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CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260317T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261117T170000
SUMMARY:Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics: Online Lecture Series
UID:20260613T130535Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<ul><li>17/3/2026 17:00 CET&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Reshef Agam-Segal</strong> (VMI): How to Be Morally Resolute: Diamond vs. Conant &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;</li>\n<li>28/4/2026 17:00 CEST &nbsp\; &nbsp\;&nbsp\;<strong>Samuel Pedziwiatr </strong>(Hagen): Echoes of Euthyphro. Wittgenstein and Schlick on the (Im-)possibility of Scientific Ethics &nbsp\;&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>18/6/2026 17:00 CEST &nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Duncan Richter </strong>(VMI): Ethics and the Supernatural &nbsp\;&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>17/11/2026 17:00 CET &nbsp\; <strong>Maria Balaska</strong> (&Aring\;bo): Wittgenstein (and Heidegger) on the Wonder at Being</li>\n<li><br>Please note the lectures start at 5pm CET (Central European Time).</li>\n</ul>
ORGANIZER;CN=Nimrod Matan;CN=Gilad Nir;CN=Jonathan Soen:
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260614T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260614T234500
SUMMARY:Workshop “What is Good Reasoning?”
UID:20260613T130536Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Bern\, Switzerland
DESCRIPTION:<p>CALL FOR ABSTRACTS</p>\n<p>Workshop &ldquo\;What is Good Reasoning?&rdquo\;</p>\n<p>University of Bern\, Switzerland</p>\n<p>10&ndash\;11 September 2026</p>\n<p>The aim of the workshop is to investigate the nature of good reasoning and its place within the normative domain. We will explore how good reasoning should be understood and how it relates to other central normative notions\, such as reasons\, ought\, value\, and fittingness. The workshop seeks to foster discussion of questions including: What are the norms and aims of reasoning? Can we explain what it means to reason well in terms of other normative or non-normative notions? And what roles do normative reasons play in good reasoning?</p>\n<p>Confirmed speakers:</p>\n<p>- Frank Hofmann&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>- Benjamin Kiesewetter&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>- David Lussi&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>- Alessandra Marra&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>- Connor McHugh&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>We invite submissions for additional talks. If you are interested\, please send an abstract of 600&ndash\;800 words (suitable for a talk of 40 minutes) as a PDF attachment to ethicsbern@gmail.com by 14 June 2026. We will notify you about the decision by the end of June.</p>\n<p>The abstract must be suitable for blind review and not contain any information that may identify you as the author. However\, please make sure that the e-mail to which the abstract is attached contains your name and institutional affiliation (if applicable).</p>\n<p>Researchers from underrepresented groups in academic philosophy are especially encouraged to submit. We will provide hotel accommodation for all accepted speakers. In addition\, there is a limited budget for covering (some of) the travelling expenses of those who do not have access to financial support from their home institution.</p>\n<p>Organizers: David Lussi\, Andreas M&uuml\;ller (University of Bern)</p>\n<p>If you have any questions\, please contact us at&nbsp\;<a name="OLE_LINK1"></a>ethicsbern@gmail.com.&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Lussi;CN="Andreas Müller":
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260615T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260616T170000
SUMMARY:Pathologies of Legalism and the Rule of Law
UID:20260613T130537Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Ithaca\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>While some societies suffer from lawlessness\, others suffer from what could be called &ldquo\;pathologies of legalism&rdquo\;. Here\, while citizens and officials adhere to the letter of the law\, they frequently flout something more fundamental in ways that erode the rule of law. In addition to the familiar uses of technicalities to game the legal system\, there are much more serious instances\, such as &ldquo\;lawfare&rdquo\;\, in which political officials weaponize the law in order to attack their political opponents. This project aims to illuminate the nature of the rule of law by investigating these and other pathologies of legalism. Questions to be posed include: What exactly is flouted when citizens or officials resort to legalism? Wherein lies the wrong or harm in such floutings? What kinds of measures would be suitable to address them effectively? Are there certain virtues that\, if cultivated\, would protect against the pathologies of legalism? Speakers will include Gerald Postema (UNC-CH)\, &ldquo\;No Tyranny More Cruel"\; Amanda Greene (UC Santa Barbara)\, &ldquo\;What&rsquo\;s Wrong with Lawfare?&rdquo\;\; Lucas Stanczyk (Harvard)\, "The Shadow Republic: Liberalism\, State Violence\, the Responsibility of Intellectuals&rdquo\;\; Kevin Toh (UCL)\, "Mutual Freedom\, Substrata of Rules\, and Subversive Legalism&rdquo\;\; Hilary Nye (Alberta)\, &ldquo\;The Rule of Law as a Thick Concept&rdquo\;\; and Mitchell Berman (Penn)\, "Cheating\, Second-Order Rules\, and Principles".</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Amanda R. Greene;CN=Emad H. Atiq;CN=Kevin Toh:
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260619T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260620T170000
SUMMARY:FrankMeta.8
UID:20260613T130538Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Frankfurt am Main\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p>FrankMeta is the annual meta-ethics conference at the Frankfurt School of Finance &amp\; Management. It&nbsp\;is designed to bring together philosophers working on normativity and metanormativity\, broadly construed. We invite submissions on new work in the metaphysics\, (meta)semantics\, epistemology and psychology of normative discourse\, as well as papers on reasons and rationality.</p>\n<p>The conference will run over two days and provide plenty of time for discussion and exchange.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN="Sebastian Köhler";CN=Christine Tiefensee:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Indiana/Indianapolis:20260622T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Indiana/Indianapolis:20260628T170000
SUMMARY:Patience in Adversity Summer Seminar
UID:20260613T130539Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:America/Indiana/Indianapolis
LOCATION:Notre Dame\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>This seminar aims to equip doctoral students and early career scholars in philosophy and religion to explore patience in adversity. We hope participants will emerge ready to contribute to the growing research on patience as it relates to courage\, anger\, self-control\, awe\, as well as how virtues interact with personal and structural hardship.</p>\n<p><br>The seminar will cover cutting-edge research in philosophy and religion and will feature senior scholars who will present their own work and advise students on their writing projects in this general area. Participants will benefit from mentoring and engagement with their own research during daily sessions.</p>\n<p>Together\, we will consider questions such as:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What are viable conceptions of patience?</li>\n<li>How is patience related to other moral psychological phenomena\, like peace\, self-control\, moral anger\, courage? How might it shape or be developed by patterns of attention?</li>\n<li>What social and cultural practices impact the experience and expression of patience?</li>\n<li>Do different theologically or culturally embedded ideas of time change the experience of patience or its value?</li>\n<li>Does patience have special political value in certain societies\, such as religiously plural societies? What other virtues might have to be operative for patience to have that value?</li>\n<li>How does a patient person properly relate to feelings of anger and sorrow in adversity?</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Logistics and Funding:</strong> Seminar main meetings will convene each day and involve discussion of invited scholars&rsquo\; work\, breakout sessions\, and small group mentoring workshops. Seminar participants will receive a $5\,000 honorarium for their participation and time. All payments will be made in US dollars.Cost of travel and lodging for award recipients is expected to be covered by the individuals themselves.</p>\n<p><strong>Application Deadline: </strong>January 9\, 2026.</p>\n<p><br><strong>Application Instructions:</strong> Applicants must submit the following materials at this link (https://baylor.app.box.com/f/e71a529d377840e896baddc6ed936914) using the document names indicated below each document description:</p>\n<p>1) Letter of application of no more than 1 page explaining: what topics regarding patience interest you\; connection of these topics with your previous or ongoing research\; how research you do or plan to do impacts populations facing adversity\; level of familiarity with moral psychology and virtue ethics generally.</p>\n<p>Name Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] &ndash\; Letter of Application</p>\n<p>2) A 250-word statement describing the scholar&rsquo\;s capacity for successful collaboration with scholars from diverse disciplines and backgrounds (psychology\, religion\, philosophy).</p>\n<p>Name Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] - Collaboration Statement</p>\n<p><br>3) Curriculum Vitae</p>\n<p>Name Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] - CV</p>\n<p><br>4) Short bio (less than 200-word) for posting on a website featuring participants.</p>\n<p>Name Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] - Short Bio</p>\n<p><br>5) Letter of support from primary advisor (PhD mentor for graduate students\, supervisor for postdoctoral researchers) stating the advisor&rsquo\;s supports for the advisee's participation and time commitment.</p>\n<p>Name Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] - Letter of Support</p>\n<p><br>6) Contact information for an additional 2-3 professional references (no letter is required from these additional references at time of application.)</p>\n<p>Name Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] - Professional References</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Anne Jeffrey;CN=Fannie Bialek:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20260623T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20260624T170000
SUMMARY:The Politics of Skepticism
UID:20260613T130540Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
LOCATION:Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam\, Amsterdam\, Netherlands\, 1081 HV
DESCRIPTION:<p>Skepticism is usually understood as a view or stance in epistemology: the skeptic raises a set of challenges to our beliefs and claims to knowledge. But doubt has always had ethical and political implications. Ancient Pyrrhonists saw suspension of judgement as a path to tranquility. Early modern thinkers used skeptical arguments against religious and political authority. In more contemporary debates over expertise\, trust\, and the "crisis of knowledge"\, questions of what we can know are inseparable from political questions.</p>\n<p>This conference explores the ethics and politics of skepticism and doubt. How does skepticism interact with politics--does skepticism undermine or enable certain political arrangements\, ideologies\, or ethical stances? What are the ethical and political implications of different skeptical views or stances? What can we say about specific contexts where doubt may be productive or perilous\, such as in democratic deliberation\, or challenges to scientific consensus?</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Christopher Ranalli;CN=Robin McKenna:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Stockholm:20260624T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Stockholm:20260624T234500
SUMMARY:Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory
UID:20260613T130541Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Stockholm
LOCATION:Helgonavägen 3\, Lund\, Sweden
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for abstracts: Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory</strong></p>\n<p>Lund University: Mon-Tue September 7-8\, 2026</p>\n<p>Submission Deadline: Wednesday\, June 24\, 2026</p>\n<p>We are pleased to announce the Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory\, which will take place at Lund University on September 7-8\, 2026. This workshop aims to bring together scholars to explore and discuss contemporary and eternal issues in value theory.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Workshop Theme</strong></p>\n<p>The workshop seeks to provide a platform for exploring and critically engaging with topics that fall under the label value theory or axiology. See&nbsp\;plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</p>\n<p><strong>Topics of Interest</strong></p>\n<p>We invite papers on a variety of topics related to value theory\, including\, but not limited to:</p>\n<p>1. Structures of Value</p>\n<p>2. Value and Decision Theory</p>\n<p>3. Value and Risk</p>\n<p>4. Value Pluralism</p>\n<p>5. Value Conflicts</p>\n<p><strong>Submission Guidelines</strong></p>\n<p>Interested authors are invited to submit extended abstracts (up to 500 words) for review. Abstracts should be submitted to valuetheorylund@gmail.com&nbsp\;by June 24\, 2026.</p>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Important Dates</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Submission Deadline: June 24\, 2026</li>\n<li>Notification of Acceptance: July 1\, 2026</li>\n<li>Workshop Dates: September 7-8\, 2026</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Keynote Speakers</strong></p>\n<p>We are delighted to host Sarah Stroud (UNC\, Chapel Hill) and Erik Carlson (Uppsala University) as our keynote speakers.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Contact Information</strong></p>\n<p>For inquiries and submissions\, please contact Anders Herlitz\, Henrik Andersson and Mattias Gunnemyr at Valuetheorylund@gmail.&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Henrik Andersson;CN=Mattias Gunnemyr;CN=Anders Herlitz:
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260630T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260630T170000
SUMMARY:Normative Reasons and AI (NORA)
UID:20260613T130542Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Stuhlsatzenhausweg 3\, Saarbrücken\, Germany\, 66123
DESCRIPTION:<p>This one-day workshop brings together researchers from philosophy and computer science to explore the intersection of normative reasoning and machine learning. Topics include the structure of practical and epistemic reasons\, how neural networks may be explained using reasons\, the coherence of AI preference orderings\, and the broader question of what it would mean for an AI system to be genuinely reason-responsive<br><br>For more information (speakers\, schedule etc.)\, see https://yamusk.github.io/websites/Nora</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Kevin Baum;CN=Muskalla Yannic:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260701T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260702T170000
SUMMARY:WoW 2026 – Sixth International Workshop on Welfare and Ethics
UID:20260613T130543Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Campus C9.3\, Saarbrücken\, Germany\, 66123
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Registration</strong>&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>If you would like to attend\, please send an email to <a href="mailto:workshoponwelfare@gmail.com">workshoponwelfare@gmail.com</a> by 15 June.</p>\n\n<p><strong>Keynote speakers</strong></p>\n<p>Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (University of Lodz)&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Theron Pummer (University of St Andrews)</p>\n<p><br></p>\n<p><strong>Further Speakers</strong></p>\n<p>Willem van der Deijl (Tilburg University)</p>\n<p><a name="docs-internal-guid-8fd94b6c-7fff-1b92-abd8-564cc974faa5"></a> Rebecca Dreier (London School of Economics)</p>\n<p>Jonas Harney (TU Dortmund University)</p>\n<p>Thorsten Helfer (Saarland University)</p>\n<p><a name="docs-internal-guid-9153c4dd-7fff-a477-edd3-4df4fdbcc2c8"></a> Paul Heller (University of Oxford)</p>\n<p><a name="docs-internal-guid-5ba03073-7fff-377c-4c44-cb30dce69a87"></a> Sylvester Kollin (Stockholm University)</p>\n<p><a name="docs-internal-guid-163a4fc0-7fff-c6e6-3503-fd46a909b574"></a> Adriano Mannino (Bielefeld University &amp\; UC Berkeley)</p>\n<p><a name="docs-internal-guid-25fab69e-7fff-f81a-682a-945f585dac42"></a> Travis Rebello (University of Colorado Boulder)</p>\n<p>Luca Stroppa (University of Turin)</p>\n\n<p><strong>Information on the workshop</strong>&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Considerations about the nature of welfare\, the value of welfare\, its distribution\, or welfare-based claims and complaints are central to moral philosophy. They are of particular concern for all philosophers who take welfare to be (at least) one source for normative reasons. Evaluative and deontic considerations about welfare provide an array of fascinating philosophical questions.</p>\n<p>It is (quite) uncontroversial that welfare has moral value and provides moral reasons\, but it is highly contested how in particular. We ought not to harm people\, but ought we also benefit them? Does this include non-human animals and other agents\, and does it include future people even if their existence depends on our actions? Can we aggregate people&rsquo\;s welfare\, or should we limit the trade-offs between their harms and benefits?</p>\n<p>Our account of welfare has implications for ethics\, but do ethical considerations also provide reasons to adopt one or another theory of welfare? What is the interaction between theories of welfare and the ethics of welfare?&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Some lives are better and some are worse\, but what constitutes their prudential value? Are well-being and ill-being analogous or do they differ in structure and relevance &ndash\; and what do particular theories imply? What are the relevant underlying concepts of desire\, pleasure\, friendship\, or other objective goods on which welfare may depend?</p>\n<p>This workshop provides a forum for the discussion of those and related questions. It aims at rallying scholars of philosophy to expand our understanding in these issues\, and we hope to promote the philosophical engagement with ethics\, welfare\, and how they interact.</p>\n\n<p><a name="docs-internal-guid-1e6e9200-7fff-150d-d667-b77aedc14092"></a> <strong>Wednesday\, July 1</strong>&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>11:00 - 11:15 Welcome and Introduction<br> </p>\n<p>11:15 - 12:00 Jonas Harney (Dortmund University) &amp\; Luca Stroppa (University of&nbsp\;Turin):&nbsp\;<em>Justifying Resolute Choice</em><br> </p>\n<p>12:30 - 13:15 Sylvester Kollin (Stockholm University):&nbsp\;<em>Welfarism Reconceptualised</em></p>\n<p><em></em>13:15 &ndash\; 14:15 <em>Lunch</em></p>\n<p>14:15 - 15:00 Paul Heller (University of Oxford):&nbsp\;<em>It is better if there are more kinds of&nbsp\;good lives</em><br> </p>\n<p>15:30 - 16:15 Adriano Mannino (Bielefeld University &amp\; UC Berkeley):&nbsp\;<em>Are There&nbsp\;Supreme Evils?</em><br> </p>\n<p>16:45 - 18:15 Theron Pummer (University of St Andrews):&nbsp\;<em>Future Suffering and the Non-Identity Problem</em><br> </p>\n<p>19:30 <em>Dinner</em><br> <br> <strong></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Thursday\, July 2</strong>&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>9:30 - 10:15 Thorsten Helfer (Saarland University):&nbsp\;<em>Desires Running Wild</em><br> </p>\n<p>10:45 &ndash\; 12:15 Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (University of Lodz):&nbsp\;<em>On the Notion of Pleasure</em><br> </p>\n<p>12.15 &ndash\; 13:15 <em>Lunch</em><br> </p>\n<p>13:15 &ndash\; 14:00 Travis Rebello (University of Colorado Boulder):&nbsp\;<em>Well-Being and&nbsp\;Psychological Continuity</em><br> </p>\n<p>14:30 &ndash\; 15:15 Rebecca Dreier (London School of Economics):&nbsp\;<em>Welfare Implications&nbsp\;of Episodic-Like Memory in Nonhuman Animals</em><br> </p>\n<p>15:45 &ndash\; 16:30 Willem van der Deijl (Tilburg University):&nbsp\;<em>Unnoticeable Welfare Value&nbsp\;and Non-Experienced Welfare Goods</em><br> </p>\n<p>18:30 <em>Dinner</em></p>\n<p><em><br></em></p>\n<p>The workshop is organised by Jonas Harney (TU Dortmund University)\, Thorsten Helfer (Saarland University)\, Maximilian Klein (Saarland University) and Hasko von Kriegstein (Toronto Metropolitan University) and generously supported by UdS Professorship for Practical Philosophy and the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (GAP e.V.).&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>More details and updates on&nbsp\;<a href="https://tinyurl.com/48twvh29">https://tinyurl.com/48twvh29</a>.</p>\n<p>For further information\, please contact the organisers at&nbsp\;<a href="mailto:workshoponwelfare@gmail.com">workshoponwelfare@gmail.com</a>.</p>\n\n\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Jonas Harney;CN=Thorsten Helfer;CN=Maximilian Klein;CN=Hasko von Kriegstein:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Budapest:20260706T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Budapest:20260710T170000
SUMMARY:Collective Moral and Intellectual Virtues - Summer Course
UID:20260613T130544Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Budapest
LOCATION:Nádor utca 9.\, Budapest\, Hungary\, 1051
DESCRIPTION:<p>Collectives and other groups have the capacity to do more than any of their individual members could accomplish alone. Groups can achieve great accomplishments and benefits\, but they can also commit evil at scale. Likewise\, through the division of cognitive labor and with the support of technologies of communication and inference\, collectives can learn things that no individual could achieve in a lifetime. However\, collectives can also spread misinformation\, disinformation\, unwarranted conspiracy theories\, and propaganda at hitherto-unimagined speed and scale.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>This course addresses both the promise and the peril that attend our increasingly connected\, global community. It offers participants the chance to think through the ethical difficulties of existence within contemporary communities\, and consider how to construct those communities in ways that enable us to flourish together as moral\, epistemic\, and political agents. We will begin with an introduction to individual virtue theory (both ethical and epistemic)\, then expand to a consideration of collective virtue theory.</p>\n<p>Philosophers have developed accounts not only of the virtues but also detailed accounts of the vices that oppose and undermine them. The fields of both vice ethics and vice epistemology have grown in recent years. Many of these vices only exist in collective contexts because they presuppose various forms of complex sociality. Interdisciplinary scholars have also developed more thorough accounts of not only individual but also collective virtues and vices\, as well as the relationship between individual and collective virtues and vices. The resulting understanding of cognitive technologies and the forms that cognitive conflict can take informs our thinking about what virtue is up against\, and what it consists of.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The team of teachers of this course has experience with both theorizing and conducting empirical studies\, using methods from psychology\, cognitive science\, and artificial intelligence.</p>\n<p>Financial aid is available.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Application deadline: 2026 March 1.</strong></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Mark Alfano:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260715T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260715T234500
SUMMARY:Fourth Austrian Summer School in Phenomenology
UID:20260613T130545Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Austrian Society for Phenomenology launches its fouth international summer school. Our objective is to promote the research of young scholars (bachelor\, master\, and doctoral students) that sheds new phenomenological light on current debates in epistemology\, metaethics\, and metaphysics. The descriptive analysis of lived experience\, the eidetic study of the various modes of intentionality\, and the epistemic role and normative dimensions ascribed to experience constitute the cornerstones of phenomenological research. In particular\, Husserl&rsquo\;s conceptions of originary givenness\, evaluative experience\, and eidetic intuition are among the various seminal contributions we find in the phenomenological tradition. Currently\, promising research is done that utilizes such conceptions in order to develop phenomenological perspectives on experiential justification\, the debate between epistemic internalism and externalism\, the theory of value\, (moral) emotions\, moral epistemology\, issues surrounding metaphysical realism and anti-realism\, as well as the epistemology and metaphysics of essence\, modality\, and metaphysical dependence relations. We would like to encourage students to develop phenomenological insights and teachings systematically and in view of contemporary debates in philosophy. Our ambition is to promote such phenomenological research by providing a platform to connect with\, discuss with\, and receive feedback from peers and experts. Each conference day is devoted to one of the subtopics of the event.</p>\n<p>The conference will be an&nbsp\;<strong>online event.</strong>&nbsp\;If you wish to participate in the summer school but not to give a talk\, please provide a short statement of motivation (not more than 150 words) and specify your name\, affiliation\, and research interests.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p>If you wish to participate in the summer school and give a talk\, please apply with an (extended) abstract of the paper you wish to present. Submissions <strong>should not exceed 500 words</strong>\, must be written in <strong>English</strong> (conference language)\, and should be prepared for <strong>blind review</strong>.</p>\n<p><strong>The submission deadline is July 15\, 2026.</strong></p>\n<p>Please send your applications/submissions and general inquiries to: <strong>laurentia</strong>[dot]<strong>adam</strong>[at]<strong>uni-graz</strong>[dot]<strong>at</strong></p>\n<p>Women and members of other traditionally underrepresented groups are especially encouraged to apply.</p>\n<p><strong>Preliminary schedule</strong></p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>1</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological Approaches to </em><em>Metaethics</em></p>\n<p><strong>Nicolas de Warren</strong> (Penn State University): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (University of Graz)</p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>2</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological </em><em>Approaches to</em><em> </em><em>Epistemology</em></p>\n<p><strong>Mirja Hartimo</strong> (University of Helsinki): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Philipp Berghofer (University of Graz)</p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>3</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological </em><em>Approaches to</em><em> Metaphysics</em></p>\n<p><strong>Kit Fine</strong> (New York University): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Michael Wallner (University of Graz)</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Philipp Berghofer;CN=Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl;CN=Michael Wallner:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Riga:20260724T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Riga:20260801T170000
SUMMARY:The F-word – Autofiction as Resistance to Patriarchy
UID:20260613T130546Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Riga
LOCATION:Saulkrasti\, Latvia
DESCRIPTION:<p>Feminism gives us a vision\, a framework\, and tools to upend systems. One of those systems is how we think of language and the self. Is it possible to say what is true\, when stories are always already framed by the world in which they take place? What role does autofiction play in our own lives\, in the process of resistance\, in the call for that which remains invisible? The poetic attention inherent in autofiction\, in escreviv&ecirc\;ncia\, that is inherent in the work\, is created for and by and to address the necessity of the impossible. Autofiction as an act of God\, of the transcendent that manifests itself in the real\, in lived experience\, and as such is aimed at resisting the patriarchy.</p>\n<p>In this symposium we aim to bring together people with whom this theme resonates\, and we ask people to share from their own life\, practise\, profession\, in order to create an ongoing conversation as a way to build resilience. We explicitly invite people to embrace the difference they bring in to contribute towards this shared endeavour.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Autofiction as Resistance as a method</strong></p>\n<p>During this week we aim to work together on exploring the themes that are central to this circle also in the way we participate. We explicitly invite people to share their insights\, artistic practises and theoretic understanding in a way that invites collaborative thinking. For this reason academic presentations are not accepted\, although a presentation can be a part of a larger workshop. Please indicate in your application how much time you would need for your intervention\, and a brief description on how you aim to use the time allotted to your session. First-time experiments are as welcome as tested concepts.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Participants without workshops/sharing of their own personal project/ideas are also most welcome to collaborate during the week in the interactive program.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>About Nordic Summer University (NSU):</strong></p>\n<p>NSU is a space for collaboration between disciplines/peoples/ideas. During the Summer Session several study circles\, each hosting their own program\, will come together &ndash\; participants are welcome to join different circles/programmes during the week. NSU is a horizontal organisation\, being present means you are a member and part of the organisation.</p>\n<p><strong>Costs</strong></p>\n<p>NSU offers a limited amount of grants and scholarships. If you are interested in receiving one (which means a reduced participation fee of only 100 euro for the whole week)\, please let us know while applying.&nbsp\;</p>\n<ul>\n<li>100 euros Scholarship (in shared 4-bed rooms with shared bathroom)</li>\n<li>1250 euros Institutional price/any room type</li>\n<li>900 euros Institutional price PhD/any room type</li>\n<li>950 euros Single room</li>\n<li>700 euros Bed in double room</li>\n<li>1000 euros Double room 1 adult 1 child</li>\n<li>1200 euros Family room 1 adult 2 children</li>\n<li>1800 euros Family room 2 adults 2 children</li>\n<li>1500 euros Family room 2 adults 1 child</li>\n<li>500 euros Camping&nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>This includes<strong>&nbsp\;accommodation and all meals for the full week</strong>. The price also includes NSU membership\, so it is not necessary to purchase it separately. Those who have already attended a winter symposium and paid the membership will receive a discount code to deduct the membership fee &ndash\; please contact us before you register to receive the discount code. No refunds will be given if participants pay membership twice by mistake\, so please mention in your application that you already attended an NSU event this year\, to receive a discount code.</p>\n<p><strong>Deadlines</strong></p>\n<p>Please send us a short text explaining your aim / topic / idea\, how much time you would need to host the experience\, and what materials you would require (paper/paint/bicycles)\, which we will try to accommodate.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Please send us your application by April 5th.</strong>&nbsp\;Especially if you would like to be considered to receive a grant/scholarship\, as decisions on grants/scholarships will be made at the end of April. Deadline to confirm and pay your spot as a grant/scholarship receiver is May 1st.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Other applicants are accepted on a rolling basis. Final deadline to apply: May 10th. By May 15th you will need to register and pay for the accommodation.</p>\n<p>Applications and queries can be send to: nicole.nobyeni@nsuweb.org</p>\n<p>Please be aware that everyone involved at Nordic Summer University is collaborating on a voluntary basis.</p>\n<p><strong>About the Circle:</strong></p>\n<p>How to think/write/be/inter-act without being limited by an already outlined goal/outcome/impact? How to explore what is messy/confused/embodied while accepting that exploration is always also taking place within philosophy/genre/language/life &ndash\; within what is. That is\, our attempt to explore\, to transcend our sites of speech happens in this world and is framed by the situatedness of our lives. Could it be otherwise? This study circle aims to take advantage of the network\, space and openness provided by the Nordic Summer University to raise questions that cannot be answered/grounded/voiced\, for philosophers/writers/feminists and/or/as-well-as those who are other(s/ed/ing).&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>This study circle will explore the liminality of not belonging in a discipline/space/frame/ category/nation. Accepting language as the limit/tool/curse and an unavoidable starting point\, building upon the work of Irigaray/Arendt/Ettinger\, this state of exception of being-with/in/of language is not simple put aside\, but accepted as a reality which is &ldquo\;disturbing\, overwhelming\, and sometimes too close for comfort&rdquo\;.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>These tensions open up a liminal space &ndash\; how to think/write/be/inter-act within such a space\, while being an/Other\\not-I/(m)\\Other within feminist philosophy? How to write/create/live as a being that is more than the categories available to mark/describe/situate them? How to explore power as a temporary space\, a moment\, political and liminal? How to read and ground ourselves in feminist philosophy while also living/m-othering/PhD-ing? How to even ask/write/question these questions\, without falling prey to the linearity inherent in what/who/why it means to question?&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>More information:&nbsp\;</strong>https://www.nsuweb.org/study-circles/circle-4-an-other-not-i-m-other-in-feminist-philosophy/&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Nicole Des Bouvrie:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260731T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260731T234500
SUMMARY:Husserl and Schutz on Intersubjectivity. Phainomenon
UID:20260613T130547Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>CALL-FOR-PAPERS</p>\n<p>Husserl considered the establishment of a transcendental community of subjects necessary for the possibility of obtaining transcendental knowledge of oneself and the world. Notwithstanding\, Husserl's philosophy has been regarded as solipsistic for a significant period. However\, analysis of Husserl's theory of perception\, even prior to the publication of the&nbsp\;<em>Cartesian Investigations\,</em>&nbsp\;suggests otherwise. According to this view\, experience of the world is understood as public rather than private. Perceived objects are not exclusive to a single perceiving subject\, although they are given in subjective experience. For this reason\, at least from the 1920s onwards\, Husserl refers to the egological foundation of his philosophy as leading toward an intersubjective transcendental phenomenology\, or even (as one can read in Hua IX: 539)\, towards a sociological phenomenology.</p>\n<p>The issue of "transcendental intersubjectivity"\, beginning from a transcendental ego\, and its role in the constitution of an intersubjectively valid world\, is discussed in Husserl's 5th Cartesian Meditation as well as in numerous unpublished manuscripts. This topic was further explored by later phenomenologists\, including Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe. Others\, overlooking Husserl's focus on the constitutive role of intersubjectivity rather than its empirical forms\, charged him with neglecting the ethical aspects of the I-Thou relationship\; this critique was most notably advanced by Emanuel L&eacute\;vinas. However\, it was in the 1950s that Alfred Schutz offered one of the most critical perspectives on the project of establishing an intersubjective transcendental community of egos. Schutz argued\, namely:&nbsp\;1) Husserl's transcendental Ego cannot be put in the plural.&nbsp\;2) Husserl did not provide conclusive proof that the existence of other Egos is a problem of the transcendental sphere.&nbsp\;3) Intersubjectivity is just an empirical-mundane problem.&nbsp\;4)&nbsp\;Transcendental subjectivity must be replaced by mundane intersubjectivity.</p>\n<p>Additionally\, Schutz made several observations about Husserl's method in the 5th Cartesian Meditation. He argued that Husserl's concept of reduction to the "sphere of the proper" assumes a distinction between the proper and the alien\, which could only have been established prior to the reduction. Schutz also noted that the experience of pairing\, which presents the alien body as similar to one's own\, lacks precision\, as it does not consider differences such as those between male and female\, or between humans and animals.</p>\n<p>N&ordm\; 40 of&nbsp\;<em>Phainomenon</em>&nbsp\;aims to retrieve this issue\, offering not only an analysis of the Husserl-Schutz debate\, but also exploring new perspectives\, namely (but not restricted to):</p>\n<p>1) the ways the experience of an alien self can be addressed from a phenomenological point-of-view\;</p>\n<p>2) intersubjectivity and lifeworld\;</p>\n<p>3) the role of the lived body in the experience of "pairing"\;</p>\n<p>4) "higher-level" intersubjective communities: family\, corporations\, trade-unions\, state institutions\;</p>\n<p>5) "mundane phenomenology" and sociology\;</p>\n<p>6) Schutz: continuation and criticisms (Lester Embree\, Thomas Luckman\, J&uuml\;rgen Habermas\, and others).</p>\n<p>The deadline for submitting proposals is July 31\, 2026.</p>\n<p>The author guidelines can be consulted and articles submitted at the following link:&nbsp\;<a href="https://phainomenon-journal.pt/index.php/phainomenon/about/submissions">https://phainomenon-journal.pt/index.php/phainomenon/about/submissions</a></p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260821T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260821T090000
SUMMARY:8th CNY Moral Psychology Workshop
UID:20260613T130548Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:1331 Salt Springs Rd\, Syracuse\, United States\, 13214
DESCRIPTION:<p>The 8th CNY Moral Psychology workshop will be held on <strong>Nov. 13\, 2026.</strong> Any topic in moral psychology is welcome. For suggested topics\, see the program from previous years or 'About the Workshop' (https://sites.google.com/lemoyne.edu/cnymoralpsychology/about). We will hold the Workshop this year in-person at Le Moyne College in Syracuse\, NY. There will not be an option to attend remotely.</p>\n<p>Please use the following link for more information.</p>\n<p>https://sites.google.com/lemoyne.edu/cnymoralpsychology/2026</p>\n<p>Sessions are read-ahead. After a brief summary of the paper's main claims and arguments\, the session will be spent in discussion. Applicants will be asked to submit rough drafts of their work (max 25 pages) in late October.</p>\n<p>This year's Workshop will feature a keynote by Dr. Ben Bradley (Syracuse University). Title TBA.</p>\n<p>To have a presentation considered\, please submit a 500-600 word abstract to the following form (https://forms.gle/8Zdu3JtpoRBLPkUL8). Abstracts are due by <u><strong><em>Aug. 21</em></strong></u></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Joseph Spino;CN=Randall R. Curren;CN=John M. Monteleone;CN=Irene Liu:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260831T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260831T120000
SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
UID:20260613T130549Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Abstracts on <em>Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical</em> (University of Zurich\, 18th-20th February 2027)</strong></p>\n<p>We invite the submission of <strong>extended abstracts</strong> (but no longer than <strong>1000 words</strong>) for presentations at the international conference on <strong>&ldquo\;Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical&rdquo\; </strong>that takes place at the <strong>University of Zurich</strong> from <strong>18th to 20th February 2027</strong>. The abstracts should be sent to <a href="mailto:sebastian.schmidt@uzh.ch"><strong>sebastian.schmidt@uzh.ch</strong></a> until <strong>August 31st 2026.</strong></p>\n<p>The conference will host a series of renowned experts from ethics and epistemology to discuss the role of relational normativity across philosophical disciplines. If your talk gets accepted\, travel expenses\, including up to three nights at a central hotel in Zurich\, flight and train tickets\, as well as lunch and dinner\, will be covered. We also plan a follow-up project such as an edited volume with a major publisher or a special issue for an academic journal. Accepted talks will be invited as contributions to this follow-up project.</p>\n<p>A recent trend in epistemology is to borrow ethical concepts to think about epistemic normativity. Maybe most notably\, the concept of epistemic injustice is meant to track the wrong that is done to someone in their capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007). More recently\, the idea that there is something we epistemically owe to each other (cf. Basu 2019) is taking hold. Epistemologists defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of accountability and blame (Kauppinen 2018\; Brown 2020\; Boult 2020\; 2024)\, that we expect each other to meet our epistemic obligations to believe or know (Goldberg 2018)\, and that we owe epistemic redress (Hull 2019)\, atonement (Woodard 2023)\, or reparations (Altanian 2022\; Lackey 2022) to those we epistemically wronged\, who might then decide to epistemically forgive us (Green 2024). This has led some epistemologists to propose more fundamentally social meta-epistemologies (Dyke 2022\; Fleisher 2024\; Hannon &amp\; Woodard 2025)\, even proposing that epistemic normativity has relational foundations (Boult 2024).</p>\n<p>While epistemologists take inspiration from the work of ethicists to develop their ideas on epistemic relationality\, the above literature develops largely in isolation from broader engagement with the recent ethical discussions on the relational structure of morality. Relational ethics has focused mostly on the explanation of our moral obligations to one another\, where obligations are typically understood as the correlates of rights or similar claims. To be under a moral obligation\, on this view\, is to be under a directed or second-personal duty to another person which is constitutively connected to the claim-right that this person has on you (e.g. Darwall 2006\, Wallace 2019\, Zylberman 2021). The relational understanding of morality illuminates the social significance of morality and the commonly held assumption that morality is grounded in relations of accountability and that moral wrongness warrants blame.</p>\n<p>The pioneering work and ongoing research by ethicists should be studied closely for the transposition of ethical concepts into epistemology to be intelligible and bear philosophical fruit. The aim of this conference is to bring together these two perspectives with a focus on discussing foundational issues surrounding relational normativity. Questions that will be discussed may include the following:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What grounds the authority of relational normativity? Do we have obligations towards one another simply in virtue of our nature as social creatures\, or is there something else that explains the authority of relational obligations?</li>\n<li>To what extent should relational normativity play a role in epistemology? Should it play a role only insofar as epistemologists are interested in moral questions pertaining to our beliefs\, or is there a distinctly epistemic kind of relational normativity?</li>\n<li>Can epistemic norms in general or in part be understood as relational duties? Maybe we owe it to others to comply with certain epistemic norms when others testify or when it comes to not wronging others with what we believe about them. Or maybe we have epistemic relational obligations in virtue of certain social roles\, such as being a scientific expert. Even so\, is there any hope in understanding epistemic normativity more broadly as relational? We do not seem to owe it to any concrete party to generally fit our beliefs to our evidence. Or do we?</li>\n<li>How can a relational perspective on epistemic normativity gain inspiration from and ground projects in social\, feminist\, and decolonial philosophy? For decades\, feminist epistemologists and ethicists have attended to how we relate to one another under conditions of oppression. While meta-normative discussions tend to pass over this more applied literature\, feminist philosophers tend to focus on the concrete contexts rather than meta-normative theory building. Can we get them into conversation?</li>\n<li>What are the relevant relations between a) practical agents and b) epistemic agents? Are these the same relations and if so on what grounds are these relations built? Or do these relations differ? What can we learn from legal relations on the one hand and personal relationships like friendship on the other hand when thinking about how to best conceive of the relevant relations?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Speakers who accepted our invitation to present at the conference include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College\, California\, USA)</li>\n<li>Monika Betzler (LMU Munich\, Germany)</li>\n<li>Cameron Boult (Brandon University\, Canada)</li>\n<li>Stephen Darwall (Yale University\, Connecticut\, USA)</li>\n<li>Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University\, Illinois\, USA)</li>\n<li>Antti Kauppinen (University of Helsinki\, Finland)</li>\n<li>Fabienne Peter (University of Warwick\, England\, UK)</li>\n<li>R. Jay Wallace (University of Berkeley\, California\, USA)</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We are very much looking forward to receiving your abstracts\,</p>\n<p>Jonas Vandieken (LMU Munich) &amp\; Sebastian Schmidt (University of Zurich)</p>\n<p>This conference is part of the Swiss National Science Foundation project on Relational Epistemology (<a  href="https://data.snf.ch/grants/grant/223891"  target="_blank">https://data.snf.ch/grants/grant/223891</a>).</p>\n<p>&nbsp\;<a href="https://zegra.ch/events/event/relational-normativity-epistemic-and-practical/">Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260901T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260903T170000
SUMMARY:Fourth Austrian Summer School in Phenomenology
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Austrian Society for Phenomenology launches its fouth international summer school. Our objective is to promote the research of young scholars (bachelor\, master\, and doctoral students) that sheds new phenomenological light on current debates in epistemology\, metaethics\, and metaphysics. The descriptive analysis of lived experience\, the eidetic study of the various modes of intentionality\, and the epistemic role and normative dimensions ascribed to experience constitute the cornerstones of phenomenological research. In particular\, Husserl&rsquo\;s conceptions of originary givenness\, evaluative experience\, and eidetic intuition are among the various seminal contributions we find in the phenomenological tradition. Currently\, promising research is done that utilizes such conceptions in order to develop phenomenological perspectives on experiential justification\, the debate between epistemic internalism and externalism\, the theory of value\, (moral) emotions\, moral epistemology\, issues surrounding metaphysical realism and anti-realism\, as well as the epistemology and metaphysics of essence\, modality\, and metaphysical dependence relations. We would like to encourage students to develop phenomenological insights and teachings systematically and in view of contemporary debates in philosophy. Our ambition is to promote such phenomenological research by providing a platform to connect with\, discuss with\, and receive feedback from peers and experts. Each conference day is devoted to one of the subtopics of the event.</p>\n<p>The conference will be an&nbsp\;<strong>online event.</strong>&nbsp\;If you wish to participate in the summer school but not to give a talk\, please provide a short statement of motivation (not more than 150 words) and specify your name\, affiliation\, and research interests.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p>If you wish to participate in the summer school and give a talk\, please apply with an (extended) abstract of the paper you wish to present. Submissions <strong>should not exceed 500 words</strong>\, must be written in <strong>English</strong> (conference language)\, and should be prepared for <strong>blind review</strong>.</p>\n<p><strong>The submission deadline is July 15\, 2026.</strong></p>\n<p>Please send your applications/submissions and general inquiries to: <strong>laurentia</strong>[dot]<strong>adam</strong>[at]<strong>uni-graz</strong>[dot]<strong>at</strong></p>\n<p>Women and members of other traditionally underrepresented groups are especially encouraged to apply.</p>\n<p><strong>Preliminary schedule</strong></p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>1</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological Approaches to </em><em>Metaethics</em></p>\n<p><strong>Nicolas de Warren</strong> (Penn State University): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (University of Graz)</p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>2</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological </em><em>Approaches to</em><em> </em><em>Epistemology</em></p>\n<p><strong>Mirja Hartimo</strong> (University of Helsinki): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Philipp Berghofer (University of Graz)</p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>3</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological </em><em>Approaches to</em><em> Metaphysics</em></p>\n<p><strong>Kit Fine</strong> (New York University): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Michael Wallner (University of Graz)</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Philipp Berghofer;CN=Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl;CN=Michael Wallner:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Stockholm:20260907T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Stockholm:20260908T170000
SUMMARY:Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory
UID:20260613T130551Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Stockholm
LOCATION:Helgonavägen 3\, Lund\, Sweden
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory</strong></p>\n<p>Lund University: Mon-Tue September 7-8\, 2026</p>\n<p>Submission Deadline: Wednesday\, June 24\, 2026</p>\n<p>We are pleased to announce the Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory\, which will take place at Lund University on September 7-8\, 2026. This workshop aims to bring together scholars to explore and discuss contemporary and eternal issues in value theory.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Workshop Theme</strong></p>\n<p>The workshop seeks to provide a platform for exploring and critically engaging with topics that fall under the label value theory or axiology. See&nbsp\;plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</p>\n<p><strong>Topics of Interest</strong></p>\n<p>We invite papers on a variety of topics related to value theory\, including\, but not limited to:</p>\n<p>1. Structures of Value</p>\n<p>2. Value and Decision Theory</p>\n<p>3. Value and Risk</p>\n<p>4. Value Pluralism</p>\n<p>5. Value Conflicts</p>\n<p><strong>Submission Guidelines</strong></p>\n<p>Interested authors are invited to submit extended abstracts (up to 500 words) for review. Abstracts should be submitted to&nbsp\;valuetheorylund@gmail.com&nbsp\;by June 24\, 2026.</p>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Important Dates</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Submission Deadline: June 24\, 2026</li>\n<li>Notification of Acceptance: July 1\, 2026</li>\n<li>Workshop Dates: September 7-8\, 2026</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Keynote Speakers</strong></p>\n<p>We are delighted to host Sarah Stroud (UNC\, Chapel Hill) and Erik Carlson (Uppsala University) as our keynote speakers.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Contact Information</strong></p>\n<p>For inquiries and submission\, please contact Anders Herlitz\, Henrik Andersson and Mattias Gunnemyr at valuetheorylund@gmail.</p>\n<p><strong>Previous conferences</strong></p>\n<p><a href="https://www.fil.lu.se/institutionen/kalendarium/evenemang/3rd-annual-workshop-value-theory-lund-university">https://www.fil.lu.se/institutionen/kalendarium/evenemang/3rd-annual-workshop-value-theory-lund-university</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Henrik Andersson;CN=Mattias Gunnemyr;CN=Anders Herlitz:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260910T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260911T170000
SUMMARY:Workshop “What is Good Reasoning?”
UID:20260613T130552Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Bern\, Switzerland
DESCRIPTION:<p>The aim of the workshop is to investigate the nature of good reasoning and its place within the normative domain. We will explore how good reasoning should be understood and how it relates to other central normative notions\, such as reasons\, ought\, value\, and fittingness. The workshop seeks to foster discussion of questions including: What are the norms and aims of reasoning? Can we explain what it means to reason well in terms of other normative or non-normative notions? And what roles do normative reasons play in good reasoning?</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Lussi;CN="Andreas Müller":
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260925T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260927T170000
SUMMARY:MadMeta XXIII
UID:20260613T130553Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:702 Langdon Street\, Madison\, United States\, 53706
ORGANIZER;CN=Russ Shafer-Landau:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260928T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260930T170000
SUMMARY:Second Conference of the European Moral Responsibility Consortium (EMRC)
UID:20260613T130554Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Vienna
LOCATION:Salzburg\, Austria
DESCRIPTION:<p>The EMRC (European Moral Responsibility Consortium) is a platform devoted to facilitating coordination and cooperation among philosophers based in Europe who are working in the area of moral responsibility and on related topics (free will\, blame\, collective responsibility\, punishment\, moral responsibility and AI\, etc.). From September 28-30\, 2026\, the second conference of the EMRC will be held in Salzburg\, Austria.</p>\n<p>Contact: emrconsortium@gmail.com</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Leonhard Menges;CN=Leonie Eichhorn:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261022T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261024T170000
SUMMARY:Rationality and Normativity Conference
UID:20260613T130555Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Prague
LOCATION:nám. Svobody 331/2\, Hradec Králové\, Czech Republic
DESCRIPTION:<p>The conference is on the nature of rationality and its relation to normativity\, especially on how rationality and reasons generate norms for what to believe\, trust or doubt. Rationality provides norms governing our thinking\, not only in general (do not form incoherent beliefs)\, but also in specific cases (do not trust that obvious conman). Which reasons the agent does or does not possess\, and their quality\, is also important. This conference aims at bringing together experts on these topics and shed light on these phenomena.</p>\n<p>Getting a clear picture of what rationality and reasons are and what norms they place on our thinking can aid with applied philosophical issues as well. For example\, is conspiracy thinking\, distrust towards scientific experts or falling for fake news irrational? If so\, which rational norms are violated exactly\, and under which circumstances? What does the rational standing of people who engage in these potentially irrational processes teach us about why they engage in them\, and what if anything we should do to combat these phenomena?</p>\n<p>Organization</p>\n<p>Organization committee:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Auke Montessori\, Jaroslav Mal&iacute\;k\, Zuzana Votavov&aacute\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Contact:</p>\n<p>https://ff.uhk.cz/rationalityandnorms/#contact&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>This conference is organized by the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences\, Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Hradec Kr&aacute\;lov&eacute\;\, as part of the project:</p>\n<p>Knowledge in the Age of Distrust</p>\n<p>Funded by the Ministry of Education\, Youth and Sports (Czech Republic). Co-funded by the European Union.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Auke Montessori:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260612T180657Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261030T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261031T170000
SUMMARY:Obligation and Normativity in Modern Moral Philosophy
UID:20260613T130556Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Rome
LOCATION:Milano\, Italy
DESCRIPTION:<p>What is distinctive about&nbsp\;<em>modern</em>&nbsp\;moral philosophy\, i.e.\, that written in the 17th&nbsp\;and 18th&nbsp\;centuries\, is often considered to be its conception of obligation. G.E.M. Anscombe\, for instance\, famously argued that modern moral philosophers\, and her contemporaries under their influence\, were wrong to try and ground the normativity of morality without reference to a divine lawgiver. Whether they are critical or merely interpretive in nature\, the views of many other influential philosophers such as H.A. Prichard\, Bernard Williams\, and Stephen Darwall have all agreed in this respect. Indeed\, Christine Korsgaard describes what she calls &lsquo\;the normative question\,&rsquo\; that is\, what&nbsp\;<em>justifies</em>&nbsp\;the demands that morality makes on us\, as one that was especially pressing for modern moral philosophers from roughly Grotius to Kant. How did modern moral philosophers explain the normativity of morality? How do modern figures use the concept of obligation to account for the normativity of morality? This conference and the planned edited volume will address these and related questions. Collectively\, the participants will engage with the works of a variety of major and minor figures from the modern period to enrich our historical and systematic understanding of the nature of morality&rsquo\;s normativity.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Michael Walschots;CN=Stefano Bacin:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180658Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261112T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261114T170000
SUMMARY:Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop\, CFA
UID:20260613T130557Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Copenhagen\, Denmark
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong><u>Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop</u></strong></p>\n<p><u><br></u></p>\n<p>Philosophers working on praise and praiseworthiness are invited to submit abstracts for a workshop on these topics\, to be held in Copenhagen in the fall of 2026\, specifically November 12-14. Abstracts on the nature&nbsp\;of praise and the nature of praiseworthiness are especially welcome. (Submissions on other praise-related issues-- e.g. the morality of praise-- will be considered\, however.)</p>\n<p>The intention is to workshop papers for a praise-themed issue of&nbsp\;<em>Oxford Studies in Agency &amp\; Responsibility</em>.&nbsp\;Selected abstracts must be&nbsp\;promised&nbsp\;to this special themed issue of OSAR. They cannot be submitted elsewhere\, and if accepted\, they must be committed to OSAR.</p>\n<p>While workshop dinners will be covered\, funds unfortunately are not available to assist with travel or accommodation.</p>\n<p>The timeline of important dates and deadlines is as follows:</p>\n<p>-Abstract due (500-1000 words): April 30\, 2026</p>\n<p>-Notification concerning acceptance: May 30\, 2026</p>\n<p>-First draft due (to be circulated amongst workshop participants): October 21\, 2026</p>\n<p>-Workshop dates: November 12-14\, 2026</p>\n<p>-Revised draft due: sometime in February 2027</p>\n<p>The papers will then be sent out by OUP for vetting and\, once returned\, contributors may make further changes. The praise-themed edition of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is expected to be in print 2028.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Anonymized abstracts (of 500-1000 words</strong>) should be submitted to&nbsp\;<strong>praiseworkshop2026@gmail.com</strong>&nbsp\;by the end of <strong>April 30</strong> (last time zone on Earth).</p>\n<p><br>Confirmed Presenters:</p>\n<p>Jules Holroyd</p>\n<p>Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen</p>\n<p>Zo&euml\; Johnson King</p>\n<p>Victoria McGeer</p>\n<p>Coleen Macnamara</p>\n<p>Leo Menges and Leonie Eichhorn</p>\n<p>Dana Nelkin</p>\n<p>David Shoemaker</p>\n<p>Daniel Telech</p>\n<p><br> &nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180658Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261113T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261113T170000
SUMMARY:8th CNY Moral Psychology Workshop
UID:20260613T130558Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:1331 Salt Springs Rd\, Syracuse\, United States\, 13214
DESCRIPTION:<p>Submit abstracts for the Workshop at the following address.</p>\n<p>https://forms.gle/8foFeWAojyHLuFXr7</p>\n<p>The keynote speaker is Ben Bradley (Syracuse University).</p>\n<p><strong>The deadline for submissions is Friday\, August 21st.</strong></p>\n<p>Please direct any questions or issues to Joseph Spino at spinojm@lemoyne.edu.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Joseph Spino;CN=Randall R. Curren;CN=John M. Monteleone;CN=Irene Liu:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180658Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261119T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261120T170000
SUMMARY:Normative Reasons and Morality 
UID:20260613T130559Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Norbert-Wollheim-Platz 1\, Frankfurt am Main\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p>While the concept of a normative reason is often taken to provide a common currency across different domains of normativity\, its role and nature within the moral domain continue to raise a number of difficult and intriguing questions. Some philosophers have argued that moral reasons are distinctive in virtue of their stringency or overridingness\; others question whether the notion of a normative reason provides the most illuminating framework for understanding moral demands at all. More generally\, the relationship between morality and normative reasons remains contested\, both with respect to the nature of moral reasons and their place within moral thought and practice. This workshop aims to examine these issues from a variety of perspectives and to explore the significance of reasons-based approaches for contemporary moral philosophy.</p>\n<p>We welcome contributions addressing questions including (but not limited to):</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What is the relationship between moral reasons and moral obligations?</li>\n<li>What distinguishes moral reasons from other kinds of reasons\, such as prudential or epistemic reasons?</li>\n<li>How should conflicts between moral reasons and other normative reasons be understood?</li>\n<li>How should cases of supererogation be understood within a reasons-based account of morality?</li>\n<li>Are moral reasons agent-relative or agent-neutral?</li>\n<li>What role do moral advice and moral testimony play in moral thought and practice?</li>\n<li>How should moral uncertainty affect the reasons we have for action?</li>\n<li>How should we understand the relationship between moral reasons and moral reasoning?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>A limited number of slots are available through an open call for abstracts. Please send your abstract\, prepared for anonymous review\, as a PDF file to si [dot] behrens [at] em [dot] uni [hyphen] frankfurt [dot] de (subject line: &ldquo\;Morality and Reasons&rdquo\;). Abstracts should be between 500 and 1\,000 words (including notes but excluding bibliography). Papers should be suitable for a 40-minute presentation. The deadline for submissions is<strong>&nbsp\;July 15\, 2026.&nbsp\;</strong>Applicants will be notified of the outcome by July 31\, 2026.</p>\n<p>We particularly encourage Ph.D. students and individuals from underrepresented groups to submit.</p>\n\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Singa Behrens:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260612T180658Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270218T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270220T170000
SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
UID:20260613T130600Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006
DESCRIPTION:<p><a href="https://zegra.ch/events/event/relational-normativity-epistemic-and-practical/">Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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