The Austrian Society for Phenomenology launches its fouth international summer school. Our objective is to promote the research of young scholars (bachelor\, master\, and doctoral students) that sheds new phenomenological light on current debates in epistemology\, metaethics\, and metaphysics. The descriptive analysis of lived experience\, the eidetic study of the various modes of intentionality\, and the epistemic role and normative dimensions ascribed to experience constitute the cornerstones of phenomenological research. In particular\, Husserl&rsquo\;s conceptions of originary givenness\, evaluative experience\, and eidetic intuition are among the various seminal contributions we find in the phenomenological tradition. Currently\, promising research is done that utilizes such conceptions in order to develop phenomenological perspectives on experiential justification\, the debate between epistemic internalism and externalism\, the theory of value\, (moral) emotions\, moral epistemology\, issues surrounding metaphysical realism and anti-realism\, as well as the epistemology and metaphysics of essence\, modality\, and metaphysical dependence relations. We would like to encourage students to develop phenomenological insights and teachings systematically and in view of contemporary debates in philosophy. Our ambition is to promote such phenomenological research by providing a platform to connect with\, discuss with\, and receive feedback from peers and experts. Each conference day is devoted to one of the subtopics of the event.
\nThe conference will be an \;online event. \;If you wish to participate in the summer school but not to give a talk\, please provide a short statement of motivation (not more than 150 words) and specify your name\, affiliation\, and research interests.
\nCall for Papers
\nIf you wish to participate in the summer school and give a talk\, please apply with an (extended) abstract of the paper you wish to present. Submissions should not exceed 500 words\, must be written in English (conference language)\, and should be prepared for blind review.
\nThe submission deadline is July 15\, 2026.
\nPlease send your applications/submissions and general inquiries to: laurentia[dot]adam[at]uni-graz[dot]at
\nWomen and members of other traditionally underrepresented groups are especially encouraged to apply.
\nPreliminary schedule
\nSeptember 1
\nPhenomenological Approaches to Metaethics
\nNicolas de Warren (Penn State University): TBA
\n3 student presentations commented on by Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (University of Graz)
\nSeptember 2
\nPhenomenological Approaches to Epistemology
\nMirja Hartimo (University of Helsinki): TBA
\n3 student presentations commented on by Philipp Berghofer (University of Graz)
\nSeptember 3
\nPhenomenological Approaches to Metaphysics
\nKit Fine (New York University): TBA
\n3 student presentations commented on by Michael Wallner (University of Graz)
ORGANIZER;CN=Philipp Berghofer;CN=Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl;CN=Michael Wallner: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Riga:20260724T170000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Riga:20260801T170000 SUMMARY:The F-word – Autofiction as Resistance to Patriarchy UID:20260712T145300Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Riga LOCATION:Saulkrasti\, Latvia DESCRIPTION:Feminism gives us a vision\, a framework\, and tools to upend systems. One of those systems is how we think of language and the self. Is it possible to say what is true\, when stories are always already framed by the world in which they take place? What role does autofiction play in our own lives\, in the process of resistance\, in the call for that which remains invisible? The poetic attention inherent in autofiction\, in escrevivê\;ncia\, that is inherent in the work\, is created for and by and to address the necessity of the impossible. Autofiction as an act of God\, of the transcendent that manifests itself in the real\, in lived experience\, and as such is aimed at resisting the patriarchy.
\nIn this symposium we aim to bring together people with whom this theme resonates\, and we ask people to share from their own life\, practise\, profession\, in order to create an ongoing conversation as a way to build resilience. We explicitly invite people to embrace the difference they bring in to contribute towards this shared endeavour. \;
\nAutofiction as Resistance as a method
\nDuring this week we aim to work together on exploring the themes that are central to this circle also in the way we participate. We explicitly invite people to share their insights\, artistic practises and theoretic understanding in a way that invites collaborative thinking. For this reason academic presentations are not accepted\, although a presentation can be a part of a larger workshop. Please indicate in your application how much time you would need for your intervention\, and a brief description on how you aim to use the time allotted to your session. First-time experiments are as welcome as tested concepts. \;
\nParticipants without workshops/sharing of their own personal project/ideas are also most welcome to collaborate during the week in the interactive program. \;
\nAbout Nordic Summer University (NSU):
\nNSU is a space for collaboration between disciplines/peoples/ideas. During the Summer Session several study circles\, each hosting their own program\, will come together &ndash\; participants are welcome to join different circles/programmes during the week. NSU is a horizontal organisation\, being present means you are a member and part of the organisation.
\nCosts
\nNSU offers a limited amount of grants and scholarships. If you are interested in receiving one (which means a reduced participation fee of only 100 euro for the whole week)\, please let us know while applying. \;
\nThis includes \;accommodation and all meals for the full week. The price also includes NSU membership\, so it is not necessary to purchase it separately. Those who have already attended a winter symposium and paid the membership will receive a discount code to deduct the membership fee &ndash\; please contact us before you register to receive the discount code. No refunds will be given if participants pay membership twice by mistake\, so please mention in your application that you already attended an NSU event this year\, to receive a discount code.
\nDeadlines
\nPlease send us a short text explaining your aim / topic / idea\, how much time you would need to host the experience\, and what materials you would require (paper/paint/bicycles)\, which we will try to accommodate. \;
\nPlease send us your application by April 5th. \;Especially if you would like to be considered to receive a grant/scholarship\, as decisions on grants/scholarships will be made at the end of April. Deadline to confirm and pay your spot as a grant/scholarship receiver is May 1st. \;
\nOther applicants are accepted on a rolling basis. Final deadline to apply: May 10th. By May 15th you will need to register and pay for the accommodation.
\nApplications and queries can be send to: nicole.nobyeni@nsuweb.org
\nPlease be aware that everyone involved at Nordic Summer University is collaborating on a voluntary basis.
\nAbout the Circle:
\nHow to think/write/be/inter-act without being limited by an already outlined goal/outcome/impact? How to explore what is messy/confused/embodied while accepting that exploration is always also taking place within philosophy/genre/language/life &ndash\; within what is. That is\, our attempt to explore\, to transcend our sites of speech happens in this world and is framed by the situatedness of our lives. Could it be otherwise? This study circle aims to take advantage of the network\, space and openness provided by the Nordic Summer University to raise questions that cannot be answered/grounded/voiced\, for philosophers/writers/feminists and/or/as-well-as those who are other(s/ed/ing). \;
\nThis study circle will explore the liminality of not belonging in a discipline/space/frame/ category/nation. Accepting language as the limit/tool/curse and an unavoidable starting point\, building upon the work of Irigaray/Arendt/Ettinger\, this state of exception of being-with/in/of language is not simple put aside\, but accepted as a reality which is &ldquo\;disturbing\, overwhelming\, and sometimes too close for comfort&rdquo\;. \;
\nThese tensions open up a liminal space &ndash\; how to think/write/be/inter-act within such a space\, while being an/Other\\not-I/(m)\\Other within feminist philosophy? How to write/create/live as a being that is more than the categories available to mark/describe/situate them? How to explore power as a temporary space\, a moment\, political and liminal? How to read and ground ourselves in feminist philosophy while also living/m-othering/PhD-ing? How to even ask/write/question these questions\, without falling prey to the linearity inherent in what/who/why it means to question? \;
\nMore information: \;https://www.nsuweb.org/study-circles/circle-4-an-other-not-i-m-other-in-feminist-philosophy/ \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Nicole Des Bouvrie: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Bucharest:20260727T060000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Bucharest:20260727T060000 SUMMARY:AvataResponsibility 2026: Virtues without borders: humans\, avatars and collective agents UID:20260712T145301Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Bucharest LOCATION:Splaiul Independenței 204\, Bucharest\, Romania DESCRIPTION:Venue: Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Bucharest\, 8 &\; 9 October 2026
\nDescription: Alongside the growing complexity of collective agents such as organizations\, groundbreaking developments in AI and robotics are reshaping our moral landscape in profound and unprecedented ways. With LLM-powered avatars\, AI companions\, and hybrid human-AI assemblages taking the scene\, we are witnessing radical challenges to longstanding assumptions about the nature of agency\, virtue and moral character. Can virtues such as honesty\, practical wisdom\, or care be attributed to artificial or collective agents\, or do they remain the exclusive province of individual human beings? The purpose of this two-day workshop is to explore the puzzle of virtue attribution across an emerging taxonomy of agents\, from human to LLM-powered avatars operating in professional\, educational\, healthcare or virtual gaming environments\, to collective agents encompassing human and artificial agency in organizational settings. Drawing on research from virtue ethics\, AI ethics\, and business ethics\, the workshop aims to interrogate both the theoretical foundations and the practical stakes of extending the traditional virtue-theoretic framework beyond its traditional human-centered scope.
\nOrganizers: This is the third of a series of five yearly workshops hosted by the Research Center in Applied Ethics of the Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Bucharest\, within the framework of the ERC Starting Grant project &ldquo\;avataResponsibility&rdquo\; (Avatar agency. Moral responsibility at the intersection of individual\, collective\, and artificial social entities in emergent avatar communities). Details of the previous edition are available here. The workshop is part of the larger series of events &ldquo\;Responsibility Matters Workshop Series&rdquo\; (RMWS) covering topics related to responsibility across various fields. For further details please contact Mihaela Constantinescu\, PI of the ERC grant avataResponsibility: mihaela.constantinescu@filosofie.unibuc.ro.
\nKeynote and Guest Speakers include
\nRoger Crisp\, University of Oxford
\nMiguel Sicart\, University of Copenhagen \;
\nAlejo Sison\, University of Navarre \;
\nDulce Redin\, University of Navarre \;
\nAnna Puzio\, University of Bern
\nCristian Iftode\, University of Bucharest \;
\nBenjamin Lange\, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitä\;t Mü\;nchen
\nFabio Tollon\, \;University of Edinburgh
\n
Submissions: We have two open slots for workshop talks and four open slots for workshop posters. We welcome submissions of abstracts (maximum 500 words\, excluding references) on topics relating virtue to avatars\, AI companions\, artificial or collective agents . Please send your anonymised abstract and short bio by 27 July 2026 to avataresponsibility@ccea.ro. Successful candidates will be notified by the beginning of August. Although full costs cannot be covered\, there might be several (partial) travel/ accomodation reimbursements available for PhD students and post-doctoral researchers without current funding.
CALL-FOR-PAPERS
\nHusserl considered the establishment of a transcendental community of subjects necessary for the possibility of obtaining transcendental knowledge of oneself and the world. Notwithstanding\, Husserl's philosophy has been regarded as solipsistic for a significant period. However\, analysis of Husserl's theory of perception\, even prior to the publication of the \;Cartesian Investigations\, \;suggests otherwise. According to this view\, experience of the world is understood as public rather than private. Perceived objects are not exclusive to a single perceiving subject\, although they are given in subjective experience. For this reason\, at least from the 1920s onwards\, Husserl refers to the egological foundation of his philosophy as leading toward an intersubjective transcendental phenomenology\, or even (as one can read in Hua IX: 539)\, towards a sociological phenomenology.
\nThe issue of "transcendental intersubjectivity"\, beginning from a transcendental ego\, and its role in the constitution of an intersubjectively valid world\, is discussed in Husserl's 5th Cartesian Meditation as well as in numerous unpublished manuscripts. This topic was further explored by later phenomenologists\, including Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe. Others\, overlooking Husserl's focus on the constitutive role of intersubjectivity rather than its empirical forms\, charged him with neglecting the ethical aspects of the I-Thou relationship\; this critique was most notably advanced by Emanuel Lé\;vinas. However\, it was in the 1950s that Alfred Schutz offered one of the most critical perspectives on the project of establishing an intersubjective transcendental community of egos. Schutz argued\, namely: \;1) Husserl's transcendental Ego cannot be put in the plural. \;2) Husserl did not provide conclusive proof that the existence of other Egos is a problem of the transcendental sphere. \;3) Intersubjectivity is just an empirical-mundane problem. \;4) \;Transcendental subjectivity must be replaced by mundane intersubjectivity.
\nAdditionally\, Schutz made several observations about Husserl's method in the 5th Cartesian Meditation. He argued that Husserl's concept of reduction to the "sphere of the proper" assumes a distinction between the proper and the alien\, which could only have been established prior to the reduction. Schutz also noted that the experience of pairing\, which presents the alien body as similar to one's own\, lacks precision\, as it does not consider differences such as those between male and female\, or between humans and animals.
\nNº\; 40 of \;Phainomenon \;aims to retrieve this issue\, offering not only an analysis of the Husserl-Schutz debate\, but also exploring new perspectives\, namely (but not restricted to):
\n1) the ways the experience of an alien self can be addressed from a phenomenological point-of-view\;
\n2) intersubjectivity and lifeworld\;
\n3) the role of the lived body in the experience of "pairing"\;
\n4) "higher-level" intersubjective communities: family\, corporations\, trade-unions\, state institutions\;
\n5) "mundane phenomenology" and sociology\;
\n6) Schutz: continuation and criticisms (Lester Embree\, Thomas Luckman\, Jü\;rgen Habermas\, and others).
\nThe deadline for submitting proposals is July 31\, 2026.
\nThe author guidelines can be consulted and articles submitted at the following link: \;https://phainomenon-journal.pt/index.php/phainomenon/about/submissions
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260821T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260821T090000 SUMMARY:8th CNY Moral Psychology Workshop UID:20260712T145303Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:1331 Salt Springs Rd\, Syracuse\, United States\, 13214 DESCRIPTION:The 8th CNY Moral Psychology workshop will be held on Nov. 13\, 2026. Any topic in moral psychology is welcome. For suggested topics\, see the program from previous years or 'About the Workshop' (https://sites.google.com/lemoyne.edu/cnymoralpsychology/about). We will hold the Workshop this year in-person at Le Moyne College in Syracuse\, NY. There will not be an option to attend remotely.
\nPlease use the following link for more information.
\nhttps://sites.google.com/lemoyne.edu/cnymoralpsychology/2026
\nSessions are read-ahead. After a brief summary of the paper's main claims and arguments\, the session will be spent in discussion. Applicants will be asked to submit rough drafts of their work (max 25 pages) in late October.
\nThis year's Workshop will feature a keynote by Dr. Ben Bradley (Syracuse University). Title TBA.
\nTo have a presentation considered\, please submit a 500-600 word abstract to the following form (https://forms.gle/8Zdu3JtpoRBLPkUL8). Abstracts are due by Aug. 21
ORGANIZER;CN=Joseph Spino;CN=Randall R. Curren;CN=John M. Monteleone;CN=Irene Liu: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260831T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260831T120000 SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical UID:20260712T145304Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Zurich LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006 DESCRIPTION:Call for Abstracts on Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (University of Zurich\, 18th-20th February 2027)
\nWe invite the submission of extended abstracts (but no longer than 1000 words) for presentations at the international conference on &ldquo\;Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical&rdquo\; that takes place at the University of Zurich from 18th to 20th February 2027. The abstracts should be sent to sebastian.schmidt@uzh.ch until August 31st 2026.
\nThe conference will host a series of renowned experts from ethics and epistemology to discuss the role of relational normativity across philosophical disciplines. If your talk gets accepted\, travel expenses\, including up to three nights at a central hotel in Zurich\, flight and train tickets\, as well as lunch and dinner\, will be covered. We also plan a follow-up project such as an edited volume with a major publisher or a special issue for an academic journal. Accepted talks will be invited as contributions to this follow-up project.
\nA recent trend in epistemology is to borrow ethical concepts to think about epistemic normativity. Maybe most notably\, the concept of epistemic injustice is meant to track the wrong that is done to someone in their capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007). More recently\, the idea that there is something we epistemically owe to each other (cf. Basu 2019) is taking hold. Epistemologists defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of accountability and blame (Kauppinen 2018\; Brown 2020\; Boult 2020\; 2024)\, that we expect each other to meet our epistemic obligations to believe or know (Goldberg 2018)\, and that we owe epistemic redress (Hull 2019)\, atonement (Woodard 2023)\, or reparations (Altanian 2022\; Lackey 2022) to those we epistemically wronged\, who might then decide to epistemically forgive us (Green 2024). This has led some epistemologists to propose more fundamentally social meta-epistemologies (Dyke 2022\; Fleisher 2024\; Hannon &\; Woodard 2025)\, even proposing that epistemic normativity has relational foundations (Boult 2024).
\nWhile epistemologists take inspiration from the work of ethicists to develop their ideas on epistemic relationality\, the above literature develops largely in isolation from broader engagement with the recent ethical discussions on the relational structure of morality. Relational ethics has focused mostly on the explanation of our moral obligations to one another\, where obligations are typically understood as the correlates of rights or similar claims. To be under a moral obligation\, on this view\, is to be under a directed or second-personal duty to another person which is constitutively connected to the claim-right that this person has on you (e.g. Darwall 2006\, Wallace 2019\, Zylberman 2021). The relational understanding of morality illuminates the social significance of morality and the commonly held assumption that morality is grounded in relations of accountability and that moral wrongness warrants blame.
\nThe pioneering work and ongoing research by ethicists should be studied closely for the transposition of ethical concepts into epistemology to be intelligible and bear philosophical fruit. The aim of this conference is to bring together these two perspectives with a focus on discussing foundational issues surrounding relational normativity. Questions that will be discussed may include the following:
\nSpeakers who accepted our invitation to present at the conference include:
\nWe are very much looking forward to receiving your abstracts\,
\nJonas Vandieken (LMU Munich) &\; Sebastian Schmidt (University of Zurich)
\nThis conference is part of the Swiss National Science Foundation project on Relational Epistemology (https://data.snf.ch/grants/grant/223891).
\n\;Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260901T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260903T170000 SUMMARY:Fourth Austrian Summer School in Phenomenology UID:20260712T145305Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:The Austrian Society for Phenomenology launches its fouth international summer school. Our objective is to promote the research of young scholars (bachelor\, master\, and doctoral students) that sheds new phenomenological light on current debates in epistemology\, metaethics\, and metaphysics. The descriptive analysis of lived experience\, the eidetic study of the various modes of intentionality\, and the epistemic role and normative dimensions ascribed to experience constitute the cornerstones of phenomenological research. In particular\, Husserl&rsquo\;s conceptions of originary givenness\, evaluative experience\, and eidetic intuition are among the various seminal contributions we find in the phenomenological tradition. Currently\, promising research is done that utilizes such conceptions in order to develop phenomenological perspectives on experiential justification\, the debate between epistemic internalism and externalism\, the theory of value\, (moral) emotions\, moral epistemology\, issues surrounding metaphysical realism and anti-realism\, as well as the epistemology and metaphysics of essence\, modality\, and metaphysical dependence relations. We would like to encourage students to develop phenomenological insights and teachings systematically and in view of contemporary debates in philosophy. Our ambition is to promote such phenomenological research by providing a platform to connect with\, discuss with\, and receive feedback from peers and experts. Each conference day is devoted to one of the subtopics of the event.
\nThe conference will be an \;online event. \;If you wish to participate in the summer school but not to give a talk\, please provide a short statement of motivation (not more than 150 words) and specify your name\, affiliation\, and research interests.
\nCall for Papers
\nIf you wish to participate in the summer school and give a talk\, please apply with an (extended) abstract of the paper you wish to present. Submissions should not exceed 500 words\, must be written in English (conference language)\, and should be prepared for blind review.
\nThe submission deadline is July 15\, 2026.
\nPlease send your applications/submissions and general inquiries to: laurentia[dot]adam[at]uni-graz[dot]at
\nWomen and members of other traditionally underrepresented groups are especially encouraged to apply.
\nPreliminary schedule
\nSeptember 1
\nPhenomenological Approaches to Metaethics
\nNicolas de Warren (Penn State University): TBA
\n3 student presentations commented on by Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (University of Graz)
\nSeptember 2
\nPhenomenological Approaches to Epistemology
\nMirja Hartimo (University of Helsinki): TBA
\n3 student presentations commented on by Philipp Berghofer (University of Graz)
\nSeptember 3
\nPhenomenological Approaches to Metaphysics
\nKit Fine (New York University): TBA
\n3 student presentations commented on by Michael Wallner (University of Graz)
ORGANIZER;CN=Philipp Berghofer;CN=Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl;CN=Michael Wallner: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260907T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260908T170000 SUMMARY:Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory UID:20260712T145306Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Helgonavägen 3\, Lund\, Sweden DESCRIPTION:Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory
\nLund University: Mon-Tue September 7-8\, 2026
\nSubmission Deadline: Wednesday\, June 24\, 2026
\nWe are pleased to announce the Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory\, which will take place at Lund University on September 7-8\, 2026. This workshop aims to bring together scholars to explore and discuss contemporary and eternal issues in value theory. \;
\nWorkshop Theme
\nThe workshop seeks to provide a platform for exploring and critically engaging with topics that fall under the label value theory or axiology. See \;plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/
\nTopics of Interest
\nWe invite papers on a variety of topics related to value theory\, including\, but not limited to:
\n1. Structures of Value
\n2. Value and Decision Theory
\n3. Value and Risk
\n4. Value Pluralism
\n5. Value Conflicts
\nSubmission Guidelines
\nInterested authors are invited to submit extended abstracts (up to 500 words) for review. Abstracts should be submitted to \;valuetheorylund@gmail.com \;by June 24\, 2026.
\n\;
\nImportant Dates
\n\;
\nKeynote Speakers
\nWe are delighted to host Sarah Stroud (UNC\, Chapel Hill) and Erik Carlson (Uppsala University) as our keynote speakers. \;
\n\;
\nContact Information
\nFor inquiries and submission\, please contact Anders Herlitz\, Henrik Andersson and Mattias Gunnemyr at valuetheorylund@gmail.
\nPrevious conferences
\n ORGANIZER;CN=Henrik Andersson;CN=Mattias Gunnemyr;CN=Anders Herlitz: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260910T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260911T170000 SUMMARY:Workshop “What is Good Reasoning?” UID:20260712T145307Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Zurich LOCATION:Bern\, Switzerland DESCRIPTION:The aim of the workshop is to investigate the nature of good reasoning and its place within the normative domain. We will explore how good reasoning should be understood and how it relates to other central normative notions\, such as reasons\, ought\, value\, and fittingness. The workshop seeks to foster discussion of questions including: What are the norms and aims of reasoning? Can we explain what it means to reason well in terms of other normative or non-normative notions? And what roles do normative reasons play in good reasoning?
ORGANIZER;CN=David Lussi;CN="Andreas Müller": METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260925T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260927T170000 SUMMARY:MadMeta XXIII UID:20260712T145308Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:702 Langdon Street\, Madison\, United States\, 53706 ORGANIZER;CN=Russ Shafer-Landau: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260928T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260930T170000 SUMMARY:Second Conference of the European Moral Responsibility Consortium (EMRC) UID:20260712T145309Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Vienna LOCATION:Salzburg\, Austria DESCRIPTION:The EMRC (European Moral Responsibility Consortium) is a platform devoted to facilitating coordination and cooperation among philosophers based in Europe who are working in the area of moral responsibility and on related topics (free will\, blame\, collective responsibility\, punishment\, moral responsibility and AI\, etc.). From September 28-30\, 2026\, the second conference of the EMRC will be held in Salzburg\, Austria.
\nContact: emrconsortium@gmail.com
ORGANIZER;CN=Leonhard Menges;CN=Leonie Eichhorn: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Bucharest:20261008T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Bucharest:20261009T170000 SUMMARY:AvataResponsibility 2026: Virtues without borders: humans\, avatars and collective agents UID:20260712T145310Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Bucharest LOCATION:Splaiul Independenței 204\, Bucharest\, Romania DESCRIPTION:Venue: Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Bucharest\, 8 &\; 9 October 2026
\nDescription: Alongside the growing complexity of collective agents such as organizations\, groundbreaking developments in AI and robotics are reshaping our moral landscape in profound and unprecedented ways. With LLM-powered avatars\, AI companions\, and hybrid human-AI assemblages taking the scene\, we are witnessing radical challenges to longstanding assumptions about the nature of agency\, virtue and moral character. Can virtues such as honesty\, practical wisdom\, or care be attributed to artificial or collective agents\, or do they remain the exclusive province of individual human beings? The purpose of this two-day workshop is to explore the puzzle of virtue attribution across an emerging taxonomy of agents\, from human to LLM-powered avatars operating in professional\, educational\, healthcare or virtual gaming environments\, to collective agents encompassing human and artificial agency in organizational settings. Drawing on research from virtue ethics\, AI ethics\, and business ethics\, the workshop aims to interrogate both the theoretical foundations and the practical stakes of extending the traditional virtue-theoretic framework beyond its traditional human-centered scope.
\nOrganizers: This is the third of a series of five yearly workshops hosted by the Research Center in Applied Ethics of the Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Bucharest\, within the framework of the ERC Starting Grant project &ldquo\;avataResponsibility&rdquo\; (Avatar agency. Moral responsibility at the intersection of individual\, collective\, and artificial social entities in emergent avatar communities). Details of the previous edition are available here. The workshop is part of the larger series of events &ldquo\;Responsibility Matters Workshop Series&rdquo\; (RMWS) covering topics related to responsibility across various fields. For further details please contact Mihaela Constantinescu\, PI of the ERC grant avataResponsibility: mihaela.constantinescu@filosofie.unibuc.ro.
\nKeynote and Guest Speakers include
\nRoger Crisp\, University of Oxford
\nMiguel Sicart\, University of Copenhagen \;
\nAlejo Sison\, University of Navarre \;
\nDulce Redin\, University of Navarre \;
\nAnna Puzio\, University of Bern
\nCristian Iftode\, University of Bucharest \;
\nBenjamin Lange\, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitä\;t Mü\;nchen
\n
Submissions: We have two open slots for workshop talks and four open slots for workshop posters. We welcome submissions of abstracts (maximum 500 words\, excluding references) on topics relating virtue to avatars\, AI companions\, artificial or collective agents . Please send your anonymised abstract and short bio by 27 July 2026 to avataresponsibility@ccea.ro. Successful candidates will be notified by the beginning of August. Although full costs cannot be covered\, there might be several (partial) travel/ accomodation reimbursements available for PhD students and post-doctoral researchers without current funding.
The conference is on the nature of rationality and its relation to normativity\, especially on how rationality and reasons generate norms for what to believe\, trust or doubt. Rationality provides norms governing our thinking\, not only in general (do not form incoherent beliefs)\, but also in specific cases (do not trust that obvious conman). Which reasons the agent does or does not possess\, and their quality\, is also important. This conference aims at bringing together experts on these topics and shed light on these phenomena.
\nGetting a clear picture of what rationality and reasons are and what norms they place on our thinking can aid with applied philosophical issues as well. For example\, is conspiracy thinking\, distrust towards scientific experts or falling for fake news irrational? If so\, which rational norms are violated exactly\, and under which circumstances? What does the rational standing of people who engage in these potentially irrational processes teach us about why they engage in them\, and what if anything we should do to combat these phenomena?
\nOrganization
\nOrganization committee: \;
\nAuke Montessori\, Jaroslav Malí\;k\, Zuzana Votavová\; \;
\nContact:
\nhttps://ff.uhk.cz/rationalityandnorms/#contact \;
\nThis conference is organized by the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences\, Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Hradec Krá\;lové\;\, as part of the project:
\nKnowledge in the Age of Distrust
\nFunded by the Ministry of Education\, Youth and Sports (Czech Republic). Co-funded by the European Union.
ORGANIZER;CN=Auke Montessori: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073450Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261030T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261031T170000 SUMMARY:Obligation and Normativity in Modern Moral Philosophy UID:20260712T145312Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Rome LOCATION:Milano\, Italy DESCRIPTION:What is distinctive about \;modern \;moral philosophy\, i.e.\, that written in the 17th \;and 18th \;centuries\, is often considered to be its conception of obligation. G.E.M. Anscombe\, for instance\, famously argued that modern moral philosophers\, and her contemporaries under their influence\, were wrong to try and ground the normativity of morality without reference to a divine lawgiver. Whether they are critical or merely interpretive in nature\, the views of many other influential philosophers such as H.A. Prichard\, Bernard Williams\, and Stephen Darwall have all agreed in this respect. Indeed\, Christine Korsgaard describes what she calls &lsquo\;the normative question\,&rsquo\; that is\, what \;justifies \;the demands that morality makes on us\, as one that was especially pressing for modern moral philosophers from roughly Grotius to Kant. How did modern moral philosophers explain the normativity of morality? How do modern figures use the concept of obligation to account for the normativity of morality? This conference and the planned edited volume will address these and related questions. Collectively\, the participants will engage with the works of a variety of major and minor figures from the modern period to enrich our historical and systematic understanding of the nature of morality&rsquo\;s normativity.
ORGANIZER;CN=Michael Walschots;CN=Stefano Bacin: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073451Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261112T140000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261114T170000 SUMMARY:Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop\, CFA UID:20260712T145313Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Copenhagen\, Denmark DESCRIPTION:Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop
\nPhilosophers working on praise and praiseworthiness are invited to submit abstracts for a workshop on these topics\, to be held in Copenhagen in the fall of 2026\, specifically November 12-14. Abstracts on the nature \;of praise and the nature of praiseworthiness are especially welcome. (Submissions on other praise-related issues-- e.g. the morality of praise-- will be considered\, however.)
\nThe intention is to workshop papers for a praise-themed issue of \;Oxford Studies in Agency &\; Responsibility. \;Selected abstracts must be \;promised \;to this special themed issue of OSAR. They cannot be submitted elsewhere\, and if accepted\, they must be committed to OSAR.
\nWhile workshop dinners will be covered\, funds unfortunately are not available to assist with travel or accommodation.
\nThe timeline of important dates and deadlines is as follows:
\n-Abstract due (500-1000 words): April 30\, 2026
\n-Notification concerning acceptance: May 30\, 2026
\n-First draft due (to be circulated amongst workshop participants): October 21\, 2026
\n-Workshop dates: November 12-14\, 2026
\n-Revised draft due: sometime in February 2027
\nThe papers will then be sent out by OUP for vetting and\, once returned\, contributors may make further changes. The praise-themed edition of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is expected to be in print 2028. \;
\nAnonymized abstracts (of 500-1000 words) should be submitted to \;praiseworkshop2026@gmail.com \;by the end of April 30 (last time zone on Earth).
\n
Confirmed Presenters:
Jules Holroyd
\nKasper Lippert-Rasmussen
\nZoë\; Johnson King
\nVictoria McGeer
\nColeen Macnamara
\nLeo Menges and Leonie Eichhorn
\nDana Nelkin
\nDavid Shoemaker
\nDaniel Telech
\n
\;
Submit abstracts for the Workshop at the following address.
\nhttps://forms.gle/8foFeWAojyHLuFXr7
\nThe keynote speaker is Ben Bradley (Syracuse University).
\nThe deadline for submissions is Friday\, August 21st.
\nPlease direct any questions or issues to Joseph Spino at spinojm@lemoyne.edu.
ORGANIZER;CN=Joseph Spino;CN=Randall R. Curren;CN=John M. Monteleone;CN=Irene Liu: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073451Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261119T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261120T170000 SUMMARY:Normative Reasons and Morality UID:20260712T145315Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Norbert-Wollheim-Platz 1\, Frankfurt am Main\, Germany DESCRIPTION:While the concept of a normative reason is often taken to provide a common currency across different domains of normativity\, its role and nature within the moral domain continue to raise a number of difficult and intriguing questions. Some philosophers have argued that moral reasons are distinctive in virtue of their stringency or overridingness\; others question whether the notion of a normative reason provides the most illuminating framework for understanding moral demands at all. More generally\, the relationship between morality and normative reasons remains contested\, both with respect to the nature of moral reasons and their place within moral thought and practice. This workshop aims to examine these issues from a variety of perspectives and to explore the significance of reasons-based approaches for contemporary moral philosophy.
\nWe welcome contributions addressing questions including (but not limited to):
\nA limited number of slots are available through an open call for abstracts. Please send your abstract\, prepared for anonymous review\, as a PDF file to si [dot] behrens [at] em [dot] uni [hyphen] frankfurt [dot] de (subject line: &ldquo\;Morality and Reasons&rdquo\;). Abstracts should be between 500 and 1\,000 words (including notes but excluding bibliography). Papers should be suitable for a 40-minute presentation. The deadline for submissions is \;July 15\, 2026. \;Applicants will be notified of the outcome by July 31\, 2026.
\nWe particularly encourage Ph.D. students and individuals from underrepresented groups to submit.
\n\n ORGANIZER;CN=Singa Behrens: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260712T073451Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270218T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270220T170000 SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical UID:20260712T145316Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:5864:16ff:fe1a:92fe%3 TZID:Europe/Zurich LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006 DESCRIPTION:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR