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CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260924T170000
SUMMARY:Inner Speech Colloquium
UID:20260910T085800Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are happy to announce another season of the online Inner Speech colloquium starting next month\, with a new list of speakers:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>- May 28th - Gary Lupyan (University of Wisconsin-Madison)</p>\n<p>- June 25th -&nbsp\;Kasia Jaszczolt (University of Cambridge)</p>\n<p>- July 16th -&nbsp\;Romain Bourdoncle (Coll&egrave\;ge de France) &amp\; Axel Baptista (Institut Jean Nicod)</p>\n<p>- August 20th - Aleksandr Fadeev (University of Leuven)</p>\n<p>- September 24th - Keith Frankish (University of Sheffield)&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><em>Times are all 16:30 CEST</em></p>\n<p>More info about the first talk coming soon. We hope to see many of you there next month! For more information or to subscribe to the mailing list\, contact: jonida.kodra@uni-osnabrueck.de</p>\n<p>Best regards\,</p>\n<p>Jonida Kodra\, Daniel M&uuml\;ller and Mathijs Geurts (University of Osnabr&uuml\;ck and&nbsp\;University of Salzburg)</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Jonida Kodra;CN=Mathijs Geurts;CN="Daniel Lennart Müller":
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20260909T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20260911T170000
SUMMARY:AISC 2026 - Natural and Artificial Intelligence: between Skills and Biases
UID:20260910T085801Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Rome
LOCATION:Palazzo Campana\, Torino\, Italy
DESCRIPTION:<p>Intelligent systems display a striking combination of competence and limitation\, regardless of their biological\, artificial\, or social origin. These systems can acquire sophisticated skills\, coordinate complex actions\, and adapt to changing environments\; at the same time they suffer systematic biases and pitfalls. Therefore\, understanding intelligence today requires accounting not only for what cognitive systems do well\, but also for how and why they fail.</p>\n\n<p>The 22nd Conference of the Italian Association of Cognitive Sciences (AISC 2026) focuses on this dichotomy\, proposing a reflection on natural and artificial intelligence between skills and biases. From embodied motor abilities and practical know-how to decision-making under uncertainty\, from artificial learning systems to collective dynamics in networked environments\, the conference aims to bring together perspectives that address both the upper and lower bounds of intelligent behaviour across different systems\, methodologies\, and levels of analysis.&nbsp\;</p>\n\n<p>Within this broad framework\, AISC 2026 welcomes contributions from all areas of cognitive science\, including theoretical\, experimental\, computational\, and philosophical approaches to cognition in biological\, social\, and artificial systems. We particularly encourage work that fosters interdisciplinary dialogue and connects traditionally distinct domains of cognitive science.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Marco Viola;CN=Fabrizio Calzavarini;CN=Vincenzo Crupi;CN=Alessandro Demichelis:
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Copenhagen:20260910T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Copenhagen:20260911T170000
SUMMARY:The Given
UID:20260910T085802Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Copenhagen
LOCATION:Karen Blixens Plads 8\, Copenhagen\, Denmark\, 2300
DESCRIPTION:<p>Perceptual experiences seem to present\, make manifest\, or &lsquo\;give&rsquo\; the world to us. Such experiences have &lsquo\;presentational phenomenology&rsquo\;\, or &lsquo\;presentational feel&rsquo\;\; they seem to offer &lsquo\;scene immediacy&rsquo\; or &lsquo\;givenness in-the-flesh&rsquo\;. And perhaps perceptual experiences are not unique in this regard: similar expressions have been used to articulate\, for instance\, mathematical intuitions\, and certain religious experiences. However\, most attempts to characterize presentational phenomenology revolve around striking yet unexplained metaphors. The aim of this conference is to move beyond metaphor\, exploring presentational phenomenology in a variety of different contexts and from a variety of different perspectives\, including epistemology\, philosophy of perception\, philosophy of religion\, psychopathology\, and VR research.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN="Søren Overgaard";CN=Laura Oppi;CN="Kasper Møller Nielsen";CN=Mads G. Henriksen:
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20260910T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20260912T170000
SUMMARY:Faces of Subjectivity. A workshop on inner awareness in the context of monistic theories of phenomenal consciousness
UID:20260910T085803Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Prague
LOCATION:Jilska 361\, Praha\, Czech Republic
DESCRIPTION:<p>Keynote speakers:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Robert J. Howell (Rice)</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Anna Giustina (Valencia)</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Sam Coleman (Birkbeck)</strong></p>\n<p>While the debate about phenomenal consciousness so far has mainly focused on the nature of the qualitative features one encounters in being conscious (e.g. the bitterness of espresso\, the feel of mental effort\, etc.)\, our workshop will focus on the nature of this encounter itself\, i.e. of the special &lsquo\;inner&rsquo\; awareness (Brentano\, Kriegel) one seems to be afforded of one&rsquo\;s own qualitative states\, due to which these states are &lsquo\;for&rsquo\; their subject\, instantiating what Joseph Levine has called &lsquo\;subjectivity&rsquo\;. Since it&rsquo\;s unclear whether and how this subjectivity of conscious states can be accounted for reductively\, we view its existence as an important challenge for the main forms of monism\, i.e. physicalism and Russellian monism. The aim of our workshop is to bring together leading thinkers working on inner\, or &lsquo\;subjective&rsquo\;\, awareness\, with those who defend various forms of monism\, and address the &lsquo\;subjectivity challenge&rsquo\; in a systematic manner\, examining its viability and significance in the broader context of consciousness studies.</p>\n\n<p><strong>Program:</strong></p>\n\n<p><u>Thursday\, September 10</u></p>\n\n<p>14:00&ndash\;15:30 Anna Giustina (Valencia)\, &ldquo\;The Structure of Inner Acquaintance&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>15:30&ndash\;15:50 coffee break</p>\n\n<p>15:50&ndash\;16:35 Jacopo Pallagrosi (Li&egrave\;ge)\, &ldquo\;The Acquaintance Trilemma: Knowledge\, Consciousness\, and Mental Qualities&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>16:35&ndash\;17:20 Maik Niemeck (Marburg)\, &ldquo\;Adverbialism about Inner Awareness is Feasible&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p><u>Friday\, September 11</u></p>\n\n<p>9:30&ndash\;11:00 Sam Coleman (Birkbeck College\, University of London)\, &ldquo\;Transparency and the Reduction of Consciousness&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>11:00&ndash\;11:20 coffee break</p>\n\n<p>11:20&ndash\;12:05 Adriana Renero (UNAM/CUNY Graduate Center)\, &ldquo\;Kripke and Lewis on Subjective Character and de se Beliefs&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>12:05&ndash\;13:35 lunch</p>\n\n<p>13:35&ndash\;14:20 Rituparna Roy (Porto)\, &ldquo\;The Experiential &lsquo\;I&rsquo\;: Subjectivity Without the Selfhood in Buddhist-Brentanian Account of Reflexivity\, Intentionality and Consciousness&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>14:20&ndash\;15:05 Andrea Pace Giannotta (Niccol&ograve\; Cusano University\, Rome)\, &ldquo\;Radically Embodied Panqualityism and the Mind/Flesh Identity Thesis&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>15:05&ndash\;15:25 coffee break</p>\n\n<p>15:25&ndash\;16:10 Jacek Jarocki (John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)\, &ldquo\;A Farewell to Descartes: Epistemological Monism and Panqualityism&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>16:10&ndash\;16:55 Jakub Mih&aacute\;lik (Czech Academy of Sciences)\, &ldquo\;Inner Awareness\, Intimacy\, and the Naturalization Challenge&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>19:00 conference dinner</p>\n\n<p><u>Saturday\, September 12</u></p>\n\n<p>9:30&ndash\;11:00 Robert J. Howell (Rice)\, &ldquo\;The Epistemic Aspect of Consciousness&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>11:00&ndash\;11:20 coffee break</p>\n\n<p>11:20&ndash\;12:05 Alberto Barbieri (University Vita-Salute San Raffaele)\, &ldquo\;From Intimacy to Qualitative Character: A Deeper Case for the Acquaintance Theory of Consciousness&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>12:05&ndash\;13:35 lunch</p>\n\n<p>13:35&ndash\;14:20 Milan Zeman (Charles University)\, &ldquo\;Is Inner Awareness Sufficient for State Consciousness?&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>14:20&ndash\;15:05 Fatimaezzahra Abid (Mohammed V University)\, &ldquo\;The Presence of the Self: Ibn &lsquo\;Arabī on Operative Subjectivity and the Failure of Representationalist Monism&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>15:05&ndash\;15:25 coffee break</p>\n\n<p>15:25&ndash\;16:10 James Hill (Charles University)\, &ldquo\;Active Subjectivity: A Berkeleyan Account&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>Download program as PDF</p>\n\n<p>Please note that this is an in-person only event and space is limited. If you&rsquo\;re interested in attending the workshop\, please e-mail Jakub Mih&aacute\;lik at mihalik@flu.cas.cz.</p>
ORGANIZER:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20260915T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20260915T120000
SUMMARY:Primo Convegno della Società Italiana di Fenomenologia: "Fenomenologia\, logica e psicologia"
UID:20260910T085804Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Rome
LOCATION:Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici\, Via Porta di Massa 1\, Napoli\, Italy\, 80133
DESCRIPTION:<p>&laquo\;Dal ripudio della psicologia empirica in nome di una logica pura Husserl passer&agrave\;\, attraverso un lungo e tormentato cammino\, alla psicologia pura o trascendentale&raquo\;.</p>\n<p>A partire da queste parole di Aldo Masullo\, scritte nel 1961\, il convegno intende indagare un tema che\, per molta filosofia del Novecento\, ha rappresentato uno dei principali limiti della fenomenologia e che\, negli ultimi anni\, si &egrave\; invece rivelato uno dei suoi aspetti pi&ugrave\; fecondi: il rapporto tra logica e psicologia.</p>\n<p>Costitutivo della formazione filosofica di Husserl e decisivo per l&rsquo\;evoluzione del suo pensiero\, il confronto tra logica e psicologia ha orientato gran parte dello sviluppo del movimento fenomenologico. La fenomenologia\, infatti\, non si &egrave\; limitata alla critica delle diverse forme di psicologismo &ndash\; logico\, gnoseologico ed etico &ndash\; ma ha elaborato una nuova concezione delle relazioni tra validit&agrave\; logica\, intenzionalit&agrave\; e soggettivit&agrave\;.</p>\n<p>Si pu&ograve\; sostenere che\, per comprendere le diverse fasi del pensiero husserliano\, cos&igrave\; come per distinguere le principali stagioni della tradizione fenomenologica\, sia necessario chiarire le differenti concezioni di logica e di psicologia che vi sono implicate. In questa prospettiva\, il rapporto tra questi due ambiti non costituisce soltanto una questione interna alla fenomenologia\, ma rappresenta una chiave interpretativa essenziale per comprendere il suo sviluppo storico e teorico.</p>\n<p>Al di l&agrave\; del perimetro strettamente fenomenologico\, la relazione tra logica e psicologia occupa oggi una posizione centrale nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo: dalla teoria della conoscenza alla teoria dei concetti\, dall&rsquo\;etica all&rsquo\;antropologia\, dalla filosofia delle scienze cognitive alla filosofia della mente\, dalla filosofia della logica alla psicopatologia.</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>In questo quadro\, si invitano studiose e studiosi a presentare contributi di carattere storico o teorico sui seguenti temi:</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>1. Fenomenologia e psicologia\;</p>\n<p>2. Fenomenologia e psicopatologia\;</p>\n<p>3. Fenomenologia e logica\;</p>\n<p>4. Etica fenomenologica tra logica e psicologia\;</p>\n<p>5. Fenomenologia\, scienze cognitive ed epistemologia\;</p>\n<p>6. Fenomenologia e teoria delle emozioni\;</p>\n<p>7. Fenomenologia e antropologia\;</p>\n<p>8. Fenomenologia e trascendentale.</p>\n<p>Gli abstract\, di massimo 2500 caratteri pi&ugrave\; 1000 di bibliografia\,&nbsp\;andranno inviati a Lorenzo Cavallo (lorenzo.cavallo2@unina.it) e a Claudio Fabbroni (claudio.fabbroni@unina.it)<br><br></p>\n<p>Scadenze</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>Invio degli abstract: 15 settembre 2026</p>\n<p>Comunicazione degli esiti: 1&deg\; ottobre 2026</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>Comitato scientifico:</p>\n<p>Anna Donise\, Felice Masi\, Anna Pia Ruoppo</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>Comitato organizzativo:</p>\n<p>Giovanni Battista Armenio\, Francesco Bevilacqua\, Lorenzo Cavallo\, Claudio Fabbroni\, Francesca Maffettone\, Giulia Salzano</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Anna Donise;CN=Felice Masi;CN=Anna Pia Ruoppo:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20260917T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20260918T170000
SUMMARY:Philosophica II - Words and Language
UID:20260910T085805Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Warsaw
LOCATION:pl. Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4\, Lublin\, Poland\, 20-031
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Philosophica</strong> is an analytic philosophy conference series hosted by the Institute of Philosophy at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University. The theme of this edition of the conference is <strong>words and language</strong>\, engaging with philosophical work addressing the nature of expressions\, meaning\, and natural language more broadly construed.</p>\n<p>We invite contributions on topics like the ontology of words\, word individuation\, pragmatic features of expressions\, meaning in natural language (metasemantics)\, or the relationship between words and language\, among others.</p>\n<p>Topics broadly related to natural language are welcome\; contributions do not need to place special emphasis on words as such\, though this is welcome.</p>\n<p>Interdisciplinary perspectives drawing on linguistics\, semantics\, metaphysics\, and other relevant areas are also welcome.</p>\n<p>The event will take place <strong>exclusively in person</strong>\; it is open to both regular faculty and students.</p>\n<p>The conference will run from 17/09/2026 to 18/09/2026.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Submissions through EasyChair (see also our CFP for details):&nbsp\;<a  href="https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=philosophica2"  target="_blank">https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=philosophica2</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Kamil Lemanek:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260917T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260917T170000
SUMMARY:Belief\, and Other Influences on Behaviour 
UID:20260910T085806Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:University of Liverpool\, Liverpool\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>The first workshop of the Liverpool/Luxembourg project\, <strong>The Role of Cognitive Experience in Decision and Action\, </strong>will be hosted at the University of Liverpool on 17th Sept\, 9am-5pm. The workshop will explore ways in which beliefs\, biases\, and non-doxastic states\, influence our behaviour and decision-making. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Speakers and Titles</strong></p>\n<p>Stephen Gadsby (Antwerp) - The Sense of Insight: Some Philosophical Questions</p>\n<p>William Hornett (Cambridge) - What the Habit-Bearer Knows</p>\n<p>Kathleen Murphy-Hollies (Birmingham) - Believing What Resonates</p>\n<p>Jack Shardlow (Liverpool) - Time Biases\, Pain\, and Memory</p>\n<p>Ema Sullivan-Bissett (Birmingham) - Belief\, All Else Equal &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Registration</strong>. If you would like to attend\, please register by 28th August\, by emailing Jack Shardlow (<u>shardlow@liverpool.ac.uk</u>) with &lsquo\;Workshop Registration&rsquo\; in the subject line of the email. Lunch and tea/coffee will be provided\, but please do let us know if you have any access or dietary requirements. Attendees may also express their interest in attending the workshop dinner (at their own expense). &nbsp\; More information and abstracts for the talks will be circulated among registered attendees in early September.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Jack Shardlow;CN=Laura Gow:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260918T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260918T180000
SUMMARY:What Would You Do Alone in a Cage with Nothing but Cocaine? A Philosophy of Addiction
UID:20260910T085807Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Gore Hall\, Newark\, United States\, 19716
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Lima:20260920T234500
DTEND;TZID=America/Lima:20260920T234500
SUMMARY:CAELO 1: First Andean Congress for Epistemology and Logic
UID:20260910T085808Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:America/Lima
LOCATION:Lima\, Peru
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Society for Epistemology and Logic of Peru (SEPLO) is pleased to announce <strong>CAELO 1: First Andean Congress for Epistemology and Logic</strong>*\, to be held in <strong>Lima\, Peru</strong>\, from <strong>22 to 28 February 2027</strong>.</p>\n<p>This inaugural congress marks the beginning of a planned series of meetings dedicated to the study of epistemology and logic\, bringing together scholars\, researchers\, and students from diverse backgrounds. The event offers a space for rigorous discussion and exchange on topics including logic\, epistemology\, philosophy of science\, analytic philosophy\, metaphysics\, social philosophy\, empirically informed approaches\, and both philosophically and scientifically oriented studies.</p>\n<p><strong>Topics and Suggested Sessions</strong></p>\n<p>Submissions are welcome on all topics in epistemology\, logic\, and related areas. Proposed thematic sessions include\, but are not limited to:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Beyond Loyalty and Disloyalty: The Social and Political Commitments of Science</li>\n<li>El Lunarejo: The Legacy of Juan de Espinosa Medrano</li>\n<li>From Science to AI\, and Backwards: Interactions between AI\, Science\, and Philosophy</li>\n<li>Ifs\, Thens\, and Otherwises: New Perspectives on the Logic of Conditionals</li>\n<li>Logic\, Reality\, and Beyond: Logical Approaches to Metaphysics</li>\n<li>Noise\, Errors\, and Flaws: Approaches to Defective Science</li>\n<li>Many Logics\, Many Reasons? The Meaning of Logical Monism and Pluralism</li>\n<li>Scientific Publishing and Publishing Scientifically: Academic Publishing under Scrutiny</li>\n<li>Scientists as Subjects: The Sociology and Historiography of Science</li>\n<li>The Shape of Thought: Diagrams in Philosophy and Science</li>\n<li>This Workshop Is about This Workshop: Self-Referential Expressions</li>\n<li>Ways of Knowing: The Philosophy of Methodology and Heuristics</li>\n<li>Proposals addressing other topics relevant to epistemology\, logic\, and closely related disciplines are equally encouraged.</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Submission Categories:</strong></p>\n<p>We invite submissions for talks and thematic sessions (including round tables and workshops). &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Individual Paper Abstracts:</strong></p>\n<p><strong></strong>Authors are invited to submit abstracts for individual papers.</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Abstracts must be <strong>anonymised</strong> (no author-identifying information).</li>\n<li>Length: <strong>300&ndash\;500 words</strong>.</li>\n<li>The body of the email must include:</li>\n<ul>\n<li>Author name(s)</li>\n<li>Institutional affiliation(s)</li>\n<li>Email address</li>\n<li>Title of the paper</li>\n</ul>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Thematic Sessions (Including Round Tables and Workshops)</strong></p>\n<p>We invite proposals for thematic sessions of various formats\, including <strong>standard paper sessions</strong>\, <strong>round tables</strong>\, and <strong>workshops</strong>.</p>\n<p>All thematic session proposals should include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Title of the session</li>\n<li>Name(s) and affiliation(s) of organiser(s)</li>\n<li>A description of the session including its theme (400&ndash\;800 words)</li>\n<li>The proposed format (e.g. paper session\, round table\, workshop)</li>\n<li>A list of proposed participants (if available)</li>\n</ul>\n<p><em>Session proposals should not be anonymised.</em></p>\n<p><em><br></em></p>\n<p><strong>Submission Instructions</strong></p>\n<p>All submissions should be sent in English or Spanish to:&nbsp\;epilog@seplo.org</p>\n<p>Please indicate the submission category (talk or thematic session) in the subject line of your email. If you propose a talk\, you may suggest a session for it.</p>\n<p>*This event was formerly called <em>Epilog 1: 1st Congress of Epistemology and Logic</em>.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Luis F. Bartolo Alegre:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20260921T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20260923T170000
SUMMARY:PTK26: 15th Meeting of the Polish Association for Cognitive Science
UID:20260910T085809Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Warsaw
LOCATION:Pl. Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 5\, Lublin\, Poland\, 20-031
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are delighted to announce the first call for abstracts for the&nbsp\;<strong>15th Biennial Meeting of the Polish Association for Cognitive Science</strong>&nbsp\;(PTK26)\, hosted by the Institute of Philosophy\, Maria<strong>&nbsp\;</strong>Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin\, from&nbsp\;<strong>September 21</strong>&nbsp\;to&nbsp\;<strong>23</strong>\, 2026.</p>\n<p>Special conference topic: Making Sense of Meaning-Making</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Piotr Konderak:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20260921T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20260921T170000
SUMMARY:PTK26 Conference: Young Researchers Workshop
UID:20260910T085810Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Warsaw
LOCATION:Pl. Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4\, Lublin\, Poland\, 20-801
DESCRIPTION:<p>In an attempt to engage a new generation of cognitive scientists\, we invite proposals for oral presentations as part of the Young Researchers Workshop\, a special event to be held on&nbsp\;<strong>September 21st</strong>. We therefore invite undergraduate and graduate (BA and MA) students to submit abstracts that either address the special topic of the conference or present the results of their inquiries more broadly. We would also like to encourage academic teachers and supervisors to motivate and support their students in the process of preparing submissions. YRW abstracts will be reviewed separately. Specialists&rsquo\; comments on each accepted contribution makes the workshop a unique opportunity to receive expert feedback.</p>\n<p>Submission info:&nbsp\;<a href="https://ptk26.umcs.lublin.pl/index.php/young-researchers-workshop/">https://ptk26.umcs.lublin.pl/index.php/young-researchers-workshop/</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Piotr Konderak;CN=Alexandra Mouratidou:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Copenhagen:20260921T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Copenhagen:20260921T234500
SUMMARY:Workshop on Functions and Representations in AI Systems
UID:20260910T085811Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Copenhagen
LOCATION:Carlsberg Academy\, Gamle Carlsberg Vej 13\, Copenhagen\, Denmark\, 1778
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Abstracts: Workshop on Functions and Representations in AI Systems</strong><br><br>16th&ndash\;17th November 2026<br>Copenhagen\, Denmark (Carlsberg Academy)<br>CFA Deadline September 21st<br><br>We invite abstract submissions for a workshop on <strong>Functions and Representations in AI Systems</strong>\, to be held in Copenhagen\, Denmark <strong>November 16th&ndash\;17th</strong>.<br><br>Abstracts of <strong>300-500 words</strong> will be due <strong>21st September</strong>.<br><br>The concepts of function and representation are widely invoked in the cognitive and life sciences. An influential philosophical tradition\, teleosemantics\, proposes to ground representation partly in biological functions and ground functions in historical selection processes. While this remains a leading approach\, the account has faced challenges\, ranging from the notorious "swampman" objection\, to more recent disputes about the nature of functional and representational explanation in scientific practice.<br><br>Independently\, the recent wave of developments in artificial intelligence has sparked questions about the representational capacities of AI models\, e.g. what\, if anything\, can large language models represent? The emerging field of mechanistic interpretability is replete with function- and representation-talk. But is this talk justified? Are AI models subject to selection processes\, in the proper sense? And are the concepts of representation and function deployed here the same as those invoked in the life sciences? Are standard philosophical frameworks adequate for the case of AI? Or should we look elsewhere\, e.g. to theorising about artefacts? And what role\, if any\, do human norms and intentionality play in grounding AI functions and content?<br><br>A workshop on these issues\, co-funded by the Pioneer Center for Artificial Intelligence (<a target="_blank">https://www.aicentre.dk/p1-programs/functions-and-representations-in-ai-systems</a>) and the Center for Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (University of Copenhagen) (<a target="_blank">https://cpai.ku.dk/</a>)\, will be held in Copenhagen\, November 16th&ndash\;17th\, in the beautiful Carlsberg Academy building (<a target="_blank">https://www.carlsbergfondet.dk/en/about-the-foundation/our-buildings/the-carlsberg-academy/</a>).</p>\n<p>Confirmed speakers include</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Rosa Cao (Stanford) (<a target="_blank">https://sites.google.com/site/luosha/home</a>)\,</li>\n<li>Dimitri Coelho Mollo (Ume&aring\;) (<a target="_blank">https://dimitrimollo.academicwebsite.com/</a>)</li>\n<li>Jumbly Grindrod (Reading) (<a target="_blank">https://jumblygrindrod.github.io/</a>)</li>\n<li>Fintan Mallory (Durham) (https://fintanmallory.com/)</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>We invite abstracts on these issues for presentation at the workshop.</strong> Questions for consideration include (but are not limited to):<br><br></p>\n<ul>\n<li>What determines whether a component of an AI model is a representation\, and what it represents?</li>\n<li>Does treating a model component as a representation entail ascribing a specific function to that component?</li>\n<li>What grounds the functions of components in AI models? The model's training history? The component's causal-explanatory role? The intentions of the model's designers and/or users?</li>\n<li>Do accounts of function and representation from biology readily translate to AI systems? How might the cases differ?</li>\n<li>In what ways are AI models similar to / different from other kinds of function-bearing artefacts?</li>\n<li>Do current practices in mechanistic interpretability reflect our best philosophical theories of representation and function (and vice versa)?</li>\n<li>To what extent are explanations in mechanistic interpretability normative\, and what is the source of that normativity? What role do notions like success/failure\, function/malfunction\, representation/misrepresentation\, accuracy/inaccuracy play in explanations of AI models?</li>\n</ul>\n<p><br>Abstracts of <strong>300-500 words</strong> should be sent via email to Iwan Williams (<a target="_blank">iwi@hum.ku.dk</a>) no later than <strong>Monday 21st September</strong>. Please include your name\, institutional affiliation and a short bio (max 150 words) in the body of your email. We look forward receiving your submissions.<br><br>Please feel free to forward this information to anyone who you think might be interested in presenting a paper or attending the workshop. A further message will be circulated closer to the time with information about registration.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Iwan Williams:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260924T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260925T170000
SUMMARY:Husserl's Phenomenological Metaphysics : Foundations\, Stakes\, Legacies\, and Perspectives
UID:20260910T085812Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Paris
LOCATION:17\, rue de la Sorbonne\, Paris\, France
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>International Conference</strong></p>\n<p><strong>&ldquo\;Husserl's Phenomenological Metaphysics : Foundations\, Stakes\, Legacies\, and Perspectives&rdquo\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Sorbonne Universit&eacute\; / &Eacute\;cole Normale Sup&eacute\;rieure de la rue d'Ulm</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Thursday 24 and Friday 25 September 2026\, Sorbonne Universit&eacute\;\, Salle des Actes (entrance at 17 rue de la Sorbonne\, 75005 Paris)</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Organisers : Julien Farges\, Laurent Perreau\, Dominique Pradelle</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Contacts : laurent.perreau@umlp.fr&nbsp\;\; julien.farges@ens.fr</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Rationale</strong></p>\n<p>The methodological\, gnoseological\, and epistemological aspects of Edmund Husserl&rsquo\;s transcendental phenomenology have already been the object of abundant commentary in the secondary literature. A better-informed and more attentive reading of Husserl&rsquo\;s work as a whole\, however\, brings to light the gradual emergence of a properly metaphysical problematic\, in a sense irreducible to the traditional perspectives of ontology or of classical metaphysics.</p>\n<p>Husserl did in fact occasionally mention the &ldquo\;&lsquo\;supreme and ultimate&rsquo\; questions&rdquo\; (<em>Cartesian</em>&nbsp\;<em>Meditations</em>\, &sect\; 64)\, or again the &ldquo\;&lsquo\;metaphysical&rsquo\; questions&rdquo\; (<em>The</em>&nbsp\;<em>Crisis</em>&nbsp\;<em>of</em>&nbsp\;<em>European</em>&nbsp\;<em>Sciences</em>&nbsp\;<em>and</em>&nbsp\;<em>Transcendental</em>&nbsp\;<em>Phenomenology</em>\, &sect\; 3)\, which phenomenology should in its turn take up\, going beyond a traditional metaphysics deemed &ldquo\;naive&rdquo\;. Far from expressing a mere claim or a simple wish\, these remarks point to a decisive project : that of a refounding of metaphysics by phenomenology\, on the basis of a rigorous analysis of the structures of transcendental subjectivity.</p>\n<p>The recent publication of the substantial volume entitled&nbsp\;<em>M&eacute\;taphysique ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique</em>&nbsp\;[Phenomenological Metaphysics] (PUF\, &ldquo\;&Eacute\;pim&eacute\;th&eacute\;e&rdquo\; series\, 2025)\, translated by John Tryssesoone in collaboration with Dominique Pradelle\, and furnished as well with an introduction written by the latter\, makes it possible to take the full measure of the efforts Husserl was able to devote to this task. The selection of texts made from within the corpus of research manuscripts reveals the profound coherence of Husserl&rsquo\;s reflections\, which elaborate an original monadological idealism\, extended by teleological and theological considerations.</p>\n<p>The conference to be held on 24 and 25 September 2026 at Sorbonne University\, with the support of the Husserl Archives in Paris and of the Institut Universitaire de France\, sets out to interrogate the substance\, the scope\, and the legitimacy of this phenomenological metaphysics as conceived by Husserl. The central issue will be to examine the way in which Husserl reconfigures the fundamental metaphysical questions of being\, of the world\, of intersubjectivity\, of the meaning of existence\, and of the absolute\, starting from the phenomenological consideration of transcendental subjectivity. It will also be a matter of examining the links that are established\, as well as the tensions that may appear\, between the practice of a descriptive phenomenology\, the assertion of a form of transcendental idealism\, and the exploration of the registers of monadology\, teleology\, and theology.</p>\n<p><strong>Program</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Thursday 24 September\, morning</strong></p>\n<p>10:00 AM : Welcome and introduction to the conference</p>\n<p>10:10 AM : John Tryssesoone (Sorbonne Universit&eacute\;)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;L'<em>ego</em>&nbsp\;m&eacute\;ditant comme &ldquo\;fait int&eacute\;gral&rdquo\;. D&eacute\;duction monadologique et apodicticit&eacute\; du monde dans les (nouvelles)&nbsp\;<em>M&eacute\;ditations cart&eacute\;siennes</em>&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>11:00 AM : Dominique Pradelle (Sorbonne Universit&eacute\;&nbsp\;/ PSL-CNRS&nbsp\;: Archives Husserl de Paris)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Preuves de l'id&eacute\;alisme transcendantal et monadologie&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p><strong>Thursday 24 September\, afternoon</strong></p>\n<p>14:00 PM : Jean-Fran&ccedil\;ois Lavigne (Universit&eacute\; de Montpellier Paul Val&eacute\;ry)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;La r&eacute\;duction transcendantale\, ouverture sur le m&eacute\;taphysique ?&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>14:50 PM : Claudio Majolino (Universit&eacute\; de Lille&nbsp\;/ UMR-CNRS 8163 STL)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;<em>H &tau\;&omicron\;ῦ ἀ&gamma\;&alpha\;&theta\;&omicron\;ῦ ἰ&delta\;έ&alpha\;.&nbsp\;</em>Remarques sur&nbsp\;Husserl et la &ldquo\;m&eacute\;taphysique&rdquo\; platonicienne&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>15:40 PM : Break</p>\n<p>16:00 PM : Julien Farges (PSL-CNRS&nbsp\;: Archives Husserl de Paris)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Essences\, connaissance des essences et m&eacute\;taphysique ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>16:50 PM : Romain Iborra (PSL-CNRS&nbsp\;: Archives Husserl de Paris)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Par-del&agrave\; la transcendance et l'immanence&nbsp\;: la pr&eacute\;immanence&nbsp\;&raquo\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Friday 25 September\, morning</strong></p>\n<p>9:00 AM : Claudia Serban (Universit&eacute\; Jean Jaur&egrave\;s\, Toulouse)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Probl&egrave\;mes m&eacute\;taphysiques\, probl&egrave\;mes de la g&eacute\;n&eacute\;rativit&eacute\;&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>9:50 AM : Luz Ascarate (Universit&eacute\; Paris I Panth&eacute\;on-Sorbonne)&nbsp\;: &laquo\; &ldquo\;L&rsquo\;homme et les animaux dans le cosmos&rdquo\; (<em>Husserliana</em>XV). La Terre selon la m&eacute\;taphysique ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>10:40 AM : Break</p>\n<p>10:50 AM : Inga R&ouml\;mer&nbsp\;(<em>Albert-Ludwigs-Universit&auml\;t Freiburg</em>)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Y a-t-il une m&eacute\;taphysique ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique sans &ldquo\;aventures m&eacute\;taphysiques&rdquo\; ?&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>11:40 AM : Natalie Depraz (Universit&eacute\; Paris Nanterre)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Qu&rsquo\;est-ce qu&rsquo\;une vie m&eacute\;taphysique&nbsp\;?&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p><strong>Friday 25 September\, afternoon</strong></p>\n<p>14:20 PM : Emiliano Trizio (Ca&rsquo\;Foscari University of Venice):&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&laquo\;&nbsp\;Facticit&eacute\; et t&eacute\;l&eacute\;ologie chez Husserl&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>15:10 PM : Laurent Perreau (Universit&eacute\; Marie et Louis Pasteur\, Besan&ccedil\;on)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;&Eacute\;thique et m&eacute\;taphysique chez le dernier Husserl&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&mdash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;&ndash\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Colloque international&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;La m&eacute\;taphysique ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique de Husserl : fondements\, enjeux\, h&eacute\;ritages et perspectives&nbsp\;&raquo\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Sorbonne Universit&eacute\;&nbsp\;/ ENS de la rue d&rsquo\;Ulm</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Jeudi 24 et vendredi 25 septembre 2026\,&nbsp\;&nbsp\;Sorbonne Universit&eacute\;\, Salle des Actes (entr&eacute\;e par le 17\, rue de la Sorbonne\, 75005\, Paris)</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Organisateurs&nbsp\;: Julien Farges\, Laurent Perreau\, Dominique Pradelle</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Contacts&nbsp\;: laurent.perreau@umlp.fr&nbsp\;\; julien.farges@ens.fr</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Argument&nbsp\;:</strong></p>\n<p>Les aspects m&eacute\;thodologiques\, gnos&eacute\;ologiques et &eacute\;pist&eacute\;mologiques de la ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologie transcendantale d&rsquo\;Edmund Husserl ont d&eacute\;j&agrave\; fait l&rsquo\;objet de commentaires abondants dans la litt&eacute\;rature secondaire. Cependant\, une lecture plus inform&eacute\;e et plus attentive de l&rsquo\;ensemble de l&rsquo\;&oelig\;uvre husserlienne met en &eacute\;vidence l&rsquo\;&eacute\;mergence progressive d&rsquo\;une probl&eacute\;matique proprement m&eacute\;taphysique\, en un sens irr&eacute\;ductible aux perspectives traditionnelles de l&rsquo\;ontologie ou de la m&eacute\;taphysique classique.</p>\n<p>De fait\, Husserl a parfois mentionn&eacute\; les &laquo\;&nbsp\;questions &ldquo\;supr&ecirc\;mes et ultimes&rdquo\;&nbsp\;&raquo\; (<em>M&eacute\;ditations cart&eacute\;siennes</em>\, &sect\; 64) ou encore les &laquo\;&nbsp\;questions &ldquo\;m&eacute\;taphysiques&rdquo\;&nbsp\;&raquo\; (<em>La crise des sciences europ&eacute\;ennes et la ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologie transcendantale</em>\, &sect\; 3) que la ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologie devrait &agrave\; son tour assumer\, en d&eacute\;passant une m&eacute\;taphysique traditionnelle jug&eacute\;e &laquo\;&nbsp\;na&iuml\;ve&nbsp\;&raquo\;. Loin d&rsquo\;exprimer une pure pr&eacute\;tention ou un simple v&oelig\;u\, ces propos d&eacute\;signent un projet d&eacute\;cisif&nbsp\;: celui d&rsquo\;une refondation de la m&eacute\;taphysique par la ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologie\, &agrave\; partir de l&rsquo\;analyse rigoureuse des structures de la subjectivit&eacute\; transcendantale.</p>\n<p>La publication r&eacute\;cente du fort volume intitul&eacute\;&nbsp\;<em>M&eacute\;taphysique ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique</em>&nbsp\;(PUF\, coll. &laquo\;&nbsp\;&Eacute\;pim&eacute\;th&eacute\;e&nbsp\;&raquo\;\, 2025)\, traduit par John Tryssesoone avec la collaboration de Dominique Pradelle\, qui b&eacute\;n&eacute\;ficie &eacute\;galement d&rsquo\;une introduction r&eacute\;dig&eacute\;e par ce dernier\, permet de prendre toute la mesure des efforts que Husserl aura pu consacrer &agrave\; cette t&acirc\;che. La s&eacute\;lection de textes op&eacute\;r&eacute\;e au sein du fonds des manuscrits de recherche r&eacute\;v&egrave\;le la profonde coh&eacute\;rence des r&eacute\;flexions husserliennes. Celles-ci &eacute\;laborent un id&eacute\;alisme monadologique original\, prolong&eacute\; par des consid&eacute\;rations t&eacute\;l&eacute\;ologiques et th&eacute\;ologiques.</p>\n<p>Le colloque pr&eacute\;vu les 24 et 25 septembre 2026 &agrave\; Sorbonne Universit&eacute\;\, avec le soutien des Archives Husserl de Paris et de l&rsquo\;Institut Universitaire de France\, se propose d&rsquo\;interroger la consistance\, la port&eacute\;e et la l&eacute\;gitimit&eacute\; de cette&nbsp\;<em>m&eacute\;taphysique ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique</em>&nbsp\;con&ccedil\;ue par Husserl. L&rsquo\;enjeu central consistera &agrave\; examiner la mani&egrave\;re dont Husserl reconfigure les questions m&eacute\;taphysiques fondamentales de l&rsquo\;&ecirc\;tre\, du monde\, de l&rsquo\;intersubjectivit&eacute\;\, du sens de l&rsquo\;existence et de l&rsquo\;absolu\, depuis la consid&eacute\;ration ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique de la subjectivit&eacute\; transcendantale. Il s&rsquo\;agira &eacute\;galement d&rsquo\;examiner les liens qui s&rsquo\;&eacute\;tablissent\, ainsi que les tensions qui peuvent appara&icirc\;tre\, entre la pratique d&rsquo\;une ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologie descriptive\, l&rsquo\;affirmation d&rsquo\;un certain id&eacute\;alisme transcendantal et l&rsquo\;exploration des registres de la monadologie\, de la t&eacute\;l&eacute\;ologie et de la th&eacute\;ologie.</p>\n<p><strong>Programme&nbsp\;:</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Jeudi 24 septembre\, matin&eacute\;e</strong></p>\n<p>10h&nbsp\;: Accueil des participants et pr&eacute\;sentation du colloque</p>\n<p>10h10&nbsp\;: John Tryssesoone (Sorbonne Universit&eacute\;)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;L'<em>ego</em>&nbsp\;m&eacute\;ditant comme &ldquo\;fait int&eacute\;gral&rdquo\;. D&eacute\;duction monadologique et apodicticit&eacute\; du monde dans les (nouvelles)&nbsp\;<em>M&eacute\;ditations cart&eacute\;siennes</em>&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>11h00&nbsp\;: Dominique Pradelle (Sorbonne Universit&eacute\;&nbsp\;/ PSL-CNRS&nbsp\;: Archives Husserl de Paris)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Preuves de l'id&eacute\;alisme transcendantal et monadologie&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p><strong>Jeudi 24 septembre\, apr&egrave\;s-midi</strong></p>\n<p>14h00&nbsp\;: Jean-Fran&ccedil\;ois Lavigne (Universit&eacute\; de Montpellier Paul Val&eacute\;ry)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;La r&eacute\;duction transcendantale\, ouverture sur le m&eacute\;taphysique ?&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>14h50&nbsp\;: Claudio Majolino (Universit&eacute\; de Lille&nbsp\;/ UMR-CNRS 8163 STL)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;<em>H &tau\;&omicron\;ῦ ἀ&gamma\;&alpha\;&theta\;&omicron\;ῦ ἰ&delta\;έ&alpha\;.&nbsp\;</em>Remarques sur&nbsp\;Husserl et la &ldquo\;m&eacute\;taphysique&rdquo\; platonicienne&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>15h40&nbsp\;: Pause</p>\n<p>16h00&nbsp\;: Julien Farges (PSL-CNRS&nbsp\;: Archives Husserl de Paris)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Essences\, connaissance des essences et m&eacute\;taphysique ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>16h50&nbsp\;: Romain Iborra (PSL-CNRS&nbsp\;: Archives Husserl de Paris)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Par-del&agrave\; la transcendance et l'immanence&nbsp\;: la pr&eacute\;immanence&nbsp\;&raquo\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Vendredi 25 septembre\, matin&eacute\;e</strong></p>\n<p>9h00&nbsp\;: Claudia Serban (Universit&eacute\; Jean Jaur&egrave\;s\, Toulouse)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Probl&egrave\;mes m&eacute\;taphysiques\, probl&egrave\;mes de la g&eacute\;n&eacute\;rativit&eacute\;&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>9h50 : Luz Ascarate (Universit&eacute\; Paris I Panth&eacute\;on-Sorbonne)&nbsp\;: &laquo\; &ldquo\;L&rsquo\;homme et les animaux dans le cosmos&rdquo\; (<em>Husserliana</em>XV). La Terre selon la m&eacute\;taphysique ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>10h40&nbsp\;: Pause</p>\n<p>10h50&nbsp\;: Inga R&ouml\;mer&nbsp\;(<em>Albert-Ludwigs-Universit&auml\;t Freiburg</em>)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Y a-t-il une m&eacute\;taphysique ph&eacute\;nom&eacute\;nologique sans &ldquo\;aventures m&eacute\;taphysiques&rdquo\; ?&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>11h40&nbsp\;: Natalie Depraz (Universit&eacute\; Paris Nanterre)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;Qu&rsquo\;est-ce qu&rsquo\;une vie m&eacute\;taphysique&nbsp\;?&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p><strong>Vendredi 25 septembre\, apr&egrave\;s-midi</strong></p>\n<p>14h20 : Emiliano Trizio (Ca&rsquo\;Foscari University of Venice):&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&laquo\;&nbsp\;Facticit&eacute\; et t&eacute\;l&eacute\;ologie chez Husserl&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>\n<p>15h10&nbsp\;: Laurent Perreau (Universit&eacute\; Marie et Louis Pasteur\, Besan&ccedil\;on)&nbsp\;: &laquo\;&nbsp\;&Eacute\;thique et m&eacute\;taphysique chez le dernier Husserl&nbsp\;&raquo\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Dominique Pradelle;CN=Julien Farges;CN=Laurent Perreau:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260930T230000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260930T230000
SUMMARY:Artificial Intelligence and The Philosophy of Technology/Künstliche Intelligenz und die Philosophie der Technik
UID:20260910T085813Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Brüggener Weg 6\, Düsseldorf\, Germany\, 40547
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Symposium</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Artificial Intelligence and the Philosophy of Technology</strong></p>\n<p>March 5&ndash\;7\, 2027</p>\n<p>EKŌ Center of Japanese Culture\, D&uuml\;sseldorf</p>\n<p><strong>About the Symposium:</strong></p>\n<p>The EKŌ Center of Japanese Culture in D&uuml\;sseldorf is hosting a symposium on the topic of &ldquo\;Artificial Intelligence and the Philosophy of Technology&rdquo\; on March 5-7\, 2027.</p>\n<p>Today\, artificial intelligence has become an indispensable part of people's daily lives\; examples include search engines\, ChatGPT\, navigation and traffic management systems\, voice assistants\, facial recognition\, personalized advertising\, and more. In this context\, AI attempts&mdash\;by means of algorithms&mdash\;to mimic human thought\, to optimize it\, and perhaps\, one day\, to replace it.</p>\n<p>This symposium aims to shed light on the philosophy of AI and technology. It is designed to be both intercultural and interdisciplinary in scope. At its center lie the following questions: What is AI\, and how does it function? What are its ethical implications? Is the term &ldquo\;Artificial Intelligence&rdquo\; a contradiction in terms? Will AI one day attain consciousness? To what extent will it shape our future lives? To what degree is AI an expression of &ldquo\;Western thought and Western culture&rdquo\;\, and how do other cultures or religions&mdash\;such as Buddhism&mdash\;view technology? In this context\, the symposium will also explore the place of AI within Japanese culture.</p>\n<p>The following sections are planned:</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;Intercultural Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence and Technology</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;AI and Consciousness</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;Western Technology and Buddhism</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;AI and Technology in Japan</p>\n<p>We welcome submissions from established scholars as well as early-career researchers (doctoral candidates\, postdocs) in the fields of Philosophy (Philosophy of Technology\, Philosophy of Mind\, Philosophy of Language\, Ethics\, Metaphysics\, Philosophy of Religion\, etc.)\, Japanese Studies\, Cultural Studies\, and related disciplines.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers:</strong></p>\n<p>&middot\; Interested scholars are invited to submit abstracts (in German or English) of 300&ndash\;500 words by <strong>September 30\, 2026</strong>\, to: <a href="mailto:hantke@eko-haus.de">hantke@eko-haus.de</a></p>\n<p>&middot\; Notification of acceptance will be sent in mid-October 2026.</p>\n<p>&middot\; Limited financial support for travel and accommodation expenses is available for selected speakers.</p>\n<p>&middot\; The presentations will subsequently be published in <em>H&ocirc\;rin. </em><em>Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur</em> (<em>H&ocirc\;rin. </em><em>Comparative Studies on Japanese Culture</em>) by the Iudicium Verlag:</p>\n<p><a href="https://eko-haus.de/sonstiges/publikationen/#j2">https://eko-haus.de/sonstiges/publikationen/#j2</a></p>\n<p><strong>Abstracts and Registration to:</strong></p>\n<p>Dr. Myriam-Sonja Hantke: <a href="mailto:hantke@eko-haus.de">hantke@eko-haus.de</a></p>\n<p><strong>Further information will be available at:</strong></p>\n<p><a href="https://eko-haus.de/">https://eko-haus.de/</a></p>\n<p><strong>Organization:</strong></p>\n<p>Prof. Dr. Hisao MATSUMARU</p>\n<p>Dr. Myriam-Sonja HANTKE</p>\n<p>Br&uuml\;ggener Weg 6 &bull\; 40547 D&uuml\;sseldorf &bull\; Germany</p>\n<p>----------------------------------------------------------------------</p>\n<p><strong>Symposium</strong></p>\n<p><strong>K&uuml\;nstliche Intelligenz und die Philosophie der Technik</strong></p>\n<p>05.03.-07.03.2027<strong></strong></p>\n<p>EKŌ-Haus der Japanischen Kultur e.V. in D&uuml\;sseldorf<strong></strong></p>\n<p><strong>&Uuml\;ber das Symposium:</strong></p>\n<p>Das EKŌ-Haus der Japanischen Kultur e.V. in D&uuml\;sseldorf veranstaltet vom 05.03. bis zum 07.03.2027 ein Symposium zum Thema &bdquo\;K&uuml\;nstliche Intelligenz und die Philosophie der Technik&ldquo\;.</p>\n<p>K&uuml\;nstliche Intelligenz ist heutzutage aus dem Alltag der Menschen nicht mehr wegzudenken\, Beispiele sind Suchmaschinen\, ChatGPT\, Navigation und Verkehrsmanagement\, Sprachassistenten\, Gesichtserkennung\, personalisierte Werbung etc. Die KI versucht dabei mittels Algorithmen menschliches Denken nachzuahmen\, dieses zu optimieren und vielleicht eines Tages zu ersetzen.</p>\n<p>Bei diesem Symposium soll die Philosophie der KI und der Technik n&auml\;her beleuchtet werden. Das Symposium soll dabei interkulturell und interdisziplin&auml\;r ausgerichtet sein. Im Zentrum stehen die Fragen: Was ist KI und wie funktioniert sie? Welche ethischen Implikationen besitzt sie? Ist der Begriff &bdquo\;K&uuml\;nstliche Intelligenz&ldquo\; ein Widerspruch in sich? Wird die KI eines Tages Bewusstsein erlangen? Wie sehr wird sie unser zuk&uuml\;nftiges Leben bestimmen? Inwieweit ist die KI Ausdruck des &bdquo\;westlichen Denkens und der westlichen Kultur&ldquo\; und wie betrachten andere Kulturen bzw. Religionen wie beispielsweise der Buddhismus Technik? Auch soll in diesem Zusammenhang nach dem Ort der KI in der japanischen Kultur gefragt werden.</p>\n<p>Folgende Sektionen sind geplant:</p>\n<p>- Interkulturelle Philosophie der K&uuml\;nstlichen Intelligenz und der Technik</p>\n<p>- KI und Bewusstsein</p>\n<p>- Westliche Technik und Buddhismus</p>\n<p>- KI und Technik in Japan</p>\n<p>Wir freuen uns &uuml\;ber Beitr&auml\;ge von Wissenschaftlern/Innen und auch von Nachwuchswissenschaftlern/Innen (Doktoranden/Innen\, PostDocs) aus der Philosophie (Philosophie der Technik\, Philosophie des Geistes\, Sprachphilosophie\, Ethik\, Metaphysik\, Religionsphilosophie etc.)\, Japanologie\, Kulturwissenschaften sowie aus angrenzenden Disziplinen.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers:</strong></p>\n<p>&middot\; Interessierte sind aufgerufen\, Abstracts (Deutsch oder Englisch) mit einem Umfang von 300-500 W&ouml\;rtern bis zum <strong>30.09.2026</strong>einzureichen an: <a href="mailto:hantke@eko-haus.de">hantke@eko-haus.de</a></p>\n<p>&middot\; Die Benachrichtigung &uuml\;ber die Annahme der Beitr&auml\;ge erfolgt Mitte Oktober 2026.</p>\n<p>&middot\; Es besteht die M&ouml\;glichkeit einer begrenzten finanziellen Unterst&uuml\;tzung f&uuml\;r Reise- und Unterkunftskosten ausgew&auml\;hlter Vortragender.</p>\n<p>&middot\; Die Vortr&auml\;ge werden anschlie&szlig\;end in <em>H&ocirc\;rin. Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur</em> im Iudicium-Verlag ver&ouml\;ffentlicht:</p>\n<p><a href="https://eko-haus.de/sonstiges/publikationen/#j2">https://eko-haus.de/sonstiges/publikationen/#j2</a></p>\n<p><strong>Abstracts und Anmeldungen an: &nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p>Dr. Myriam-Sonja Hantke: <a href="mailto:hantke@eko-haus.de">hantke@eko-haus.de</a></p>\n<p><strong>Weitere Informationen folgen auf:</strong></p>\n<p><a href="https://eko-haus.de/">https://eko-haus.de/</a></p>\n<p><strong>Organisation:</strong></p>\n<p>Prof. Dr. Hisao MATSUMARU</p>\n<p>Dr. Myriam-Sonja HANTKE</p>\n<p>Br&uuml\;ggener Weg 6 &bull\; 40547 D&uuml\;sseldorf &bull\; Germany</p>
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261001T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261001T000000
SUMMARY:Persistence: The Annual Print/Ebook of the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong><u>Call for Papers &mdash\; <em>Persistence</em>\, Volume 1 (2026)</u></strong></p>\n<p><em><strong>Persistence</strong></em> is the annual peer-reviewed journal of the <strong>Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing (ICSAC)</strong>\, published as a curated print and ebook volume (ISBN-registered\; distributed via Amazon and Ingram). It is independent and diamond open access: no submission or publication fees of any kind\, and authors retain full copyright (CC BY 4.0 default\, author's choice).</p>\n<p>Scope. Persistence publishes rigorous\, foundational\, and cross-disciplinary work in complexity science broadly construed: nonlinear dynamics and complex systems\; information theory and the geometry of information\; and computational or theoretical approaches to cognition\, consciousness\, and intelligence\, biological and artificial. We welcome contributions from physics\, biology\, neuroscience\, cognitive science\, computer science\, mathematics\, and philosophy &mdash\; and we especially value work that crosses disciplinary lines or interrogates foundations and methods.</p>\n<p>For this audience: we particularly welcome philosophical and foundational work &mdash\; philosophy of mind and cognitive science\, philosophy of physics and computation\, formal epistemology\, and conceptual or methodological critique &mdash\; within that interdisciplinary scope.</p>\n<p>Rigorous heterodox and independent research is read on equal terms with institutionally affiliated work.</p>\n<p>Review &mdash\; and why you can trust it. Every submission is evaluated through a structured multi-reviewer process\, with a human curator signing off on each decision and submissions blinded beforehand. Our entire editorial pipeline &mdash\; rubrics\, blinding procedure\, and citation checks &mdash\; is open source and public\, so you can read exactly how your paper will be judged before submitting:</p>\n<p>https://github.com/ICSAC/editorial-system<br><br>Terms. No fees to submit or publish. Authors keep full copyright. Accepted papers are eligible to appear in the print/ebook volume and receive a DOI and a public review record. <strong>ICSAC</strong> has already produced a peer-reviewed scholarly print volume (LCCN-registered) &mdash\; an established pipeline\, not a first attempt.</p>\n<p>Submission. Details and portal: https://icsacinstitute.org/submit &middot\; Deadline: 01 October 2026.</p>\n<p>Curator: N. M. Thornhill &middot\; Contact: submissions@icsacinstitute.org</p>
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Copenhagen:20261012T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Copenhagen:20261016T170000
SUMMARY:Models of Consciousness 7
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TZID:Europe/Copenhagen
LOCATION:Copenhagen\, Denmark
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20261015T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20261019T170000
SUMMARY:Covert Consciousness
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TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Crans Montana\, Switzerland
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Covert Consciousness: Detection and Treatment &nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><em>Neuroscience Strategic Intelligence\, Grand Challenge Workshop</em></p>\n<p>https://neurosas.org/strategic-intelligence/challenge-workshops/the-workshops/covert-consciousness%20detection-and-treatment/ &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>October 15-19\; Crans-Montana\, Switzerland &nbsp\;&nbsp\; &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Over the past decade\, it has become clear that a significant number of behaviourally unresponsive patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) are covertly conscious\, as shown by complex and/or voluntary cortical response patterns. The realisation that behaviourally unresponsive patients are not necessarily unconscious changes the way brain-injured and critically ill patients must be assessed and treated\, and how families are counselled. &nbsp\;This Challenge Workshop will focus on the latest advances in detecting and managing covert consciousness in both ICU and sub-acute settings\, supporting functional recovery through pharmacological or neurotechnological interventions\, restoring communication via brain-machine interfaces\, and navigating philosophical and ethical implications. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Open to clinicians\, researchers\, patient advocates\, ethicists\, philosophers\, and technologists. &nbsp\; Participation is limited to 20 individuals\, selected on the basis of merit and relevance to the workshop. &nbsp\; &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Applications are reviewed on a rolling basis until all 20 available spots are filled. &nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Christof Koch;CN=Michael J. Young:
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T090000
SUMMARY:Arkete: Philosophy of Perception: Representation\, Reality\, and Cognitive Structure
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Arkete</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Special Issue 2025</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Philosophy of Perception: Representation\, Reality\, and Cognitive Structure</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Editors:</strong> Mariano Bianca (University of Siena) and Paolo Piccari (University of Siena)</p>\n<p>Philosophical reflection on perception has returned to the centre of contemporary debates in philosophy of mind\, epistemology\, and metaphysics. Questions concerning perceptual content\, representational structure\, and the relation between experience and reality have gained renewed prominence in light of current discussions on cognition\, conceptual capacities\, and the epistemic role of perception.</p>\n<p>At the same time\, the field remains divided between competing models: representationalist accounts\, relational theories\, disjunctivism\, and naturalistic approaches that attempt to explain perception through cognitive or computational frameworks. These debates raise a deeper philosophical question: whether perception should be understood primarily as an internal mental state or rather as a structured form of access to an objective world.</p>\n<p>This special issue aims to gather contributions that investigate perception as a cognitive and conceptual phenomenon with epistemic and metaphysical implications. Particular attention will be devoted to approaches that combine analytic rigour with broader theoretical ambition\, exploring how perceptual experience contributes to the constitution of knowledge and to the articulation of reality.</p>\n<p>We welcome contributions addressing these questions\, preferably grounded in concrete cases and/or examples that help clarify and support philosophical analysis.</p>\n<p><strong>Topics for Submission (including\, but not limited to)</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>The nature of perceptual representation</li>\n<li>Conceptual vs. non-conceptual content</li>\n<li>Perceptual content and cognitive architecture</li>\n<li>Perception and realism</li>\n<li>Relationalism\, representationalism\, and disjunctivism</li>\n<li>Perceptual justification and epistemic normativity</li>\n<li>Perception and ordinary knowledge</li>\n<li>Similarity and structural models of representation</li>\n<li>Perception\, categorisation\, and concept formation</li>\n<li>Perception and mental representation in cognitive science</li>\n<li>Illusion\, hallucination\, and theories of error</li>\n<li>The metaphysical implications of perceptual theories</li>\n<li>Perception and the structure of reality</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Submission Guidelines</strong></p>\n<p>Submissions must be original and unpublished\, written in English or Italian\, and formatted according to the journal&rsquo\;s editorial guidelines. All manuscripts will undergo double-blind peer review.</p>\n<p>The 2025 issue of <em>Arkete</em> will be dedicated to these questions. The volume will include articles selected through this Call for Papers as well as invited contributions by national and international scholars.</p>\n<p>All submissions must be sent no later than <strong>30 September 2026</strong> to the Editors at:</p>\n<p>mariano.bianca@unisi.it<br> paolo.piccari@unisi.it</p>\n<p>Manuscripts must conform to the editorial guidelines available at:<br> <a target="_new">https://www.arkete.it</a></p>\n<p>Accepted languages: English and Italian.</p>\n<p>Maximum length: <strong>40\,000 characters</strong> (including spaces\, footnotes\, references\, and abstract).</p>\n<p>Each submission must include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>an abstract (max. 150 words\, in English)</li>\n<li>5&ndash\;6 keywords (in English)</li>\n<li>the anonymised manuscript prepared for blind review</li>\n</ul>\n<p>In a separate file attached to the same email\, authors must provide:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>name and surname</li>\n<li>institutional affiliation</li>\n<li>email address</li>\n<li>title of the paper</li>\n<li>abstract and keywords</li>\n</ul>
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261015T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261015T180000
SUMMARY:Are AI Models Conscious?
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TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Gore Recital Hall\, Newark\, United States\, 19716
DESCRIPTION:<p>There are two opposed perspectives on AI consciousness. Computational functionalism says computational improvements will lead to conscious AI whereas biological naturalism says that biological aspects of animals are necessary for consciousness.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;This talk concerns the pros and cons of these two points of view.</p>
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T230000
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SUMMARY:Scienza&Filosofia 37: "Between Mind and Machine: Genealogy and Phenomenology of Computation"/"Tra mente e macchina: genealogia e fenomenologia del calcolo"
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DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>ENG:</strong><br><br></p>\n<p>Computation profoundly shapes how we think\, communicate\, and relate to the world. Yet the philosophical and anthropological foundations of this practice&mdash\;rooted in formal logic and symbolic manipulation&mdash\;often remain underexplored. Computation is not merely a technique\, a cognitive routine\, or a fixed feature of the natural world\; rather\, it is a complex cultural practice that interacts with and structures thought and world alike\, deeply redefining both.</p>\n<p>The genealogy of computational thought reveals a crucial paradox: though originally understood as an impersonal\, purely formal device\, computation is inextricably interwoven with human life. From inscriptional practices that encode cognitive strategies to logical machines that simulate universal rules of reasoning\; from artificial neural architectures that fuse mechanical rules and behavioral theory to neuroscientific models that render the brain an algorithmic device&mdash\;computation emerges as a cultural force no less potent than art\, myth\, or language.</p>\n<p>The phenomenological tradition offers valuable conceptual tools for grasping the complexity of these practices and their conceptual forms. Husserl&rsquo\;s rarely applied idea of &ldquo\;language as calculation&rdquo\; suggests that symbolic notation functions not only as an instrument of communication but as a medium capable of generating what we might call &ldquo\;computational evidence&rdquo\;&mdash\;a clarity produced through the systematic manipulation of symbols. This perspective widens our understanding of writing in all its forms\, pointing to a dynamic interaction between phenomenology and computation.</p>\n<p>At the same time\, the history of logical machines&mdash\;from nineteenth‑century devices to today&rsquo\;s AI architectures&mdash\;highlights a further tension between the impersonal universality and technical reproducibility of algorithmic calculation and the personal construction of meaning.</p>\n<p>Despite rich theoretical premises\, the practical successes of computation have often obscured the historical‑conceptual background of debates on artificial intelligence. Strictly speaking\, the epistemology of AI stands on behaviorist and cybernetic paradigms that frame cognition and thought as algorithmic processes. These &ldquo\;operative concepts&rdquo\;&mdash\;to borrow Eugen Fink&rsquo\;s distinction between &ldquo\;thematic&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;operative&rdquo\; concepts&mdash\;characterize our approach to classical philosophical problems\, predisposing us to read intelligence\, consciousness\, language\, creativity\, and so forth in computational terms\, thereby generating a familiar vicious circle.</p>\n<p>In neuroscience\, the temptation to interpret the brain as a computer raises fundamental epistemological questions. Computational models\, for all their productivity\, may furnish convenient abstractions rather than capture the brain&rsquo\;s actual functioning. Built on data averages and variance filtering\, such models struggle to reproduce the organ&rsquo\;s staggering complexity. These simplifications\, however interesting\, may not reveal an intrinsic computational essence of the brain.</p>\n<p>To resist such assumptions\, it may be fruitful to consider computation as a &ldquo\;symbolic form&rdquo\; in the Cassirerian sense: a capacity that not only processes but also structures how we conceive of and relate to the world. The potential case studies are innumerable\, yet the guiding philosophical question should remain the same: Can the concept of symbolic form be applied to the ways different artificial intelligences shape the world? Do AIs in any meaningful sense possess an &ldquo\;external&rdquo\; world? And is this enough to deny that human reality&mdash\;with its perceptions and values&mdash\;is itself shaped by codes\, algorithms\, and digital infrastructures?</p>\n<p>Finally\, in connection with these questions\, we must investigate the ethical‑political impact of AI: how do algorithms condition our decisions and structure their logical form? Can human beings still be regarded as autonomous and responsible moral subjects in a world increasingly characterized by co‑agency between humans and intelligent machines?</p>\n<p>This dossier of Scienza &amp\; Filosofia seeks to create an interdisciplinary space for reflection that illuminates the historical\, genealogical\, phenomenological\, and epistemological entanglements of computational thought. Our aim is not only to clarify the roots of computational thinking but also to enrich the ongoing dialogue on the role of technology and computation in contemporary culture.</p>\n<p><strong>Suggested (non‑exhaustive) Topics</strong></p>\n\n<ul>\n<li>Writing\, symbolic notation\, and cognitive practices: from Husserlian phenomenology to contemporary theories of computation as a medium of thought</li>\n<li>History of logical machines and genealogy of computation: from nineteenth‑century mechanical devices to contemporary digital architecture</li>\n<li>The paradox of intimate technology: algorithmic universality and personal meaning‑making in an era of pervasive computation</li>\n<li>Genealogy of artificial intelligence: behaviorist and cybernetic assumptions and their legacies in contemporary models of cognition</li>\n<li>Is the brain a computer? Computational models in neuroscience between heuristic value and ontological reductionism</li>\n<li>Computation as symbolic form and cultural practice</li>\n<li>Language and thought in Large Language Models and in human cognition</li>\n<li>Computational subjectivity: from theories of the subject (Cartesian\, Kantian\, phenomenological\, analytic\, etc.) to contemporary algorithmic identities</li>\n<li>Philosophy of mathematics and formal logic: theoretical foundations of computational thought</li>\n<li>Ethics and politics of computation: the impact of algorithms on ethical decision‑making and the political domain</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We welcome contributions from philosophy (phenomenology\, analytic philosophy\, philosophy of mind\, science and technology studies\, intellectual history)\, cognitive science\, computer science\, neuroscience\, media studies\, and adjacent fields. Interdisciplinary proposals are especially encouraged.</p>\n<p><strong>Submission of Proposals:</strong> To participate in this call for papers\, please submit an abstract of no more than 500 characters&mdash\;including the title of the proposed essay and a description of the argument&mdash\;to scienzaefilosofia@gmail.com by <strong>October 15\, 2026</strong>. Proposals will be evaluated by the editors and the journal&rsquo\;s review committee. Authors will be notified of the selection results\, along with the new deadline for submitting manuscripts\, which is set for <strong>March 15\, 2027</strong>. Finally\, manuscripts will undergo a double-blind peer review process\, and authors will be notified of the review results upon completion of the process.</p>\n<p><strong>Accepted Languages:</strong> Italian\, English\, French\, German and Spanish.<strong><br><br></strong>Edited by Claudio Fabbroni and Lorenzo De Stefano.<strong><br><br>ITA:<br></strong></p>\n<p>Il calcolo plasma profondamente il modo in cui pensiamo\, comunichiamo e ci rapportiamo al mondo. Eppure\, i fondamenti filosofici e antropologici di questa pratica &ndash\; radicati nella logica formale e nella manipolazione simbolica &ndash\; rimangono spesso inesplorati. La computazione non &egrave\; semplicemente una tecnica\, una pratica cognitiva o una caratteristica immutabile del mondo naturale: &egrave\; piuttosto una pratica culturale complessa\, che interagisce e struttura il pensiero e il mondo\, ridefinendoli profondamente.</p>\n<p>La genealogia del pensiero computazionale rivela un paradosso cruciale: sebbene originariamente concepito come un dispositivo puramente formale e impersonale\, la computazione &egrave\; intrecciata in modo inestricabile alla vita umana. Dalle pratiche di scrittura che codificano strategie cognitive alle macchine logiche che simulano le regole universali del ragionamento\, dalle architetture neurali artificiali che fondono regole meccaniche e teoria comportamentale con i modelli neuroscientifici che rendono il cervello una macchina algoritmica\, il calcolo si configura come una forza culturale potente quanto arte\, mito o linguaggio.</p>\n<p>La tradizione fenomenologica offre strumenti concettuali preziosi per comprendere la complessit&agrave\; di tali pratiche e delle loro forme concettuali. L&rsquo\;idea husserliana del &ldquo\;linguaggio come calcolo&rdquo\;\, raramente applicata alla comprensione della scrittura\, suggerisce che la notazione simbolica funzioni non solo come strumento di comunicazione\, ma come medium capace di generare quella che potremmo chiamare &ldquo\;evidenza computazionale&rdquo\; &ndash\; una chiarezza prodotta dalla manipolazione sistematica di simboli. Questa prospettiva espande la nostra visione della scrittura &ndash\; di qualsiasi tipo essa sia &ndash\;\, suggerendo invece un&rsquo\;interazione dinamica tra fenomenologia e calcolo.</p>\n<p>La storia delle macchine logiche\, dai primi dispositivi ottocenteschi alle contemporanee architetture di intelligenza artificiale\, illumina\, tuttavia\, un&rsquo\;ulteriore tensione: quella tra l&rsquo\;universalit&agrave\; impersonale e riproducibilit&agrave\; tecnica del calcolo algoritmico e la costruzione personale di significato.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Pur muovendosi entro queste premesse teoriche\, l&rsquo\;impatto dei risultati pratici ha offuscato il retroterra storico‑concettuale del dibattito sull&rsquo\;intelligenza artificiale. L&rsquo\;epistemologia dell&rsquo\;intelligenza artificiale\, infatti\, a voler rimanere stretti\, si regge sui paradigmi comportamentisti e cibernetici\, che inquadrano la cognizione e il pensiero come processi algoritmici. Tali concetti &ldquo\;operativi&rdquo\; &ndash\; per riprendere la distinzione di Eugen Fink tra concetti &ldquo\;tematici&rdquo\; e &ldquo\;operativi&rdquo\; &ndash\; plasmano il modo in cui comprendiamo i classici problemi della tradizione filosofica\, poich&eacute\; ci predispongono a interpretare i problemi dell&rsquo\;intelligenza\, della coscienza\, del linguaggio\, della creativit&agrave\; e cos&igrave\; via in termini computazionali\, generando il pi&ugrave\; classico dei circoli viziosi.</p>\n<p>In ambito neuroscientifico\, sappiamo\, che la tentazione di interpretare il cervello come un computer solleva interrogativi epistemologici fondamentali. I modelli computazionali\, pur essendo straordinariamente produttivi\, potrebbero offrire astrazioni convenienti piuttosto che catturare il funzionamento reale del cervello. Le teorie computazionali si basano su medie di dati e filtraggio di varianze\, strumenti per mezzo dei quali risulta difficile riprodurre la complessit&agrave\; strabiliante dell&rsquo\;organo cerebrale. Queste semplificazioni\, quindi\, per quanto preziose\, potrebbero non rivelare un&rsquo\;essenza computazionale intrinseca del cervello.</p>\n<p>Per scongiurare assunzioni di questo tipo\, pu&ograve\; essere opportuno considerare la computazione come &ldquo\;forma simbolica&rdquo\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;nel senso cassireriano\, ovverosia nei termini di una capacit&agrave\; che non solo elabora\, ma struttura il modo in cui concepiamo e ci rapportiamo al mondo. I casi di studio a cui applicare quest&rsquo\;idea sono potenzialmente innumerevoli\, ma la domanda filosofica guida dovrebbe rimanere la stessa: si pu&ograve\; applicare il concetto di forma simbolica al modo in cui le diverse intelligenze artificiali plasmano il mondo? Esiste realmente un mondo &ldquo\;esterno&rdquo\; per le intelligenze artificiali? E questo basta a negare che la realt&agrave\; umana\, con le sue percezioni e i suoi valori\, non sia plasmata da codici\, algoritmi e infrastrutture digitali?</p>\n<p>In relazione a quest&rsquo\;ultima domanda\, occorrer&agrave\; infine indagare l&rsquo\;impatto etico-politico dell&rsquo\;intelligenza artificiale: in che modo gli algoritmi condizionano le nostre decisioni e ne strutturano la forma logica? Gli esseri umani potranno essere considerati soggetti morali autonomi e responsabili in un mondo in cui la co-agentivit&agrave\; fra uomini e macchine intelligenti caratterizzer&agrave\; sempre pi&ugrave\; la quotidianit&agrave\; di tutti noi?</p>\n<p>Questo dossier di Scienza&amp\;Filosofia auspica la creazione di uno spazio di riflessione interdisciplinare per illuminare gli intrecci storici\, genealogici\, fenomenologici ed epistemologici del pensiero computazionale. Il dossier mira a chiarire non solo le radici del pensiero computazionale\, ma anche ad arricchire il dialogo in corso sul ruolo della tecnologia e del calcolo nella cultura contemporanea.</p>\n<p><strong>Spunti tematici\, non vincolanti\, per la riflessione:</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Scrittura\, notazione simbolica e pratiche cognitive: dalla fenomenologia husserliana alle teorie contemporanee del calcolo come medium di pensiero</li>\n<li>Storia delle macchine logiche e genealogia della computazione: dai dispositivi meccanici ottocenteschi alle architetture digitali contemporanee</li>\n<li>Il paradosso della tecnologia intima: universalit&agrave\; algoritmica e costruzione personale di significato nell&rsquo\;era della computazione pervasiva</li>\n<li>Genealogia dell&rsquo\;intelligenza artificiale: assunzioni comportamentiste\, cibernetiche e le loro eredit&agrave\; nei modelli contemporanei di cognizione</li>\n<li>Il cervello &egrave\; un computer? I modelli computazionali nelle neuroscienze tra euristica e riduzionismo ontologico</li>\n<li>Computazione come forma simbolica e pratica culturale</li>\n<li>Linguaggio e pensiero nei Large Language Models e nell&rsquo\;uomo</li>\n<li>Soggettivit&agrave\; computazionale: dalle teorie del soggetto (cartesiana\, kantiana\, fenomenologica\, analitica ecc.) alle identit&agrave\; algoritmiche contemporanee</li>\n<li>Filosofia della matematica e logica formale: i fondamenti teorici del pensiero computazionale</li>\n<li>Etica e politica del calcolo: l&rsquo\;impatto degli algoritmi sulle decisioni etiche e sulla dimensione politica</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Sono ben accetti contributi provenienti dalla filosofia (fenomenologia\, filosofia analitica\, filosofia della mente\, science and technology studies/STS\, storia delle idee)\, dalle scienze cognitive\, dall&rsquo\;informatica\, dalle neuroscienze\, dagli studi sui media e da ambiti affini. Sono particolarmente incoraggiate proposte interdisciplinari.</p>\n<p><strong>Procedura</strong>: Per partecipare alla call\, occorre inviare all&rsquo\;indirizzo scienzaefilosofia@gmail.com\, entro il <strong>15 ottobre 2026</strong> un abstract di max 500 battute comprendente il titolo della proposta di saggio e una descrizione dell&rsquo\;iter argomentativo. Le proposte saranno valutate dai curatori e dal comitato di lettori della rivista. Gli autori riceveranno comunicazione dell&rsquo\;esito della selezione\, unitamente all&rsquo\;indicazione della nuova deadline per l&rsquo\;invio dei contributi che &egrave\; fissata per il <strong>15 marzo 2027</strong>. Infine\, i contributi verranno sottoposti a doppia blind review e gli autori riceveranno\, al termine della procedura\, comunicazione circa l&rsquo\;esito della valutazione.</p>\n<p><strong>Lingue accettate</strong>: italiano\, inglese\, francese\, tedesco e spagnolo.<br><br></p>\n<p>A cura di Claudio Fabbroni e Lorenzo De Stefano.</p>
ORGANIZER:
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261015T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261015T170000
SUMMARY:JAM (Junkyard Anniversary Meeting) - Philosophy of Imagination Conference
UID:20260910T085820Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:America/Los_Angeles
LOCATION:The Kravis Center\, Claremont\, United States\, 91711
DESCRIPTION:<p>A philosophy of imagination conference to commemorate the 10th anniversary of The Junkyard blog. In addition to the invited speakers\, there will be a number of contributed sessions.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p>JAM will include parallel sessions for submitted papers selected via an open call. Papers should be anonymized and no more than 3000 words (not including references). Philosophical papers on all topics concerning imagination are welcome. The submission deadline is <strong>October 15</strong>. Notification of paper status will be provided by December 1. A limited number of partial travel stipends are available for early career researchers and scholars residing outside the United States.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Symposium Proposals</strong></p>\n<p>JAM also has limited spots for submitted symposia selected via an open call. Symposia on all philosophical themes concerning imagination are welcome. The submission deadline is <strong>October 15</strong>. Notification of proposal status will be provided by December 1. A symposium should contain 3 papers and may also include up to two discussants and a chair (if you do not specify a chair\, one will be assigned to you).&nbsp\;&nbsp\;Symposium proposals should be anonymized\, and they should&nbsp\;explain the theme of the symposium and include extended abstracts of each of the three symposium papers (1000 words each).&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Amy Kind:
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Tokyo:20261016T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Tokyo:20261017T170000
SUMMARY:Philosophy & AI 5 (PhAI5) 
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TZID:Asia/Tokyo
LOCATION:Clark Memorial Student Center\, Sapporo-shi\, Japan
DESCRIPTION:<p>The event is the fifth installment of <em>Philosophy &amp\; AI</em>\, an event series established to promote research and collaboration on the philosophy of AI in Asia\, and also\, to promote interaction between philosophers of AI and AI researchers in other academic disciplines\, as well as outside academia.</p>\n<p><strong>Basic information</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Date &amp\; Time: 16&ndash\;17 October\, 2026\, 10:00-17:30 (JST)</li>\n<li>Venue: Clark Memorial Student Center\, Hokkaido University\, Sapporo\, Hokkaido (Google Maps)</li>\n<li>Language: English</li>\n<li>Format: In-person only</li>\n<li>Registration athttps://forms.gle/yCu4Y2f4NQnMXXj26.</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Keynote speaker</strong>: Jun Otsuka (Zen University)</p>\n<p><strong>Invited speakers</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Herman Cappelen (University of Hong Kong)</li>\n<li>Alexandre Erler (National Yang Ming Chiao Tong University)</li>\n<li>Mirko Farina (Huaqiao University)</li>\n<li>Xiaoyu Ke (East China Normal University)</li>\n<li>Youjin Kong (Seoul National University)</li>\n<li>Ying-Tung Lin (National Yang Ming Chiao Tong University)</li>\n<li>Kengo Miyazono (Hokkaido University)</li>\n<li>Jacob Mortimer (Peking University)</li>\n<li>Rafal Rzepka (Hokkaido University)</li>\n<li>Rachel Sterken (University of Hong Kong)</li>\n<li>Richard Stone (Tokyo City University)</li>\n<li>Davide Zappeli (Fudan University)</li>\n<li>Sonia Zhang (Hokkaido University)</li>\n</ul>\n\n<p>Find out more at our official website!</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Katsunori Miyahara;CN=Hayate Shimizu;CN=Sonia Zhang;CN="Sebastian Sunday Grève";CN=Yiwen Zhan:
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261016T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261017T170000
SUMMARY:15th Annual Florida State University Free Will\, Moral Responsibility\, and Agency Conference
UID:20260910T085822Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Tallahassee\, United States\, 32304
DESCRIPTION:<p>The conference will take place at Florida State University on October 16-17\, 2026. The conference is open to any who is interested in attending.&nbsp\;If you would like to attend and require further information\, please email&nbsp\;Justice Cabantangan (jac24m at fsu.edu). The conference website (https://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference)&nbsp\;is currently under maintenance.</p>\nhttps://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference</a>
ORGANIZER;CN=Justice Cabantangan:
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20261016T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20261017T170000
SUMMARY:The Architecture of Propositional Thought: From Cognitive Maps to Language and Reasoning
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TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:Columbia\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>One of the most promising routes to understanding the architecture of propositional thought&mdash\;and cognition more broadly&mdash\;is to begin with the mammalian navigation system and its associated neural machinery (cognitive maps\, place cells\, grid cells\, path integration\, sequence generation\, hippocampal replay\, and related control mechanisms). Rather than treating navigation as a domain-specific specialization\, this approach treats it as an evolutionarily ancient and well-characterized architectural template that may have been replicated\, extended\, and abstracted to support a wide range of cognitive capacities.</p>\n<p>A growing body of work suggests that the hippocampus&ndash\;entorhinal cortex system is not merely a spatial navigation system\, but a general system for managing structured representations and sequences\, supporting planning\, memory\, inference\, imagination\, and offline simulation. At the same time\, complementary research highlights the role of frontoparietal control systems in maintaining\, selecting\, and flexibly manipulating these representations under task demands. Together\, these findings motivate an architectural perspective in which navigation-like mapping and replay mechanisms interact with control\, valuation\, imagery\, and language to support higher cognition.</p>\n<p>Accordingly\, the guiding idea behind this conference is to explore whether propositional thought itself&mdash\;across linguistic and non-linguistic forms&mdash\;can be understood as emerging from the reuse and extension of navigation-like architectures for offline control\, simulation\, and problem solving.</p>\n<p>The conference is also aimed at producing an edited volume on the same topic and foster future research collaborations among participants.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Gualtiero Piccinini:
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261018T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261018T090000
SUMMARY:Beyond Diagnostic Boundaries. Mentalizing\, Theory of Mind\, and Cognitive Heterogeneity in Neurodevelopmental Conditions
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>This call for papers invites contributions to the Special Issue &ldquo\;Beyond Diagnostic Boundaries: Mentalizing\, Theory of Mind\, and Cognitive Heterogeneity in Neurodevelopmental Conditions\,&rdquo\; to be published in <em>Reti\, saperi\, linguaggi &ndash\; Italian Journal of Cognitive Sciences</em>\, a prestigious international peer-reviewed journal indexed in Scopus and Web of Science&ndash\;ESCI.</p>\n<p>The Special Issue will explore mentalizing and Theory of Mind across neurodevelopmental conditions\, with particular attention to cognitive heterogeneity within and across diagnostic categories. We welcome empirical\, theoretical\, methodological\, and review contributions addressing topics such as autism and other neurodevelopmental conditions\, individual differences in social cognition\, language and interaction\, embodied and ecological approaches to mentalizing\, and innovative assessment methods.</p>\n<p>Researchers interested in contributing should send a <strong>provisional title and a 300&ndash\;400-word abstract to <a href="mailto:paola.pennisi@unime.it">paola.pennisi@unime.it</a> by 18 October 2026</strong>. Preliminary decisions will be communicated by 2 November 2026. The <strong>deadline for full manuscripts is 30 May 2027</strong>\, with publication expected in July 2027.</p>\n<p>Manuscripts in English are especially encouraged. There are no submission or publication fees.</p>
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261019T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261019T180000
SUMMARY:Reasons are States of Affairs
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are pleased to announce our monthly&nbsp\;<em>online</em>&nbsp\;talk series on "<strong>Inferences &amp\; Capacities</strong>."<br><br>Our next speaker is:<br><br></p>\n<p><strong>Eva Schmidt</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund)<br><strong>Reasons are States of Affairs</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Oct 19</strong>:<em>&nbsp\;11am (Buenos Aires)\, 10am (New York)\, 4pm (Berlin).</em></p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:</strong>&nbsp\;Reasons have a double role\, a normative role: they count in favor of belief or action\; and an explanatory role: they provide a rational explanation of a subject&rsquo\;s beliefs or actions. These roles pull in different directions regarding the question of the metaphysical nature of reasons&ndash\; are they states of affairs or (true) propositions? Here\, we support the states of affairs view. We <em>first</em> present an argument starting from the particular case of reasons which are available to semantically unsophisticated subjects who do not possess any semantic concepts (such as &ldquo\;truth&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;reference&rdquo\;). We argue that the reasons to which such subjects respond are states of affairs\, and that\, by extension\,&nbsp\; so are the reasons of more sophisticated subjects. <em>Second</em>\, we undermine arguments for the claim that reasons are propositions &ndash\; or specifically\, fine-grained Fregean propositions. Such arguments appeal to specific cases in which epistemic justification or reason explanation differs in fine-grained ways\, apparently corresponding to differences between the Fregean propositions that are the reasons in these cases. Further arguments appeal to the need of a content-relation between reasons and the supported responses\, which apparently only Fregean propositions can explain and to the nature of (inferential) justification.</p>\n\n<p><strong>How to participate</strong>:&nbsp\;Please\, send an email to <strong>Alfredo Vernazzani</strong> at:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>alfredo-vernazzani AT protonmail.com</p>\n<p>_______</p>\n<ul>\n<li>About&nbsp\;<strong>Inferences &amp\; Capacities</strong>:</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The series brings together work on inferential capacities\, rationality\, normativity\, and cognition &mdash\; across both human and non-human animals &mdash\; with the aim of fostering discussion on the nature and limits of the cognitive sphere. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>2026 line-up: &nbsp\;<br><br></p>\n<p>April 27:&nbsp\;<strong>Angelica Kaufmann</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Milan): "Mind Blanking as Mental Imagery."&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>May 18:&nbsp\;<strong>Federico Burdman</strong>&nbsp\;(Universidad Alberto Hurtado) "Constrained choices: addiction\, attention\, and reasons-responsiveness."&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>June 22:&nbsp\;<strong>Susanna Schellenberg</strong>&nbsp\;(Rutgers): TBA&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>July 20:&nbsp\;<strong>Cameron Buckner</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Florida): "Chains-of-Thought\, Inner Speech\, and Artificial Epistemic Agency."</p>\n<p>September 7:&nbsp\;<strong>Ulf Hlobil</strong>&nbsp\;(Concordia University): TBA &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>October 19:<strong>&nbsp\;Eva Schmidt</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund): TBA&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>November 16:&nbsp\;<strong>Hans-Johann Glock</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Z&uuml\;rich): "Is Ascribing Inferences to Brains or Non-human Animals a Fallacy?"&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>December 14:&nbsp\;<strong>Emma Borg</strong>&nbsp\;(SAS\, University of London): "Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: The Scope of Common-Sense Psychology."&nbsp\;<br><br></p>\n<p>Each talk lasts c. 40 minutes followed by 40 minutes open Q&amp\;A. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The series is co-organized by:</p>\n<p><strong>Mariela Aguilera</strong>&nbsp\;(University of C&oacute\;rdoba)</p>\n<p><strong>Mat&iacute\;as Osta-V&eacute\;lez</strong>&nbsp\;(Universidad de la Rep&uacute\;blica)</p>\n<p><strong>Alfredo Vernazzani</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund\; Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg).</p>\n<p>Visit our website:&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Alfredo Vernazzani;CN=Mariela Aguilera;CN="Matías Osta Vélez":
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261030T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261030T090000
SUMMARY:Locus
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Dossier </strong><strong>Walking-with the Past: Embodiment\, Environment\, and Narrative</strong></p>\n<p><strong><em>Locus. Journal of Culture Studies</em></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Guest editors: Marieke Borren and Susan Hogervorst</strong></p>\n<p>As an everyday act of embodied locomotion\, walking rarely becomes an explicit object of reflection\, let alone an entry point into questions of history and memory. Yet as we move through streets\, landscapes\, ruins\, and memorial sites\, alone or collectively\, walking can reactivate personal memories\, disclose hidden histories\, and inscribe new narratives into shared spaces. Examples range from commemorative marches and heritage walking tours to psychogeographical drifts that excavate urban and peri-urban spaces as palimpsests\, and the prominent role of walking in first-person biographical accounts of displacement. In literary and cinematic representations\, moreover\, walking often mediates between personal memories and the meaningful environments in which they unfold.</p>\n<p>This dossier of <em>Locus</em> explores walking as an embodied mnemonic\, narrative\, and pedagogical practice. We are particularly interested in the philosophical question of how walking mediates between body\, environment\, memory\, and history. We therefore invite contributions that approach walking from one of three interconnected perspectives: (1) embodiment and bodily memory\, (2) environment and place\, or (3) narrative and representation.</p>\n<p><strong>Walking-with the past: a phenomenological perspective</strong></p>\n<p>Walking may have a particularly strong relation to memory because it is never a purely present activity. From a phenomenological perspective\, the moving body can be understood as a sedimentation of histories and habits: bodily comportment is shaped by past experience\, social norms\, technologies\, infrastructures\, and built environments. Walking is thus not simply an activity performed by a body in space\; it is an embodied way of inhabiting an already meaningful world.</p>\n<p>At the same time\, environments are not neutral backdrops or abstract spaces. They constitute structured fields of affordances that enable and constrain particular forms of movement. Streets\, paths\, ruins\, memorial sites\, and infrastructures invite certain trajectories\, rhythms\, and styles of walking while discouraging others. Historical transformations of built environments may thus become sedimented in bodily habits\, while changes in bodily practices can disclose otherwise unnoticed historical layers of place.</p>\n<p>Walking consequently unfolds in a dynamic relation between historically sedimented bodily habits and environments that themselves bear traces of past events. This raises questions not only about memory and history but also about the phenomenological constitution of bodily subjectivity\, place\, temporality\, and world.</p>\n<p>These questions resonate with phenomenological approaches from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to more recent work on embodiment\, place\, habit\, and environmental experience\, as well as with approaches in 4E cognition and ecological approaches to perception\, including work on affordances and the embodied and situated character of cognition.</p>\n<p>From a cultural memory perspective\, walking can likewise inscribe collective and personal histories into places and reactivate past experiences in the present. Collaborative walking practices in public history\, commemoration\, heritage education\, and psychogeography can make historical layers experientially available through bodily movement. In this sense\, walking may be understood as a form of embodied historical inquiry: a way of encountering the past not merely as an object of representation\, but through situated\, sensory\, and affective engagement with places and environments.</p>\n<p>The notion of &ldquo\;walking-with the past&rdquo\; therefore points to a relational and co-constitutive understanding of historical experience. The past is not simply something walkers represent or remember\; it may be encountered\, activated\, and partially re-enacted through movement in places where histories have been sedimented.</p>\n<p><strong>Possible questions include:</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Walking and embodied memory</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>How might phenomenological approaches to walking deepen our understanding of the relationship between embodiment\, memory\, and historical experience?</li>\n<li>How does walking reveal the historicity of embodied practices and everyday forms of movement?</li>\n<li>How are personal and collective memories sedimented in bodily habits and styles of walking?</li>\n<li>How does embodied movement activate or reorganize autobiographical memory?</li>\n<li>What kinds of memories\, meanings\, or narratives emerge specifically through embodied movement?</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Walking\, environment\, and place</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>How do historical transformations of landscapes\, infrastructures\, and built environments shape the affordances of walking and become sedimented in bodily comportment and habit?</li>\n<li>How are temporal\, particularly historical\, dimensions of lived experience involved in ambulatory place-making?</li>\n<li>How does walking disclose historical layers embedded in landscapes and urban environments?</li>\n<li>How can walking disclose or produce memoryscapes\, including traumascapes?</li>\n<li>What does walking reveal about the phenomenological constitution of place?</li>\n<li>How might concepts such as sedimentation\, historicity\, habituality\, affordance\, and bodily schema illuminate walking as a historical practice?</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Walking\, narrative time\, and representation</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>How does walking structure narrative or autobiographical time in literary\, cinematic\, or autobiographical works?</li>\n<li>How do representations of walking connect personal memory with broader historical or cultural contexts?</li>\n<li>How can phenomenological perspectives illuminate the relation between walking\, embodiment\, and narrative time?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We particularly welcome philosophical contributions\, including phenomenological and critical-phenomenological approaches to embodiment\, bodily memory\, temporality\, place\, historicity\, habit\, affordance\, and environmental experience. We also welcome contributions from 4E cognition\, ecological approaches to perception\, cultural memory studies\, history\, heritage studies\, psychogeography\, narrative studies\, and the walking arts\, including work that brings these perspectives into dialogue.</p>\n<p><strong>Types of contributions</strong></p>\n<p>We invite proposals for:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>theoretical contributions on walking\, embodiment\, memory\, place\, historicity\, and habit\, particularly from phenomenology and 4E cognition\;</li>\n<li>philosophical or interdisciplinary analyses of walking as a mode of encountering history and place\;</li>\n<li>empirical or methodological studies of walking in public history\, heritage\, commemoration\, oral history\, or psychogeography\;</li>\n<li>analyses of literary\, cinematic\, or autobiographical representations of walking\;</li>\n<li>artistic and practice-based contributions from walking artists\, psychogeographers\, and practitioners working with locative media or walking-based artistic research.</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong><em>The full call\, including further information about the dossier and submission guidelines\, is available on the </em></strong><a href="https://platform.openjournals.nl/LOCUS/call-for-papers"><strong><em>Locus Open Journals website</em></strong></a><strong><em>.</em></strong></p>\n<p><strong>About <em>Locus</em></strong><br><em>Locus: Journal of Culture Studies</em> is an interdisciplinary\, diamond Open Access journal published by the Department of Culture Studies at the Open University of the Netherlands. It provides a forum for scholarship across the humanities and culture studies\, including philosophy\, and particularly welcomes interdisciplinary dialogue between academic research and cultural practice. In addition to stand-alone articles\, the journal publishes biannual thematic &lsquo\;dossiers\,&rsquo\; special collections of articles on topical debates. These dossiers cover diverse themes such as <em>the cultural imagination of human and non-human animals\, the coloniality of natural history collections</em>\, <em>performativity</em>\, and <em>embodiment</em>.</p>\n<p>We recently completed the migration of Locus to the <a href="https://platform.openjournals.nl/LOCUS/">Open Journals ecosystem</a>. While our current platform is new\, all back issues and articles remain fully available through our <a href="locus.ou.nl">former platform</a>.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Submission information</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Abstracts (300&ndash\;500 words): due 30 October 2026</li>\n<li>Notification of acceptance: 15 November 2026</li>\n<li>Full manuscripts (4\,000&ndash\;5\,000 words): due 3 January 2027</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Submissions are accepted in English and Dutch. All submissions will undergo editorial review.</p>\n<p>For inquiries about the theme\, please contact Marieke Borren: <a href="mailto:marieke.borren@ou.nl">marieke.borren@ou.nl</a>.</p>
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20261031T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20261031T234500
SUMMARY:Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions
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TZID:Europe/Vienna
LOCATION:Graz\, Austria\, 8010
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>CfP:&nbsp\;Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions</strong></p>\n<p>Confirmed&nbsp\;speakers: Maria Alvarez\, Havi Carel\, Hanne Jacobs\, Quill Kukla\, Kristina Musholt and&nbsp\;Caleb Ward.</p>\n\n<p>The notion of agency plays a central role across many areas of philosophy\, including philosophy of action\, ethics\, political philosophy\, epistemology\, feminist philosophy\, and phenomenology.&nbsp\;While traditionally conceptualized in terms of intentional action\, rational control\, and autonomy\, our understanding of agency has recently come under intense scrutiny and is now being increasingly transformed.&nbsp\;Feminist and phenomenological approaches\, in particular\, have emphasized the need for a richer and more fine-grained conception of agency&mdash\;one that takes seriously the social\, historical\, and relational contexts in which agents are situated. From this perspective\, agency cannot be adequately understood without acknowledging that agents are not only rational decision-makers\, but also emotional\, embodied\, desiring\, creative\, and affective beings.</p>\n<p>This conference invites new investigations into agency as it is lived and exercised under non-ideal conditions\, such as vulnerability\, dependency\, uncertainty\, coercion\, structural injustice\, affective ambivalence\, or crisis. Rather than presupposing idealized models of action and rational control\, the conference aims to analyze how agency isreconfigured&nbsp\;under such conditions. We also particularly welcome contributions that examine how rational and virtuous agency should be rethought under non-ideal conditions and in times of crisis.</p>\n<p>Possible questions include (but are not limited to):</p>\n<ul>\n<li>How can agency and autonomy be understood from a phenomenological perspective?</li>\n<li>How can accounts of agency be expanded to include non-human forms of agency\, such as animal agency?</li>\n<li>How should we rethink rational and/or virtuous agency in a non-idealized framework?</li>\n<li>What role do affective\, embodied\,&nbsp\;and imaginative capacities play in sustaining rational and virtuous agency?</li>\n<li>What is the relationship between beliefs\, credences\, emotions\, and actions?</li>\n<li>Can ambivalence be compatible with (rational) agency?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>In addition to contemporary approaches\, we explicitly welcome historical-philosophical work\, including contributions engaging with the phenomenological tradition\, as well as those that critically engage with accounts of agency from marginalized figures and traditions in the history of philosophy.</p>\n<p>Contributions from early-career researchers are especially encouraged.</p>\n<p>The conference is planned as an in-person event only.</p>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p>We invite you to submit an anonymized abstract of up to 500 words&nbsp\;by&nbsp\;<strong>October 31\, 2026&nbsp\;</strong>to&nbsp\;laurentia.adam@uni-graz.at</p>\n<p>Please include a separate file with your name\, email address\, the title of your talk\, and your affiliation (if any) and put &lsquo\;Rethinking Agency Graz 2027&rsquo\; in the subject line.</p>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p>Organizing Team: Emanuela Carta\, Denis Dzanic\, and Daniel Neumann.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN="Denis Džanić";CN=Emanuela Carta;CN=Daniel Neumann:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261104T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261106T170000
SUMMARY:The 4th annual conference of the The International Society for the Philosophy of the Sciences of the Mind
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>What is the mind\, and how does it work? These questions have led to centuries of philosophical and empirical investigations\, and still lack definitive answers. We thus invite submissions from all disciplines that leverage insights from the use of different techniques\, methodologies\, and research questions to shed light on the nature and functioning of the mind.</p>\n<p>In this fourth web conference\, we seek again to bring together many of these perspectives to build a common ground\, a comprehensive and multi-scale conceptual landscape of the mind. We accept submissions from a broad range of perspectives\, including - but not limited to - philosophy of psychology\, philosophy of psychiatry\, philosophy of neuroscience\, philosophy of cognitive science\, philosophy of mind\, philosophy of artificial intelligence &amp\; robotics\, philosophy of linguistics\, philosophy of ethology\, philosophy of (cognitive) anthropology\, philosophy of biology\, philosophy of the social sciences and consciousness studies.</p>\n<p>We are delighted to already have a number of excellent keynote speakers confirmed for 2026\, including:</p>\n<p>Devon Bailey<br>University of Johannesburg\,&nbsp\;Republic of South Africa</p>\n<p>Louise Barrett<br>University of Lethbridge\,&nbsp\;Canada</p>\n<p>Ali Boyle<br>LSE\,&nbsp\;United Kingdom</p>\n<p>Melina Gastelum Vargas<br>UNAM\, Mexico</p>\n<p>Michael Kirchhoff<br>University of Wollongong\,&nbsp\;Australia</p>\n<p>Yukie Nagai<br>University of Tokyo\, Japan</p>\n<p>Practical Information</p>\n<p>When: 4-6 November 2026<br>Where: Online<br>Fees: The conference is fully online\, and no fee is required<br>Further Inquiries:&nbsp\;ispsmofficial@gmail.com</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Marco Facchin;CN=Valeria Becattini;CN=Liberty Severs;CN=Niccolo Negro;CN="María Jimena Clavel Vázquez";CN=Carlos Barth;CN=Laura Oppi;CN=April Owens:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261104T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261106T170000
SUMMARY:4th ISPSM Online Conference
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TZID:Europe/London
ORGANIZER;CN=Marco Facchin:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261105T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261107T170000
SUMMARY:Primo Convegno della Società Italiana di Fenomenologia: "Fenomenologia\, logica e psicologia"
UID:20260910T085830Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Rome
LOCATION:Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici\, Via Porta di Massa 1\, Napoli\, Italy\, 80133
DESCRIPTION:<p>&laquo\;Dal ripudio della psicologia empirica in nome di una logica pura Husserl passer&agrave\;\, attraverso un lungo e tormentato cammino\, alla psicologia pura o trascendentale&raquo\;.</p>\n<p>A partire da queste parole di Aldo Masullo\, scritte nel 1961\, il convegno intende indagare un tema che\, per molta filosofia del Novecento\, ha rappresentato uno dei principali limiti della fenomenologia e che\, negli ultimi anni\, si &egrave\; invece rivelato uno dei suoi aspetti pi&ugrave\; fecondi: il rapporto tra logica e psicologia.</p>\n<p>Costitutivo della formazione filosofica di Husserl e decisivo per l&rsquo\;evoluzione del suo pensiero\, il confronto tra logica e psicologia ha orientato gran parte dello sviluppo del movimento fenomenologico. La fenomenologia\, infatti\, non si &egrave\; limitata alla critica delle diverse forme di psicologismo &ndash\; logico\, gnoseologico ed etico &ndash\; ma ha elaborato una nuova concezione delle relazioni tra validit&agrave\; logica\, intenzionalit&agrave\; e soggettivit&agrave\;.</p>\n<p>Si pu&ograve\; sostenere che\, per comprendere le diverse fasi del pensiero husserliano\, cos&igrave\; come per distinguere le principali stagioni della tradizione fenomenologica\, sia necessario chiarire le differenti concezioni di logica e di psicologia che vi sono implicate. In questa prospettiva\, il rapporto tra questi due ambiti non costituisce soltanto una questione interna alla fenomenologia\, ma rappresenta una chiave interpretativa essenziale per comprendere il suo sviluppo storico e teorico.</p>\n<p>Al di l&agrave\; del perimetro strettamente fenomenologico\, la relazione tra logica e psicologia occupa oggi una posizione centrale nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo: dalla teoria della conoscenza alla teoria dei concetti\, dall&rsquo\;etica all&rsquo\;antropologia\, dalla filosofia delle scienze cognitive alla filosofia della mente\, dalla filosofia della logica alla psicopatologia.</p>\n<p>In questo quadro\, si invitano studiose e studiosi a presentare contributi di carattere storico o teorico sui seguenti temi:</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>1. Fenomenologia e psicologia\;</p>\n<p>2. Fenomenologia e psicopatologia\;</p>\n<p>3. Fenomenologia e logica\;</p>\n<p>4. Etica fenomenologica tra logica e psicologia\;</p>\n<p>5. Fenomenologia\, scienze cognitive ed epistemologia\;</p>\n<p>6. Fenomenologia e teoria delle emozioni\;</p>\n<p>7. Fenomenologia e antropologia\;</p>\n<p>8. Fenomenologia e trascendentale.</p>\n<p>Gli abstract\, di massimo 2500 caratteri pi&ugrave\; 1000 di bibliografia\, andranno inviati a Lorenzo Cavallo (lorenzo.cavallo2@unina.it) e a Claudio Fabbroni (claudio.fabbroni@unina.it)<br><br></p>\n<p>Scadenze</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>Invio degli abstract: 15 settembre 2026</p>\n<p>Comunicazione degli esiti: 1&deg\; ottobre 2026</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>Comitato scientifico:</p>\n<p>Anna Donise\, Felice Masi\, Anna Pia Ruoppo</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>Comitato organizzativo:</p>\n<p>Giovanni Battista Armenio\, Francesco Bevilacqua\, Lorenzo Cavallo\, Claudio Fabbroni\, Francesca Maffettone\, Giulia Salzano</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Anna Donise;CN=Felice Masi;CN=Anna Pia Ruoppo:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261105T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261106T170000
SUMMARY:Biological Naturalism about Consciousness
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TZID:America/Los_Angeles
LOCATION:390 Portola Plaza\, Los Angeles\, United States
ORGANIZER;CN=Josh Armstrong;CN=Hayley Clatterbuck;CN=Bob Fischer:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Budapest:20261112T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Budapest:20261113T170000
SUMMARY:Non-intentional modes of consciousness in phenomenology: affectivity\, imagination\, unconscious\, embodiment
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TZID:Europe/Budapest
LOCATION:Múzeum krt. 4/i\, Budapest\, Hungary\, 1088
DESCRIPTION:<p>Non-intentional modes of consciousness in phenomenology: affectivity\, imagination\, unconscious\, embodiment</p>\n<p>Throughout the long history of phenomenology\, alongside intentional modes of consciousness\, so-called non-intentional forms of consciousness have played an increasingly significant role: affectivity\, fantasy\, unconscious\, embodiment\, etc. The main aim of the conference is to provide an overview of past and contemporary research of non-intentional forms of conscious functioning.</p>\n<p>Suggested topics:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; embodiment\, bodily existence\, bodily memory</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; affectivity\, emotions\, existential moods</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; phenomenological unconscious\, association\, passive syntheses</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; psychology\, psychoanalysis and phenomenology</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; phenomenology and cognitive sciences</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; intersubjectivity\, culture\, sociality</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; understanding\, interpretation\, narrativity</p>\n<p>The conference is organized by the "Research Group on Non-Intentional Modes of Consciousness" at the Institute of Philosophy\, E&ouml\;tv&ouml\;s Lor&aacute\;nd University\, Budapest.</p>\n<p>Confirmed plenary speakers:</p>\n<p>Natalie Depraz</p>\n<p>Sarah Hein&auml\;maa</p>\n<p>Thiemo Breyer</p>\n<p>Thomas Fuchs (online)</p>\n<p>Dieter Lohmar</p>\n<p>Dermot Moran (online)</p>\n<p>Nicolas de Warren (online)</p>\n<p>Dan Zahavi (online)</p>\n<p>Conference venue: Budapest\, E&ouml\;tv&ouml\;s Lor&aacute\;nd University\, Institute of Philosophy (M&uacute\;zeum krt. 4.)</p>\n<p>Conference dates: November 12&ndash\;13\, 2026.</p>\n<p>The conference website with all the necessary information:</p>\n<p>https://phil.elte.hu/content/non-intentional-modes-of-consciousness-in-phenomenology-call-for-papers.t.53079?m=11091</p>\n<p>We are accepting submissions with abstracts of up to 500 words until July 31\, 2026 at the following email address: <a href="mailto:phenomenology.conf2026@gmail.com">phenomenology.conf2026@gmail.com</a></p>\n<p>Please send a brief introduction\, including your affiliation\, in a separate document.</p>\n<p>We will send notifications regarding accepted presentations by August 10\, 2026.</p>\n<p>There is no registration fee.</p>\n<p>We warmly welcome all interested parties:</p>\n<p>The organizers</p>\n<p>Tam&aacute\;s Ullmann\, Professor of Philosophy</p>\n<p>Csaba Olay\, Professor of Philosophy</p>\n<p>Bence P&eacute\;ter Maros&aacute\;n\, Associate Professor</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Bence Marosan;CN="Tamás Ullmann";CN=Csaba Olay:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20261113T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20261114T170000
SUMMARY:Toronto-London Philosophy of Perception Workshop
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TZID:America/Toronto
LOCATION:Jackman Humanities Building\, Room 100\, Toronto\, Canada
ORGANIZER;CN=Sonia Sedivy;CN=Kevin J. Lande;CN=Jacob Beck;CN=James Stazicker;CN=Matthew Soteriou;CN=Bill Brewer:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Copenhagen:20261116T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Copenhagen:20261117T170000
SUMMARY:Workshop on Functions and Representations in AI Systems
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TZID:Europe/Copenhagen
LOCATION:Carlsberg Academy\, Gamle Carlsberg Vej 13\, Copenhagen\, Denmark\, 1778
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Workshop on Functions and Representations in AI Systems</strong><br><br>16th&ndash\;17th November 2026<br>Copenhagen\, Denmark (Carlsberg Academy)<br>CFA Deadline September 21st<br><br>The concepts of <em>function</em> and <em>representation</em> are widely invoked in the cognitive and life sciences. An influential philosophical tradition\, teleosemantics\, proposes to ground representation partly in biological functions and ground functions in historical selection processes. While this remains a leading approach\, the account has faced challenges\, ranging from the notorious "swampman" objection\, to more recent disputes about the nature of functional and representational explanation in scientific practice.<br><br>Independently\, the recent wave of developments in artificial intelligence has sparked questions about the representational capacities of AI models\, e.g. what\, if anything\, can large language models represent? The emerging field of mechanistic interpretability is replete with function- and representation-talk. But is this talk justified? Are AI models subject to selection processes\, in the proper sense? And are the concepts of representation and function deployed here the same as those invoked in the life sciences? Are standard philosophical frameworks adequate for the case of AI? Or should we look elsewhere\, e.g. to theorising about artefacts? And what role\, if any\, do human norms and intentionality play in grounding AI functions and content?<br><br>A workshop on these issues\, co-funded by the Pioneer Center for Artificial Intelligence (https://www.aicentre.dk/p1-programs/functions-and-representations-in-ai-systems) and the Center for Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (University of Copenhagen) (https://cpai.ku.dk/)\, will be held in Copenhagen\, November 16th&ndash\;17th\, in the beautiful Carlsberg Academy building (https://www.carlsbergfondet.dk/en/about-the-foundation/our-buildings/the-carlsberg-academy/).</p>\n<p>Confirmed speakers include</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Rosa Cao (Stanford) (https://sites.google.com/site/luosha/home)\,</li>\n<li>Dimitri Coelho Mollo (Ume&aring\;) (https://dimitrimollo.academicwebsite.com/)</li>\n<li>Jumbly Grindrod (Reading) (<a target="_blank">https://jumblygrindrod.github.io/</a>)</li>\n<li>Fintan Mallory (Durham) (https://fintanmallory.com/)</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>We invite abstracts on these issues for presentation at the workshop.</strong> See CFA page here (deadline 21st September)&nbsp\;https://philevents.org/event/show/152957.</p>\n<p>Please feel free to forward this information to anyone who you think might be interested in presenting a paper or attending the workshop. A further message will be circulated closer to the time with information about registration.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Iwan Williams:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261116T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261116T180000
SUMMARY:Is ascribing inferences to brains or non-human animals a fallacy?
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are pleased to announce our monthly&nbsp\;<em>online</em>&nbsp\;talk series on "Inferences &amp\; Capacities."<br><br>Our next speaker is:<br><br></p>\n<p><strong>Hans-Johann Glock&nbsp\;</strong>(University of Z&uuml\;rich)<br><strong>"Is ascribing inferences to brains or non-human animals a fallacy?"</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Nov 16</strong>:<em>&nbsp\;12am (Buenos Aires)\, 10am (New York)\, 4pm (Berlin).</em><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Abstract</strong>: TBA</p>\n<p>How to participate:&nbsp\;Please\, send an email to <strong>Alfredo Vernazzani</strong> at:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>alfredo-vernazzani AT protonmail.com</p>\n<p>_______</p>\n<ul>\n<li>About&nbsp\;Inferences &amp\; Capacities:</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The series brings together work on inferential capacities\, rationality\, normativity\, and cognition &mdash\; across both human and non-human animals &mdash\; with the aim of fostering discussion on the nature and limits of the cognitive sphere. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>2026 line-up: &nbsp\;<br><br></p>\n<p>April 27:&nbsp\;<strong>Angelica Kaufmann</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Milan): "Mind Blanking as Mental Imagery."&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>May 18:&nbsp\;<strong>Federico Burdman</strong>&nbsp\;(Universidad Alberto Hurtado) "Constrained choices: addiction\, attention\, and reasons-responsiveness."&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>June 22:&nbsp\;<strong>Susanna Schellenberg</strong>&nbsp\;(Rutgers): TBA&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>July 20:&nbsp\;<strong>Cameron Buckner</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Florida): "Chains-of-Thought\, Inner Speech\, and Artificial Epistemic Agency."</p>\n<p>September 7:&nbsp\;<strong>Ulf Hlobil&nbsp\;</strong>(Concordia University): TBA &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>October 19:&nbsp\;<strong>Eva Schmidt</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund): TBA&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>November 16:&nbsp\;<strong>Hans-Johann Glock</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Z&uuml\;rich): "Is Ascribing Inferences to Brains or Non-human Animals a Fallacy?"&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>December 14:&nbsp\;<strong>Emma Borg</strong>&nbsp\;(SAS\, University of London): "Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: The Scope of Common-Sense Psychology."&nbsp\;<br><br></p>\n<p>Each talk lasts c. 40 minutes followed by 40 minutes open Q&amp\;A. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The series is co-organized by:</p>\n<p><strong>Mariela Aguilera&nbsp\;</strong>(University of C&oacute\;rdoba)</p>\n<p><strong>Mat&iacute\;as Osta-V&eacute\;lez&nbsp\;</strong>(Universidad de la Rep&uacute\;blica)</p>\n<p><strong>Alfredo Vernazzani</strong>&nbsp\;(TU Dortmund\; Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg).</p>\n<p>Visit our website:&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Alfredo Vernazzani;CN=Mariela Aguilera;CN="Matías Osta Vélez":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20261120T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20261120T170000
SUMMARY:Boundaries of Artificial Intelligence: From Computational Models to Mind Emulation and Superintelligent Systems
UID:20260910T085836Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:f84c:d7ff:fee1:b55%3
TZID:Europe/Warsaw
LOCATION:Podchorążych 2\, Kraków\, Poland
DESCRIPTION:<p>The rapid development of artificial intelligence is reshaping our understanding of cognition\, consciousness\, and the nature of the mind. Advances in computational modeling\, neuroscience\, and neurotechnology raise fundamental questions about the possibility of Whole Brain Emulation (WBE)\, understood as the reconstruction and simulation of the human brain in silico.</p>\n<p>&nbsp\;At the same time\, progress in artificial intelligence brings increasing attention to the potential emergence of advanced and possibly superintelligent systems. These developments raise critical questions concerning controllability\, safety\, and the long-term trajectory of human civilization. In this context\, issues of AI alignment\, strategic timing of technological development\, and global coordination become central.</p>\n<p>This conference aims to provide an interdisciplinary platform for researchers working at the intersection of artificial intelligence\, neuroscience\, computer science\, philosophy\, and the social sciences. We welcome contributions addressing theoretical foundations\, technical feasibility\, as well as philosophical\, ethical\, and strategic implications of the transition from computational models to artificial and emulated minds.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Andrzej Dabrowski;CN=Magdalena Reuter;CN="Stanisław Ruczaj";CN=Olga Qq;CN=Marcin Urbaniak;CN=Anna Sarosiek:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261125T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261127T170000
SUMMARY:Simposio Internacional MemoriEs 2026
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Simposio Internacional Online MemoriEs 2026</strong> <br> <br> <strong>MemoriEs</strong> propone un espacio de di&aacute\;logo interdisciplinario en torno a las relaciones entre memoria\, corporalidad y g&eacute\;nero\, con el objetivo de problematizar los supuestos te&oacute\;ricos que han separado estos &aacute\;mbitos en tradiciones de investigaci&oacute\;n diversas. Desde las ciencias cognitivas\, la neurociencia\, la fenomenolog&iacute\;a\, la filosof&iacute\;a feminista\, los estudios de g&eacute\;nero y las ciencias sociales\, el simposio busca examinar c&oacute\;mo los cuerpos recuerdan\, c&oacute\;mo las experiencias corporales configuran la memoria y c&oacute\;mo las din&aacute\;micas de g&eacute\;nero influyen en lo que se recuerda\, se olvida o se silencia. Daremos especial atenci&oacute\;n a los procesos de inscripci&oacute\;n material\, afectiva y social de la memoria\, as&iacute\; como a las desigualdades estructurales que moldean las trayectorias mn&eacute\;micas individuales y colectivas.</p>\n<p><strong>Convocatoria:</strong> Se invita a investigadores\, activistas\, doctorandos y profesionales en Filosof&iacute\;a\, Neurociencias\, Antropolog&iacute\;a\, Estudios de G&eacute\;nero\, Ciencias cognitivas\, Psicolog&iacute\;a y &aacute\;reas afines a participar como ponentes (45 min: 20&ndash\;25 de exposici&oacute\;n + 15&ndash\;20 de discusi&oacute\;n).</p>\n<p><strong>L&iacute\;neas tem&aacute\;ticas:</strong></p>\n<p>-&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;-&nbsp\;Inscripci&oacute\;n corporal del recuerdo</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;-&nbsp\;El cuerpo como memoria</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;-&nbsp\;Afectividad\, trauma y memoria som&aacute\;tica</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;-&nbsp\;G&eacute\;nero y configuraci&oacute\;n de la experiencia mn&eacute\;mica</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;-&nbsp\;El rol de la memoria en narrativas de g&eacute\;nero</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;-&nbsp\;Socializaci&oacute\;n del g&eacute\;nero y narrativas autobiogr&aacute\;ficas</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;-&nbsp\;Memoria\, identidad y performatividad</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;-&nbsp\;Diferencias generizadas en las pr&aacute\;cticas de recordar</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;-&nbsp\;Da&ntilde\;os epist&eacute\;micos en contextos de injusticias de g&eacute\;nero</p>\n<p>Interesados\, favor de enviar un resumen (300 palabras en espa&ntilde\;ol) antes del 30 de septiembre de 2026</p>\n<p><strong>Env&iacute\;o de res&uacute\;menes: </strong>https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSePf_EsviiWCXvsWgdilnrT2M2Nc-eS0m5RIvQIKqrQXoT_Rw/viewform<strong></strong></p>\n\n<p><strong>Website: </strong>https://memories.lat/simposio-2026-2/<strong></strong></p>
ORGANIZER;CN="Alberto Guerrero-Velázquez";CN=Elena Ostos;CN=Lucienne Huby;CN="Alba Marcela Zárate Rochín":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261214T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261214T180000
SUMMARY:Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: Exploring the scope of common-sense psychology
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are pleased to announce our monthly&nbsp\;<em>online</em>&nbsp\;talk series on "Inferences &amp\; Capacities."<br><br>Our last speaker for 2026 is:<br><br></p>\n<p><strong>Emma Borg&nbsp\;</strong>(SAS\, University of London)<br><strong>"Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: Exploring the scope of common-sense psychology"</strong></p>\n<p>December 14:<em>&nbsp\;12am (Buenos Aires)\, 10am (New York)\, 4pm (Berlin).</em></p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:</strong> A standard philosophical view holds that human action is typically <em>intentional</em>\, i.e. reasons-responsive\, driven by what a subject believes\, desires\, and intends. This picture of human action seems crucial to many things we care about (e.g. underpinning reactive moral attitudes). However\, recently questions have been asked about the <em>scope</em> of what Fodor 1987 called &lsquo\;good old common sense belief/desire psychology&rsquo\;: is the assumption that human behaviour is <em>typically</em> reasons-responsive right? According to various scope-based challenges\, although the reasons-based approach holds for occurrently considered\, consciously-willed actions\, most of what humans do is not like this. In particular\, fidgets\, habits\, and skills have all been argued to fall beyond the reach of the common-sense framework. Yet if this is right\, then the reasons-based model turns out to be less interesting or impressive than we might once have thought\, since it accounts for only a tiny sliver of human action\, ignoring vast swathes of what people do. My aim in this talk is to defend common-sense psychology from various incarnations of the scope challenge. I&rsquo\;ll argue that\, at heart\, the challenge rests on a background picture of different\, fully encapsulated systems for thought and action\, a picture we have reason to resist.</p>\n<p>How to participate:&nbsp\;Please\, send an email to Alfredo Vernazzani at:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>alfredo-vernazzani AT protonmail.com</p>\n<p>_______</p>\n<ul>\n<li>About&nbsp\;Inferences &amp\; Capacities:</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The series brings together work on inferential capacities\, rationality\, normativity\, and cognition &mdash\; across both human and non-human animals &mdash\; with the aim of fostering discussion on the nature and limits of the cognitive sphere. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>2026 line-up: &nbsp\;<br><br></p>\n<p>April 27:&nbsp\;<strong>Angelica Kaufmann&nbsp\;</strong>(University of Milan): "Mind Blanking as Mental Imagery."&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>May 18:&nbsp\;<strong>Federico Burdman</strong>&nbsp\;(Universidad Alberto Hurtado) "Constrained choices: addiction\, attention\, and reasons-responsiveness."&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>June 22:&nbsp\;<strong>Susanna Schellenberg</strong>&nbsp\;(Rutgers): TBA&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>July 20:&nbsp\;<strong>Cameron Buckner</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Florida): "Chains-of-Thought\, Inner Speech\, and Artificial Epistemic Agency."</p>\n<p>September 7:&nbsp\;<strong>Ulf Hlobil</strong>&nbsp\;(Concordia University): TBA &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>October 19:&nbsp\;<strong>Eva Schmidt&nbsp\;</strong>(TU Dortmund): TBA&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>November 16:&nbsp\;<strong>Hans-Johann Glock</strong>&nbsp\;(University of Z&uuml\;rich): "Is Ascribing Inferences to Brains or Non-human Animals a Fallacy?"&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>December 14:&nbsp\;<strong>Emma Borg</strong>&nbsp\;(SAS\, University of London): "Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: The Scope of Common-Sense Psychology."&nbsp\;<br><br></p>\n<p>Each talk lasts c. 40 minutes followed by 40 minutes open Q&amp\;A. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The series is co-organized by:</p>\n<p><strong>Mariela Aguilera&nbsp\;</strong>(University of C&oacute\;rdoba)</p>\n<p><strong>Mat&iacute\;as Osta-V&eacute\;lez&nbsp\;</strong>(Universidad de la Rep&uacute\;blica)</p>\n<p><strong>Alfredo Vernazzani&nbsp\;</strong>(TU Dortmund\; Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg).</p>\n<p>Visit our website:&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Alfredo Vernazzani;CN=Mariela Aguilera;CN="Matías Osta Vélez":
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261215T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261215T170000
SUMMARY:Fiction and Lies: the ASIFF/SIRFF Fourth International Congress
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TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Edinburgh\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>Supported by the British Society of Aesthetics and the Scots Philosophical Association</p>\n<p>KEYNOTE SPEAKERS</p>\n<p>--Professor Eileen John (Philosophy\, University of Warwick)<br>--Professor Pierre Bayard (Literature\, Universit&eacute\; Paris 8 - Saint-Denis)</p>\n<p><br>From Plato&rsquo\;s indictment of the tragic poets as misrepresenting the truth\, to Sir Philip Sidney&rsquo\;s famous claim in the Defence of Poesy that &lsquo\;the Poet\, he nothing affirms\, and therefore never lieth&rsquo\;\, to current debates about fictionality and factuality\, the relationship between&nbsp\;fiction&nbsp\;and&nbsp\;lies&nbsp\;has been a focus of scholarly attention. Both&nbsp\;fiction-makers and liars make things up and misrepresent the truth. But it is traditionally assumed that with&nbsp\;fiction\, the invention is non-deceptive. As Margaret Macdonald (1954\, 170) put the point\, &lsquo\;The conviction induced by a story is the result of a mutual conspiracy\, freely entered into\, between author and audience. A storyteller does not&nbsp\;lie\, nor is a normal auditor deceived&rsquo\;. Macdonald proposed that instead\,&nbsp\;fiction-makers engage in a non-deceptive pretence of assertion\; but other approaches also distinguish between fictionality and deception\, from philosophers who associate&nbsp\;fiction&nbsp\;with an invitation to make-believe rather than to believe to narratologists who treat fictionality as a rhetorical mode of communication that overtly signals fabrication. If&nbsp\;lies&nbsp\;are assertions aimed at deception\, perhaps&nbsp\;fictions&nbsp\;are incapable of&nbsp\;lying.<br><br>Yet a sharp distinction between fictionality and deception confronts numerous challenges. Scholars across disciplines have considered the many ways in which&nbsp\;fictions&nbsp\;can affect our beliefs\, for good or ill. Even if&nbsp\;fictions&nbsp\;cannot&nbsp\;lie&nbsp\;in some technical sense\, they can certainly mislead\, insinuate\, obfuscate and so on. Works of&nbsp\;fiction&nbsp\;may be instances of propaganda which misrepresent the facts\; think of Oliver Stone&rsquo\;s film JFK (1991) or Michael Crichton&rsquo\;s&nbsp\;novel&nbsp\;State of Fear (2004). And the distinctions between the&nbsp\;fictional&nbsp\;and factual are under increasing pressure in the current culture of disinformation and &lsquo\;fake news&rsquo\; &ndash\; a category not so easy to distinguish from &lsquo\;fictional&nbsp\;news&rsquo\;.<br><br>This three-day international conference aims to explore the relationship between&nbsp\;fiction&nbsp\;and&nbsp\;lies&nbsp\;from a range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives\, including philosophy\, literary history and theory\, narratology\, film and media studies\, psychology and cognitive science. Proposals may address fiction in general\, or any historical period or cultural tradition. We also encourage studies of fictional works in a variety of media (including video games\, comics\, film\, and television series).</p>\n<p>Possible topics include but are not limited to:</p>\n<p>&bull\;The possibility of lying in/through fiction</p>\n<p>&bull\;Other modes of deception and dissimulation in fiction (in particular works\, in different media\, etc.)</p>\n<p>&bull\;Fiction and fictionality as (tools for) propaganda</p>\n<p>&bull\;The relationship between fiction and fake news</p>\n<p>&bull\;Differing historical or cultural conceptions of the relationship between fiction and lies</p>\n<p>&bull\;Representations of deception within fiction (e.g.\, unreliable narrators\, lying protagonists\, forgers)</p>\n<p>&bull\;Fictions that (seem to) deceive about their own status (e.g.\, mockumentary)\, and more generally\, questions of &lsquo\;framing&rsquo\;</p>\n\n<p>Please note: There may be a conference registration fee (discounted for students) depending on the outcome of grant funding applications.</p>\n\n<p>Submission guidance</p>\n<p>&bull\;All submissions should be sent by attachment in Word or pdf to fictionlies2026@gmail.com by 15 December 2025.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&bull\;Papers: Abstracts should be no longer than 350 words\, in English or French. Bear in mind that sessions scheduled for paper presentations will be 30 minutes (20 minutes presentation\, 10 minutes questions and answers).&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&bull\;Symposia: Proposals\, in English or French\, should be no longer than 500 words and should include a description of the topic/theme\, the names/affiliations of participants and brief abstracts of the papers. Sessions for symposia will be 1.5 hours or 2 hours depending on the schedule and thus should typically have no more than three speakers.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&bull\;We encourage submissions from\, and symposia including\, members of groups underrepresented in their disciplines\, including women in philosophy. Symposia in philosophy should ensure that the proposal follows the Good Practice Policy of the British Philosophical Association and the Society for Women in Philosophy (see bpa.ac.uk/resources/women-in-philosophy/good-practice). Please also take note of the BPA&rsquo\;s Environment/Travel Guideline Scheme (bpa.ac.uk/policies).</p>\n<p>&bull\;Funding may be available towards the cost of arranging childcare for speakers who may require it. Please ask for details.</p>\n<p>&bull\;Participants in the conference will be expected to become members of the Association if they are not already (www.fictionstudies.org).</p>\n<p>Early career prize</p>\n<p>The ASIFF/SIRFF will offer a prize for the best paper by an early-career scholar (doctoral student or scholar who has received their PhD within the last 3 years)\, to be presented at the conference. The winner will receive a monetary award of &euro\;1\,000 (euros). If you would like to be considered for this award\, please submit your completed conference paper (no more than 3\,500 words/20\,000 characters) by 28 February 2026 to fictionlies2026@gmail.com. The article must be unpublished.</p>\n&nbsp\;
ORGANIZER;CN=Stacie Friend:
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20261231T234500
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20261231T234500
SUMMARY:4th Inquiry Network Workshop
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TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:2000 North Pkwy\, Memphis\, United States\, 38112
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Inquiry Network is hosting a workshop on inquiry at Rhodes College in Memphis\, TN\, April 2-3\, 2027.</p>\n<p>This meeting will be held in conjunction with the annual Mid-South Philosophy Conference.</p>\n<p>We invite submissions of anonymized abstracts (up to 1\,000 words) on any topic related to the philosophy of inquiry. For example\, papers might address topics such as:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Norms of inquiry.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; The relationship between inquiry and interrogative attitudes such as curiosity and suspension of judgment.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; The relationship between inquiry and attention or salience.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; The semantics and pragmatics of questions.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Virtues and vices of inquiry.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Inquiry in specific domains\, such as scientific inquiry or philosophical inquiry.</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Historical approaches to inquiry (for example\, work on the American Pragmatists\, ancient Pyrrhonians\, etc.).</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Ethics of inquiry.</p>\n<p>Please submit anonymized abstracts (up to 1\,000 words) by <strong>EOD&nbsp\;</strong><strong>December 31</strong><strong>\, 2026&nbsp\;</strong>to inquirynetworkgroup@gmail.com.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Thorstad;CN=Jared A. Millson:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270128T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270130T170000
SUMMARY:Collective Agency in Classical and Continental Philosophy (Vilnius\, 2027)
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TZID:Europe/Vilnius
LOCATION:Vilnius\, Lithuania
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Conference description</strong></p>\n<p>It is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\,&nbsp\; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.</p>\n<p>This conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency<strong>.</strong> We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.</p>\n<p>We invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.</p>\n<p>Possible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Relational nature of personhood</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collectives and ontological unity</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Categorisation of group agency</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective emotions</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective justice</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Groups and moral responsibility</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture</p>\n<p>&middot\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Confirmed keynote speakers:</strong></p>\n<p>Thornton Lockwood (University of Florida)</p>\n<p>Sophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)</p>\n\n<p><strong>Submission guidelines</strong></p>\n<p><u>Submission deadline and acceptance notification</u></p>\n<p>The abstracts must be submitted by <strong>Monday 1st June 2026</strong>.</p>\n<p>The acceptance notifications might be expected after <strong>Tuesday 30th June 2026</strong>.</p>\n<p><u>Submission procedure</u></p>\n<p>We invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.</p>\n<p>Please write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.</p>\n<p>The abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com</p>\n<p><u>Paper delivery</u></p>\n<p>All the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.</p>\n<p><u>Other practicalities</u></p>\n<p>Please note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.</p>\n<p>Lunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.</p>\n<p><strong>Organisers</strong></p>\n<p>This conference is part of the research project <em>&ldquo\;</em><strong>Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory</strong><em>&rdquo\;</em> (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270131T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270131T090000
SUMMARY:Clinical Pragmatics and the Cognitive Sciences
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>CALL FOR CHAPTERS</p>\n<p>CLINICAL PRAGMATICS AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES<br> Language\, Mind\, and Communication Across the Lifespan</p>\n<p>Edited by Paola Pennisi<br> University of Messina\, Italy</p>\n<p>Proposed for the Springer series<br> Perspectives in Pragmatics\, Philosophy &amp\; Psychology</p>\n<p>────────────────────────────────────────</p>\n<p>ABOUT THE VOLUME</p>\n<p>Clinical pragmatics offers a privileged perspective on the relationships between language\, meaning\, cognition\, and social interaction.</p>\n<p>This edited volume will bring together clinical\, linguistic\, philosophical\, psychological\, neuropsychological\, and cognitive-scientific approaches to pragmatic communication across the lifespan.</p>\n<p>We particularly welcome contributions that begin with the description or analysis of clinical and atypical pragmatic-linguistic profiles and use this evidence to develop\, refine\, or challenge broader theories of language\, meaning\, cognition\, and interaction.</p>\n<p>There are no submission or publication fees for contributors.</p>\n<p>────────────────────────────────────────</p>\n<p>TOPICS MAY INCLUDE</p>\n<p>&bull\; Autism and other neurodevelopmental conditions<br> &bull\; Social and pragmatic communication disorders<br> &bull\; Developmental language disorder and intellectual disability<br> &bull\; Genetic and rare syndromes<br> &bull\; Schizophrenia\, psychosis\, and psychiatric conditions<br> &bull\; Aphasia and right-hemisphere communication disorders<br> &bull\; Traumatic brain injury<br> &bull\; Parkinson&rsquo\;s disease\, dementia\, and other neurodegenerative conditions<br> &bull\; Hearing loss\, visual impairment\, and multimodal communication<br> &bull\; Pragmatic development and pragmatic changes across the lifespan<br> &bull\; Theory of mind\, mentalizing\, and social cognition<br> &bull\; Executive functions\, memory\, attention\, emotion\, and cognitive flexibility<br> &bull\; Pragmatic inference\, implicature\, presupposition\, and speech acts<br> &bull\; Metaphor\, irony\, humour\, sarcasm\, and indirect language<br> &bull\; Narrative\, discourse\, conversation\, prosody\, gesture\, and gaze<br> &bull\; Embodied\, enactive\, phenomenological\, ecological\, and interactional approaches<br> &bull\; Pragmatic assessment\, diagnosis\, intervention\, and rehabilitation<br> &bull\; Cross-linguistic\, cross-cultural\, and multilingual perspectives<br> &bull\; Digital technologies\, computational methods\, and artificial intelligence</p>\n<p>Related proposals are also welcome.</p>\n<p>────────────────────────────────────────</p>\n<p>TYPES OF CONTRIBUTIONS</p>\n<p>The volume welcomes:</p>\n<p>&bull\; Experimental and observational studies<br> &bull\; Descriptions of pragmatic-linguistic profiles<br> &bull\; Qualitative\, quantitative\, and mixed-method studies<br> &bull\; Conversation\, discourse\, narrative\, and multimodal analyses<br> &bull\; Clinical case studies and case series<br> &bull\; Comparative and transdiagnostic studies<br> &bull\; Assessment and intervention studies<br> &bull\; Methodological contributions<br> &bull\; Theoretical and philosophical papers<br> &bull\; Systematic\, scoping\, and narrative reviews<br> &bull\; Meta-analyses and interdisciplinary position papers</p>\n<p>Contributions may address any age group\, from early childhood to older adulthood.</p>\n<p>────────────────────────────────────────</p>\n<p>SUBMISSION</p>\n<p>Please submit:</p>\n<p>&bull\; A provisional title<br> &bull\; An abstract of approximately 300&ndash\;500 words<br> &bull\; Five keywords<br> &bull\; Authors&rsquo\; names\, affiliations\, and contact details<br> &bull\; A short biographical note<br> &bull\; The proposed type of contribution</p>\n<p>Abstracts should be sent to:</p>\n<p>Paola Pennisi<br> University of Messina<br>paola.pennisi@unime.it</p>\n<p>────────────────────────────────────────</p>\n<p>IMPORTANT DATES</p>\n<p>Abstract submission: 31 January 2027<br> Notification of acceptance: 14 February 2027<br> Full chapter submission: 7 January 2028<br> Peer-review reports: 28 February 2028<br> Final manuscript submission to Springer: June 2028</p>\n<p>────────────────────────────────────────</p>\n<p>All chapters will undergo scholarly peer review. Acceptance of an abstract does not automatically guarantee publication of the final chapter.</p>\n<p>Prospective contributors are welcome to circulate this call among interested colleagues.</p>
ORGANIZER:
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Lima:20270222T080000
DTEND;TZID=America/Lima:20270228T170000
SUMMARY:CAELO 1: First Andean Congress for Epistemology and Logic
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TZID:America/Lima
LOCATION:Lima\, Peru
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>CAELO 1: First Andean Congress for Epistemology and Logic</strong>*\, organised by Peru&rsquo\;s&nbsp\;<em>Society for Epistemology and Logic</em>&nbsp\;(SEPLO)\, will take place in Lima\, Peru\, from&nbsp\;22 to 28 February 2027.</p>\n<p>This inaugural congress marks the beginning of a planned series dedicated to the study of epistemology and logic\, bringing together scholars\, researchers\, and students from diverse backgrounds. The event offers a space for rigorous discussion and exchange on topics including logic\, epistemology\, philosophy of science\, analytic philosophy\, metaphysics\, social philosophy\, empirically informed approaches\, and both philosophically and scientifically oriented studies. Participants will have the opportunity to engage in talks and workshops that foster interdisciplinary dialogue and critical reflection. Contributions from all levels of experience are welcome\, from established researchers to early-career scholars and students. Proposed sessions and workshops include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Beyond Loyalty and Disloyalty: The Social and Political Commitements of Science</li>\n<li>El Lunarejo: The Legacy of Juan de Espinosa Medrano</li>\n<li>From Science to AI\, and Backwards: Interactions between AI\, Science\, and Philosophy</li>\n<li>Ifs\, Thens\, and Otherwises: New Perspectives on the Logic of Conditionals</li>\n<li>Logic\, Reality\, and Beyond: Logical Approaches to Metaphysics</li>\n<li>Noise\, Errors\, and Flaws: Approaches to Defective Science</li>\n<li>Many Logics\, Many Reasons? The Meaning of Logical Monism and Pluralism</li>\n<li>Scientific Publishing and Publishing Scientifically: Academic Publishing under Scrutiny</li>\n<li>Scientists as Subjects: The Sociology and Historiography of Science</li>\n<li>The Shape of Thought: Diagrams in Philosophy and Science</li>\n<li>This Workshop Is about This Workshop: Self-Referential Expressions</li>\n<li>Ways of Knowing: The Philosophy of Methodology and Heuristics&nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>*This event was formerly called <em>Epilog 1: 1st Congress of Epistemology and Logic</em>.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Luis F. Bartolo Alegre:
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20270224T090000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20270226T170000
SUMMARY:Conference for Asia Pacific Psychedelic Science
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TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Melbourne\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:<p>Australia is at the centre of this shift. In 2020\, Monash University established the country's first dedicated psychedelic research lab. In 2023\, the Therapeutic Goods Administration created a regulated pathway for authorised psychiatrists to prescribe MDMA and psilocybin\, making Australia one of the first countries to formalise clinical access to psychedelic-assisted therapy outside of clinical trials.</p>\n<p>Multiple groups across the Asia-Pacific are now conducting world-first and world-class psychedelic research\, assessing implementation in real-world clinics\, asking questions across a diverse array of disciplines\, manufacturing psychedelic compounds in novel ways\, shaping novel policy\, and developing psychedelic practice.</p>\n<p>CAPS27 builds on that foundation. It's a forum for researchers\, clinicians\, policymakers\, ethicists\, cultural scholars\, educators\, industry leaders\, and funders to meet\, share evidence\, build collaborations\, and advance the field together.</p>
ORGANIZER:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270301T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270301T000000
SUMMARY:Mind without Inner Representation? Psychological Discourse\, Rationality\, and Mental Anti-Representationalism (Special Issue of JCCP)
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>CFP: Mind without Inner Representation?</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Psychological Discourse\, Rationality\, and Mental Anti-Representationalism</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Special Issue of&nbsp\;</strong><strong><em>Journal of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy</em> (</strong><strong>JCCP)</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Guest Editor:</strong> Rusong Huang</p>\n<p><strong>Contact:</strong> rusongh@gmail.com</p>\n<p><strong>Submission deadline:</strong> March 1\, 2027</p>\n<p><strong>Topic areas:</strong> Philosophy of Mind\; Philosophy of Language\; Metaphysics\; Normativity\; Philosophy of Psychology</p>\n<p><strong>Description</strong></p>\n<p>When we attribute beliefs\, desires\, intentions\, fears\, memories\, imaginings\, sensations\, or experiences to someone\, what are we doing?</p>\n<p>Much of modern philosophy of mind has assumed that psychological sentences are representational: they describe mental states\, properties\, events\, or processes belonging to a subject. This assumption generates familiar metaphysical pressures. If psychological sentences represent mental facts\, then we must explain how such facts fit into the physical world. This gives rise to what has been variously called the location problem\, the placement problem\, the accommodation problem\, or the problem of how mind can be at home in nature.</p>\n<p>This special issue invites papers that examine whether the representational assumption about psychological discourse should be rejected\, revised\, or defended. It focuses on a family of views that challenge\, in different ways\, the idea that psychological sentences primarily function to represent inner mental facts. These include fictionalism\, eliminativism\, error theory\, illusionism\, and mental anti-representationalism &mdash\; what we may call\, for convenience\, the FEEL theories and MAR. The issue welcomes both sympathetic and critical treatments of these views\, as well as papers that defend more traditional representationalist approaches.</p>\n<p>A central aim of the issue is to explore the relations among these positions. Are the FEEL theories and MAR competing alternatives\, or can they be combined? Does MAR collapse into one of the FEEL theories\, or does it offer a distinct way of rejecting inner-fact representationalism? Can these approaches preserve the explanatory\, rational\, and normative roles of psychological discourse while avoiding the metaphysical burdens of inner-object models of mind?</p>\n<p><strong>Possible topics</strong></p>\n<p>Submissions may address\, but are not limited to:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>the semantics of psychological sentences\;</li>\n<li>belief\, desire\, intention\, memory\, imagination\, pain\, or experience as mentality attributions\;</li>\n<li>rationality and normativity in psychological explanation\;</li>\n<li>whether psychological discourse represents inner mental facts\;</li>\n<li>the relation between Mental Anti-Representationalism and fictionalism\, eliminativism\, error theory\, or illusionism\;</li>\n<li>whether anti-representationalism collapses into non-realism about the mental\;</li>\n<li>psychological explanation without inner mental objects\;</li>\n<li>anti-representationalism and physicalism\;</li>\n<li>consciousness\, introspection\, and illusionism\;</li>\n<li>Sellarsian\, Wittgensteinian\, Rylean\, Davidsonian\, Dennettian\, McDowellian\, Brandomian\, expressivist\, or pragmatist approaches to mind\;</li>\n<li>implications for artificial intelligence or machine mentality.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Papers may be sympathetic\, critical\, historical\, systematic\, or comparative.</p>\n<p><strong>Submission instructions</strong></p>\n<p>Submissions should be original articles not currently under consideration elsewhere.</p>\n<p>Manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review and should not exceed <strong>10\,000 words</strong>\, including quotations and footnotes but excluding reference lists.</p>\n<p>Please submit manuscripts in the Editorial Manager for JCCP:&nbsp\; <a href="https://www.editorialmanager.com/jccp/default.aspx">https://www.editorialmanager.com/jccp/default.aspx</a>&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>You may see submission instructions <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jccp/jccp-overview.xml?language=en&amp\;srsltid=AfmBOoqCvVB9xb2tM6E2KSHw2S1aaqaPTBcQI91IK3qNbV-HcuZhHpip&amp\;contents=ArtSub">here</a>.</p>\n<p>Please indicate that the paper is intended for the special issue <strong>&ldquo\;Mind without Inner Representation? Psychological Discourse\, Rationality\, and Mental Anti-Representationalism.&rdquo\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Submission deadline:</strong> March 1\, 2027</p>\n<p><strong>Expected publication:</strong> Fall 2027 / early 2028</p>
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270301T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270301T090000
SUMMARY:Special issue of Agatheos: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion: "Philosophy of Mind Meets Philosophy of Religion"
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>CFP: Philosophy of Mind Meets Philosophy of Religion</p>\n<p><strong>Special issue on &ldquo\;Philosophy of Mind Meets Philosophy of Religion&rdquo\;</strong></p>\n<p>Deadline: 1 March 2027<br>Editors: Prof. Andrei A. Buckareff and Dr. Mikael Leidenhag</p>\n<p>The philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion were largely siloed sub-disciplines for much of the 20th and early 21st centuries. Insofar as the sub-disciplines made connections\, it was mostly in work by traditional theists considering the implications of the ontological commitments of theism for how to think about persons and the afterlife. To the extent that philosophy of mind had an influence on debates in the philosophy of religion\, much of the work centered around theists arguing that theistic supernaturalism enjoys an advantage over atheistic naturalism with respect to the hard problem of consciousness. Again\, there have been exceptions. For instance\, some panentheistic models of the divine mind offered in the 1990s and 2000s were influenced by work on emergentism in the philosophy of mind. And William Alston&rsquo\;s work on religious experience borrowed heavily from his own work and the work of others on direct realism about perception.</p>\n<p>In the last twenty years\, there has been growing interest in alternative conceptions of an ultimate. Along with this growing interest\, we have witnessed a growing body of research exploring how work in the philosophy of mind can bear not only on models of the ultimate\, but help shed light on other problems in the philosophy of religion.</p>\n<p>This special issue is devoted to essays that explore the intersection between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. Examples of some topics that may be explored include\, but are not limited to\, the following:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>How does a theory in the metaphysics of mind\, such as panpsychism\, open the door for understanding commitments of either a traditional model of God or an alternative (e.g.\, pantheism or panentheism)?</li>\n<li>Do the problems of mental causation faced by property dualist and substance dualist theories of the mind generalize to traditional theistic conceptions of an ultimate?</li>\n<li>Can enactivist theories of perception help shed light on the differences between the religious experiences of adherents of different religions (and those who eschew any religious commitments)?</li>\n<li>How do theories of emotion bear on debates over the rationality of religious commitments that stem from religious experiences that are affectively-valenced?</li>\n<li>Does work on cognition as embodied and embedded present an obstacle to providing coherent traditional theistic models of God and count in favor some alternative conceptions of an ultimate to traditional theism?</li>\n<li>Are some conceptions of an ultimate found in various religious traditions better poised than others to provide an answer to puzzles about consciousness such as the boundary problem and the hard problem?</li>\n<li>Does accepting a particular theory of intentional agency as providing necessary and sufficient conditions for exercises of agency restrict the range of viable conceptions of an ultimate or constrain what sorts of powers can be ascribed to an ultimate?</li>\n<li>Is there an interface problem posed by the move from the representational contents of a religious experience to the religious beliefs formed on the basis of those experiences?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We welcome submissions on the foregoing topics and any other topics that explore the boundaries of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion for this special issue.</p>\n<p>To submit\, please visit <a href="https://publicera.kb.se/aejpr/about/submissions">https://publicera.kb.se/aejpr/about/submissions</a>. Name the file &ldquo\;Special Issue PoMPoR&rdquo\;.</p>
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20270303T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20270305T170000
SUMMARY:Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions
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TZID:Europe/Vienna
LOCATION:Graz\, Austria\, 8010
ORGANIZER;CN="Denis Džanić";CN=Emanuela Carta;CN=Daniel Neumann:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20270305T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20270307T170000
SUMMARY:Artificial Intelligence and The Philosophy of Technology/Künstliche Intelligenz und die Philosophie der Technik
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TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Brüggener Weg 6\, Düsseldorf\, Germany\, 40547
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Symposium</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Artificial Intelligence and the Philosophy of Technology</strong></p>\n<p>March 5&ndash\;7\, 2027</p>\n<p>EKŌ Center of Japanese Culture\, D&uuml\;sseldorf</p>\n<p><strong>About the Symposium:</strong></p>\n<p>The EKŌ Center of Japanese Culture in D&uuml\;sseldorf is hosting a symposium on the topic of &ldquo\;Artificial Intelligence and the Philosophy of Technology&rdquo\; on March 5-7\, 2027.</p>\n<p>Today\, artificial intelligence has become an indispensable part of people's daily lives\; examples include search engines\, ChatGPT\, navigation and traffic management systems\, voice assistants\, facial recognition\, personalized advertising\, and more. In this context\, AI attempts&mdash\;by means of algorithms&mdash\;to mimic human thought\, to optimize it\, and perhaps\, one day\, to replace it.</p>\n<p>This symposium aims to shed light on the philosophy of AI and technology. It is designed to be both intercultural and interdisciplinary in scope. At its center lie the following questions: What is AI\, and how does it function? What are its ethical implications? Is the term &ldquo\;Artificial Intelligence&rdquo\; a contradiction in terms? Will AI one day attain consciousness? To what extent will it shape our future lives? To what degree is AI an expression of &ldquo\;Western thought and Western culture&rdquo\;\, and how do other cultures or religions&mdash\;such as Buddhism&mdash\;view technology? In this context\, the symposium will also explore the place of AI within Japanese culture.</p>\n<p>The following sections are planned:</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;Intercultural Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence and Technology</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;AI and Consciousness</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;Western Technology and Buddhism</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;AI and Technology in Japan</p>\n<p>We welcome submissions from established scholars as well as early-career researchers (doctoral candidates\, postdocs) in the fields of Philosophy (Philosophy of Technology\, Philosophy of Mind\, Philosophy of Language\, Ethics\, Metaphysics\, Philosophy of Religion\, etc.)\, Japanese Studies\, Cultural Studies\, and related disciplines.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers:</strong></p>\n<p>&middot\; Interested scholars are invited to submit abstracts (in German or English) of 300&ndash\;500 words by <strong>September 30\, 2026</strong>\, to: <a href="mailto:hantke@eko-haus.de">hantke@eko-haus.de</a></p>\n<p>&middot\; Notification of acceptance will be sent in mid-October 2026.</p>\n<p>&middot\; Limited financial support for travel and accommodation expenses is available for selected speakers.</p>\n<p>&middot\; The presentations will subsequently be published in <em>H&ocirc\;rin. </em><em>Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur</em> (<em>H&ocirc\;rin. </em><em>Comparative Studies on Japanese Culture</em>) by the Iudicium Verlag:</p>\n<p><a href="https://eko-haus.de/sonstiges/publikationen/#j2">https://eko-haus.de/sonstiges/publikationen/#j2</a></p>\n<p><strong>Abstracts and Registration to:</strong></p>\n<p>Dr. Myriam-Sonja Hantke: <a href="mailto:hantke@eko-haus.de">hantke@eko-haus.de</a></p>\n<p><strong>Further information will be available at:</strong></p>\n<p><a href="https://eko-haus.de/">https://eko-haus.de/</a></p>\n<p><strong>Organization:</strong></p>\n<p>Prof. Dr. Hisao MATSUMARU</p>\n<p>Dr. Myriam-Sonja HANTKE</p>\n<p>Br&uuml\;ggener Weg 6 &bull\; 40547 D&uuml\;sseldorf &bull\; Germany</p>\n<p>----------------------------------------------------------------------</p>\n<p><strong>Symposium</strong></p>\n<p><strong>K&uuml\;nstliche Intelligenz und die Philosophie der Technik</strong></p>\n<p>05.03.-07.03.2027<strong></strong></p>\n<p>EKŌ-Haus der Japanischen Kultur e.V. in D&uuml\;sseldorf<strong></strong></p>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>&Uuml\;ber das Symposium:</strong></p>\n<p>Das EKŌ-Haus der Japanischen Kultur e.V. in D&uuml\;sseldorf veranstaltet vom 05.03. bis zum 07.03.2027 ein Symposium zum Thema &bdquo\;K&uuml\;nstliche Intelligenz und die Philosophie der Technik&ldquo\;.</p>\n<p>K&uuml\;nstliche Intelligenz ist heutzutage aus dem Alltag der Menschen nicht mehr wegzudenken\, Beispiele sind Suchmaschinen\, ChatGPT\, Navigation und Verkehrsmanagement\, Sprachassistenten\, Gesichtserkennung\, personalisierte Werbung etc. Die KI versucht dabei mittels Algorithmen menschliches Denken nachzuahmen\, dieses zu optimieren und vielleicht eines Tages zu ersetzen.</p>\n<p>Bei diesem Symposium soll die Philosophie der KI und der Technik n&auml\;her beleuchtet werden. Das Symposium soll dabei interkulturell und interdisziplin&auml\;r ausgerichtet sein. Im Zentrum stehen die Fragen: Was ist KI und wie funktioniert sie? Welche ethischen Implikationen besitzt sie? Ist der Begriff &bdquo\;K&uuml\;nstliche Intelligenz&ldquo\; ein Widerspruch in sich? Wird die KI eines Tages Bewusstsein erlangen? Wie sehr wird sie unser zuk&uuml\;nftiges Leben bestimmen? Inwieweit ist die KI Ausdruck des &bdquo\;westlichen Denkens und der westlichen Kultur&ldquo\; und wie betrachten andere Kulturen bzw. Religionen wie beispielsweise der Buddhismus Technik? Auch soll in diesem Zusammenhang nach dem Ort der KI in der japanischen Kultur gefragt werden.</p>\n<p>Folgende Sektionen sind geplant:</p>\n<p>- Interkulturelle Philosophie der K&uuml\;nstlichen Intelligenz und der Technik</p>\n<p>- KI und Bewusstsein</p>\n<p>- Westliche Technik und Buddhismus</p>\n<p>- KI und Technik in Japan</p>\n<p>Wir freuen uns &uuml\;ber Beitr&auml\;ge von Wissenschaftlern/Innen und auch von Nachwuchswissenschaftlern/Innen (Doktoranden/Innen\, PostDocs) aus der Philosophie (Philosophie der Technik\, Philosophie des Geistes\, Sprachphilosophie\, Ethik\, Metaphysik\, Religionsphilosophie etc.)\, Japanologie\, Kulturwissenschaften sowie aus angrenzenden Disziplinen.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers:</strong></p>\n<p>&middot\; Interessierte sind aufgerufen\, Abstracts (Deutsch oder Englisch) mit einem Umfang von 300-500 W&ouml\;rtern bis zum <strong>30.09.2026</strong>einzureichen an: <a href="mailto:hantke@eko-haus.de">hantke@eko-haus.de</a></p>\n<p>&middot\; Die Benachrichtigung &uuml\;ber die Annahme der Beitr&auml\;ge erfolgt Mitte Oktober 2026.</p>\n<p>&middot\; Es besteht die M&ouml\;glichkeit einer begrenzten finanziellen Unterst&uuml\;tzung f&uuml\;r Reise- und Unterkunftskosten ausgew&auml\;hlter Vortragender.</p>\n<p>&middot\; Die Vortr&auml\;ge werden anschlie&szlig\;end in <em>H&ocirc\;rin. Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur</em> im Iudicium-Verlag ver&ouml\;ffentlicht:</p>\n<p><a href="https://eko-haus.de/sonstiges/publikationen/#j2">https://eko-haus.de/sonstiges/publikationen/#j2</a></p>\n<p><strong>Abstracts und Anmeldungen an: &nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p>Dr. Myriam-Sonja Hantke: <a href="mailto:hantke@eko-haus.de">hantke@eko-haus.de</a></p>\n<p><strong>Weitere Informationen folgen auf:</strong></p>\n<p><a href="https://eko-haus.de/">https://eko-haus.de/</a></p>\n<p><strong>Organisation:</strong></p>\n<p>Prof. Dr. Hisao MATSUMARU</p>\n<p>Dr. Myriam-Sonja HANTKE</p>\n<p>Br&uuml\;ggener Weg 6 &bull\; 40547 D&uuml\;sseldorf &bull\; Germany</p>
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DTSTAMP:20260910T020655Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20270324T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20270327T170000
SUMMARY:3rd PhOMO APA affiliated group session
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TZID:America/Los_Angeles
LOCATION:Portland\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Philosophy of Memory Organization (PhOMO) invites applications to present at its next APA affiliated group session\, expected to take place at the 2027 Pacific Division meeting in Portland\, Oregon (March 24th&ndash\;27th\, 2027).</p>\n\n<p>Following previous sessions\, PhOMO expects to run a 2-hour event consisting of three 30-minute talks\, each followed by 10 minutes of Q&amp\;A.</p>\n\n<p>Colleagues at all career stages are encouraged to apply\, especially early career researchers. Since the affiliated groups program is distinct from the APA&rsquo\;s divisional program\, those who expect or intend to present on the divisional program are free to apply.</p>\n\n<p>To apply\, please submit a title and abstract of your proposed talk (up to 500 words\, excluding references). Abstracts should centrally address memory and will be evaluated on the basis of their originality\, significance\, clarity of argument\, and suitability for a 30-minute talk. Only one submission will be considered by any given individual\, whether as single author or co-author.</p>\n\n<p>Submissions must be prepared for blind review and submitted as an attachment by email to:phil.mem.org@gmail.com</p>\n\n<p>In the body of the email\, applicants are requested to specify the name(s) and any institutional affiliation(s) of the author(s).</p>\n\n<p>The deadline for submissions is 23:59 CEST on 18th September 2026. Successful applicants will be informed within 2 weeks of the deadline.</p>\n\n<p>Please note that PhOMO is unable to financially support the meeting registration\, travel\, or accommodation costs of selected speakers. Those selected to present at the session will be expected to be members of PhOMO at the time of the event.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=James Openshaw:
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