\;s reasons are obstructed &ndash\; either by external circumstances\, such as unfavourable conditions\, or by one&rsquo\;s inertia of intelligence\, the additional judgement required from the agent to translate one&rsquo\;s intention into concrete action.
\nOn this view\, action is understood as a predicate of ability: the power to act is conceived independently of its actual conditions. In this light\, whether an action is realized becomes irrelevant\, since its validity is not empirically verifiable. In other words\, if action is understood as mere potentiality &ndash\; prior to entering into relations with the empirical world &ndash\; its effects on others\, or how they judge it\, become entirely irrelevant. The agent\, in this sense\, retains the authority to insist that\, regardless of what one actually does\, one&rsquo\;s intention remains perfectly valid.
\nHegel criticizes this model. It may turn out that\, in acting from intention\, the agent is mistaken. Or even if one&rsquo\;s reasons are sound\, the outcome could still be wrong. For instance\, helping others may be a valid principle\, but the way it is employed could be flawed if those one intends to help are\, in fact\, hindered or harmed by one&rsquo\;s actions. In other words\, knowing that an action conforms to an ability (potentia) is never enough to rule out the possibility that something about it is wrong in the particular situation. That possibility could only be excluded if the content of the action were realized in its concrete exercise &ndash\; a notion that undermines the very idea of ability as such. Therefore\, Hegel insists that action cannot be separated from one&rsquo\;s concrete doing. On Hegel&rsquo\;s terms: the actuality of purpose is the purpose of acting. Because the consequences of action partake within the causality of the action itself\, as a result every action is\, by its very concept\, incongruent with the agent&rsquo\;s prior intention. Hegel&rsquo\;s prominent critique of moral action &ndash\; as an action that focuses solely on intentions and\, insofar as it takes place in the actual form of social and political life\, comes into conflict with its consequences &ndash\; is evidently connected with this structure.
\nIf no action can be separated from its actual consequences\, then what distinguishes a successful action from a failed one? And if action is mediated by the incongruence between intention and outcome\, what does this imply for the &ldquo\;truth&rdquo\; of the entire process of the action? What is &ndash\; from this perspective &ndash\; a &ldquo\;wrong&rdquo\; action\, what is a &ldquo\;true&rdquo\; action\, and how do they relate to each other in understanding the entire process of action? Moreover\, if action cannot be free from intention or validated by its outcome\, but both of them can be explained only through the whole of its process\, how then should we interpret the ethics of Hegel&rsquo\;s philosophy of action (as both a deontological and a utilitarian or pragmatist interpretation would be misleading)?
\nThe present issue aims to explore these questions and the nexus of related topics (e.g.\, virtuous action\, political action\, historical action) from varied perspectives\, all of which stem from the following conceptual tension: for Hegel\, action resides in one&rsquo\;s concrete doing &ndash\; there is no action outside of what one actually does\, and in this sense\, action cannot be validated by one&rsquo\;s intention in its entirety. Yet this does not mean that its validity depends on its consequences\; rather\, both intention and outcome are explained in light of knowledge discerned through action.
\nWhile Hegel&rsquo\;s understanding of action has gained growing interest in recent scholarship\, this aspect remains largely overlooked and underdeveloped. Beginning with the Phenomenology of Spirit\, traversing through the Science of Logic\, and culminating in the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of History\, this question remains highly relevant for Hegel&rsquo\;s entire practical philosophy. Specifically\, this issue aims to explore\, among others\, the following set of problems as articulated in Hegel&rsquo\;s practical philosophy:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; How is practical knowledge related to action\, and what grounds this relation?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; In what ways do intention and outcome figure within the causality of action\, and across different kinds of action (virtuous\, political\, historical\, etc.)?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; What is the relation between failed and successful action? Are these distinct or simply different aspects of one and the same concept of action?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; How can we distinguish action from the notions of ability\, power\, or disposition?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Is action independent of\, or dependent upon\, other competent subjects\, and does this imply that it is intersubjective and social in its origin?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; What does it mean to concretely exercise action within specific forms of social and political life?
\n
HOW TO SUBMIT
\nSubmissions will be collected from September 1 to September 30\, 2026. There are no specific length limitations.
\nTo submit an article for the special issue of Open Philosophy\, authors are asked to access the online submission system at:
\nhttp://www.editorialmanager.com/opphil/ \;
\nPlease choose as article type: Hegel&rsquo\;s Philosophy of Action
\nBefore submission the authors should carefully read over the Instruction for Authors\, available at: \;https://www.degruyter.com/publication/journal_key/OPPHIL/downloadAsset/OPPHIL_Instruction%20for%20Authors.pdf \;
\nAll contributions will undergo critical review before being accepted for publication.
\nFurther questions about this thematic issue can be addressed to Bojana Jovićević at \;bojana.jovicevic@ff.uni-lj.si and/or Gregor Schä\;fer at gregor.schaefer@unibas.ch. In case of technical problems with submission\, please write to Assistant.Managing.Editor@degruyterbrill.com \;
\nBecause \;Open Philosophy \;is published under an Open Access model\, as a rule\, publication costs should be covered by so called \;Article Publishing Charges \;(APC)\, paid by authors\, their affiliated institutions\, funders or sponsors.
\nAuthors without access to publishing funds are encouraged to discuss potential discounts or waivers with OA Portfolio Manager Magdalena Skoneczna (magdalena.skoneczna@degruyterbrill.com) before submitting their manuscripts.
\nFind us on facebook: https://www.facebook.com/DGOpenPhilosophy
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261006T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261007T170000 SUMMARY:The Nature of Social Identities: Metaphysics\, Epistemology\, and Politics UID:20260811T204510Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/Prague LOCATION:Arna Nováka 1\, Brno \, Czech Republic\, 60200 DESCRIPTION:The Department of Philosophy\, Faculty of Arts\, Masaryk University in Brno\, Czech Republic\, invites submissions for a conference on the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of social identities\, organised within the research project Identity Politics: Metaphysics and Epistemology.
\nConference Theme
\nIn recent decades\, political and social debates have increasingly focused on identity-based groups defined by characteristics such as race\, gender\, sexual orientation\, disability\, class\, religion\, or age. These developments have generated extensive discussion in political philosophy and social theory. However\, many of the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions underlying identity politics remain insufficiently examined.
\nThis conference aims to investigate the nature\, constitution\, and epistemic role of social identities. In particular\, we seek to explore the mechanisms through which identities emerge as robust social and political entities\, and the ways in which identity-related features&mdash\;such as lived experience\, self-identification\, social recognition\, and shared narratives&mdash\;contribute to their formation and persistence. \;
\nAnother central aim is to examine whether different identities (for example\, race\, gender\, sexual orientation\, or class) are constituted through similar or distinct metaphysical and epistemic mechanisms. Comparative approaches that analyse similarities and differences across identities are especially welcome. \;
\nThe conference will also address the epistemological aspects of social identities\, including questions concerning situated knowledge\, epistemic authority\, intersectionality\, and conflicts among different socially situated perspectives.
\nTopics
\nPossible topics include\, but are not limited to:
\nMetaphysics of Social and Political Identities
\nEpistemology of Social Identity
\nSubmissions from metaphysics\, epistemology\, social philosophy\, feminist philosophy\, philosophy of race\, and related areas are welcome.
\nKeynote speaker: Kristina Rolin (Tampere University)
\nSubmission Guidelines
\nPlease submit an anonymous abstract of 400&ndash\;500 words.
\nThe submission should be attached to the email in .pdf format and prepared for blind review. Please include the following information separately in the body of the email: your name(s)\, affiliation(s)\, contact information\, the title of your talk.
\nImportant Dates
\nConference Details
\nSubmission
\nPlease send submissions to: belohrad@phil.muni.cz
\nContact
\nFor inquiries\, please contact: Radim Bělohrad\, Ph.D. (belohrad@phil.muni.cz)
\nOrganizing committee
\nRadim Bělohrad\, Ph.D. \;
\nZdeňka Jastrzembská\;\, Ph.D. \;
\nMarek Picha\, Ph.D.
\nDagmar Pichová\;\, Ph.D.
ORGANIZER;CN=Radim Belohrad: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261013T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261015T170000 SUMMARY:COMET 2026 - Metaphysics in Contemporary Continental Philosophy UID:20260811T204511Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/Amsterdam LOCATION:Nijmegen\, Netherlands DESCRIPTION:COMET 2026 &ndash\; Metaphysics in Contemporary Continental Philosophy
\n13-15 October | Radboud University\, Nijmegen\, the Netherlands
\nCOMET is the annual expert meeting for metaphysics in contemporary continental philosophy\, hosted at Radboud University by its Center for Contemporary European Philosophy (CCEP).
\nIt brings together researchers across career stages who are doing metaphysical work in or in dialogue with continental philosophy\, and offers a setting to discuss research projects in depth.
\nWe are looking for contributions on what there is and how it is structured\, from any school or methodology within the field.
\nPROGRAM
\nThe meeting opens on Tuesday afternoon with a thematic session on ontologies of process and action\, featuring invited talks by Prof. Rein Raud (Tallinn University) and Dr. Mercedes Valmisa Oviedo (University of Gettysburg).
\nWednesday and Thursday are devoted to open sessions selected through this call. Each day has five speakers\, each with a sixty-minute plenary slot split roughly equally between presentation and discussion. The program also provides ample time between sessions for informal exchanges.
\nThe working language is English. Presentations in Dutch\, French\, and German are also welcome\, provided the speaker makes an English translation of their talk available for participants to follow along. The organizers can assist with translations from and into these languages during discussions
\nSUBMISSION GUIDELINES
\nPlease send an abstract of max. 250 words\, prepared for blind review\, plus a separate document with a biographical note of max. 150 words to comet@ru.nl. The deadline is July 2.
\nSelection is a two-stage process. Abstracts first undergo blind review. From the resulting shortlist\, the organizers compose the final program with an eye to a balanced representation of ideas\, career stages\, and backgrounds.
\nATTENDING WITHOUT PRESENTING
\nIn addition to ten speaker slots\, there are fifteen places for researchers who wish to attend and participate in discussions without presenting. To apply\, send an email with a short motivation and biographical note to comet@ru.nl.
\nPRACTICAL INFORMATION
\nThere is no registration fee. All sessions take place on campus. Speakers and participants are responsible for their own travel and accommodation.
\nFurther details about COMET 2026 are available at https://www.ru.nl/en/about-us/events/comet-2026. Last year&rsquo\;s program and abstracts can be found there as well.
\nORGANIZERS
\nCOMET 2026 is organized by dr. Arjen Kleinherenbrink and dr. Tim Miechels at the Center for Contemporary European Philosophy (CCEP) of the Faculty of Philosophy\, Theology\, and Religious Studies at Radboud University.
\nPARTNERS
\nCOMET is closely connected to the School of Materialist Research and Malta University's Engaging the Contemporary conference. There is significant overlap in our intellectual aims\, and we invite anyone already involved in one to find their way to the others.
\n
Arkete
\nSpecial Issue 2025
\nPhilosophy of Perception: Representation\, Reality\, and Cognitive Structure
\nEditors: Mariano Bianca (University of Siena) and Paolo Piccari (University of Siena)
\nPhilosophical reflection on perception has returned to the centre of contemporary debates in philosophy of mind\, epistemology\, and metaphysics. Questions concerning perceptual content\, representational structure\, and the relation between experience and reality have gained renewed prominence in light of current discussions on cognition\, conceptual capacities\, and the epistemic role of perception.
\nAt the same time\, the field remains divided between competing models: representationalist accounts\, relational theories\, disjunctivism\, and naturalistic approaches that attempt to explain perception through cognitive or computational frameworks. These debates raise a deeper philosophical question: whether perception should be understood primarily as an internal mental state or rather as a structured form of access to an objective world.
\nThis special issue aims to gather contributions that investigate perception as a cognitive and conceptual phenomenon with epistemic and metaphysical implications. Particular attention will be devoted to approaches that combine analytic rigour with broader theoretical ambition\, exploring how perceptual experience contributes to the constitution of knowledge and to the articulation of reality.
\nWe welcome contributions addressing these questions\, preferably grounded in concrete cases and/or examples that help clarify and support philosophical analysis.
\nTopics for Submission (including\, but not limited to)
\nSubmission Guidelines
\nSubmissions must be original and unpublished\, written in English or Italian\, and formatted according to the journal&rsquo\;s editorial guidelines. All manuscripts will undergo double-blind peer review.
\nThe 2025 issue of Arkete will be dedicated to these questions. The volume will include articles selected through this Call for Papers as well as invited contributions by national and international scholars.
\nAll submissions must be sent no later than 30 September 2026 to the Editors at:
\nmariano.bianca@unisi.it
paolo.piccari@unisi.it
Manuscripts must conform to the editorial guidelines available at:
https://www.arkete.it
Accepted languages: English and Italian.
\nMaximum length: 40\,000 characters (including spaces\, footnotes\, references\, and abstract).
\nEach submission must include:
\nIn a separate file attached to the same email\, authors must provide:
\nThe journal \;Diakrisis: Yearbook of Theology and Philosophy \;invites submissions for its 2026 issue\, dedicated to the theme \;Love\, Conversion\, and Transformation of the Self\, approached from theological\, philosophical\, and phenomenological perspectives.
\nLove and conversion belong among the most decisive experiences shaping human existence. Whether understood as affective relation\, ethical orientation\, spiritual event\, or existential rupture\, love raises fundamental questions about alterity\, freedom\, and selfhood. Conversion\, in turn\, names a moment&mdash\;or a process&mdash\;of reorientation\, often described as \;metanoia\, decision\, or response to an event that precedes and exceeds the subject. Together\, love and conversion articulate a dynamic understanding of the self as capable of transformation\, openness\, and renewal.
\nThis thematic issue seeks to explore the complex relations between love\, conversion\, and the transformation of the self\, without presupposing a fixed hierarchy among them. Is conversion the fruit of an encounter with love\, or does love emerge from a prior act of conversion? How are affectivity\, decision\, and transformation intertwined in religious\, philosophical\, and phenomenological accounts of subjectivity? To what extent can love and conversion be understood as events that reconfigure the self beyond moralism or voluntarism?
\nWe welcome contributions engaging\, among others\, with:
\nSubmissions should offer original research and engage critically with relevant primary sources and contemporary scholarship. Interdisciplinary approaches at the intersection of theology\, philosophy\, and phenomenology are particularly encouraged.
\nSubmission Guidelines
\nImportant Dates and Publication Model
\nDiakrisis \;follows an online-first publication model. Articles are published individually online \;as soon as they are accepted \;after peer review and editorial approval. Each article receives a \;DOI upon publication\, making it immediately citable. Final pagination is assigned only when the annual issue is closed (November 30\, 2026).
\nArticles accepted and published online during the year will be collected and arranged into the \;final annual issue\, which will be released in December 2026 with complete pagination and finalized metadata.
\nDeadline: October 20. Manuscripts received by this date will be considered for inclusion in the current year&rsquo\;s volume.
\nPublication month: \;December.
\nSubmission Process
\nWe look forward to your contributions and to fostering rich discussions that bridge theology and philosophy in the exploration of love\, conversion\, and transformation of the self.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261106T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261107T170000 SUMMARY:Social Categories of the Future UID:20260811T204514Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:America/Los_Angeles LOCATION:1156 High Street\, Santa Cruz\, United States DESCRIPTION:Recent years have seen an explosion of work on social categories\, including gender\, race\, disability\, and sexual orientation. But little attention has been paid to what these and other categories might look like in the future. \;
\nFor example\, trans philosophy is just beginning to broach the topic of futuristic social categories\, while social metaphysics has just begun to investigate gender abolitionism (the view that gender categories should be abolished in a more just future.) Philosophers of AI have just begun thinking about how artificially intelligent entities will fit into human-constructed social structures\, or whether they will develop their own social hierarchies.
\nWe plan to bring together researchers from different approaches and viewpoints working on these and related topics. Topics for abstracts include\, but are not limited to:
\nThe existence and nonexistence of gender categories in the future\, and their level of grain
\nGender abolitionism
\nChanging notions of ability\, disability\, and health given new technologies and scientific breakthroughs
\nChanging notions of biological sex given advances in reproductive technology
\nRacial\, ethnic\, and religious categories of the future
\nAmeliorative construction and destruction of social categories \;
\nSocial categories and hierarchies of artificial intelligent agents
\nThis workshop is generously funded by the International Social Ontology Society and the Department of Philosophy at University of California\, Santa Cruz.
\nOrganizers: Sara Bernstein and Nico Orlandi
\nPlease send extended abstracts of no more than 1500 words to socialcategoriesofthefuture@gmail.com. Deadline: August 15\, 2026 (anywhere in the world).
\nSmall travel bursaries may be available for graduate students and precariously employed attendees. Please email the organizers to find out more.
ORGANIZER;CN=Sara Bernstein;CN=Nico Orlandi: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261107T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261108T170000 SUMMARY:University of Pennsylvania Metaphysics Workshop UID:20260811T204515Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:Philadelphia\, United States DESCRIPTION:The inagural meeting of the Penn Metaphysics Workshop will take place on November 7-8. \; Attendance is open\; those wishing to attend are asked to email Sam Elgin (samelgin@upenn.edu) so that we can ensure sufficient catering
\n\nThis workshop is supported in part by the Andrea Mitchell Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of Pennsylvania.
ORGANIZER;CN=Samuel Elgin: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270101T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270101T090000 SUMMARY:CFP: Fate and Narrative Identity UID:20260811T204516Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:CALL FOR PAPERS
\nSpecial Issue of The Journal of Ethics: Fate and narrative identity
\nDeadline for submission of full draft: 1 January 2027
\nLength of paper: 8\,000-11\,000 words\, including footnotes but not including references at the end.
\nThis special issue starts with the autobiographical question: who am I? What are the most important constituents of my identity? We might distinguish involuntary components such as my birth nationality\, my ethnicity\, by socio-economic background\, my gender\, from voluntary components such as my profession\, my marriage\, my political allegiance\, my long-term residence. But even involuntary components admit of more-or-less voluntary interpretations of the meaning of such components. An ethnic identity can yield a sense of belonging or indifference\, an unwanted constraint can be changed into a catalyst for important life choices.
\nVoluntary identity components and voluntary interpretations usually admit of a narrative description of how they came to play the important role in my identity\, and of how I see their role in the future. As part of that narrative description\, I might ask myself which components are somehow essential to who I am &ndash\; in other words\, without that component\, I cannot imagine being me. Most often these components will begin their narrative role with an event of pure luck. In such a case\, I may be tempted to speak of that event as fateful. So this special issue is about the question: what does it mean to see a narrative identity component as 'my fate'? What can the concept of fate contribute to my and others&rsquo\; understanding of my life?
\nImportantly\, we are NOT directly interested in the concept of fate as denying free will. We are not directly interested in any kind of metaphysical notion\, divine or otherwise\, that might determine my future. Instead\, our autobiographical perspective is primarily about making sense of our past and present\, in the sense described by Robert Solomon&rsquo\;s article &lsquo\;Fate and Fatalism&rsquo\; Philosophy East and West\, Vol. 53\, No. 4 (Oct.\, 2003)\, pp. 435-454.
\nSolomon offers many examples. He himself\, a professional philosopher\, started at university studying medicine\, and on an impulse took a philosophy elective that steered him into a whole new area of interest. He wants to call the impulse fateful. Now it might be said that given his (known and unknown) dispositions\, he was fated to switch to philosophy sooner or later\, and if he had missed this one elective\, other opportunities would have caught his eye. As such we might reach for Heraclitus&rsquo\;s mantra of &ldquo\;character is destiny&rdquo\;. But consider another of Solomon&rsquo\;s examples: two people have been married to one another for many years\, and as such have deeply influenced one another&rsquo\;s identity. And yet their meeting\, their subsequent romantic availability\, their mutual attraction\, their cohabitational compatibility\, their shared interests etc. &ndash\; all of that was radically contingent. Retrospectively\, however\, that meeting (and everything else) was necessary\, fated\, in order for them to become who they are now\, individually\, and jointly\, many years later.
\nWe&rsquo\;re not only interested in Solomon&rsquo\;s retrospective view of fateful events\, we&rsquo\;re also interested in the experience of practical necessity (a phrase coined by Bernard Williams in his 1981 article of that name). Here the agent\, in the present\, discovers what she &lsquo\;must&rsquo\; do\, given who she is\, what she has become\, what roles she fills\, who she is in a relationship with\, where she works etc.. Such a discovery about oneself may be more or less surprising\, and more or less acceptable and understandable among one&rsquo\;s friends (who know her more or less well). Williams&rsquo\;s concept has spawned some philosophical discussion\, but his and others&rsquo\; heroes do not usually use the word &lsquo\;fate&rsquo\; &ndash\; the question is whether they are entitled to do so\, while taking themselves and being taken seriously.
\nWe welcome submissions on the following topics: (not exhaustive)
\nSubmission instructions for Authors
\nAuthors must make use of the standard online EM system used by The Journal of Ethics. All manuscripts will go through the standard double-blind peer-review process according to The Journal of Ethics&rsquo\; guidelines. As a matter of general policy on special issues\, all submission will also be checked by the editor-in-chief. All manuscripts should be prepared according to the journal&rsquo\;s guidelines provided on The Journal of Ethics website. \;
\nCo-editors:
\n \; \; \; \; \; ·\; \; \; Katrien Schaubroeck\, University of Antwerp\, Belgium.
katrien.schaubroeck@uantwerpen.be
\; \; \; \; \; ·\; \; \; Christopher Cowley\, Charles University\, Czech Republic\, and University College Dublin\, Ireland.
Christopher.cowley@ff.cuni.cz
Call for Papers
\nSynthese \;Topical Collection: Against the Grain: Developing the Prospects of Non-Naturalistic Metaphysics of Science
\nGuest Editors:
Raoni Arroyo (Federal University of Santa Catarina / CNPq\, Brazil)
Bruno Borge (University of Buenos Aires / CONICET\, Argentina)\,
Cristiá\;n Soto (University of Chile\, Chile).
Topical Collection website: \;https://link.springer.com/collections/dgjhfehdbd
\nA key feature of recent developments in the metaphysics of science is that it has mostly\, if not exclusively\, been developed within a naturalistic framework. For our purposes\, naturalism can broadly be conceived in any of the following ways: it can be understood as continuous with\, constrained by\, derived from\, or useful to science.
\nWhat all these have in common is a deferential attitude towards science\, which may roughly be spelled out as follows: when it comes to ontology\, methodology\, or epistemology\, metaphysicians of science should best defer such issues to science (particularly physics). Most\, if not all\, more or less recent developments that &ldquo\;take science seriously&rdquo\; fall under the naturalistic umbrella. One possible consequence of this default naturalistic orientation is that it may unduly restrict the scope of legitimate metaphysical inquiry.
\nWe understand non-naturalistic metaphysics of science as a style of metaphysical practice whose problems need not exclusively arise within or emanate from the sciences. More specifically\, it is a kind of metaphysics that remains oriented toward science without treating science as the sole source of its problems\, methods\, or epistemic credentials. In this context\, by &ldquo\;non-naturalistic&rdquo\; we do not mean metaphysics that ignores\, or floats free from\, science\, but rather metaphysical inquiry that engages with science without being fully grounded in\, derived from\, or subordinated to it.
\nThe aim of the Topical Collection is not merely to criticize naturalism\, but to articulate positive alternatives: ways of doing metaphysics of science that engage with scientific practices\, examine the metaphysical assumptions and frontiers of science\, and remain epistemically relevant to our overall scientific outlook without adopting a deferential stance toward science.
\nBy contrast\, naturalistic metaphysics of science has science as the proper ontological\, epistemic\, and methodological ground of metaphysical inquiry. Non-naturalistic metaphysics of science asks and addresses metaphysical issues properly\, which can rightfully be considered as yielding genuine epistemic contributions to our knowledge or understanding of how the world is or could be.
\nAppropriate Topics for Submission include\, among others:
\n\nThis list is not meant to be exhaustive.
\nFor further information\, please contact the guest editors:
\nRaoni Arroyo: \;raoniarroyo@gmail.com
Bruno Borge: \;brunojborge@gmail.com
Cristiá\;n Soto: \;cssotto@uchile.cl
The deadline for submissions is \;January 15\, 2027.
\nSubmissions via: \;https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx
\nPlease select &ldquo\;Submit New Manuscript&rdquo\; and choose the Topical Collection &ldquo\;Against the Grain: Developing the Prospects of Non-Naturalistic Metaphysics of Science&rdquo\; from the drop-down menu.
\nRaoni Arroyo
Federal University of Santa Catarina / CNPq
Email: \;raoniarroyo@gmail.com
Bruno Borge
University of Buenos Aires / CONICET
Email: \;brunojborge@gmail.com
Cristiá\;n Soto
University of Chile
Email: \;cssotto@uchile.cl
CFP: Mind without Inner Representation?
\nPsychological Discourse\, Rationality\, and Mental Anti-Representationalism
\nSpecial Issue of \;Journal of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy (JCCP)
\nGuest Editor: Rusong Huang
\nContact: rusongh@gmail.com
\nSubmission deadline: March 1\, 2027
\nTopic areas: Philosophy of Mind\; Philosophy of Language\; Metaphysics\; Normativity\; Philosophy of Psychology
\nDescription
\nWhen we attribute beliefs\, desires\, intentions\, fears\, memories\, imaginings\, sensations\, or experiences to someone\, what are we doing?
\nMuch of modern philosophy of mind has assumed that psychological sentences are representational: they describe mental states\, properties\, events\, or processes belonging to a subject. This assumption generates familiar metaphysical pressures. If psychological sentences represent mental facts\, then we must explain how such facts fit into the physical world. This gives rise to what has been variously called the location problem\, the placement problem\, the accommodation problem\, or the problem of how mind can be at home in nature.
\nThis special issue invites papers that examine whether the representational assumption about psychological discourse should be rejected\, revised\, or defended. It focuses on a family of views that challenge\, in different ways\, the idea that psychological sentences primarily function to represent inner mental facts. These include fictionalism\, eliminativism\, error theory\, illusionism\, and mental anti-representationalism &mdash\; what we may call\, for convenience\, the FEEL theories and MAR. The issue welcomes both sympathetic and critical treatments of these views\, as well as papers that defend more traditional representationalist approaches.
\nA central aim of the issue is to explore the relations among these positions. Are the FEEL theories and MAR competing alternatives\, or can they be combined? Does MAR collapse into one of the FEEL theories\, or does it offer a distinct way of rejecting inner-fact representationalism? Can these approaches preserve the explanatory\, rational\, and normative roles of psychological discourse while avoiding the metaphysical burdens of inner-object models of mind?
\nPossible topics
\nSubmissions may address\, but are not limited to:
\nPapers may be sympathetic\, critical\, historical\, systematic\, or comparative.
\nSubmission instructions
\nSubmissions should be original articles not currently under consideration elsewhere.
\nManuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review and should not exceed 10\,000 words\, including quotations and footnotes but excluding reference lists.
\nPlease submit manuscripts in the Editorial Manager for JCCP: \; https://www.editorialmanager.com/jccp/default.aspx \;
\nYou may see submission instructions here.
\nPlease indicate that the paper is intended for the special issue &ldquo\;Mind without Inner Representation? Psychological Discourse\, Rationality\, and Mental Anti-Representationalism.&rdquo\;
\nSubmission deadline: March 1\, 2027
\nExpected publication: Fall 2027 / early 2028
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20270325T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20270327T170000 SUMMARY:The Metaphysical Society of America UID:20260811T204519Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:America/Los_Angeles LOCATION:702 E. Desmet Ave.\, Spokane\, United States DESCRIPTION:The 2027 conference of the MSA invites submissions on the theme of the &ldquo\;metaphysics of habit\,&rdquo\; understood both as a subjective and objective genitive. Contributors may explore the metaphysical underpinnings of habit or investigate habit as a metaphysical principle in its own right. Topics of interest include\, but are not necessarily limited to\, the following questions:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit a pragmatic device for assuaging epistemological impasses\, as in Hume\, or can it have a genuine metaphysical function? If so\, how\, when and under what conditions?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit conscious or unconscious\, intelligent or blind? Is it a sign of rational consistency or the erosion of thought into blind compulsion? Is it learned or inherited\, adaptive or mechanical\, spontaneous or rote\, proactive or reactive? Is habit a result of repetition or the propensity to repeat? Or\, does habit subvert these dichotomies altogether?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Are practice\, routine\, custom\, tics and neuroses distinct in kind from habit itself or only various degrees or intensities of habit? Or\, is habit a species of one of these categories?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Must habit be relegated to psychology or is habit operative at other\, or even all\, domains of being? What of motricity or motor habit? Are instinct and inertia species of habit? Is habit a metaphysical principle underpinning various notions of evolution? Might it underwrite scientific theories\, e.g. quantum theory? Could habit account for the lawfulness of nature itself? What is the metaphysics of social and collective habits? Could there be a theology of habit?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit an attribute or might it constitute substantiality itself? Do individuals possess habits or is the self but a nexus of habits? Are some kinds of beings inherently habitual and others impervious to habit? Can a rock acquire a habit? Can artificial intelligence?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit an effect\, a cause or the very principle of causality itself? Is habit antecedent to its effects or simultaneous with them? Is habit a result consequent to its cause(s) or simultaneous with it? Or\, is it temporalization itself?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Can habit perform the functions Kant allotted to transcendental structures &ndash\; synthesis\, identity\, regularity\, temporal contraction? If so\, are traditions that make habit into a metaphysical principle\, e.g. French Spiritualism and American Pragmatism\, post-Kantian? Or\, are they instead post-Humean or post-Leibnizian?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Can habit be simultaneously empirical and contingent\, yet also universal? Is habit a priori or a posteriori\, transcendental or empirically real? Could habit ground a &ldquo\;metaphysical empiricism\,&rdquo\; &ldquo\;transcendental empiricism&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;critical realism&rdquo\;?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit dyadic and chiasmatic? Does habit have more to do with the Dyad or the One?
\nAbstracts that address these and related questions and issues in original ways are especially encouraged and will be prioritized. Submissions of abstracts for papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome.
\nGuidelines for the Submission of Abstracts
\nDeadline: September 1\, 2026
\nSubmit to: Jessica Wahman\, Vice President of the MSA (msamarch2027@gmail.com)
\nFormat: Word documents of no more than 600 words. Late abstracts and those shorter than 400 words or longer than 600 words will not be considered. To facilitate double-anonymous review\, an abstract should not contain the author&rsquo\;s name or otherwise identify the author. In the email to which the abstract is attached\, authors should indicate full name\, institutional affiliation (if any)\, and abstract title. The email subject-line should read: \; 2027 MSA Submission [last name of author)] -- for example: 2027 MSA Submission Leibniz.
\nAristotle Prize
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s annual Aristotle Prize\, which is only awarded if a submission is deemed worthy of the prize\, is open to current students without a Ph.D. The Aristotle Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with costs for attending the annual meeting.
\nPersons who wish to be considered for this prize must a) clearly state (in an email message accompanying their submission) their eligibility for this prize and their desire to be considered for it\, and b) submit a full\, final paper in addition to the abstract by the September 1\, 2026 deadline. The body of the text (as is proposed to be read at the meeting) must be no longer than 3\,750 words.
\nPlato Prize
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s annual Plato Prize\, which is only awarded if a submission is deemed worthy of the prize\, is open to persons who have received their first Ph.D. in the last six years&mdash\;thus (for the 2027 meeting) in 2021 or more recently. The Plato Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with costs for attending the annual meeting.
\nPersons who wish to be considered for this prize must a) clearly state (in an email message accompanying their submission) their eligibility for this prize and their desire to be considered for it\, and b) submit a full\, final paper in addition to the abstract by the September 1\, 2026 deadline. The body of the text (as is proposed to be read at the meeting) must be no longer than 3\,750 words.
\nTravel Grants
\nThanks to the generous support of past MSA Presidents\, Society members\, and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot Fund for Systematic Philosophy\, the MSA is pleased to be able to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $400 to current graduate students and post-doctoral researchers within two years of their first PhD whose submissions are selected for the conference program. Persons who wish to receive such reimbursements must state their eligibility in their submission email and\, at the conference\, provide the MSA with all relevant expense receipts. (Invoices are not acceptable.)
\nAcceptance decisions will be announced by November 20\, 2026.
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s Executive Council (https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/about.htm) operates as the vetting committee. Those accepted for the conference must submit completed papers by February 20\, 2027 to allow review by session chairs. Papers may not exceed 3\,750 words. Eligibility to present at the conference requires payment of both membership and registration fees (https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/membership.htm).
ORGANIZER;CN=Tyler Tritten: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260811T203545Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20300531T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20300531T090000 SUMMARY:Phenomenologies of Religious Experience UID:20260811T204520Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:3cca:14ff:fe3c:a4c3%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:This series invites proposals in classical phenomenology\, French phenomenology\, pre- and post-phenomenologies\, and in methodologies that bridge phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The relation between phenomenology and religious experience can be considered in a variety of modes: epistemic (phenomenology as a "rigorous science" of religious experience in Husserl's sense)\; ontic (phenomenology as a way to access the core motive\, or regulative ideal\, of religion)\; analogical (phenomenological experience as a secular version of religious experience)\; generalizing (religious experience turning into phenomenological experience when stripped from its dogmatic frame)\, etc. Proposals can take critical\, descriptive\, theoretical\, comparative\, historical\, or other approaches\, and they can focus on the interplay between religious or spiritual experience and assorted theoretical approaches\, or proceed from such experience towards building a new theory. In accord with Husserl&rsquo\;s original intent\, the series welcomes attempts to locate spiritual or religious experience within a broader theory of the sciences (Wissenschaftslehre) and to expand phenomenology towards transcendental philosophy and metaphysics.
The series covers five areas:
1) Clarifications of religious and spiritual experience\, its formal phenomenological research\, and its relationships to art\, textuality\, culture\, anthropology\, politics\, and comparative religion\;
2) Metaphysical extensions of the phenomenology of religious and spiritual experience\;
3) Existential and psychological analyses\, in different traditions\, of religious and spiritual experience\;
4) Theologies of religious experience\, with or beyond a specific focus on ritual and liturgy\, including liberation theologies\, feminist theologies\, theologies at the intersection of religious experience and race\, social status\, etc.\;
5) The phenomenology of religious and spiritual experience as applied to and/ or examined within medicine\, nursing\, and the health sciences and the natural and social sciences.
The series is published in cooperation with the Society for the Phenomenology of Religious Experience\, \;www.sophere.org.
Editors: \;Michael Barber (michael.barber@slu.edu)\, Peter Costello (PCOSTELL@providence.edu)\, Olga Louchakova-Schwartz (founding editor\, \;olouch@ucdavis.edu)\, and Martin Nitsche (nitsche@flu.cas.cz)
Advisory Board: \;Jason Alvis (University of Vienna)\, Angela Ales Bello (Pontifical Lateran University)\, Michel Bitbol (The French National Center for Scientific Research)\, Carla Canullo (University of Macerata)\, David Ciavatta (Ryerson University)\, Crina Gschwandtner (Fordham University)\, Neal DeRoo (The King&rsquo\;s University)\, Thomas Fuchs (University of Heidelberg)\, James G. Hart (University of Indiana)\, Richard Kearney (Boston College)\, Jeff McCurry (Duquesne University)\, Felix O&rsquo\;Murchadha (National University of Ireland\, Galway)\, Dermot Moran (Boston College)\, Tom Nenon (The University of Memphis)\, Ryōsuke Ōhashi (Universities of Kyoto and Osaka)\, Vincent Pastro (Jesuit School of Theology of Santa Clara University and Aquinas Institute of Theology\, St Louis)\, Hans Rainer Sepp (Charles University)\, Michel Staudigl (University of Vienna)\, Claudia Welz (Aarhus University)
Staff editorial contact: \;Jana Hodges-Kluck (jhodges-kluck@rowman.com) \;
*Please note that this event has officially been postponed. More information will be made available asap in the near future*
\nMany human cognitive capacities and processes may be deployed creatively\, from unique choices made for oneself up through novel cultural shifts. Similarly\, large swaths of our daily lives are taken up with performing spontaneous\, on-the-fly\, and unplanned activities that are\, in a word\, improvised. \; Charting out the nature of both creativity and improvisation\, taken individually or together\, remains an open and pressing issue. In this conference\, we will delve into various philosophical\, theoretical\, empirical\, and interdisciplinary issues that are related to creativity and improvisation. A non-exhaustive list of related questions and themes for this topic include:
\n- What is the relationship between improvisation and creativity?
\n- What is the relationship between creative activity and well-being?
\n- What is the best way to model individual and collective creativity?
\n- Is creativity in the arts the same thing as in other domains\, such as in science or business?
\n- What are the pros and cons of different scientific operationalizations of creativity and improvisation?
\n- Provide a conceptual analysis of creativity and/or improvisation.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR