Covert Consciousness: Detection and Treatment \;
\nNeuroscience Strategic Intelligence\, Grand Challenge Workshop
\nhttps://neurosas.org/strategic-intelligence/challenge-workshops/the-workshops/covert-consciousness%20detection-and-treatment/ \;
\nOctober 15-19\; Crans-Montana\, Switzerland \; \; \;
\nOver the past decade\, it has become clear that a significant number of behaviourally unresponsive patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) are covertly conscious\, as shown by complex and/or voluntary cortical response patterns. The realisation that behaviourally unresponsive patients are not necessarily unconscious changes the way brain-injured and critically ill patients must be assessed and treated\, and how families are counselled. \;This Challenge Workshop will focus on the latest advances in detecting and managing covert consciousness in both ICU and sub-acute settings\, supporting functional recovery through pharmacological or neurotechnological interventions\, restoring communication via brain-machine interfaces\, and navigating philosophical and ethical implications. \;
\nOpen to clinicians\, researchers\, patient advocates\, ethicists\, philosophers\, and technologists. \; Participation is limited to 20 individuals\, selected on the basis of merit and relevance to the workshop. \; \;
\nApplications are reviewed on a rolling basis until all 20 available spots are filled. \; \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Christof Koch;CN=Michael J. Young: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T090000 SUMMARY:Arkete: Philosophy of Perception: Representation\, Reality\, and Cognitive Structure UID:20261013T230133Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Arkete
\nSpecial Issue 2026
\nPhilosophy of Perception: Representation\, Reality\, and Cognitive Structure
\nEditors: Mariano Bianca (University of Siena) and Paolo Piccari (University of Siena)
\nPhilosophical reflection on perception has returned to the centre of contemporary debates in philosophy of mind\, epistemology\, and metaphysics. Questions concerning perceptual content\, representational structure\, and the relation between experience and reality have gained renewed prominence in light of current discussions on cognition\, conceptual capacities\, and the epistemic role of perception.
\nAt the same time\, the field remains divided between competing models: representationalist accounts\, relational theories\, disjunctivism\, and naturalistic approaches that attempt to explain perception through cognitive or computational frameworks. These debates raise a deeper philosophical question: whether perception should be understood primarily as an internal mental state or rather as a structured form of access to an objective world.
\nThis special issue aims to gather contributions that investigate perception as a cognitive and conceptual phenomenon with epistemic and metaphysical implications. Particular attention will be devoted to approaches that combine analytic rigour with broader theoretical ambition\, exploring how perceptual experience contributes to the constitution of knowledge and to the articulation of reality.
\nWe welcome contributions addressing these questions\, preferably grounded in concrete cases and/or examples that help clarify and support philosophical analysis.
\nTopics for Submission (including\, but not limited to)
\nSubmission Guidelines
\nSubmissions must be original and unpublished\, written in English or Italian\, and formatted according to the journal&rsquo\;s editorial guidelines. All manuscripts will undergo double-blind peer review.
\nThe 2025 issue of Arkete will be dedicated to these questions. The volume will include articles selected through this Call for Papers as well as invited contributions by national and international scholars.
\nAll submissions must be sent no later than 15 October 2026 to the Editors at:
\nmariano.bianca@unisi.it
paolo.piccari@unisi.it
Manuscripts must conform to the editorial guidelines available at:
https://www.arkete.it
Accepted languages: English and Italian.
\nMaximum length: 40\,000 characters (including spaces\, footnotes\, references\, and abstract).
\nEach submission must include:
\nIn a separate file attached to the same email\, authors must provide:
\nThere are two opposed perspectives on AI consciousness. Computational functionalism says computational improvements will lead to conscious AI whereas biological naturalism says that biological aspects of animals are necessary for consciousness. \; \;This talk concerns the pros and cons of these two points of view.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T230000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T230000 SUMMARY:Scienza&Filosofia 37: "Between Mind and Machine: Genealogy and Phenomenology of Computation"/"Tra mente e macchina: genealogia e fenomenologia del calcolo" UID:20261013T230135Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:ENG:
Computation profoundly shapes how we think\, communicate\, and relate to the world. Yet the philosophical and anthropological foundations of this practice&mdash\;rooted in formal logic and symbolic manipulation&mdash\;often remain underexplored. Computation is not merely a technique\, a cognitive routine\, or a fixed feature of the natural world\; rather\, it is a complex cultural practice that interacts with and structures thought and world alike\, deeply redefining both.
\nThe genealogy of computational thought reveals a crucial paradox: though originally understood as an impersonal\, purely formal device\, computation is inextricably interwoven with human life. From inscriptional practices that encode cognitive strategies to logical machines that simulate universal rules of reasoning\; from artificial neural architectures that fuse mechanical rules and behavioral theory to neuroscientific models that render the brain an algorithmic device&mdash\;computation emerges as a cultural force no less potent than art\, myth\, or language.
\nThe phenomenological tradition offers valuable conceptual tools for grasping the complexity of these practices and their conceptual forms. Husserl&rsquo\;s rarely applied idea of &ldquo\;language as calculation&rdquo\; suggests that symbolic notation functions not only as an instrument of communication but as a medium capable of generating what we might call &ldquo\;computational evidence&rdquo\;&mdash\;a clarity produced through the systematic manipulation of symbols. This perspective widens our understanding of writing in all its forms\, pointing to a dynamic interaction between phenomenology and computation.
\nAt the same time\, the history of logical machines&mdash\;from nineteenth‑century devices to today&rsquo\;s AI architectures&mdash\;highlights a further tension between the impersonal universality and technical reproducibility of algorithmic calculation and the personal construction of meaning.
\nDespite rich theoretical premises\, the practical successes of computation have often obscured the historical‑conceptual background of debates on artificial intelligence. Strictly speaking\, the epistemology of AI stands on behaviorist and cybernetic paradigms that frame cognition and thought as algorithmic processes. These &ldquo\;operative concepts&rdquo\;&mdash\;to borrow Eugen Fink&rsquo\;s distinction between &ldquo\;thematic&rdquo\; and &ldquo\;operative&rdquo\; concepts&mdash\;characterize our approach to classical philosophical problems\, predisposing us to read intelligence\, consciousness\, language\, creativity\, and so forth in computational terms\, thereby generating a familiar vicious circle.
\nIn neuroscience\, the temptation to interpret the brain as a computer raises fundamental epistemological questions. Computational models\, for all their productivity\, may furnish convenient abstractions rather than capture the brain&rsquo\;s actual functioning. Built on data averages and variance filtering\, such models struggle to reproduce the organ&rsquo\;s staggering complexity. These simplifications\, however interesting\, may not reveal an intrinsic computational essence of the brain.
\nTo resist such assumptions\, it may be fruitful to consider computation as a &ldquo\;symbolic form&rdquo\; in the Cassirerian sense: a capacity that not only processes but also structures how we conceive of and relate to the world. The potential case studies are innumerable\, yet the guiding philosophical question should remain the same: Can the concept of symbolic form be applied to the ways different artificial intelligences shape the world? Do AIs in any meaningful sense possess an &ldquo\;external&rdquo\; world? And is this enough to deny that human reality&mdash\;with its perceptions and values&mdash\;is itself shaped by codes\, algorithms\, and digital infrastructures?
\nFinally\, in connection with these questions\, we must investigate the ethical‑political impact of AI: how do algorithms condition our decisions and structure their logical form? Can human beings still be regarded as autonomous and responsible moral subjects in a world increasingly characterized by co‑agency between humans and intelligent machines?
\nThis dossier of Scienza &\; Filosofia seeks to create an interdisciplinary space for reflection that illuminates the historical\, genealogical\, phenomenological\, and epistemological entanglements of computational thought. Our aim is not only to clarify the roots of computational thinking but also to enrich the ongoing dialogue on the role of technology and computation in contemporary culture.
\nSuggested (non‑exhaustive) Topics
\nWe welcome contributions from philosophy (phenomenology\, analytic philosophy\, philosophy of mind\, science and technology studies\, intellectual history)\, cognitive science\, computer science\, neuroscience\, media studies\, and adjacent fields. Interdisciplinary proposals are especially encouraged.
\nSubmission of Proposals: To participate in this call for papers\, please submit an abstract of no more than 500 words&mdash\;including the title of the proposed essay and a description of the argument&mdash\;to scienzaefilosofia@gmail.com by October 15\, 2026. Proposals will be evaluated by the editors and the journal&rsquo\;s review committee. Authors will be notified of the selection results\, along with the new deadline for submitting manuscripts\, which is set for March 15\, 2027. Finally\, manuscripts will undergo a double-blind peer review process\, and authors will be notified of the review results upon completion of the process.
\nAccepted Languages: Italian\, English\, French\, German and Spanish.
Edited by Claudio Fabbroni and Lorenzo De Stefano.
ITA:
Il calcolo plasma profondamente il modo in cui pensiamo\, comunichiamo e ci rapportiamo al mondo. Eppure\, i fondamenti filosofici e antropologici di questa pratica &ndash\; radicati nella logica formale e nella manipolazione simbolica &ndash\; rimangono spesso inesplorati. La computazione non è\; semplicemente una tecnica\, una pratica cognitiva o una caratteristica immutabile del mondo naturale: è\; piuttosto una pratica culturale complessa\, che interagisce e struttura il pensiero e il mondo\, ridefinendoli profondamente.
\nLa genealogia del pensiero computazionale rivela un paradosso cruciale: sebbene originariamente concepito come un dispositivo puramente formale e impersonale\, la computazione è\; intrecciata in modo inestricabile alla vita umana. Dalle pratiche di scrittura che codificano strategie cognitive alle macchine logiche che simulano le regole universali del ragionamento\, dalle architetture neurali artificiali che fondono regole meccaniche e teoria comportamentale con i modelli neuroscientifici che rendono il cervello una macchina algoritmica\, il calcolo si configura come una forza culturale potente quanto arte\, mito o linguaggio.
\nLa tradizione fenomenologica offre strumenti concettuali preziosi per comprendere la complessità\; di tali pratiche e delle loro forme concettuali. L&rsquo\;idea husserliana del &ldquo\;linguaggio come calcolo&rdquo\;\, raramente applicata alla comprensione della scrittura\, suggerisce che la notazione simbolica funzioni non solo come strumento di comunicazione\, ma come medium capace di generare quella che potremmo chiamare &ldquo\;evidenza computazionale&rdquo\; &ndash\; una chiarezza prodotta dalla manipolazione sistematica di simboli. Questa prospettiva espande la nostra visione della scrittura &ndash\; di qualsiasi tipo essa sia &ndash\;\, suggerendo invece un&rsquo\;interazione dinamica tra fenomenologia e calcolo.
\nLa storia delle macchine logiche\, dai primi dispositivi ottocenteschi alle contemporanee architetture di intelligenza artificiale\, illumina\, tuttavia\, un&rsquo\;ulteriore tensione: quella tra l&rsquo\;universalità\; impersonale e riproducibilità\; tecnica del calcolo algoritmico e la costruzione personale di significato. \;
\nPur muovendosi entro queste premesse teoriche\, l&rsquo\;impatto dei risultati pratici ha offuscato il retroterra storico‑concettuale del dibattito sull&rsquo\;intelligenza artificiale. L&rsquo\;epistemologia dell&rsquo\;intelligenza artificiale\, infatti\, a voler rimanere stretti\, si regge sui paradigmi comportamentisti e cibernetici\, che inquadrano la cognizione e il pensiero come processi algoritmici. Tali concetti &ldquo\;operativi&rdquo\; &ndash\; per riprendere la distinzione di Eugen Fink tra concetti &ldquo\;tematici&rdquo\; e &ldquo\;operativi&rdquo\; &ndash\; plasmano il modo in cui comprendiamo i classici problemi della tradizione filosofica\, poiché\; ci predispongono a interpretare i problemi dell&rsquo\;intelligenza\, della coscienza\, del linguaggio\, della creatività\; e così\; via in termini computazionali\, generando il più\; classico dei circoli viziosi.
\nIn ambito neuroscientifico\, sappiamo\, che la tentazione di interpretare il cervello come un computer solleva interrogativi epistemologici fondamentali. I modelli computazionali\, pur essendo straordinariamente produttivi\, potrebbero offrire astrazioni convenienti piuttosto che catturare il funzionamento reale del cervello. Le teorie computazionali si basano su medie di dati e filtraggio di varianze\, strumenti per mezzo dei quali risulta difficile riprodurre la complessità\; strabiliante dell&rsquo\;organo cerebrale. Queste semplificazioni\, quindi\, per quanto preziose\, potrebbero non rivelare un&rsquo\;essenza computazionale intrinseca del cervello.
\nPer scongiurare assunzioni di questo tipo\, può\; essere opportuno considerare la computazione come &ldquo\;forma simbolica&rdquo\; \; \;nel senso cassireriano\, ovverosia nei termini di una capacità\; che non solo elabora\, ma struttura il modo in cui concepiamo e ci rapportiamo al mondo. I casi di studio a cui applicare quest&rsquo\;idea sono potenzialmente innumerevoli\, ma la domanda filosofica guida dovrebbe rimanere la stessa: si può\; applicare il concetto di forma simbolica al modo in cui le diverse intelligenze artificiali plasmano il mondo? Esiste realmente un mondo &ldquo\;esterno&rdquo\; per le intelligenze artificiali? E questo basta a negare che la realtà\; umana\, con le sue percezioni e i suoi valori\, non sia plasmata da codici\, algoritmi e infrastrutture digitali?
\nIn relazione a quest&rsquo\;ultima domanda\, occorrerà\; infine indagare l&rsquo\;impatto etico-politico dell&rsquo\;intelligenza artificiale: in che modo gli algoritmi condizionano le nostre decisioni e ne strutturano la forma logica? Gli esseri umani potranno essere considerati soggetti morali autonomi e responsabili in un mondo in cui la co-agentività\; fra uomini e macchine intelligenti caratterizzerà\; sempre più\; la quotidianità\; di tutti noi?
\nQuesto dossier di Scienza&\;Filosofia auspica la creazione di uno spazio di riflessione interdisciplinare per illuminare gli intrecci storici\, genealogici\, fenomenologici ed epistemologici del pensiero computazionale. Il dossier mira a chiarire non solo le radici del pensiero computazionale\, ma anche ad arricchire il dialogo in corso sul ruolo della tecnologia e del calcolo nella cultura contemporanea.
\nSpunti tematici\, non vincolanti\, per la riflessione:
\nSono ben accetti contributi provenienti dalla filosofia (fenomenologia\, filosofia analitica\, filosofia della mente\, science and technology studies/STS\, storia delle idee)\, dalle scienze cognitive\, dall&rsquo\;informatica\, dalle neuroscienze\, dagli studi sui media e da ambiti affini. Sono particolarmente incoraggiate proposte interdisciplinari.
\nProcedura: Per partecipare alla call\, occorre inviare all&rsquo\;indirizzo scienzaefilosofia@gmail.com\, entro il 15 ottobre 2026 un abstract di max 500 parole comprendente il titolo della proposta di saggio e una descrizione dell&rsquo\;iter argomentativo. Le proposte saranno valutate dai curatori e dal comitato di lettori della rivista. Gli autori riceveranno comunicazione dell&rsquo\;esito della selezione\, unitamente all&rsquo\;indicazione della nuova deadline per l&rsquo\;invio dei contributi che è\; fissata per il 15 marzo 2027. Infine\, i contributi verranno sottoposti a doppia blind review e gli autori riceveranno\, al termine della procedura\, comunicazione circa l&rsquo\;esito della valutazione.
\nLingue accettate: italiano\, inglese\, francese\, tedesco e spagnolo.
A cura di Claudio Fabbroni e Lorenzo De Stefano.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261015T170000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261015T170000 SUMMARY:JAM (Junkyard Anniversary Meeting) - Philosophy of Imagination Conference UID:20261013T230136Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:America/Los_Angeles LOCATION:The Kravis Center\, Claremont\, United States\, 91711 DESCRIPTION:A philosophy of imagination conference to commemorate the 10th anniversary of The Junkyard blog. In addition to the invited speakers\, there will be a number of contributed sessions.
\nCall for Papers
\nJAM will include parallel sessions for submitted papers selected via an open call. Papers should be anonymized and no more than 3000 words (not including references). Philosophical papers on all topics concerning imagination are welcome. The submission deadline is October 15. Notification of paper status will be provided by December 1. A limited number of partial travel stipends are available for early career researchers and scholars residing outside the United States.
\nCall for Symposium Proposals
\nJAM also has limited spots for submitted symposia selected via an open call. Symposia on all philosophical themes concerning imagination are welcome. The submission deadline is October 15. Notification of proposal status will be provided by December 1. A symposium should contain 3 papers and may also include up to two discussants and a chair (if you do not specify a chair\, one will be assigned to you). \; \;Symposium proposals should be anonymized\, and they should \;explain the theme of the symposium and include extended abstracts of each of the three symposium papers (1000 words each). \; \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Amy Kind: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Tokyo:20261016T100000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Tokyo:20261017T170000 SUMMARY:Philosophy & AI 5 (PhAI5) UID:20261013T230137Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Asia/Tokyo LOCATION:Clark Memorial Student Center\, Sapporo-shi\, Japan DESCRIPTION:The event is the fifth installment of Philosophy &\; AI\, an event series established to promote research and collaboration on the philosophy of AI in Asia\, and also\, to promote interaction between philosophers of AI and AI researchers in other academic disciplines\, as well as outside academia.
\nBasic information
\nKeynote speaker: Jun Otsuka (Zen University)
\nInvited speakers
\nFind out more at our official website!
ORGANIZER;CN=Katsunori Miyahara;CN=Hayate Shimizu;CN=Sonia Zhang;CN="Sebastian Sunday Grève";CN=Yiwen Zhan: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261016T103000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20270527T170000 SUMMARY:Modelling the Mind. Seminar Series in the Philosophy of Cognitive Science UID:20261013T230138Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Rome LOCATION:Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici\, Via Porta di Massa 1\, Napoli\, Italy\, 80133 DESCRIPTION:What do cognitive scientists explain when they explain a behaviour\, and what would count as having explained it? How do computational\, mechanistic\, representational and dynamical accounts of the same phenomenon relate &mdash\; do they compete\, complement one another\, or answer different questions? Where do the methods and models of empirical research come from\, and how well do they fit what they are meant to describe? What\, if anything\, do artificial systems teach us about biological minds?
\nQuestions of this kind keep coming up because there is no shortage of findings about the mind. What is scarce is a clear account of how they hang together\, or whether they do. Modelling the Mind is a seminar series for working that out in the open\, one talk at a time. The aim is to contribute to an empirically informed philosophical understanding of the mind and of the methods by which it is studied.
\nUpcoming talks:
\nFri 9 October 2026 - Silvano Zipoli Caiani (Università\; degli Studi di Firenze)
\nFri 16 October 2026 - Matteo Colombo (Tilburg University)
\nThu 12 November 2026 - Dimitri Coelho Mollo (Umeå\; University)
\nThu 10 December 2026 - Beate Krickel (Technische Universitä\;t Berlin)
\nMon 18 January 2027 - Nina Poth (Radboud University)
\nThu 11 February 2027 - Andrew Richmond (University of Otago)
\nWed 3 March 2027 - Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri)
\nWed 31 March 2027 - Grace Lindsay (New York University)
\nWed 21 April 2027 - Mazviita Chirimuuta (University of Edinburgh)
\nFri 7 May 2027 - Danielle Williams (New York University)
\nThu 27 May 2027 - Alfredo Paternoster (Università\; degli Studi di Bergamo)
\nEach session pairs a 45-minute talk with an extended discussion. Each talk of the seminar series is in hybrid form. Attendance is free\, in person and remotely\, and everyone is welcome at any career stage.
\nFor info on abstracts\, Zoom links\, times of the talks (in UTC) and to subscribe to the mailing list - \;in order to receive by email all of the above information and reminders of the talks \;- visit our website at the link below.
ORGANIZER;CN=Claudio Fabbroni: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261016T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261017T170000 SUMMARY:15th Annual Florida State University Free Will\, Moral Responsibility\, and Agency Conference UID:20261013T230139Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:Tallahassee\, United States\, 32304 DESCRIPTION:The conference will take place at Florida State University on October 16-17\, 2026. The conference is open to any who is interested in attending. \;If you would like to attend and require further information\, please email \;Justice Cabantangan (jac24m at fsu.edu). The conference website (https://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference) \;is currently under maintenance.
\nhttps://philosophy.fsu.edu/free-will-conference ORGANIZER;CN=Justice Cabantangan: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261016T153000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261016T163000 SUMMARY:Neurotransmitters and the medium-dependence of neural computing UID:20261013T230140Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Rome LOCATION:Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici\, Via Porta di Massa 1\, Napoli\, Italy\, 80133 DESCRIPTION:Abstract:
\nComputations are abstract operations defined formally and independently from the physical media\, which can implement them. This suggests that\, if the brain is a computing system\, then the computations it performs must be medium-independent operations. But whether the brain is a computing system and whether its computations are medium-independent are contentious issues. Here\, I address these issues by focusing on neurotransmitters\, whose activities have limited medium-independence\, and whose functional roles in neural computing remain underexplored in the philosophy of the mind sciences. After distinguishing three functional roles of neurotransmitters in neural computation\, I argue that some neural computations are not medium-independent\, because neurotransmitters play a constitutive role in defining them.
ORGANIZER;CN=Claudio Fabbroni: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20261016T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20261017T170000 SUMMARY:The Architecture of Propositional Thought: From Cognitive Maps to Language and Reasoning UID:20261013T230141Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:Columbia\, United States DESCRIPTION:One of the most promising routes to understanding the architecture of propositional thought&mdash\;and cognition more broadly&mdash\;is to begin with the mammalian navigation system and its associated neural machinery (cognitive maps\, place cells\, grid cells\, path integration\, sequence generation\, hippocampal replay\, and related control mechanisms). Rather than treating navigation as a domain-specific specialization\, this approach treats it as an evolutionarily ancient and well-characterized architectural template that may have been replicated\, extended\, and abstracted to support a wide range of cognitive capacities.
\nA growing body of work suggests that the hippocampus&ndash\;entorhinal cortex system is not merely a spatial navigation system\, but a general system for managing structured representations and sequences\, supporting planning\, memory\, inference\, imagination\, and offline simulation. At the same time\, complementary research highlights the role of frontoparietal control systems in maintaining\, selecting\, and flexibly manipulating these representations under task demands. Together\, these findings motivate an architectural perspective in which navigation-like mapping and replay mechanisms interact with control\, valuation\, imagery\, and language to support higher cognition.
\nAccordingly\, the guiding idea behind this conference is to explore whether propositional thought itself&mdash\;across linguistic and non-linguistic forms&mdash\;can be understood as emerging from the reuse and extension of navigation-like architectures for offline control\, simulation\, and problem solving.
\nThe conference is also aimed at producing an edited volume on the same topic and foster future research collaborations among participants.
\nIf you would like a link to attend this conference virtually\, please email Nathaniel Stagg at nsqk2@umsystem.edu
ORGANIZER;CN=Gualtiero Piccinini: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261018T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261018T090000 SUMMARY:Beyond Diagnostic Boundaries. Mentalizing\, Theory of Mind\, and Cognitive Heterogeneity in Neurodevelopmental Conditions UID:20261013T230142Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:This call for papers invites contributions to the Special Issue &ldquo\;Beyond Diagnostic Boundaries: Mentalizing\, Theory of Mind\, and Cognitive Heterogeneity in Neurodevelopmental Conditions\,&rdquo\; to be published in Reti\, saperi\, linguaggi &ndash\; Italian Journal of Cognitive Sciences\, a prestigious international peer-reviewed journal indexed in Scopus and Web of Science&ndash\;ESCI.
\nThe Special Issue will explore mentalizing and Theory of Mind across neurodevelopmental conditions\, with particular attention to cognitive heterogeneity within and across diagnostic categories. We welcome empirical\, theoretical\, methodological\, and review contributions addressing topics such as autism and other neurodevelopmental conditions\, individual differences in social cognition\, language and interaction\, embodied and ecological approaches to mentalizing\, and innovative assessment methods.
\nResearchers interested in contributing should send a provisional title and a 300&ndash\;400-word abstract to paola.pennisi@unime.it by 18 October 2026. Preliminary decisions will be communicated by 2 November 2026. The deadline for full manuscripts is 30 May 2027\, with publication expected in July 2027.
\nManuscripts in English are especially encouraged. There are no submission or publication fees.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261019T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261019T180000 SUMMARY:Reasons are States of Affairs UID:20261013T230143Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:We are pleased to announce our monthly \;online \;talk series on "Inferences &\; Capacities."
Our next speaker is:
Eva Schmidt \;(TU Dortmund)
Reasons are States of Affairs
Oct 19: \;11am (Buenos Aires)\, 10am (New York)\, 4pm (Berlin).
\nAbstract: \;Reasons have a double role\, a normative role: they count in favor of belief or action\; and an explanatory role: they provide a rational explanation of a subject&rsquo\;s beliefs or actions. These roles pull in different directions regarding the question of the metaphysical nature of reasons&ndash\; are they states of affairs or (true) propositions? Here\, we support the states of affairs view. We first present an argument starting from the particular case of reasons which are available to semantically unsophisticated subjects who do not possess any semantic concepts (such as &ldquo\;truth&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;reference&rdquo\;). We argue that the reasons to which such subjects respond are states of affairs\, and that\, by extension\, \; so are the reasons of more sophisticated subjects. Second\, we undermine arguments for the claim that reasons are propositions &ndash\; or specifically\, fine-grained Fregean propositions. Such arguments appeal to specific cases in which epistemic justification or reason explanation differs in fine-grained ways\, apparently corresponding to differences between the Fregean propositions that are the reasons in these cases. Further arguments appeal to the need of a content-relation between reasons and the supported responses\, which apparently only Fregean propositions can explain and to the nature of (inferential) justification.
\n\nHow to participate: \;Please\, send an email to Alfredo Vernazzani at: \;
\nalfredo-vernazzani AT protonmail.com
\n_______
\nThe series brings together work on inferential capacities\, rationality\, normativity\, and cognition &mdash\; across both human and non-human animals &mdash\; with the aim of fostering discussion on the nature and limits of the cognitive sphere. \;
\n2026 line-up: \;
April 27: \;Angelica Kaufmann \;(University of Milan): "Mind Blanking as Mental Imagery." \;
\nMay 18: \;Federico Burdman \;(Universidad Alberto Hurtado) "Constrained choices: addiction\, attention\, and reasons-responsiveness." \;
\nJune 22: \;Susanna Schellenberg \;(Rutgers): TBA \;
\nJuly 20: \;Cameron Buckner \;(University of Florida): "Chains-of-Thought\, Inner Speech\, and Artificial Epistemic Agency."
\nSeptember 7: \;Ulf Hlobil \;(Concordia University): TBA \;
\nOctober 19: \;Eva Schmidt \;(TU Dortmund): TBA \;
\nNovember 16: \;Hans-Johann Glock \;(University of Zü\;rich): "Is Ascribing Inferences to Brains or Non-human Animals a Fallacy?" \;
\nDecember 14: \;Emma Borg \;(SAS\, University of London): "Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: The Scope of Common-Sense Psychology." \;
Each talk lasts c. 40 minutes followed by 40 minutes open Q&\;A. \;
\nThe series is co-organized by:
\nMariela Aguilera \;(University of Có\;rdoba)
\nMatí\;as Osta-Vé\;lez \;(Universidad de la Repú\;blica)
\nAlfredo Vernazzani \;(TU Dortmund\; Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg).
\nVisit our website: \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Alfredo Vernazzani;CN=Mariela Aguilera;CN="Matías Osta Vélez": METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261022T170000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261022T183000 SUMMARY:Online Inner Speech Colloquium - Kasia Jaszczolt UID:20261013T230144Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:For the last inner speech colloquium of the year\, we are delighted to have Kasia Jaszczolt (University of Cambridge) as our speaker. She will be giving a talk titled: "Self-reference and pragmatic indexicals". Further information and the abstract can be found below. Please note that we will be starting half an hour later than usual\, at 17:00.
\n
Date &\; Time: 22-10-26\, 17:00-18:30 CEST
Link: https://teams.microsoft.com/meet/345014069399153?p=RWDfS3OrNuOdEmFgGE \;
\n
Abstract
Indexicals are philosophers&rsquo\; fiction &ndash\; what counts as an indexical expression engenders interminable debates. It is well-documented that both indexicals and non-indexicals have indexical and non-indexical uses\; languages without pronouns have referential nouns whose essential semantic/pragmatic properties are\, arguably\, not categorically different from those of indexicals. I argue that this lack of a principled distinction calls for regarding indexicality as a functional category &ndash\; indexicals are not expressions but at most functions of expressions. I take on board the case of markers of first-person reference and demonstrate\, using some cross-linguistic evidence\, that a generalised perspective using such a functional category comes with an added advantage of being able to capture the facts that (i) different de se concepts warrant different links to the &lsquo\;self-file&rsquo\; and that (ii) the cognitive access to oneself is a gradable property &ndash\; the characteristics of self-reference that are critical for explicating self-talk.
\nIf you would like to subscribe to (or unsubscribe from) the mailing list\, please contact:jonida.kodra@uni-osnabrueck.de.
\nWe hope to see many of you there!
\nBest regards\,
\nJonida Kodra\, Daniel Mü\;ller and Mathijs Geurts (University of Osnabrü\;ck and Paris Lodron University Salzburg)
ORGANIZER;CN=Jonida Kodra;CN=Mathijs Geurts;CN="Daniel Lennart Müller": METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261025T230000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261025T230000 SUMMARY:Negative Social Action: Silence\, Salience\, and the Politics of Absence UID:20261013T230145Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Gabelsbergerstraße 62\, Munich\, Germany DESCRIPTION:DEADLINE for Abstract Submission: 25 October 2026
\nLanguage is the specifically human alternative to physical violence. As speaking animals\, human beings are capable of inflicting harm through words alone\, and this capacity has driven scholars across philosophy of language\, linguistics\, and related disciplines to investigate verbal violence and hate speech: if we can do things with our words\, then we can also do harm with them (Austin 1962\; Langton 1993\; Maitra and McGowan 2012\; Kukla 2014\; Bianchi 2018\; Langton 2018).
\nYet what is said is only part of the picture. What happens when harm is produced not by what is said\, but by what is left unsaid\, unanswered\, unnoticed\, or absent? Silence is commonly understood as the mere absence of speech\, a neutral gap in communication\, or simply the failure to act. However\, scholars across different disciplines have increasingly challenged this conception\, arguing that silence and related forms of communicative absence are active\, socially structured\, and consequential phenomena (Maitra 2007\; Langton 2007\; Kurzon 2011\; Schrö\;ter 2013\; Tanesini 2018\; Klieber 2024). Silence can communicate\, subordinate\, exclude\, and harm (Bird 2002\; Langton 2007\; Maitra 2009\; Klieber 2024)\; it can be strategically deployed to maintain ambiguity or plausible deniability (Anthonissen 2008\; Schrö\;ter 2013\, 2019\, 2022)\, or emerge from socially organised patterns of inattention that marginalise certain voices\, perspectives\, and experiences (Fricker 2007\; Dotson 2011\; Pohlhaus 2012\; Medina 2013\; Smith and Archer 2020).
\nThis workshop takes as its starting point two converging lines of inquiry. The first concerns silence as a communicative act: a socially embedded practice capable of conveying meaning\, performing social functions\, and shaping relations (Langton 2007\; Schrö\;ter 2013\; Tanesini 2018\; Klieber 2024). The second concerns what we call the politics of absence: the socially structured forms of inattention\, non-response\, and selective salience through which collective patterns of noticing and overlooking are produced and maintained (Watzl 2017\; Wu 2024\; Kaeslin 2024\; Caprioglio Panizza 2022).
\nBy bringing these perspectives into dialogue\, the workshop extends questions traditionally associated with philosophy of language and communication studies towards philosophy of mind\, ethics and moral philosophy\, and philosophy of perception. Taken together\, they point towards a broader theoretical framework centred on negative social action: socially significant actions performed not through explicit speech or overt intervention\, but through absences\, omissions\, silences\, failures of uptake\, and organised forms of non-attention.
\nWe want to investigate cases in which harm is produced through what remains unsaid\, unacknowledged\, unanswered\, unnoticed\, or excluded from personal and collective awareness. Such harm frequently operates indirectly and diffusely\, with a high degree of deniability (Maitra 2007\; Zerubavel 2006\; Saul 2018). Rather than treating silence and inattention as passive phenomena\, the workshop examines their role in producing social meanings\, epistemic environments\, political realities\, and forms of harm.
\nWe ask how absences communicate\, how they shape what becomes collectively visible or invisible\, and how responsibility should be understood when harms arise not from what someone does or says\, but from what is omitted\, neglected\, or left unnoticed (Ayala-Ló\;pez and Vasilyeva 2016\; Smith and Archer 2020). We also welcome empirical work examining how patterns of silence\, non-response\, and inattention shape collective responses to harmful speech\, including their effects on perceived social norms and the recognition of harm (Zapata et al. 2024).
\nMore information:
ORGANIZER;CN=Irene Lo Faro;CN=Jimena Zapata: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261030T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261030T170000 SUMMARY:Philosophical perspectives on artificial reasoning systems UID:20261013T230146Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Emil-Figge-Straße 50\, Dortmund\, Germany DESCRIPTION:The philosophy department of TU Dortmund is organising a one-day workshop exploring the philosophical dimensions of (limitations of) reasoning in large language models. Early LLMs were notorious for frequently generating outputs that\, to users\, appeared to contain basic reasoning errors. However\, in recent years\, researchers and AI developers have invested much effort in improving the common-sense and formal reasoning capacities of transformer-based models through reinforcement learning and similar techniques. This has led to a generation of 'large reasoning models&rsquo\; that perform well on various benchmarks of reasoning problems. Still\, questions remain about how we should interpret these capacities. Do large reasoning models really engage in reasoning\, or merely in a statistical approximation of reasoning? What accounts of reasoning are available in the philosophical literature\, and are these accounts applicable to LLMs? Do LLMs fare differently with respect different kinds of reasoning (e.g. common-sense reasoning\, practical reasoning or counterfactual reasoning)? What are the risks of over-attributing reasoning capacities to LLMs? This workshop brings together philosophers who work on these and related questions.
\nSpeakers:
\nGregor Betz\, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
\nJaroslav Malik\, \;University of Hradec Krá\;lové\;
\nMirco Sambrotta\, Slovak Academy of Sciences
\nCordelia Berz\, LMU Munich
\nLeonard Dung\, Ruhr-University Bochum
\nThom-Felix Thormann\, Ruhr-University Bochum
\nJoris Graff\, TU Dortmund
\nAttendance is open to anyone interested\, but we would like to ask attendants to register in \;advance by sending an email to joris.graff@tu-dortmund.de. Registration is possible until October 26th. Upon registering\, the schedule will be provided via email.
ORGANIZER;CN=Joris Graff: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261030T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261030T090000 SUMMARY:Locus UID:20261013T230147Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Dossier Walking-with the Past: Embodiment\, Environment\, and Narrative
\nLocus. Journal of Culture Studies
\nCall for Papers
\nGuest editors: Marieke Borren and Susan Hogervorst
\nAs an everyday act of embodied locomotion\, walking rarely becomes an explicit object of reflection\, let alone an entry point into questions of history and memory. Yet as we move through streets\, landscapes\, ruins\, and memorial sites\, alone or collectively\, walking can reactivate personal memories\, disclose hidden histories\, and inscribe new narratives into shared spaces. Examples range from commemorative marches and heritage walking tours to psychogeographical drifts that excavate urban and peri-urban spaces as palimpsests\, and the prominent role of walking in first-person biographical accounts of displacement. In literary and cinematic representations\, moreover\, walking often mediates between personal memories and the meaningful environments in which they unfold.
\nThis dossier of Locus explores walking as an embodied mnemonic\, narrative\, and pedagogical practice. We are particularly interested in the philosophical question of how walking mediates between body\, environment\, memory\, and history. We therefore invite contributions that approach walking from one of three interconnected perspectives: (1) embodiment and bodily memory\, (2) environment and place\, or (3) narrative and representation.
\nWalking-with the past: a phenomenological perspective
\nWalking may have a particularly strong relation to memory because it is never a purely present activity. From a phenomenological perspective\, the moving body can be understood as a sedimentation of histories and habits: bodily comportment is shaped by past experience\, social norms\, technologies\, infrastructures\, and built environments. Walking is thus not simply an activity performed by a body in space\; it is an embodied way of inhabiting an already meaningful world.
\nAt the same time\, environments are not neutral backdrops or abstract spaces. They constitute structured fields of affordances that enable and constrain particular forms of movement. Streets\, paths\, ruins\, memorial sites\, and infrastructures invite certain trajectories\, rhythms\, and styles of walking while discouraging others. Historical transformations of built environments may thus become sedimented in bodily habits\, while changes in bodily practices can disclose otherwise unnoticed historical layers of place.
\nWalking consequently unfolds in a dynamic relation between historically sedimented bodily habits and environments that themselves bear traces of past events. This raises questions not only about memory and history but also about the phenomenological constitution of bodily subjectivity\, place\, temporality\, and world.
\nThese questions resonate with phenomenological approaches from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to more recent work on embodiment\, place\, habit\, and environmental experience\, as well as with approaches in 4E cognition and ecological approaches to perception\, including work on affordances and the embodied and situated character of cognition.
\nFrom a cultural memory perspective\, walking can likewise inscribe collective and personal histories into places and reactivate past experiences in the present. Collaborative walking practices in public history\, commemoration\, heritage education\, and psychogeography can make historical layers experientially available through bodily movement. In this sense\, walking may be understood as a form of embodied historical inquiry: a way of encountering the past not merely as an object of representation\, but through situated\, sensory\, and affective engagement with places and environments.
\nThe notion of &ldquo\;walking-with the past&rdquo\; therefore points to a relational and co-constitutive understanding of historical experience. The past is not simply something walkers represent or remember\; it may be encountered\, activated\, and partially re-enacted through movement in places where histories have been sedimented.
\nPossible questions include:
\nWalking and embodied memory
\nWalking\, environment\, and place
\nWalking\, narrative time\, and representation
\nWe particularly welcome philosophical contributions\, including phenomenological and critical-phenomenological approaches to embodiment\, bodily memory\, temporality\, place\, historicity\, habit\, affordance\, and environmental experience. We also welcome contributions from 4E cognition\, ecological approaches to perception\, cultural memory studies\, history\, heritage studies\, psychogeography\, narrative studies\, and the walking arts\, including work that brings these perspectives into dialogue.
\nTypes of contributions
\nWe invite proposals for:
\nThe full call\, including further information about the dossier and submission guidelines\, is available on the Locus Open Journals website.
\nAbout Locus
Locus: Journal of Culture Studies is an interdisciplinary\, diamond Open Access journal published by the Department of Culture Studies at the Open University of the Netherlands. It provides a forum for scholarship across the humanities and culture studies\, including philosophy\, and particularly welcomes interdisciplinary dialogue between academic research and cultural practice. In addition to stand-alone articles\, the journal publishes biannual thematic &lsquo\;dossiers\,&rsquo\; special collections of articles on topical debates. These dossiers cover diverse themes such as the cultural imagination of human and non-human animals\, the coloniality of natural history collections\, performativity\, and embodiment.
We recently completed the migration of Locus to the Open Journals ecosystem. While our current platform is new\, all back issues and articles remain fully available through our former platform. \;
\nSubmission information
\nSubmissions are accepted in English and Dutch. All submissions will undergo editorial review.
\nFor inquiries about the theme\, please contact Marieke Borren: marieke.borren@ou.nl.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20261031T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20261031T234500 SUMMARY:Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions UID:20261013T230148Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Vienna LOCATION:Graz\, Austria\, 8010 DESCRIPTION:CfP: \;Rethinking Agency under Non-Ideal Conditions
\nConfirmed \;speakers: Maria Alvarez\, Havi Carel\, Hanne Jacobs\, Quill Kukla\, Kristina Musholt and \;Caleb Ward.
\n\nThe notion of agency plays a central role across many areas of philosophy\, including philosophy of action\, ethics\, political philosophy\, epistemology\, feminist philosophy\, and phenomenology. \;While traditionally conceptualized in terms of intentional action\, rational control\, and autonomy\, our understanding of agency has recently come under intense scrutiny and is now being increasingly transformed. \;Feminist and phenomenological approaches\, in particular\, have emphasized the need for a richer and more fine-grained conception of agency&mdash\;one that takes seriously the social\, historical\, and relational contexts in which agents are situated. From this perspective\, agency cannot be adequately understood without acknowledging that agents are not only rational decision-makers\, but also emotional\, embodied\, desiring\, creative\, and affective beings.
\nThis conference invites new investigations into agency as it is lived and exercised under non-ideal conditions\, such as vulnerability\, dependency\, uncertainty\, coercion\, structural injustice\, affective ambivalence\, or crisis. Rather than presupposing idealized models of action and rational control\, the conference aims to analyze how agency isreconfigured \;under such conditions. We also particularly welcome contributions that examine how rational and virtuous agency should be rethought under non-ideal conditions and in times of crisis.
\nPossible questions include (but are not limited to):
\nIn addition to contemporary approaches\, we explicitly welcome historical-philosophical work\, including contributions engaging with the phenomenological tradition\, as well as those that critically engage with accounts of agency from marginalized figures and traditions in the history of philosophy.
\nContributions from early-career researchers are especially encouraged.
\nThe conference is planned as an in-person event only.
\n\;
\nWe invite you to submit an anonymized abstract of up to 500 words \;by \;October 31\, 2026 \;to \;laurentia.adam@uni-graz.at
\nPlease include a separate file with your name\, email address\, the title of your talk\, and your affiliation (if any) and put &lsquo\;Rethinking Agency Graz 2027&rsquo\; in the subject line.
\n\;
\nOrganizing Team: Emanuela Carta\, Denis Dzanic\, and Daniel Neumann.
ORGANIZER;CN="Denis Džanić";CN=Emanuela Carta;CN=Daniel Neumann: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261104T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261106T170000 SUMMARY:The 4th annual conference of the The International Society for the Philosophy of the Sciences of the Mind UID:20261013T230149Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:What is the mind\, and how does it work? These questions have led to centuries of philosophical and empirical investigations\, and still lack definitive answers. We thus invite submissions from all disciplines that leverage insights from the use of different techniques\, methodologies\, and research questions to shed light on the nature and functioning of the mind.
\nIn this fourth web conference\, we seek again to bring together many of these perspectives to build a common ground\, a comprehensive and multi-scale conceptual landscape of the mind. We accept submissions from a broad range of perspectives\, including - but not limited to - philosophy of psychology\, philosophy of psychiatry\, philosophy of neuroscience\, philosophy of cognitive science\, philosophy of mind\, philosophy of artificial intelligence &\; robotics\, philosophy of linguistics\, philosophy of ethology\, philosophy of (cognitive) anthropology\, philosophy of biology\, philosophy of the social sciences and consciousness studies.
\nWe are delighted to already have a number of excellent keynote speakers confirmed for 2026\, including:
\nDevon Bailey
University of Johannesburg\, \;Republic of South Africa
Louise Barrett
University of Lethbridge\, \;Canada
Ali Boyle
LSE\, \;United Kingdom
Melina Gastelum Vargas
UNAM\, Mexico
Michael Kirchhoff
University of Wollongong\, \;Australia
Yukie Nagai
University of Tokyo\, Japan
Practical Information
\nWhen: 4-6 November 2026
Where: Online
Fees: The conference is fully online\, and no fee is required
Further Inquiries: \;ispsmofficial@gmail.com
«\;Dal ripudio della psicologia empirica in nome di una logica pura Husserl passerà\;\, attraverso un lungo e tormentato cammino\, alla psicologia pura o trascendentale»\;.
\nA partire da queste parole di Aldo Masullo\, scritte nel 1961\, il convegno intende indagare un tema che\, per molta filosofia del Novecento\, ha rappresentato uno dei principali limiti della fenomenologia e che\, negli ultimi anni\, si è\; invece rivelato uno dei suoi aspetti più\; fecondi: il rapporto tra logica e psicologia.
\nCostitutivo della formazione filosofica di Husserl e decisivo per l&rsquo\;evoluzione del suo pensiero\, il confronto tra logica e psicologia ha orientato gran parte dello sviluppo del movimento fenomenologico. La fenomenologia\, infatti\, non si è\; limitata alla critica delle diverse forme di psicologismo &ndash\; logico\, gnoseologico ed etico &ndash\; ma ha elaborato una nuova concezione delle relazioni tra validità\; logica\, intenzionalità\; e soggettività\;.
\nSi può\; sostenere che\, per comprendere le diverse fasi del pensiero husserliano\, così\; come per distinguere le principali stagioni della tradizione fenomenologica\, sia necessario chiarire le differenti concezioni di logica e di psicologia che vi sono implicate. In questa prospettiva\, il rapporto tra questi due ambiti non costituisce soltanto una questione interna alla fenomenologia\, ma rappresenta una chiave interpretativa essenziale per comprendere il suo sviluppo storico e teorico.
\nAl di là\; del perimetro strettamente fenomenologico\, la relazione tra logica e psicologia occupa oggi una posizione centrale nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo: dalla teoria della conoscenza alla teoria dei concetti\, dall&rsquo\;etica all&rsquo\;antropologia\, dalla filosofia delle scienze cognitive alla filosofia della mente\, dalla filosofia della logica alla psicopatologia.
\nIn questo quadro\, si invitano studiose e studiosi a presentare contributi di carattere storico o teorico sui seguenti temi:
\n1. Fenomenologia e psicologia\;
\n2. Fenomenologia e psicopatologia\;
\n3. Fenomenologia e logica\;
\n4. Etica fenomenologica tra logica e psicologia\;
\n5. Fenomenologia\, scienze cognitive ed epistemologia\;
\n6. Fenomenologia e teoria delle emozioni\;
\n7. Fenomenologia e antropologia\;
\n8. Fenomenologia e trascendentale.
\nGli abstract\, di massimo 2500 caratteri più\; 1000 di bibliografia\, andranno inviati a Lorenzo Cavallo (lorenzo.cavallo2@unina.it) e a Claudio Fabbroni (claudio.fabbroni@unina.it)
Scadenze
\nInvio degli abstract: 15 settembre 2026
\nComunicazione degli esiti: 1°\; ottobre 2026
\nComitato scientifico:
\nAnna Donise\, Felice Masi\, Anna Pia Ruoppo
\nComitato organizzativo:
\nGiovanni Battista Armenio\, Francesco Bevilacqua\, Lorenzo Cavallo\, Claudio Fabbroni\, Francesca Maffettone\, Giulia Salzano
ORGANIZER;CN=Anna Donise;CN=Felice Masi;CN=Anna Pia Ruoppo: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261105T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20261106T170000 SUMMARY:Biological Naturalism about Consciousness UID:20261013T230152Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:America/Los_Angeles LOCATION:390 Portola Plaza\, Los Angeles\, United States ORGANIZER;CN=Josh Armstrong;CN=Hayley Clatterbuck;CN=Bob Fischer: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20261111T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20261112T170000 SUMMARY:The Age of the Bookworm: Can Large Language Models Represent the World? UID:20261013T230153Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Zurich LOCATION:Rue des Savoises 15\, Genève\, Switzerland\, 1205 DESCRIPTION:What does it mean for a system trained exclusively on text to represent and understand the world?
\nSince the public release of ChatGPT in late 2022\, large language models (LLMs) have become a fixture of academic and public life. Yet how these systems work\, and what they are fundamentally capable of\, remains poorly understood. Many people know that they are trained to predict the next token given a context. Far fewer have reflected on the capacities that emerge from this simple training objective\, or on what fine-tuning through human feedback and verifiable rewards adds to it.
\nA useful starting point is Bender and Koller's (2020) thought experiment. An infinitely smart octopus intercepts underwater telegraph messages between two islanders. After eavesdropping on vast amounts of their talk about life on land\, could it produce meaningful text about that world without ever engaging with it directly? The sharper question behind the analogy is this: can an LLM's internal states and outputs be about extra-linguistic reality\, independently of the meaning human interpreters project onto them?
\nThis two-day interdisciplinary workshop brings together philosophers and AI researchers to address that question and related issues of grounding\, reference\, intentionality and understanding in LLMs. It sits at the intersection of philosophy of mind and language\, linguistics and artificial intelligence.
\nRegistration: please write to Niels.Linnemann@unige.ch / Subject "Bookworm". 30 places\, first come\, first served.
ORGANIZER;CN=Niels Linnemann;CN=Eliot Du Sordet: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Budapest:20261112T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Budapest:20261113T170000 SUMMARY:Non-intentional modes of consciousness in phenomenology: affectivity\, imagination\, unconscious\, embodiment UID:20261013T230154Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Budapest LOCATION:Múzeum krt. 4/i\, Budapest\, Hungary\, 1088 DESCRIPTION:Non-intentional modes of consciousness in phenomenology: affectivity\, imagination\, unconscious\, embodiment
\nThroughout the long history of phenomenology\, alongside intentional modes of consciousness\, so-called non-intentional forms of consciousness have played an increasingly significant role: affectivity\, fantasy\, unconscious\, embodiment\, etc. The main aim of the conference is to provide an overview of past and contemporary research of non-intentional forms of conscious functioning.
\nSuggested topics:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; embodiment\, bodily existence\, bodily memory
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; affectivity\, emotions\, existential moods
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; phenomenological unconscious\, association\, passive syntheses
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; psychology\, psychoanalysis and phenomenology
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; phenomenology and cognitive sciences
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; intersubjectivity\, culture\, sociality
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; understanding\, interpretation\, narrativity
\nThe conference is organized by the "Research Group on Non-Intentional Modes of Consciousness" at the Institute of Philosophy\, Eö\;tvö\;s Lorá\;nd University\, Budapest.
\nConfirmed plenary speakers:
\nNatalie Depraz
\nSarah Heinä\;maa
\nThiemo Breyer
\nThomas Fuchs (online)
\nDieter Lohmar
\nDermot Moran (online)
\nNicolas de Warren (online)
\nDan Zahavi (online)
\nConference venue: Budapest\, Eö\;tvö\;s Lorá\;nd University\, Institute of Philosophy (Mú\;zeum krt. 4.)
\nConference dates: November 12&ndash\;13\, 2026.
\nThe conference website with all the necessary information:
\nhttps://phil.elte.hu/content/non-intentional-modes-of-consciousness-in-phenomenology-call-for-papers.t.53079?m=11091
\nWe are accepting submissions with abstracts of up to 500 words until July 31\, 2026 at the following email address: phenomenology.conf2026@gmail.com
\nPlease send a brief introduction\, including your affiliation\, in a separate document.
\nWe will send notifications regarding accepted presentations by August 10\, 2026.
\nThere is no registration fee.
\nWe warmly welcome all interested parties:
\nThe organizers
\nTamá\;s Ullmann\, Professor of Philosophy
\nCsaba Olay\, Professor of Philosophy
\nBence Pé\;ter Marosá\;n\, Associate Professor
ORGANIZER;CN=Bence Marosan;CN="Tamás Ullmann";CN=Csaba Olay: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20261113T083000 DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20261114T170000 SUMMARY:Space in Mind: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives UID:20261013T230155Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:America/Toronto LOCATION:Hamilton\, Canada\, L8S 1C7 DESCRIPTION:Here is our full list of speakers: Sara Aronowitz\, Richard Arthur\, Katherine Dunlop\, Alexandre Duval\, Gary Hatfield\, Alistair Isaac\, Alex Klein\, Mohan Matthen\, Tyke Nunez\, Michael Rescorla\, Lisa Shabel\, and Elizabeth Spelke.
The human ability to perceive spatial properties and think about space has been at the center of philosophical inquiry for more than 2000 years. It plays a pivotal role in the arguments of numerous influential figures\, including Plato\, Descartes\, Berkeley\, Kant\, Helmholtz\, James\, and Russell. However\, the interest in this topic has waned substantially in contemporary philosophy. Philosophers of psychology and cognitive scientists now do their work largely independently from historical scholarship on these important figures. To bridge this gap\, the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University is organizing a workshop entitled "Space in Mind: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives". The goal of the workshop is to bring about a dialogue between researchers interested in historical scholarship and those directly involved in contemporary debates\, and to highlight insights of historical philosophers that can help us make progress on contemporary issues. \;
We are pleased to announce our monthly \;online \;talk series on "Inferences &\; Capacities."
Our next speaker is:
Hans-Johann Glock \;(University of Zü\;rich)
"Is ascribing inferences to brains or non-human animals a fallacy?"
Nov 16: \;12am (Buenos Aires)\, 10am (New York)\, 4pm (Berlin).
Abstract: TBA
\nHow to participate: \;Please\, send an email to Alfredo Vernazzani at: \;
\nalfredo-vernazzani AT protonmail.com
\n_______
\nThe series brings together work on inferential capacities\, rationality\, normativity\, and cognition &mdash\; across both human and non-human animals &mdash\; with the aim of fostering discussion on the nature and limits of the cognitive sphere. \;
\n2026 line-up: \;
April 27: \;Angelica Kaufmann \;(University of Milan): "Mind Blanking as Mental Imagery." \;
\nMay 18: \;Federico Burdman \;(Universidad Alberto Hurtado) "Constrained choices: addiction\, attention\, and reasons-responsiveness." \;
\nJune 22: \;Susanna Schellenberg \;(Rutgers): TBA \;
\nJuly 20: \;Cameron Buckner \;(University of Florida): "Chains-of-Thought\, Inner Speech\, and Artificial Epistemic Agency."
\nSeptember 7: \;Ulf Hlobil \;(Concordia University): TBA \;
\nOctober 19: \;Eva Schmidt \;(TU Dortmund): TBA \;
\nNovember 16: \;Hans-Johann Glock \;(University of Zü\;rich): "Is Ascribing Inferences to Brains or Non-human Animals a Fallacy?" \;
\nDecember 14: \;Emma Borg \;(SAS\, University of London): "Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: The Scope of Common-Sense Psychology." \;
Each talk lasts c. 40 minutes followed by 40 minutes open Q&\;A. \;
\nThe series is co-organized by:
\nMariela Aguilera \;(University of Có\;rdoba)
\nMatí\;as Osta-Vé\;lez \;(Universidad de la Repú\;blica)
\nAlfredo Vernazzani \;(TU Dortmund\; Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg).
\nVisit our website: \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Alfredo Vernazzani;CN=Mariela Aguilera;CN="Matías Osta Vélez": METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20261120T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20261120T170000 SUMMARY:Boundaries of Artificial Intelligence: From Computational Models to Mind Emulation and Superintelligent Systems UID:20261013T230158Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Warsaw LOCATION:Podchorążych 2\, Kraków\, Poland DESCRIPTION:The rapid development of artificial intelligence is reshaping our understanding of cognition\, consciousness\, and the nature of the mind. Advances in computational modeling\, neuroscience\, and neurotechnology raise fundamental questions about the possibility of Whole Brain Emulation (WBE)\, understood as the reconstruction and simulation of the human brain in silico.
\n\;At the same time\, progress in artificial intelligence brings increasing attention to the potential emergence of advanced and possibly superintelligent systems. These developments raise critical questions concerning controllability\, safety\, and the long-term trajectory of human civilization. In this context\, issues of AI alignment\, strategic timing of technological development\, and global coordination become central.
\nThis conference aims to provide an interdisciplinary platform for researchers working at the intersection of artificial intelligence\, neuroscience\, computer science\, philosophy\, and the social sciences. We welcome contributions addressing theoretical foundations\, technical feasibility\, as well as philosophical\, ethical\, and strategic implications of the transition from computational models to artificial and emulated minds.
ORGANIZER;CN=Andrzej Dabrowski;CN=Magdalena Reuter;CN="Stanisław Ruczaj";CN=Olga Qq;CN=Marcin Urbaniak;CN=Anna Sarosiek: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20261120T123000 DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20261120T133000 SUMMARY:The Cognitive and Representational Roles of Intentionality UID:20261013T230159Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:America/Toronto LOCATION:London\, Canada DESCRIPTION:Philosophical Briefings is a work-in-progress lunch series held by the Philosophy Department at Western University.
ORGANIZER;CN=Jasmine Gunkel;CN=Corey W. Dyck: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261123T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261124T170000 SUMMARY:The Language and Attitudes of Inquiry UID:20261013T230200Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Habelschwerdter Allee 30\, 14195\, Berlin\, Germany DESCRIPTION:Invited Speakers:
\n\;Tez Clark (Bard College) \;Mike Deigan (Human Abilities Center\, Berlin) -Daniel Drucker (University of Texas at Austin) -Daniel Hoek (University of Virginia) -Matthew McGrath (Washington University in St. Louis) -Anne Meylan (University of Zurich) -Juliette Vazard (University of Zurich) -Alexandra Zinke (Goethe University Frankfurt)
ORGANIZER;CN=Michele Palmira;CN=Alexander Dinges: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261125T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261127T170000 SUMMARY:Simposio Internacional MemoriEs 2026 UID:20261013T230201Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Simposio Internacional Online MemoriEs 2026
MemoriEs propone un espacio de diá\;logo interdisciplinario en torno a las relaciones entre memoria\, corporalidad y gé\;nero\, con el objetivo de problematizar los supuestos teó\;ricos que han separado estos á\;mbitos en tradiciones de investigació\;n diversas. Desde las ciencias cognitivas\, la neurociencia\, la fenomenologí\;a\, la filosofí\;a feminista\, los estudios de gé\;nero y las ciencias sociales\, el simposio busca examinar có\;mo los cuerpos recuerdan\, có\;mo las experiencias corporales configuran la memoria y có\;mo las diná\;micas de gé\;nero influyen en lo que se recuerda\, se olvida o se silencia. Daremos especial atenció\;n a los procesos de inscripció\;n material\, afectiva y social de la memoria\, así\; como a las desigualdades estructurales que moldean las trayectorias mné\;micas individuales y colectivas.
Convocatoria: Se invita a investigadores\, activistas\, doctorandos y profesionales en Filosofí\;a\, Neurociencias\, Antropologí\;a\, Estudios de Gé\;nero\, Ciencias cognitivas\, Psicologí\;a y á\;reas afines a participar como ponentes (45 min: 20&ndash\;25 de exposició\;n + 15&ndash\;20 de discusió\;n).
\nLí\;neas temá\;ticas:
\n- \; \; \; \;- \;Inscripció\;n corporal del recuerdo
\n- \; \; \; \;- \;El cuerpo como memoria
\n- \; \; \; \;- \;Afectividad\, trauma y memoria somá\;tica
\n- \; \; \; \;- \;Gé\;nero y configuració\;n de la experiencia mné\;mica
\n- \; \; \; \;- \;El rol de la memoria en narrativas de gé\;nero
\n- \; \; \; \;- \;Socializació\;n del gé\;nero y narrativas autobiográ\;ficas
\n- \; \; \; \;- \;Memoria\, identidad y performatividad
\n- \; \; \; \;- \;Diferencias generizadas en las prá\;cticas de recordar
\n- \; \; \; \;- \;Dañ\;os episté\;micos en contextos de injusticias de gé\;nero
\nInteresados\, favor de enviar un resumen (300 palabras en españ\;ol) antes del 30 de septiembre de 2026
\nEnví\;o de resú\;menes: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSePf_EsviiWCXvsWgdilnrT2M2Nc-eS0m5RIvQIKqrQXoT_Rw/viewform
\n\nWebsite: https://memories.lat/simposio-2026-2/
ORGANIZER;CN="Alberto Guerrero-Velázquez";CN=Elena Ostos;CN=Lucienne Huby;CN="Alba Marcela Zárate Rochín": METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261201T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261201T234500 SUMMARY:Disembodied agency in Neuro Technologies: Ethical and Legal Challenges UID:20261013T230202Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Disembodied agency in Neuro Technologies: Ethical and Legal Challenges
\nEdited by L. Valera &\; Marcelo Barrientos
\nCall for Abstracts
\nIn the framework of our research "Redeeming autonomy: disembodied agency in Neuro Technologies (RADIANT)" project\, we invite you to participate in the shaping of the book "Autonomy in emerging technologies: ethical and legal challenges". The contribution of women will be especially encouraged\, as well as papers addressing Latin-America&rsquo\;s perspective.
\nThe current development of NTs like brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) and neurofeedback (NF) in cognitive neuroscience and clinical interventions is demanding new ethical approaches and regulations\, as the recent case for neurorights has shown. The advancements in this field sparked concerns about the potential misuse of these NTs since they seem to cause a potential loss of personal autonomy.
\nThe topics to be addressed\, as the title of the research suggests\, will be the crossovers between Philosophy\, Ethics and Law\, to address the challenges of autonomy facing the development of technology in general\, and\, specially\, brain-computer interfaces and neurofeedback\, data protection\, privacy and neurorights.
\nSome examples of topics:
\nThe list is indicative rather than exhaustive. People interested in these - or similar - topics may send a long abstract (1.000 words including references) to avillamizar@uc.cl by December 1st. We expect that final papers would be around 4\,000-6\,000 words. (Please note that neither submission nor acceptance of an abstract is a guarantee of publication). The deadline for the final paper is May 30th\, 2027. The book will be published between 2027/2028 in a Springer series.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Lisbon:20261203T133000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Lisbon:20261204T170000 SUMMARY:Interdisciplinary Workshop on Biases UID:20261013T230203Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Lisbon LOCATION:Facultade de Letras \, Lisbon\, Portugal DESCRIPTION:Thursday 3rd December
\n13.30 Cristina Mendonç\;a (WJCR &ndash\; Instituto Universitá\;rio de Ciê\;ncias Psicoló\;gicas\, Sociais e da Vida\, Portugal): Cognitive biases in the social transmission of information
\n14.30 Elena Popa (Universidad de Sevilla\, Spain): Scientific objectivity: From values\, to biases\, to context
\n15.30 Simone Lackner (Independent researcher\, Portugal): AI and objective Truth &ndash\; the myth of the rational agent
\nFriday 4th December
\n9.00 Filipa Madeira (Universidade Cató\;lica Portuguesa\, Portugal): When does race capture attention? Resource scarcity in a healthcare context
\n10.00 Marina Trakas (Universidade de Lisboa\, Portugal): Mnemonic biases
\n11.00 Francisco Cruz (WJCR &ndash\; Instituto Universitá\;rio de Ciê\;ncias Psicoló\;gicas\, Sociais e da Vida\, Portugal): Putting the biased in bias: Cognitive and motivational bases in distorted social judgments
\nThis activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT &ndash\; Fundaç\;ã\;o para a Ciê\;ncia e a Tecnologia\, CEEC Ind Research Project 2024.10330.CEECIND: "An inquiry into memory biases\, memory virtues\, and mnemonic humility" \;
\n ORGANIZER;CN=Marina Trakas: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261208T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261209T170000 SUMMARY:Negative Social Action: Silence\, Salience\, and the Politics of Absence UID:20261013T230204Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Gabelsbergerstraße 62\, Munich\, Germany DESCRIPTION:DEADLINE for Abstract Submission: 25 October 2026
\nLanguage is the specifically human alternative to physical violence. As speaking animals\, human beings are capable of inflicting harm through words alone\, and this capacity has driven scholars across philosophy of language\, linguistics\, and related disciplines to investigate verbal violence and hate speech: if we can do things with our words\, then we can also do harm with them (Austin 1962\; Langton 1993\; Maitra and McGowan 2012\; Kukla 2014\; Bianchi 2018\; Langton 2018).
\nYet what is said is only part of the picture. What happens when harm is produced not by what is said\, but by what is left unsaid\, unanswered\, unnoticed\, or absent? Silence is commonly understood as the mere absence of speech\, a neutral gap in communication\, or simply the failure to act. However\, scholars across different disciplines have increasingly challenged this conception\, arguing that silence and related forms of communicative absence are active\, socially structured\, and consequential phenomena (Maitra 2007\; Langton 2007\; Kurzon 2011\; Schrö\;ter 2013\; Tanesini 2018\; Klieber 2024). Silence can communicate\, subordinate\, exclude\, and harm (Bird 2002\; Langton 2007\; Maitra 2009\; Klieber 2024)\; it can be strategically deployed to maintain ambiguity or plausible deniability (Anthonissen 2008\; Schrö\;ter 2013\, 2019\, 2022)\, or emerge from socially organised patterns of inattention that marginalise certain voices\, perspectives\, and experiences (Fricker 2007\; Dotson 2011\; Pohlhaus 2012\; Medina 2013\; Smith and Archer 2020).
\nThis workshop takes as its starting point two converging lines of inquiry. The first concerns silence as a communicative act: a socially embedded practice capable of conveying meaning\, performing social functions\, and shaping relations (Langton 2007\; Schrö\;ter 2013\; Tanesini 2018\; Klieber 2024). The second concerns what we call the politics of absence: the socially structured forms of inattention\, non-response\, and selective salience through which collective patterns of noticing and overlooking are produced and maintained (Watzl 2017\; Wu 2024\; Kaeslin 2024\; Caprioglio Panizza 2022).
\nBy bringing these perspectives into dialogue\, the workshop extends questions traditionally associated with philosophy of language and communication studies towards philosophy of mind\, ethics and moral philosophy\, and philosophy of perception. Taken together\, they point towards a broader theoretical framework centred on negative social action: socially significant actions performed not through explicit speech or overt intervention\, but through absences\, omissions\, silences\, failures of uptake\, and organised forms of non-attention.
\nWe want to investigate cases in which harm is produced through what remains unsaid\, unacknowledged\, unanswered\, unnoticed\, or excluded from personal and collective awareness. Such harm frequently operates indirectly and diffusely\, with a high degree of deniability (Maitra 2007\; Zerubavel 2006\; Saul 2018). Rather than treating silence and inattention as passive phenomena\, the workshop examines their role in producing social meanings\, epistemic environments\, political realities\, and forms of harm.
\nWe ask how absences communicate\, how they shape what becomes collectively visible or invisible\, and how responsibility should be understood when harms arise not from what someone does or says\, but from what is omitted\, neglected\, or left unnoticed (Ayala-Ló\;pez and Vasilyeva 2016\; Smith and Archer 2020). We also welcome empirical work examining how patterns of silence\, non-response\, and inattention shape collective responses to harmful speech\, including their effects on perceived social norms and the recognition of harm (Zapata et al. 2024).
\nMore information: \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Irene Lo Faro;CN=Jimena Zapata: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261214T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261214T180000 SUMMARY:Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: Exploring the scope of common-sense psychology UID:20261013T230205Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:We are pleased to announce our monthly \;online \;talk series on "Inferences &\; Capacities."
Our last speaker for 2026 is:
Emma Borg \;(SAS\, University of London)
"Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: Exploring the scope of common-sense psychology"
December 14: \;12am (Buenos Aires)\, 10am (New York)\, 4pm (Berlin).
\nAbstract: A standard philosophical view holds that human action is typically intentional\, i.e. reasons-responsive\, driven by what a subject believes\, desires\, and intends. This picture of human action seems crucial to many things we care about (e.g. underpinning reactive moral attitudes). However\, recently questions have been asked about the scope of what Fodor 1987 called &lsquo\;good old common sense belief/desire psychology&rsquo\;: is the assumption that human behaviour is typically reasons-responsive right? According to various scope-based challenges\, although the reasons-based approach holds for occurrently considered\, consciously-willed actions\, most of what humans do is not like this. In particular\, fidgets\, habits\, and skills have all been argued to fall beyond the reach of the common-sense framework. Yet if this is right\, then the reasons-based model turns out to be less interesting or impressive than we might once have thought\, since it accounts for only a tiny sliver of human action\, ignoring vast swathes of what people do. My aim in this talk is to defend common-sense psychology from various incarnations of the scope challenge. I&rsquo\;ll argue that\, at heart\, the challenge rests on a background picture of different\, fully encapsulated systems for thought and action\, a picture we have reason to resist.
\nHow to participate: \;Please\, send an email to Alfredo Vernazzani at: \;
\nalfredo-vernazzani AT protonmail.com
\n_______
\nThe series brings together work on inferential capacities\, rationality\, normativity\, and cognition &mdash\; across both human and non-human animals &mdash\; with the aim of fostering discussion on the nature and limits of the cognitive sphere. \;
\n2026 line-up: \;
April 27: \;Angelica Kaufmann \;(University of Milan): "Mind Blanking as Mental Imagery." \;
\nMay 18: \;Federico Burdman \;(Universidad Alberto Hurtado) "Constrained choices: addiction\, attention\, and reasons-responsiveness." \;
\nJune 22: \;Susanna Schellenberg \;(Rutgers): TBA \;
\nJuly 20: \;Cameron Buckner \;(University of Florida): "Chains-of-Thought\, Inner Speech\, and Artificial Epistemic Agency."
\nSeptember 7: \;Ulf Hlobil \;(Concordia University): TBA \;
\nOctober 19: \;Eva Schmidt \;(TU Dortmund): TBA \;
\nNovember 16: \;Hans-Johann Glock \;(University of Zü\;rich): "Is Ascribing Inferences to Brains or Non-human Animals a Fallacy?" \;
\nDecember 14: \;Emma Borg \;(SAS\, University of London): "Twitches\, Fidgets\, Habits\, Skills: The Scope of Common-Sense Psychology." \;
Each talk lasts c. 40 minutes followed by 40 minutes open Q&\;A. \;
\nThe series is co-organized by:
\nMariela Aguilera \;(University of Có\;rdoba)
\nMatí\;as Osta-Vé\;lez \;(Universidad de la Repú\;blica)
\nAlfredo Vernazzani \;(TU Dortmund\; Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg).
\nVisit our website: \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Alfredo Vernazzani;CN=Mariela Aguilera;CN="Matías Osta Vélez": METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261215T170000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261215T170000 SUMMARY:Fiction and Lies: the ASIFF/SIRFF Fourth International Congress UID:20261013T230206Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London LOCATION:Edinburgh\, United Kingdom DESCRIPTION:Supported by the British Society of Aesthetics and the Scots Philosophical Association
\nKEYNOTE SPEAKERS
\n--Professor Eileen John (Philosophy\, University of Warwick)
--Professor Pierre Bayard (Literature\, Université\; Paris 8 - Saint-Denis)
From Plato&rsquo\;s indictment of the tragic poets as misrepresenting the truth\, to Sir Philip Sidney&rsquo\;s famous claim in the Defence of Poesy that &lsquo\;the Poet\, he nothing affirms\, and therefore never lieth&rsquo\;\, to current debates about fictionality and factuality\, the relationship between \;fiction \;and \;lies \;has been a focus of scholarly attention. Both \;fiction-makers and liars make things up and misrepresent the truth. But it is traditionally assumed that with \;fiction\, the invention is non-deceptive. As Margaret Macdonald (1954\, 170) put the point\, &lsquo\;The conviction induced by a story is the result of a mutual conspiracy\, freely entered into\, between author and audience. A storyteller does not \;lie\, nor is a normal auditor deceived&rsquo\;. Macdonald proposed that instead\, \;fiction-makers engage in a non-deceptive pretence of assertion\; but other approaches also distinguish between fictionality and deception\, from philosophers who associate \;fiction \;with an invitation to make-believe rather than to believe to narratologists who treat fictionality as a rhetorical mode of communication that overtly signals fabrication. If \;lies \;are assertions aimed at deception\, perhaps \;fictions \;are incapable of \;lying.
Yet a sharp distinction between fictionality and deception confronts numerous challenges. Scholars across disciplines have considered the many ways in which \;fictions \;can affect our beliefs\, for good or ill. Even if \;fictions \;cannot \;lie \;in some technical sense\, they can certainly mislead\, insinuate\, obfuscate and so on. Works of \;fiction \;may be instances of propaganda which misrepresent the facts\; think of Oliver Stone&rsquo\;s film JFK (1991) or Michael Crichton&rsquo\;s \;novel \;State of Fear (2004). And the distinctions between the \;fictional \;and factual are under increasing pressure in the current culture of disinformation and &lsquo\;fake news&rsquo\; &ndash\; a category not so easy to distinguish from &lsquo\;fictional \;news&rsquo\;.
This three-day international conference aims to explore the relationship between \;fiction \;and \;lies \;from a range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives\, including philosophy\, literary history and theory\, narratology\, film and media studies\, psychology and cognitive science. Proposals may address fiction in general\, or any historical period or cultural tradition. We also encourage studies of fictional works in a variety of media (including video games\, comics\, film\, and television series).
Possible topics include but are not limited to:
\n&bull\;The possibility of lying in/through fiction
\n&bull\;Other modes of deception and dissimulation in fiction (in particular works\, in different media\, etc.)
\n&bull\;Fiction and fictionality as (tools for) propaganda
\n&bull\;The relationship between fiction and fake news
\n&bull\;Differing historical or cultural conceptions of the relationship between fiction and lies
\n&bull\;Representations of deception within fiction (e.g.\, unreliable narrators\, lying protagonists\, forgers)
\n&bull\;Fictions that (seem to) deceive about their own status (e.g.\, mockumentary)\, and more generally\, questions of &lsquo\;framing&rsquo\;
\n\nPlease note: There may be a conference registration fee (discounted for students) depending on the outcome of grant funding applications.
\n\nSubmission guidance
\n&bull\;All submissions should be sent by attachment in Word or pdf to fictionlies2026@gmail.com by 15 December 2025. \;
\n&bull\;Papers: Abstracts should be no longer than 350 words\, in English or French. Bear in mind that sessions scheduled for paper presentations will be 30 minutes (20 minutes presentation\, 10 minutes questions and answers). \;
\n&bull\;Symposia: Proposals\, in English or French\, should be no longer than 500 words and should include a description of the topic/theme\, the names/affiliations of participants and brief abstracts of the papers. Sessions for symposia will be 1.5 hours or 2 hours depending on the schedule and thus should typically have no more than three speakers. \;
\n&bull\;We encourage submissions from\, and symposia including\, members of groups underrepresented in their disciplines\, including women in philosophy. Symposia in philosophy should ensure that the proposal follows the Good Practice Policy of the British Philosophical Association and the Society for Women in Philosophy (see bpa.ac.uk/resources/women-in-philosophy/good-practice). Please also take note of the BPA&rsquo\;s Environment/Travel Guideline Scheme (bpa.ac.uk/policies).
\n&bull\;Funding may be available towards the cost of arranging childcare for speakers who may require it. Please ask for details.
\n&bull\;Participants in the conference will be expected to become members of the Association if they are not already (www.fictionstudies.org).
\nEarly career prize
\nThe ASIFF/SIRFF will offer a prize for the best paper by an early-career scholar (doctoral student or scholar who has received their PhD within the last 3 years)\, to be presented at the conference. The winner will receive a monetary award of &euro\;1\,000 (euros). If you would like to be considered for this award\, please submit your completed conference paper (no more than 3\,500 words/20\,000 characters) by 28 February 2026 to fictionlies2026@gmail.com. The article must be unpublished.
\n \; ORGANIZER;CN=Stacie Friend: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Edmonton:20261216T004500 DTEND;TZID=America/Edmonton:20261216T004500 SUMMARY:1st Interpersonal Philosophy Network Workshop UID:20261013T230207Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:America/Edmonton LOCATION:Lethbridge\, Canada DESCRIPTION:1st Interpersonal Philosophy Network Workshop 2027
\nUniversity of Lethbridge | 2-3 April 2027
\nThe Interpersonal Philosophy Network (IPN)\, in collaboration with the Critical Thinking &\; Civic Engagement Lab \;at the University of Lethbridge\, invite abstract submissions for a two-day workshop exploring philosophical questions concerning interpersonal relations.
\nThe workshop aims to bring together researchers working on the nature\, value\, and normative significance of our relations with others. We welcome contributions from a wide range of philosophical traditions and subfields.
\nKeynote Speakers
\n(1) Kimberley Brownlee (University of British Columbia)
\n(2) TBC.
\nAbstract Submission
\nWe invite submissions on any topic related to the philosophy of interpersonal relations\, though we are particularly interested in the epistemology\, ethics\, and politics of interpersonal relations. For example\, papers might address topics such as:
\nPlease submit an anonymised PDF abstract (up to 1000 words) through the following form by 15 December\, 2026: https://forms.gle/jXPRqdNE2dzSQnEW7
\nFurther Details
\nThe workshop will feature:
\nPresentations should be suitable for a 30-40 minute talk\, followed by discussion.
\nAccepted speakers will receive a CAD $300 honorarium to help offset travel and accommodation expenses.
\nParticipants are warmly invited to join an informal excursion to Waterton Lakes National Park on Sunday\, 4 April 2027.
\nIf you have any questions please contact adham.elshazly@uleth.ca
ORGANIZER;CN=Adham El Shazly;CN=Facundo Rodriguez;CN=Paloma Morales: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20261231T234500 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20261231T234500 SUMMARY:4th Inquiry Network Workshop UID:20261013T230208Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:2000 North Pkwy\, Memphis\, United States\, 38112 DESCRIPTION:The Inquiry Network is hosting a workshop on inquiry at Rhodes College in Memphis\, TN\, April 2-3\, 2027.
\nThis meeting will be held in conjunction with the annual Mid-South Philosophy Conference.
\nWe invite submissions of anonymized abstracts (up to 1\,000 words) on any topic related to the philosophy of inquiry. For example\, papers might address topics such as:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Norms of inquiry.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; The relationship between inquiry and interrogative attitudes such as curiosity and suspension of judgment.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; The relationship between inquiry and attention or salience.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; The semantics and pragmatics of questions.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Virtues and vices of inquiry.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Inquiry in specific domains\, such as scientific inquiry or philosophical inquiry.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Historical approaches to inquiry (for example\, work on the American Pragmatists\, ancient Pyrrhonians\, etc.).
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Ethics of inquiry.
\nPlease submit anonymized abstracts (up to 1\,000 words) by EOD \;December 31\, 2026 \;to inquirynetworkgroup@gmail.com.
ORGANIZER;CN=David Thorstad;CN=Jared A. Millson: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Brussels:20270104T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Brussels:20270104T234500 SUMMARY:CREPH Seminar "Attention and Consciousness: New Directions" UID:20261013T230209Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Brussels LOCATION:Pl. du Vingt Août 7\, Liège\, Belgium\, 4000 DESCRIPTION:ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: NEW DIRECTIONS
CREPH Research Seminar in Phenomenology
University of Liè\;ge\, Belgium 10&ndash\;14 May 2027
The Centre de Recherches Phé\;nomé\;nologiques (CREPH) at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Liè\;ge (Belgium) is pleased to announce the next CREPH Research Seminar in Phenomenology\, devoted to attention and consciousness\, which will take place from Monday 10 May to Friday 14 May 2027.
\nThe CREPH Seminar is a week-long event held every two years\, each edition exploring a specific topic in phenomenology and philosophy of mind\, broadly understood. The program will include invited talks and contributed papers selected through a call for abstracts.
\nOver the past two decades\, the relationship between attention and phenomenal consciousness has attracted renewed philosophical interest\, giving rise to an increasingly rich and differentiated literature. Yet\, despite increasingly refined arguments and mappings of the logical space\, foundational questions remain debated. Is attention necessary\, or even both necessary and sufficient\, for phenomenal consciousness? What kind of necessity is at stake? If experience overflows attention\, what is the nature of this unattended phenomenology? Is it fully determinate and specific\, or does attention contribute to making it so?
\nAlongside these questions about the dependence relations between attention and consciousness\, a further line of inquiry concerns attention&rsquo\;s contribution to the character and organization of experience. This includes its effects on our overall experience and the precise nature of the structural role often attributed to it. It also concerns whether attention contributes uniformly across different kinds of experience or plays distinctive roles in different experiential domains such as\, for example\, emotional and cognitive phenomenology.
\nThese issues also have epistemic consequences\, particularly concerning attention&rsquo\;s contribution to the acquisition of perceptual and introspective knowledge. Debate centres on whether attention facilitates such knowledge\, whether it is indispensable to it\, and whether its effects can sometimes be disruptive - for instance\, when attending to an experience essentially modifies the very phenomenon we seek to understand. Clarifying these possibilities requires examining how attention&rsquo\;s contribution to conscious experience bears on its capacity to be knowledge-conducive.
\nThe seminar aims to explore these questions by bringing contemporary debates into dialogue with historical accounts of attention. We welcome contributions from phenomenology\, philosophy of mind\, epistemology\, as well as historical investigations addressing these themes.
\nInvited Speakers
\nNatalie Depraz (Paris Nanterre) \;
\nAnna Giustina (Valencia)
\nHanne Jacobs (Tilburg)
\nHamid Taieb (Humboldt)
\nJuliette Vazard (Zurich)
\nCall for Abstracts
\nWe welcome submissions addressing the themes of the seminar from contemporary or historical perspectives. A non-exhaustive list of possible questions includes:
\nIs attention necessary or even necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness? Can consciousness occur without attention? Is there unconscious attention?
\nDoes attention act as a gatekeeper for conscious experience\, or does phenomenal consciousness overflow the limits of attention? Is the phenomenology overflowing attention fully determinate and specific or is it indeterminate or generic? \;
\nHow does attention modify the phenomenal character of experience? What implications does this have for theories of consciousness (e.g.\, representationalist views)?
\nWhat structural role\, if any\, does attention play in the organisation of the phenomenal field?
\nDoes attention play sui generis phenomenal and/or epistemic roles in particular experiential types (e.g.\, emotional phenomenology\, cognitive phenomenology\, agential phenomenology\, etc.)?
\nWhat is the epistemic import of attention with respect to perceptual and introspective knowledge acquisition? Is attention necessary to have propositional and/or doxastic justification? What role does attention play in inquiry?
\nCan the so-called phenomenal modification problem be overcome?
\nWhat is the relationship between attention and inner awareness?
\nHow have historical accounts of attention addressed these issues\, and what can they contribute to contemporary debates?
\nThose interested in presenting at the seminar are invited to submit an anonymized abstract of no more than one page \;(excluding references) in either English or French to both jacopopallagrosi@gmail.com and vmartinis@uliege.be (please include both addresses \;in the email).
\nEach speaker will have a one-hour slot\, so presentations should ideally last around 30&ndash\;40 minutes\, followed by Q&\;A. The presentation itself may also be given in either English or French.
\nSubmission deadline: 4 January 2027
Notification of acceptance: 15 January 2027
Organizers: Arnaud Dewalque\, Valentina Martinis\, Jacopo Pallagrosi.
\nScientific Committee: Christian Blanco\, Alexis Delamare\, Arnaud Dewalque\, Ethan Field\, Quentin Hosch\, Bruno Leclercq\, Francesca Maffettone\, Valentina Martinis\, Jacopo Pallagrosi\, Denis Seron.
\nContact:jacopopallagrosi@gmail.com\;vmartinis@uliege.be \;
\nPermalink:http://www.pheno.ulg.ac.be/sem/?num_id=19&\;page=1&\;lang=fr
\n ORGANIZER;CN=Jacopo Pallagrosi;CN=Arnaud Dewalque;CN=Valentina Martinis: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270107T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270107T090000 SUMMARY:Call for Papers - PAMBA 2027 UID:20261013T230210Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:CALL FOR PAPERS
The Philosophy of Animal Minds and Behaviour Association (PAMBA) invites submissions of abstracts for its 2027 biennial meeting\, which will be held at the University of Warwick on April 27th-29th 2027. Abstracts can be on any topics in the field of philosophy of animal minds to be presented as a paper or poster. Abstracts must be fully anonymized\, no longer than 1000 words and submitted by January 7th 2027 to PAMBA.Warwick@gmail.com.
All submissions will be considered for both talk and poster presentations. If you do not wish your submission to be considered for one of the formats\, please make this clear in your submission email. \;
The subject line of your email must read 'PAMBA abstract submission'.
If you qualify for the PAMBA Prize and also wish to submit a full paper\, please follow the instructions below. \;
PAMBA PRIZE
We are also pleased to invite submissions for the PAMBA Prize essay in any area of the philosophy of animal minds. The winning essay will be published in Biology &\; Philosophy and the winner will be awarded an invitation to present the paper as a keynote talk at the PAMBA meeting at Warwick. We will additionally cover travel expenses of up to £\;1500 to offset travel costs to the PAMBA conference. The paper must be unpublished\, under 10\,000 words\, and meet the Biology &\; Philosophy submission guidelines.
The competition is open to early-career researchers\, defined as PhD students or those who are within five years of receiving their PhDs (i.e.\, the PhD should have been received in January 2022 or later).
Submissions on all aspects of the philosophy of animal minds are welcome. \;
Please send submissions with the subject line 'PAMBA Prize submission' to PAMBA.Warwick@gmail.com. For any questions\, please email us at the same address. \;
If you want your PAMBA prize submission to be considered for a poster or talk at the PAMBA conference\, please also submit an abstract to the main conference email as above.
The deadline is by January 7th 2027.
The rich\, multidimensional representations by which we remember events in our personal past share key features with those by which we imagine future\, counterfactual\, or other situations. These include overlapping neural bases\, shared construction operations\, and perhaps continuities in representational format and semantic profile too.
\nThis workshop addresses two broad sets of questions. The first concerns the semantics of these representations: what determines their subject matter\; what does their accuracy consist in\; what contributions are made by trace-indexes\, gists\, and schemas? The second concerns their format: are such representations built compositionally\; do they have a syntax\; what is the role of mental imagery\; are there forms of remembering or imagining that do not employ such representations at all? Answers to both sets of questions bear on many other issues: the function(s) of a purported episodic system\, or the effects of ageing and conditions such as depression.
\nThe workshop aims to make progress on these questions by bringing together philosophers and psychologists working on memory\, imagination\, and mental representation.
\nLOCATION
\nAll talks in SHHK Conference Room (05-57) at NTU Singapore.
\nPROVISIONAL SCHEDULE
\nDay 1 (Monday 11th January)
\n09:30&ndash\;09:40. Welcome
\n09:40&ndash\;10:40. Kourken Michaelian (Grenoble)
\n10:40&ndash\;11:00. Tea/coffee break
\n11:00&ndash\;12:00. Simon Brown (Ashoka)
\n12:00&ndash\;13:00. James Openshaw (NTU)
\n13:00&ndash\;14:30. Lunch
\n14:30&ndash\;15:30. Johannes Mahr (York)
\n15:30&ndash\;16:30. Megan Entwistle (Grenoble)
\n16:30&ndash\;17:00. Tea/coffee break
\n17:00&ndash\;18:00. Peter Langland-Hassan (Cincinnati)
\n19:00. Workshop dinner
\nDay 2 (Tuesday 12th January)
\n09:30&ndash\;10:30. Kristina Liefke (Bochum)
\n10:30&ndash\;11:00. Tea/coffee break
\n11:00&ndash\;12:00. Lizhu Luo (NTU)
\n12:00&ndash\;13:00. Denis Perrin (Grenoble)
\n13:00&ndash\;14:30. Lunch
\n14:30&ndash\;15:30. Andrea Nocerino (NTU)
\n15:30&ndash\;16:30. André\; Sant&rsquo\;Anna (Yonsei)
\n16:30&ndash\;17:00. Tea/coffee break
\n17:00&ndash\;18:00. Robert Hopkins (Oxford)
\nDETAILS AND REGISTRATION
\nFor details\, future updates\, and to register\, please visit the website below.
\n\nAttendance is free but registration is required by Monday 28th December.
\nENQUIRIES
\nContact James Openshaw (james.openshaw@ntu.ed.sg).
\nORGANISERS
\nJames Openshaw (NTU) and Kourken Michaelian (Grenoble).
\nFUNDING
\nThe workshop is funded by an NTU Start-Up Grant and also a Merlion Workshop grant held in conjunction with Kourken Michaelian (Centre for Philosophy of Memory\, Grenoble). \;
ORGANIZER;CN=James Openshaw: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270111T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270111T234500 SUMMARY:Dimensions of Radical Embodiment IV UID:20261013T230212Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London LOCATION:Bristol\, United Kingdom DESCRIPTION:The 4th instalment of the Dimensions of Radical Embodiment Conference series will take place at the University of Bristol on 26-27th July 2027. \;
\nThe conference focuses on Radical Embodied Cognition\, Ecological Psychology\, and Enactivist approaches to the mind\, and related philosophical issues.
\nAs well as addressing broad issues relating to these approaches\, this instalment of the conference will have two specific areas of focus:
\n1.Radical Embodiment in Healthcare and Psychopathology
\n2.Radical Embodiment in AI and Robotics
\n\nInvited Speakers
\nDr Steve Battle (UWE)
\nDr Joel Krueger (University of Exeter)
\nProf. Ute Leonards (University of Bristol)
\nThe conference will also include talks based on submitted abstracts (see Call for Contributions page)\, with some spaces reserved for early career researchers and PhD students. The deadline for submitted abstracts is Monday 11th January 2027.
\nIf you are interested in presenting your work at the conference\, please submit an anonymised abstract (maximum 500 words) for a talk of roughly 30 minutes by email to dre4bristol@gmail.com by the deadline of midnight on Monday 11th January 2027. \;
\nPlease also submit a separate document including the following information:
\nName
\nAffiliation
\nPosition or Student Status
\nIf a PhD graduate\, the year of your PhD award
\nWhether you are interested in also attending the Embodiment and Intelligence in Philosophy and Robotics conference on 28-29th July
\nWhether your proposed talk is:
\nA general talk on Radical Embodiment
\nA talk on Radical Embodiment in healthcare and psychopathology
\nA talk on Radical Embodiment in AI and Robotics
\nSuggested topics
\n\nNovel explanations of mental phenomena in terms of radical embodied / ecological psychology / enactivist frameworks
\nResponses to challenges posed to radical embodied / ecological psychology / enactivist frameworks
\nProposals for integration or separation of radical embodied vs. enactivist frameworks
\nForging links between radical embodied / ecological psychology / enactivist frameworks and established issues in other areas of philosophy
\nRadical embodiment and epistemic injustice
\nRadically embodied accounts of ineffability
\nRadical embodiment and bodily doubt
\nApplications of radical embodied / ecological psychology / enactivist frameworks in healthcare
\nAffordances in illness and old age
\nApplications of radical embodied / ecological psychology / enactivist frameworks in psychopathology
\nAffordances in psychopathology
\nApplications of radical embodied / ecological psychology / enactivist frameworks in robotics
\nAnti-representationalist approaches to understanding AI
\nCritiques of computational functionalism in AI narratives from radical embodied / ecological psychology / enactivist perspectives
\nRobotic affordances
\nRadical embodied / ecological psychology / enactivist approaches to artificial consciousness
\nThe conference will be immediately followed by a partner event at the same venue\, the British Academy conference on Embodiment and Intelligence in Philosophy and Robotics\, which will take place on 28-29th July 2027. Speakers at Dimensions of Radical Embodiment 4 will not need to pay a registration fee to attend this extra conference.
\n\nIf you have any questions about the conference\, please email the organizer\, Max Jones (max.jones@bristol.ac.uk).
ORGANIZER;CN=Max Jones: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270113T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270113T170000 SUMMARY:NARRABODY: Narrative and Body in Post-Stroke Selfhood. A Longitudinal Qualitative Study UID:20261013T230213Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:We are delighted to announce the next series of UK XPHI Online. This is a monthly online workshop devoted to discussion of work in progress in experimental philosophy (broadly construed). We feature work from all areas of experimental philosophy\, by researchers at all career stages\, from the UK and all over the world. The workshop meets once a month on Teams\, typically the second Wednesday of each month (16:00-18:00 UK time)\, for a two-hour session that typically features two talks (each 40 minutes plus 15 minutes Q&\;A). \;
\n\;Talk 1
\nTalk 2
\nOct 14\, 16-18 UK
\nRedesigning Ethical Thought Experiments: Reassessing the Experimental Challenge to Moral Intuition\, Pietro Tunesi (Trinity College Dublin)
\nWhat people (don't) want to know in the moral domain\, Jordan Wylie (Cornell University)\, Nathan Liang (Cornell University)\, and Charlotte Austin (Cornell University)
\nNov 11\, 16-18 UK
\nMoral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging: An Experimental Investigation\, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (Aarhus University)\, Kevin Reuter (University of Gothenburg)\, Somogy Varga (Aarhus University)\,
\nThe Side-Effect Effect and &ldquo\;Intentionally&rdquo\;\, Lilian O&rsquo\;Brien (Tampere University\, University of Helsinki)\, Svetlana Vetchinnikova (University of Helsinki).
\nDec 9\, 16-18 UK
\nMischaracterization Objection 2.0\, David Bordonaba-Plou (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)\, Krzysztof Sękowski (University of Warsaw)
\nFrom Thought Experiments to Experimental Evidence: Transparency and Quality of Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Bartosz Maćkiewicz (University of Warsaw)\, Katarzyna Kuś (University of Warsaw)\, Joanna Gęgotek (University of Warsaw)\, Monika Gurak (University of Warsaw)\, and Franciszek Kittel (University of Warsaw).
\nJan 13\, 16-18 UK
\nNARRABODY: Narrative and Body in Post-Stroke Selfhood. A Longitudinal Qualitative Study\, Camille Lé\;pingle (ENS de Lyon)
\nA cross-cultural\, qualitative study on HPV vaccination intention\, Konrad Henne (University of Heidelberg)\, Alejandra Petino Zappala (Ruhr University Bochum)\, Nora Heinzelmann (University of Heidelberg)
\nFeb 10\, 16-18 UK
\nDo subjects have revelation intuitions?\, Marcus Ashby (King&rsquo\;s College London)
\nCorrect\, incorrect\, or does it depend? Demonstrating and explaining variation in folk metanormative judgment\, Mikló\;s Kü\;rthy (University of Graz)\, Geoffrey Goodwin (University of Pennsylvania)\, Paulo Sousa (Queen's University Belfast).
\nTo submit for future series\, please email the organizers an abstract of up to 500 words by Dec 15\, 2026 to james.andow@manchester.ac.uk.
\nThis series is organised by:
\nEugen Fischer (UEA)
\nJoanna Demaree-Cotton (Oxford)
\nJames Andow (Manchester)
ORGANIZER;CN=James Andow;CN=Joanna Demaree-Cotton;CN=Eugen Fischer: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270128T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vilnius:20270130T170000 SUMMARY:Collective Agency in Classical and Continental Philosophy (Vilnius\, 2027) UID:20261013T230214Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/Vilnius LOCATION:Vilnius\, Lithuania DESCRIPTION:Conference description
\nIt is commonly assumed that individuals\, rather than collectives\, are the primary agents of action. According to ontological individualism\, social phenomena and collective actions are ultimately reducible to the actions and mental states of individuals. In recent decades\, however\, \; philosophers have developed a vibrant debate around collective agency\, noting for instance that certain mutual obligations cannot be reduced to individual duties and that groups can exhibit a unity of intention and action beyond the sum of their members. Much of this discussion has taken place within the analytic tradition.
\nThis conference asks what new insights can be gained by turning to classical and continental philosophy to enrich our understanding of collective agency. We believe that these traditions offer rich\, as yet underexplored\, conceptual resources that can open up fruitful new perspectives on questions of collective intentionality\, action\, and identity. In doing so\, the conference seeks to bridge philosophical traditions that often work in isolation\, bringing continental\, classical\, and analytic thinkers into dialogue around a shared theme. This will be one of the first forums to put figures from phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, personalism\, ancient and classical philosophy in direct conversation with analytic approaches to collective agency &ndash\; a creative synthesis we hope will break new theoretical ground.
\nWe invite contributions from scholars in continental philosophy (especially phenomenology\, hermeneutics\, existentialism\, personalism\, critical theory etc.)\, classical philosophy (e.g. ancient Greek and Roman thought\, medieval philosophy\, Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic traditions)\, political and social theory\, and related areas. Submissions from analytic philosophers that engage with the aforementioned traditions are also welcome.
\nPossible questions and topics that conference papers might address include\, but are not limited to\, the following themes:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the individual identity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Relational nature of personhood
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collectives and ontological unity
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Categorisation of group agency
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Group intentions\, beliefs\, minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective emotions
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Individual duties and virtues in relation to groups
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective justice
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Groups and moral responsibility
\n·\; \; \; \; Acting together in politics (solidarity\, civil disobedience\, collective movements)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Institutions\, corporations\, states as unitary agents and minds
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Collective identity and play\, art\, culture
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; &ldquo\;We&rdquo\; in the aesthetic experience
\nConfirmed keynote speakers:
\nThornton Lockwood (University of Florida)
\nSophie Loidolt (TU Darmstadt)
\n\nSubmission guidelines
\nSubmission deadline and acceptance notification
\nThe abstracts must be submitted by Monday 1st June 2026.
\nThe acceptance notifications might be expected after Tuesday 30th June 2026.
\nSubmission procedure
\nWe invite proposals from researchers at every stage of their career and particularly welcome submissions from PhD students and early-career researchers. Abstracts should be submitted as .pdf or .docx files and should not exceed 500 words (without references). Abstracts should contain the title and a short outline of the paper\, specifying the main problem\, thesis\, and the intended line of argument.
\nPlease write &lsquo\;Conference Abstract Submission&rsquo\; in the subject line of your email and include in the email your name\, departmental affiliation\, email address\, short bio.
\nThe abstract must be submitted via email:cola.conference2026@gmail.com
\nPaper delivery
\nAll the authors of the accepted papers will be expected to submit their full papers before the conference. Presentations will be 45 minutes long\, including discussion. The papers will have to be sent for the conference organizers by Monday 11th January 2027.
\nOther practicalities
\nPlease note that this is an in-person conference held at Vilnius University\, Lithuania.
\nLunch and dinner will be provided throughout the conference. Unfortunately\, we are unable to cover travel and accommodation costs.
\nOrganisers
\nThis conference is part of the research project &ldquo\;Collective Agency: Towards A Three-Part Philosophical Theory&rdquo\; (No. S-MIP-25-108)\, funded by the Lithuanian Research Council. Project implementers and conference organisers are Vilius Bartninkas\, Simas Čelutka\, and Aistė Noreikaitė.
ORGANIZER;CN=Vilius Bartninkas: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270131T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270131T090000 SUMMARY:Clinical Pragmatics and the Cognitive Sciences UID:20261013T230215Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:CALL FOR CHAPTERS
\nCLINICAL PRAGMATICS AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Language\, Mind\, and Communication Across the Lifespan
Edited by Paola Pennisi
University of Messina\, Italy
Proposed for the Springer series
Perspectives in Pragmatics\, Philosophy &\; Psychology
────────────────────────────────────────
\nABOUT THE VOLUME
\nClinical pragmatics offers a privileged perspective on the relationships between language\, meaning\, cognition\, and social interaction.
\nThis edited volume will bring together clinical\, linguistic\, philosophical\, psychological\, neuropsychological\, and cognitive-scientific approaches to pragmatic communication across the lifespan.
\nWe particularly welcome contributions that begin with the description or analysis of clinical and atypical pragmatic-linguistic profiles and use this evidence to develop\, refine\, or challenge broader theories of language\, meaning\, cognition\, and interaction.
\nThere are no submission or publication fees for contributors.
\n────────────────────────────────────────
\nTOPICS MAY INCLUDE
\n&bull\; Autism and other neurodevelopmental conditions
&bull\; Social and pragmatic communication disorders
&bull\; Developmental language disorder and intellectual disability
&bull\; Genetic and rare syndromes
&bull\; Schizophrenia\, psychosis\, and psychiatric conditions
&bull\; Aphasia and right-hemisphere communication disorders
&bull\; Traumatic brain injury
&bull\; Parkinson&rsquo\;s disease\, dementia\, and other neurodegenerative conditions
&bull\; Hearing loss\, visual impairment\, and multimodal communication
&bull\; Pragmatic development and pragmatic changes across the lifespan
&bull\; Theory of mind\, mentalizing\, and social cognition
&bull\; Executive functions\, memory\, attention\, emotion\, and cognitive flexibility
&bull\; Pragmatic inference\, implicature\, presupposition\, and speech acts
&bull\; Metaphor\, irony\, humour\, sarcasm\, and indirect language
&bull\; Narrative\, discourse\, conversation\, prosody\, gesture\, and gaze
&bull\; Embodied\, enactive\, phenomenological\, ecological\, and interactional approaches
&bull\; Pragmatic assessment\, diagnosis\, intervention\, and rehabilitation
&bull\; Cross-linguistic\, cross-cultural\, and multilingual perspectives
&bull\; Digital technologies\, computational methods\, and artificial intelligence
Related proposals are also welcome.
\n────────────────────────────────────────
\nTYPES OF CONTRIBUTIONS
\nThe volume welcomes:
\n&bull\; Experimental and observational studies
&bull\; Descriptions of pragmatic-linguistic profiles
&bull\; Qualitative\, quantitative\, and mixed-method studies
&bull\; Conversation\, discourse\, narrative\, and multimodal analyses
&bull\; Clinical case studies and case series
&bull\; Comparative and transdiagnostic studies
&bull\; Assessment and intervention studies
&bull\; Methodological contributions
&bull\; Theoretical and philosophical papers
&bull\; Systematic\, scoping\, and narrative reviews
&bull\; Meta-analyses and interdisciplinary position papers
Contributions may address any age group\, from early childhood to older adulthood.
\n────────────────────────────────────────
\nSUBMISSION
\nPlease submit:
\n&bull\; A provisional title
&bull\; An abstract of approximately 300&ndash\;500 words
&bull\; Five keywords
&bull\; Authors&rsquo\; names\, affiliations\, and contact details
&bull\; A short biographical note
&bull\; The proposed type of contribution
Abstracts should be sent to:
\nPaola Pennisi
University of Messina
paola.pennisi@unime.it
────────────────────────────────────────
\nIMPORTANT DATES
\nAbstract submission: 31 January 2027
Notification of acceptance: 14 February 2027
Full chapter submission: 7 January 2028
Peer-review reports: 28 February 2028
Final manuscript submission to Springer: June 2028
────────────────────────────────────────
\nAll chapters will undergo scholarly peer review. Acceptance of an abstract does not automatically guarantee publication of the final chapter.
\nProspective contributors are welcome to circulate this call among interested colleagues.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270210T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270210T170000 SUMMARY:Do subjects have revelation intuitions? UID:20261013T230216Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:We are delighted to announce the next series of UK XPHI Online. This is a monthly online workshop devoted to discussion of work in progress in experimental philosophy (broadly construed). We feature work from all areas of experimental philosophy\, by researchers at all career stages\, from the UK and all over the world. The workshop meets once a month on Teams\, typically the second Wednesday of each month (16:00-18:00 UK time)\, for a two-hour session that typically features two talks (each 40 minutes plus 15 minutes Q&\;A). \;
\n\;Talk 1
\nTalk 2
\nOct 14\, 16-18 UK
\nRedesigning Ethical Thought Experiments: Reassessing the Experimental Challenge to Moral Intuition\, Pietro Tunesi (Trinity College Dublin)
\nWhat people (don't) want to know in the moral domain\, Jordan Wylie (Cornell University)\, Nathan Liang (Cornell University)\, and Charlotte Austin (Cornell University)
\nNov 11\, 16-18 UK
\nMoral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging: An Experimental Investigation\, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (Aarhus University)\, Kevin Reuter (University of Gothenburg)\, Somogy Varga (Aarhus University)\,
\nThe Side-Effect Effect and &ldquo\;Intentionally&rdquo\;\, Lilian O&rsquo\;Brien (Tampere University\, University of Helsinki)\, Svetlana Vetchinnikova (University of Helsinki).
\nDec 9\, 16-18 UK
\nMischaracterization Objection 2.0\, David Bordonaba-Plou (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)\, Krzysztof Sękowski (University of Warsaw)
\nFrom Thought Experiments to Experimental Evidence: Transparency and Quality of Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Bartosz Maćkiewicz (University of Warsaw)\, Katarzyna Kuś (University of Warsaw)\, Joanna Gęgotek (University of Warsaw)\, Monika Gurak (University of Warsaw)\, and Franciszek Kittel (University of Warsaw).
\nJan 13\, 16-18 UK
\nNARRABODY: Narrative and Body in Post-Stroke Selfhood. A Longitudinal Qualitative Study\, Camille Lé\;pingle (ENS de Lyon)
\nA cross-cultural\, qualitative study on HPV vaccination intention\, Konrad Henne (University of Heidelberg)\, Alejandra Petino Zappala (Ruhr University Bochum)\, Nora Heinzelmann (University of Heidelberg)
\nFeb 10\, 16-18 UK
\nDo subjects have revelation intuitions?\, Marcus Ashby (King&rsquo\;s College London)
\nCorrect\, incorrect\, or does it depend? Demonstrating and explaining variation in folk metanormative judgment\, Mikló\;s Kü\;rthy (University of Graz)\, Geoffrey Goodwin (University of Pennsylvania)\, Paulo Sousa (Queen's University Belfast).
\nTo submit for future series\, please email the organizers an abstract of up to 500 words by Dec 15\, 2026 to james.andow@manchester.ac.uk.
\nThis series is organised by:
\nEugen Fischer (UEA)
\nJoanna Demaree-Cotton (Oxford)
\nJames Andow (Manchester)
ORGANIZER;CN=James Andow;CN=Joanna Demaree-Cotton;CN=Eugen Fischer: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Lima:20270222T080000 DTEND;TZID=America/Lima:20270228T170000 SUMMARY:CAELO 1: First Andean Congress for Epistemology and Logic UID:20261013T230217Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:America/Lima LOCATION:Lima\, Peru DESCRIPTION:CAELO 1: First Andean Congress for Epistemology and Logic*\, organised by Peru&rsquo\;s \;Society for Epistemology and Logic \;(SEPLO)\, will take place in Lima\, Peru\, from \;22 to 28 February 2027.
\nThis inaugural congress marks the beginning of a planned series dedicated to the study of epistemology and logic\, bringing together scholars\, researchers\, and students from diverse backgrounds. The event offers a space for rigorous discussion and exchange on topics including logic\, epistemology\, philosophy of science\, analytic philosophy\, metaphysics\, social philosophy\, empirically informed approaches\, and both philosophically and scientifically oriented studies. Participants will have the opportunity to engage in talks and workshops that foster interdisciplinary dialogue and critical reflection. Contributions from all levels of experience are welcome\, from established researchers to early-career scholars and students. Proposed sessions and workshops include:
\n*This event was formerly called Epilog 1: 1st Congress of Epistemology and Logic.
ORGANIZER;CN=Luis F. Bartolo Alegre: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20270224T090000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20270226T170000 SUMMARY:Conference for Asia Pacific Psychedelic Science UID:20261013T230218Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:Melbourne\, Australia DESCRIPTION:Australia is at the centre of this shift. In 2020\, Monash University established the country's first dedicated psychedelic research lab. In 2023\, the Therapeutic Goods Administration created a regulated pathway for authorised psychiatrists to prescribe MDMA and psilocybin\, making Australia one of the first countries to formalise clinical access to psychedelic-assisted therapy outside of clinical trials.
\nMultiple groups across the Asia-Pacific are now conducting world-first and world-class psychedelic research\, assessing implementation in real-world clinics\, asking questions across a diverse array of disciplines\, manufacturing psychedelic compounds in novel ways\, shaping novel policy\, and developing psychedelic practice.
\nCAPS27 builds on that foundation. It's a forum for researchers\, clinicians\, policymakers\, ethicists\, cultural scholars\, educators\, industry leaders\, and funders to meet\, share evidence\, build collaborations\, and advance the field together.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270301T000000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270301T000000 SUMMARY:Mind without Inner Representation? Psychological Discourse\, Rationality\, and Mental Anti-Representationalism (Special Issue of JCCP) UID:20261013T230219Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:CFP: Mind without Inner Representation?
\nPsychological Discourse\, Rationality\, and Mental Anti-Representationalism
\nSpecial Issue of \;Journal of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy (JCCP)
\nGuest Editor: Rusong Huang
\nContact: rusongh@gmail.com
\nSubmission deadline: March 1\, 2027
\nTopic areas: Philosophy of Mind\; Philosophy of Language\; Metaphysics\; Normativity\; Philosophy of Psychology
\nDescription
\nWhen we attribute beliefs\, desires\, intentions\, fears\, memories\, imaginings\, sensations\, or experiences to someone\, what are we doing?
\nMuch of modern philosophy of mind has assumed that psychological sentences are representational: they describe mental states\, properties\, events\, or processes belonging to a subject. This assumption generates familiar metaphysical pressures. If psychological sentences represent mental facts\, then we must explain how such facts fit into the physical world. This gives rise to what has been variously called the location problem\, the placement problem\, the accommodation problem\, or the problem of how mind can be at home in nature.
\nThis special issue invites papers that examine whether the representational assumption about psychological discourse should be rejected\, revised\, or defended. It focuses on a family of views that challenge\, in different ways\, the idea that psychological sentences primarily function to represent inner mental facts. These include fictionalism\, eliminativism\, error theory\, illusionism\, and mental anti-representationalism &mdash\; what we may call\, for convenience\, the FEEL theories and MAR. The issue welcomes both sympathetic and critical treatments of these views\, as well as papers that defend more traditional representationalist approaches.
\nA central aim of the issue is to explore the relations among these positions. Are the FEEL theories and MAR competing alternatives\, or can they be combined? Does MAR collapse into one of the FEEL theories\, or does it offer a distinct way of rejecting inner-fact representationalism? Can these approaches preserve the explanatory\, rational\, and normative roles of psychological discourse while avoiding the metaphysical burdens of inner-object models of mind?
\nPossible topics
\nSubmissions may address\, but are not limited to:
\nPapers may be sympathetic\, critical\, historical\, systematic\, or comparative.
\nSubmission instructions
\nSubmissions should be original articles not currently under consideration elsewhere.
\nManuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review and should not exceed 10\,000 words\, including quotations and footnotes but excluding reference lists.
\nPlease submit manuscripts in the Editorial Manager for JCCP: \; https://www.editorialmanager.com/jccp/default.aspx \;
\nYou may see submission instructions here.
\nPlease indicate that the paper is intended for the special issue &ldquo\;Mind without Inner Representation? Psychological Discourse\, Rationality\, and Mental Anti-Representationalism.&rdquo\;
\nSubmission deadline: March 1\, 2027
\nExpected publication: Fall 2027 / early 2028
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261013T230131Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270301T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270301T090000 SUMMARY:Special issue of Agatheos: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion: "Philosophy of Mind Meets Philosophy of Religion" UID:20261013T230220Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:88f:7dff:fed6:58d1%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:CFP: Philosophy of Mind Meets Philosophy of Religion
\nSpecial issue on &ldquo\;Philosophy of Mind Meets Philosophy of Religion&rdquo\;
\nDeadline: 1 March 2027
Editors: Prof. Andrei A. Buckareff and Dr. Mikael Leidenhag
The philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion were largely siloed sub-disciplines for much of the 20th and early 21st centuries. Insofar as the sub-disciplines made connections\, it was mostly in work by traditional theists considering the implications of the ontological commitments of theism for how to think about persons and the afterlife. To the extent that philosophy of mind had an influence on debates in the philosophy of religion\, much of the work centered around theists arguing that theistic supernaturalism enjoys an advantage over atheistic naturalism with respect to the hard problem of consciousness. Again\, there have been exceptions. For instance\, some panentheistic models of the divine mind offered in the 1990s and 2000s were influenced by work on emergentism in the philosophy of mind. And William Alston&rsquo\;s work on religious experience borrowed heavily from his own work and the work of others on direct realism about perception.
\nIn the last twenty years\, there has been growing interest in alternative conceptions of an ultimate. Along with this growing interest\, we have witnessed a growing body of research exploring how work in the philosophy of mind can bear not only on models of the ultimate\, but help shed light on other problems in the philosophy of religion.
\nThis special issue is devoted to essays that explore the intersection between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. Examples of some topics that may be explored include\, but are not limited to\, the following:
\nWe welcome submissions on the foregoing topics and any other topics that explore the boundaries of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion for this special issue.
\nTo submit\, please visit https://publicera.kb.se/aejpr/about/submissions. Name the file &ldquo\;Special Issue PoMPoR&rdquo\;.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR