BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260317T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261117T170000
SUMMARY:Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics: Online Lecture Series
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<ul><li>17/3/2026 17:00 CET&nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Reshef Agam-Segal</strong> (VMI): How to Be Morally Resolute: Diamond vs. Conant &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\; &nbsp\;</li>\n<li>28/4/2026 17:00 CEST &nbsp\; &nbsp\;&nbsp\;<strong>Samuel Pedziwiatr </strong>(Hagen): Echoes of Euthyphro. Wittgenstein and Schlick on the (Im-)possibility of Scientific Ethics &nbsp\;&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>18/6/2026 17:00 CEST &nbsp\; &nbsp\;<strong>Duncan Richter </strong>(VMI): Ethics and the Supernatural &nbsp\;&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>17/11/2026 17:00 CET &nbsp\; <strong>Maria Balaska</strong> (&Aring\;bo): Wittgenstein (and Heidegger) on the Wonder at Being</li>\n<li><br>Please note the lectures start at 5pm CET (Central European Time).</li>\n</ul>
ORGANIZER;CN=Nimrod Matan;CN=Gilad Nir;CN=Jonathan Soen:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260831T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260831T120000
SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
UID:20260826T122301Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Abstracts on <em>Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical</em> (University of Zurich\, 18th-20th February 2027)</strong></p>\n<p>We invite the submission of <strong>extended abstracts</strong> (but no longer than <strong>1000 words</strong>) for presentations at the international conference on <strong>&ldquo\;Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical&rdquo\; </strong>that takes place at the <strong>University of Zurich</strong> from <strong>18th to 20th February 2027</strong>. The abstracts should be sent to <a href="mailto:sebastian.schmidt@uzh.ch"><strong>sebastian.schmidt@uzh.ch</strong></a> until <strong>August 31st 2026.</strong></p>\n<p>The conference will host a series of renowned experts from ethics and epistemology to discuss the role of relational normativity across philosophical disciplines. If your talk gets accepted\, travel expenses\, including up to three nights at a central hotel in Zurich\, flight and train tickets\, as well as lunch and dinner\, will be covered. We also plan a follow-up project such as an edited volume with a major publisher or a special issue for an academic journal. Accepted talks will be invited as contributions to this follow-up project.</p>\n<p>A recent trend in epistemology is to borrow ethical concepts to think about epistemic normativity. Maybe most notably\, the concept of epistemic injustice is meant to track the wrong that is done to someone in their capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007). More recently\, the idea that there is something we epistemically owe to each other (cf. Basu 2019) is taking hold. Epistemologists defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of accountability and blame (Kauppinen 2018\; Brown 2020\; Boult 2020\; 2024)\, that we expect each other to meet our epistemic obligations to believe or know (Goldberg 2018)\, and that we owe epistemic redress (Hull 2019)\, atonement (Woodard 2023)\, or reparations (Altanian 2022\; Lackey 2022) to those we epistemically wronged\, who might then decide to epistemically forgive us (Green 2024). This has led some epistemologists to propose more fundamentally social meta-epistemologies (Dyke 2022\; Fleisher 2024\; Hannon &amp\; Woodard 2025)\, even proposing that epistemic normativity has relational foundations (Boult 2024).</p>\n<p>While epistemologists take inspiration from the work of ethicists to develop their ideas on epistemic relationality\, the above literature develops largely in isolation from broader engagement with the recent ethical discussions on the relational structure of morality. Relational ethics has focused mostly on the explanation of our moral obligations to one another\, where obligations are typically understood as the correlates of rights or similar claims. To be under a moral obligation\, on this view\, is to be under a directed or second-personal duty to another person which is constitutively connected to the claim-right that this person has on you (e.g. Darwall 2006\, Wallace 2019\, Zylberman 2021). The relational understanding of morality illuminates the social significance of morality and the commonly held assumption that morality is grounded in relations of accountability and that moral wrongness warrants blame.</p>\n<p>The pioneering work and ongoing research by ethicists should be studied closely for the transposition of ethical concepts into epistemology to be intelligible and bear philosophical fruit. The aim of this conference is to bring together these two perspectives with a focus on discussing foundational issues surrounding relational normativity. Questions that will be discussed may include the following:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What grounds the authority of relational normativity? Do we have obligations towards one another simply in virtue of our nature as social creatures\, or is there something else that explains the authority of relational obligations?</li>\n<li>To what extent should relational normativity play a role in epistemology? Should it play a role only insofar as epistemologists are interested in moral questions pertaining to our beliefs\, or is there a distinctly epistemic kind of relational normativity?</li>\n<li>Can epistemic norms in general or in part be understood as relational duties? Maybe we owe it to others to comply with certain epistemic norms when others testify or when it comes to not wronging others with what we believe about them. Or maybe we have epistemic relational obligations in virtue of certain social roles\, such as being a scientific expert. Even so\, is there any hope in understanding epistemic normativity more broadly as relational? We do not seem to owe it to any concrete party to generally fit our beliefs to our evidence. Or do we?</li>\n<li>How can a relational perspective on epistemic normativity gain inspiration from and ground projects in social\, feminist\, and decolonial philosophy? For decades\, feminist epistemologists and ethicists have attended to how we relate to one another under conditions of oppression. While meta-normative discussions tend to pass over this more applied literature\, feminist philosophers tend to focus on the concrete contexts rather than meta-normative theory building. Can we get them into conversation?</li>\n<li>What are the relevant relations between a) practical agents and b) epistemic agents? Are these the same relations and if so on what grounds are these relations built? Or do these relations differ? What can we learn from legal relations on the one hand and personal relationships like friendship on the other hand when thinking about how to best conceive of the relevant relations?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Speakers who accepted our invitation to present at the conference include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College\, California\, USA)</li>\n<li>Monika Betzler (LMU Munich\, Germany)</li>\n<li>Cameron Boult (Brandon University\, Canada)</li>\n<li>Stephen Darwall (Yale University\, Connecticut\, USA)</li>\n<li>Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University\, Illinois\, USA)</li>\n<li>Antti Kauppinen (University of Helsinki\, Finland)</li>\n<li>Fabienne Peter (University of Warwick\, England\, UK)</li>\n<li>R. Jay Wallace (University of Berkeley\, California\, USA)</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We are very much looking forward to receiving your abstracts\,</p>\n<p>Jonas Vandieken (LMU Munich) &amp\; Sebastian Schmidt (University of Zurich)</p>\n<p>This conference is part of the Swiss National Science Foundation project on Relational Epistemology (<a  href="https://data.snf.ch/grants/grant/223891"  target="_blank">https://data.snf.ch/grants/grant/223891</a>).</p>\n<p>&nbsp\;<a href="https://zegra.ch/events/event/relational-normativity-epistemic-and-practical/">Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260901T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260903T170000
SUMMARY:Fourth Austrian Summer School in Phenomenology
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Austrian Society for Phenomenology launches its fouth international summer school. Our objective is to promote the research of young scholars (bachelor\, master\, and doctoral students) that sheds new phenomenological light on current debates in epistemology\, metaethics\, and metaphysics. The descriptive analysis of lived experience\, the eidetic study of the various modes of intentionality\, and the epistemic role and normative dimensions ascribed to experience constitute the cornerstones of phenomenological research. In particular\, Husserl&rsquo\;s conceptions of originary givenness\, evaluative experience\, and eidetic intuition are among the various seminal contributions we find in the phenomenological tradition. Currently\, promising research is done that utilizes such conceptions in order to develop phenomenological perspectives on experiential justification\, the debate between epistemic internalism and externalism\, the theory of value\, (moral) emotions\, moral epistemology\, issues surrounding metaphysical realism and anti-realism\, as well as the epistemology and metaphysics of essence\, modality\, and metaphysical dependence relations. We would like to encourage students to develop phenomenological insights and teachings systematically and in view of contemporary debates in philosophy. Our ambition is to promote such phenomenological research by providing a platform to connect with\, discuss with\, and receive feedback from peers and experts. Each conference day is devoted to one of the subtopics of the event.</p>\n<p>The conference will be an&nbsp\;<strong>online event.</strong>&nbsp\;If you wish to participate in the summer school but not to give a talk\, please provide a short statement of motivation (not more than 150 words) and specify your name\, affiliation\, and research interests.</p>\n<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p>If you wish to participate in the summer school and give a talk\, please apply with an (extended) abstract of the paper you wish to present. Submissions <strong>should not exceed 500 words</strong>\, must be written in <strong>English</strong> (conference language)\, and should be prepared for <strong>blind review</strong>.</p>\n<p><strong>The submission deadline is July 15\, 2026.</strong></p>\n<p>Please send your applications/submissions and general inquiries to: <strong>laurentia</strong>[dot]<strong>adam</strong>[at]<strong>uni-graz</strong>[dot]<strong>at</strong></p>\n<p>Women and members of other traditionally underrepresented groups are especially encouraged to apply.</p>\n<p><strong>Preliminary schedule</strong></p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>1</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological Approaches to </em><em>Metaethics</em></p>\n<p><strong>Nicolas de Warren</strong> (Penn State University): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (University of Graz)</p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>2</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological </em><em>Approaches to</em><em> </em><em>Epistemology</em></p>\n<p><strong>Mirja Hartimo</strong> (University of Helsinki): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Philipp Berghofer (University of Graz)</p>\n<p><u>September </u><u>3</u></p>\n<p><em>Phenomenological </em><em>Approaches to</em><em> Metaphysics</em></p>\n<p><strong>Kit Fine</strong> (New York University): TBA</p>\n<p>3 student presentations commented on by Michael Wallner (University of Graz)</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Philipp Berghofer;CN=Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl;CN=Michael Wallner:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260907T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260908T170000
SUMMARY:Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory
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TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Helgonavägen 3\, Lund\, Sweden
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory</strong></p>\n<p>Lund University: Mon-Tue September 7-8\, 2026</p>\n<p>Submission Deadline: Wednesday\, June 24\, 2026</p>\n<p>We are pleased to announce the Fourth Annual Workshop on Value Theory\, which will take place at Lund University on September 7-8\, 2026. This workshop aims to bring together scholars to explore and discuss contemporary and eternal issues in value theory.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Workshop Theme</strong></p>\n<p>The workshop seeks to provide a platform for exploring and critically engaging with topics that fall under the label value theory or axiology. See&nbsp\;plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</p>\n<p><strong>Topics of Interest</strong></p>\n<p>We invite papers on a variety of topics related to value theory\, including\, but not limited to:</p>\n<p>1. Structures of Value</p>\n<p>2. Value and Decision Theory</p>\n<p>3. Value and Risk</p>\n<p>4. Value Pluralism</p>\n<p>5. Value Conflicts</p>\n<p><strong>Submission Guidelines</strong></p>\n<p>Interested authors are invited to submit extended abstracts (up to 500 words) for review. Abstracts should be submitted to&nbsp\;valuetheorylund@gmail.com&nbsp\;by June 24\, 2026.</p>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Important Dates</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Submission Deadline: June 24\, 2026</li>\n<li>Notification of Acceptance: July 1\, 2026</li>\n<li>Workshop Dates: September 7-8\, 2026</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Keynote Speakers</strong></p>\n<p>We are delighted to host Sarah Stroud (UNC\, Chapel Hill) and Erik Carlson (Uppsala University) as our keynote speakers.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Contact Information</strong></p>\n<p>For inquiries and submission\, please contact Anders Herlitz\, Henrik Andersson and Mattias Gunnemyr at valuetheorylund@gmail.</p>\n<p><strong>Previous conferences</strong></p>\n<p><a href="https://www.fil.lu.se/institutionen/kalendarium/evenemang/3rd-annual-workshop-value-theory-lund-university">https://www.fil.lu.se/institutionen/kalendarium/evenemang/3rd-annual-workshop-value-theory-lund-university</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Henrik Andersson;CN=Mattias Gunnemyr;CN=Anders Herlitz:
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DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260910T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20260911T170000
SUMMARY:Workshop “What is Good Reasoning?”
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TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Bern\, Switzerland
DESCRIPTION:<p>The aim of the workshop is to investigate the nature of good reasoning and its place within the normative domain. We will explore how good reasoning should be understood and how it relates to other central normative notions\, such as reasons\, ought\, value\, and fittingness. The workshop seeks to foster discussion of questions including: What are the norms and aims of reasoning? Can we explain what it means to reason well in terms of other normative or non-normative notions? And what roles do normative reasons play in good reasoning?</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=David Lussi;CN="Andreas Müller":
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DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260925T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260927T170000
SUMMARY:MadMeta XXIII
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TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:702 Langdon Street\, Madison\, United States\, 53706
ORGANIZER;CN=Russ Shafer-Landau:
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260928T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260930T170000
SUMMARY:Second Conference of the European Moral Responsibility Consortium (EMRC)
UID:20260826T122306Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:Europe/Vienna
LOCATION:Salzburg\, Austria
DESCRIPTION:<p>The EMRC (European Moral Responsibility Consortium) is a platform devoted to facilitating coordination and cooperation among philosophers based in Europe who are working in the area of moral responsibility and on related topics (free will\, blame\, collective responsibility\, punishment\, moral responsibility and AI\, etc.). From September 28-30\, 2026\, the second conference of the EMRC will be held in Salzburg\, Austria.</p>\n<p>Contact: emrconsortium@gmail.com</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Leonhard Menges;CN=Leonie Eichhorn:
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DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261007T234500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261007T234500
SUMMARY:9th Annual Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop
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TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Caldwell Hall\, Chapel Hill\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>We invite submissions of abstracts for the 2027 Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop\, to be held on March 26-27\, 2027. (Please note that this year's workshop\, unfortunately and unavoidably\, conflicts with the Pacific APA.) Abstracts should be between 750-1000 words (inclusive of footnotes but exclusive of any bibliography) and should summarize a paper that can be presented in no more than 40 minutes. The title of the paper should be included <strong>within </strong>the document above the abstract. Please prepare your abstract for anonymous review\, and submit it in .pdf or .docx form to <a href="mailto:chnormativity@gmail.com">chnormativity@gmail.com</a> by October 7th\, 2026.</p>\n<p>We will consider papers on any aspect of normativity\, construed broadly to include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>The traditional questions of metaethics</li>\n<li>The nature of other (possible) kinds of normativity (prudential\, epistemic\, aesthetic\, political\, legal\, etc.)</li>\n<li>More abstract and general questions within first-order normative theory</li>\n<li>Theories of reasons\, rationality\, and reasoning</li>\n<li>The semantics and pragmatics of normative language</li>\n<li>The psychology of normative judgment</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Those who presented papers at the last two Normativity Workshops (the 8th annual workshop\, held in 2026\; and the 7th annual workshop\, held in 2025) are not eligible to submit papers this year. Those who chaired/commented at the last two workshops\, or who presented at previous workshops\, <em>are</em> eligible to submit. There is a limit of one submission per person\; co-authored papers count toward this limit.</p>\n<p>For the eighth workshop running\, papers accepted to the workshop will be eligible for publication in a special issue of <em>Philosophical Studies</em>. Authors of accepted papers are encouraged\, but not required\, to submit their papers to the special issue.</p>\n<p>The authors of the seven best abstracts <em>not</em> selected for the workshop will be invited to chair a session at the workshop and\, as part of that\, to act as a "mini-commentator"\, asking an extended (3-5 minute) first question. In order to facilitate this\, we will ask authors of accepted papers to send their chair-commentators a draft of their full paper by March 1st.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Chris Howard;CN=Margaret Shea;CN=Alex Worsnip:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Bucharest:20261008T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Bucharest:20261009T170000
SUMMARY:AvataResponsibility 2026: Virtues without borders: humans\, avatars and collective agents
UID:20260826T122308Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:Europe/Bucharest
LOCATION:Splaiul Independenței 204\, Bucharest\, Romania
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Venue</strong>: Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Bucharest\, 8 &amp\; 9 October 2026</p>\n<p><strong>Description</strong>: Alongside the growing complexity of collective agents such as organizations\, groundbreaking developments in AI and robotics are reshaping our moral landscape in profound and unprecedented ways. With LLM-powered avatars\, AI companions\, and hybrid human-AI assemblages taking the scene\, we are witnessing radical challenges to longstanding assumptions about the nature of agency\, virtue and moral character. Can virtues such as honesty\, practical wisdom\, or care be attributed to artificial or collective agents\, or do they remain the exclusive province of individual human beings? The purpose of this two-day workshop is to explore the puzzle of virtue attribution across an emerging taxonomy of agents\, from human to LLM-powered avatars operating in professional\, educational\, healthcare or virtual gaming environments\, to collective agents encompassing human and artificial agency in organizational settings. Drawing on research from virtue ethics\, AI ethics\, and business ethics\, the workshop aims to interrogate both the theoretical foundations and the practical stakes of extending the traditional virtue-theoretic framework beyond its traditional human-centered scope.</p>\n<p><strong>Organizers: </strong>This is the third of a series of five yearly workshops hosted by the <a href="http://ccea.ro/">Research Center in Applied Ethics</a> of the Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Bucharest\, within the framework of the ERC Starting Grant project &ldquo\;<a href="https://avataresponsibility.ccea.ro/the-2nd-edition/">avataResponsibility</a>&rdquo\; (Avatar agency. Moral responsibility at the intersection of individual\, collective\, and artificial social entities in emergent avatar communities). Details of the previous edition are available <a href="https://avataresponsibility.ccea.ro/current-edition/">here</a>. The workshop is part of the larger series of events &ldquo\;<a href="http://comore.ccea.ro/responsibility-matters-workshop-series/">Responsibility Matters Workshop Series</a>&rdquo\; (RMWS) covering topics related to responsibility across various fields. For further details please contact Mihaela Constantinescu\, PI of the ERC grant avataResponsibility: mihaela.constantinescu@filosofie.unibuc.ro.</p>\n<p><strong>Keynote and Guest Speakers include</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Roger Crisp</strong>\, <em>University of Oxford</em></p>\n<p><strong>Miguel Sicart</strong>\, <em>University of Copenhagen&nbsp\;</em></p>\n<p><strong>Alejo Sison</strong>\,<em> University of Navarre&nbsp\;</em></p>\n<p><strong>Dulce Redin</strong>\, <em>University of Navarre&nbsp\;</em></p>\n<p><strong>Anna Puzio</strong>\, <em>University of Bern</em></p>\n<p><strong>Cristian Iftode</strong>\, <em>University of Bucharest&nbsp\;</em></p>\n<p><strong>Benjamin Lange</strong>\, <em>Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit&auml\;t M&uuml\;nchen </em></p>\n<p><br><strong>Submissions: </strong>We have two open slots for workshop talks and four open slots for workshop posters. We welcome submissions of abstracts (maximum 500 words\, excluding references) on topics relating virtue to avatars\, AI companions\, artificial or collective agents . Please send your anonymised abstract and short bio by <strong>9 August 2026</strong> to <a href="mailto:avataresponsibility@ccea.ro">avataresponsibility@ccea.ro</a>. Successful candidates will be notified by the beginning of August. Although full costs cannot be covered\, there might be several (partial) travel/ accomodation reimbursements available for PhD students and post-doctoral researchers without current funding.</p>
ORGANIZER:
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DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261022T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20261024T170000
SUMMARY:Rationality and Normativity Conference
UID:20260826T122309Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:Europe/Prague
LOCATION:nám. Svobody 331/2\, Hradec Králové\, Czech Republic
DESCRIPTION:<p>The conference is on the nature of rationality and its relation to normativity\, especially on how rationality and reasons generate norms for what to believe\, trust or doubt. Rationality provides norms governing our thinking\, not only in general (do not form incoherent beliefs)\, but also in specific cases (do not trust that obvious conman). Which reasons the agent does or does not possess\, and their quality\, is also important. This conference aims at bringing together experts on these topics and shed light on these phenomena.</p>\n<p>Getting a clear picture of what rationality and reasons are and what norms they place on our thinking can aid with applied philosophical issues as well. For example\, is conspiracy thinking\, distrust towards scientific experts or falling for fake news irrational? If so\, which rational norms are violated exactly\, and under which circumstances? What does the rational standing of people who engage in these potentially irrational processes teach us about why they engage in them\, and what if anything we should do to combat these phenomena?</p>\n<p>Organization</p>\n<p>Organization committee:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Auke Montessori\, Jaroslav Mal&iacute\;k\, Zuzana Votavov&aacute\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Contact:</p>\n<p>https://ff.uhk.cz/rationalityandnorms/#contact&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p>This conference is organized by the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences\, Faculty of Philosophy\, University of Hradec Kr&aacute\;lov&eacute\;\, as part of the project:</p>\n<p>Knowledge in the Age of Distrust</p>\n<p>Funded by the Ministry of Education\, Youth and Sports (Czech Republic). Co-funded by the European Union.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Auke Montessori:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261030T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261031T170000
SUMMARY:Obligation and Normativity in Modern Moral Philosophy
UID:20260826T122310Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:Europe/Rome
LOCATION:Milano\, Italy
DESCRIPTION:<p>What is distinctive about&nbsp\;<em>modern</em>&nbsp\;moral philosophy\, i.e.\, that written in the 17th&nbsp\;and 18th&nbsp\;centuries\, is often considered to be its conception of obligation. G.E.M. Anscombe\, for instance\, famously argued that modern moral philosophers\, and her contemporaries under their influence\, were wrong to try and ground the normativity of morality without reference to a divine lawgiver. Whether they are critical or merely interpretive in nature\, the views of many other influential philosophers such as H.A. Prichard\, Bernard Williams\, and Stephen Darwall have all agreed in this respect. Indeed\, Christine Korsgaard describes what she calls &lsquo\;the normative question\,&rsquo\; that is\, what&nbsp\;<em>justifies</em>&nbsp\;the demands that morality makes on us\, as one that was especially pressing for modern moral philosophers from roughly Grotius to Kant. How did modern moral philosophers explain the normativity of morality? How do modern figures use the concept of obligation to account for the normativity of morality? This conference and the planned edited volume will address these and related questions. Collectively\, the participants will engage with the works of a variety of major and minor figures from the modern period to enrich our historical and systematic understanding of the nature of morality&rsquo\;s normativity.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Michael Walschots;CN=Stefano Bacin:
METHOD:PUBLISH
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DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20261104T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20261106T170000
SUMMARY:The 3nd Conference Ethics and AI Towards a New Ethos of AI
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TZID:Europe/Warsaw
LOCATION:Pl. Politechniki 1\, Warsaw\, Poland
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Conference ETHICS and AI\, </strong><strong>The 3rd Edition: Towards a New Ethos of AI</strong></p>\n<p>We are entering a historic moment in which artificial intelligence is no longer simply a tool that supports our processes\, but is becoming a personal technology &mdash\; one that co-decides\, recommends\, communicates\, and increasingly acts on our behalf. Personalised AI systems are already reshaping education\, business\, politics\, and the everyday choices we all make\, as the market moves faster than regulation can follow and ethical reflection races to keep pace with innovation. At the same time\, a real and urgent tension defines this transformation: increasingly sycophantic LLMs optimised for user satisfaction and engagement risk enclosing individuals within epistemic bubbles\; powerful AI ideologies promoted by major technology leaders frame rapid deployment as unquestionable progress\; and regulatory frameworks continue to struggle to respond adequately to the speed and scale of change. The Ethics and AI conference grows out of this tension and from the conviction that it deserves serious\, open\, cross-disciplinary conversation bringing together AI engineers\, philosophers\, ethicists\, and argumentation researchers to jointly examine the design\, social\, and political decisions shaping the future of technology. Our interest goes beyond compliance: we ask a deeper question about ethos &mdash\; what values\, what model of responsibility\, and ultimately what worldview we are embedding in the systems we build\, and what this means for our shared digital society. We seek to articulate a new ethos for AI design\, capable of translating responsibility\, justice\, and kindness into technological practice\, and of guiding the development of benevolent AI &mdash\; not merely persuasive or adaptive\, but genuinely benevolent\, trustworthy\, and oriented toward the common good and a resilient digital society.</p>\n<p><strong>Keynote speakers</strong>:&nbsp\;</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Andrea Laus (SkillGym)&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>Łukasz Kobyliński (Polish Academy of Sciences\, Sages)&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>Bartosz Sawicki (Warsaw University of Technology)&nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Special guest</strong>:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Jakub Jernajczyk (The Eugeniusz Geppert Academy of Art and Design in Wrocław)</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>The exhibition "Trust\, social media and digital society"</strong></p>\n<p>The exhibition "Trust\, social media and digital society" presented at the <em>Ethics and AI</em> conference is delivered by the <strong>Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw</strong>. The conference is organised under the auspices of the <strong>[iTRUST] project</strong> (NCN/CHIST-ERA\, 2022/04/Y/ST6/00001).</p>\n<p><strong>Submissions may address\, but are not limited to\, the following thematic areas</strong>:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>From ethics to ethos: values and character in AI systems</li>\n<li>Virtue ethics and AI design (prudence\, justice\, benevolence\, responsibility)</li>\n<li>Silence in the field of ethics and AI ethics</li>\n<li>Ways of communicating ethical content: text\, code\, action\, training and silence\, etc.</li>\n<li>The transition from general-purpose AI to personalized and agentic systems</li>\n<li>Fairness debt in the AI and software ingeneering design</li>\n<li>Business adoption of AI and corporate moral responsibility</li>\n<li>Ethical risk\, accountability\, and liability in AI-driven enterprises</li>\n<li>Responsible innovation and ethically aligned product development</li>\n<li>Public policy\, regulation\, and adaptive governance of AI</li>\n<li>Cultural\, religious\, and civilizational perspectives on AI ethics</li>\n<li>AI and the common good</li>\n<li>The future of trustworthy and value-oriented AI ecosystems</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Submission&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p>We invite submissions of regular abstracts (300&ndash\;500 words) prepared for double-blind peer review. should be submitted via the EasyChair platform:https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=eaai-3. Each accepted contribution will be allocated a 30-minute presentation slot\, including time for discussion. We accept submissions in English and Polish (since part of the conference will be held in Polish).</p>\n<p><strong>Conference Fee</strong></p>\n<p>The registration fee is 600 PLN (140 euro). The registration fee for students is 300 PLN (70 euro).&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Submission deadlines</strong>&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>From June 10\, 2026: submission open&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>September 15: submission deadline&nbsp\;</p>\n\n<p>October 5: 2026: notifications of acceptance or rejection&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN="Krzysztof Sołoducha":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20261104T234500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Warsaw:20261104T234500
SUMMARY:The 3nd Conference Ethics and AI Towards a New Ethos of AI
UID:20260826T122312Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:Europe/Warsaw
LOCATION:Pl. Politechniki 1\, Warsaw\, Poland
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Conference ETHICS and AI\, </strong><strong>The 3rd Edition: Towards a New Ethos of AI</strong></p>\n<p>We are entering a historic moment in which artificial intelligence is no longer simply a tool that supports our processes\, but is becoming a personal technology &mdash\; one that co-decides\, recommends\, communicates\, and increasingly acts on our behalf. Personalised AI systems are already reshaping education\, business\, politics\, and the everyday choices we all make\, as the market moves faster than regulation can follow and ethical reflection races to keep pace with innovation. At the same time\, a real and urgent tension defines this transformation: increasingly sycophantic LLMs optimised for user satisfaction and engagement risk enclosing individuals within epistemic bubbles\; powerful AI ideologies promoted by major technology leaders frame rapid deployment as unquestionable progress\; and regulatory frameworks continue to struggle to respond adequately to the speed and scale of change. The Ethics and AI conference grows out of this tension and from the conviction that it deserves serious\, open\, cross-disciplinary conversation bringing together AI engineers\, philosophers\, ethicists\, and argumentation researchers to jointly examine the design\, social\, and political decisions shaping the future of technology. Our interest goes beyond compliance: we ask a deeper question about ethos &mdash\; what values\, what model of responsibility\, and ultimately what worldview we are embedding in the systems we build\, and what this means for our shared digital society. We seek to articulate a new ethos for AI design\, capable of translating responsibility\, justice\, and kindness into technological practice\, and of guiding the development of benevolent AI &mdash\; not merely persuasive or adaptive\, but genuinely benevolent\, trustworthy\, and oriented toward the common good and a resilient digital society.</p>\n<p><strong>Keynote speakers</strong>:&nbsp\;</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Andrea Laus (SkillGym)&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>Łukasz Kobyliński (Polish Academy of Sciences\, Sages)&nbsp\;</li>\n<li>Bartosz Sawicki (Warsaw University of Technology)&nbsp\;</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Special guest</strong>:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Jakub Jernajczyk (The Eugeniusz Geppert Academy of Art and Design in Wrocław)</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>The exhibition "Trust\, social media and digital society"</strong></p>\n<p>The exhibition "Trust\, social media and digital society" presented at the <em>Ethics and AI</em> conference is delivered by the <strong>Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw</strong>. The conference is organised under the auspices of the <strong>[iTRUST] project</strong> (NCN/CHIST-ERA\, 2022/04/Y/ST6/00001).</p>\n<p><strong>Submissions may address\, but are not limited to\, the following thematic areas</strong>:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>From ethics to ethos: values and character in AI systems</li>\n<li>Virtue ethics and AI design (prudence\, justice\, benevolence\, responsibility)</li>\n<li>Silence in the field of ethics and AI ethics</li>\n<li>Ways of communicating ethical content: text\, code\, action\, training and silence\, etc.</li>\n<li>The transition from general-purpose AI to personalized and agentic systems</li>\n<li>Fairness debt in the AI and software ingeneering design</li>\n<li>Business adoption of AI and corporate moral responsibility</li>\n<li>Ethical risk\, accountability\, and liability in AI-driven enterprises</li>\n<li>Responsible innovation and ethically aligned product development</li>\n<li>Public policy\, regulation\, and adaptive governance of AI</li>\n<li>Cultural\, religious\, and civilizational perspectives on AI ethics</li>\n<li>AI and the common good</li>\n<li>The future of trustworthy and value-oriented AI ecosystems</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Submission&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p>We invite submissions of regular abstracts (300&ndash\;500 words) prepared for double-blind peer review. should be submitted via the EasyChair platform:https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=eaai-3. Each accepted contribution will be allocated a 30-minute presentation slot\, including time for discussion. We accept submissions in English and Polish (since part of the conference will be held in Polish).</p>\n<p><strong>Conference Fee</strong></p>\n<p>The registration fee is 600 PLN (140 euro). The registration fee for students is 300 PLN (70 euro).&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Submission deadlines</strong>&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>From June 10\, 2026: submission open&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>September 15: submission deadline&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>October 5: 2026: notifications of acceptance or rejection&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN="Krzysztof Sołoducha":
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261112T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261114T170000
SUMMARY:Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop\, CFA
UID:20260826T122313Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Copenhagen\, Denmark
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong><u>Praise and Praiseworthiness Workshop</u></strong></p>\n<p><u><br></u></p>\n<p>Philosophers working on praise and praiseworthiness are invited to submit abstracts for a workshop on these topics\, to be held in Copenhagen in the fall of 2026\, specifically November 12-14. Abstracts on the nature&nbsp\;of praise and the nature of praiseworthiness are especially welcome. (Submissions on other praise-related issues-- e.g. the morality of praise-- will be considered\, however.)</p>\n<p>The intention is to workshop papers for a praise-themed issue of&nbsp\;<em>Oxford Studies in Agency &amp\; Responsibility</em>.&nbsp\;Selected abstracts must be&nbsp\;promised&nbsp\;to this special themed issue of OSAR. They cannot be submitted elsewhere\, and if accepted\, they must be committed to OSAR.</p>\n<p>While workshop dinners will be covered\, funds unfortunately are not available to assist with travel or accommodation.</p>\n<p>The timeline of important dates and deadlines is as follows:</p>\n<p>-Abstract due (500-1000 words): April 30\, 2026</p>\n<p>-Notification concerning acceptance: May 30\, 2026</p>\n<p>-First draft due (to be circulated amongst workshop participants): October 21\, 2026</p>\n<p>-Workshop dates: November 12-14\, 2026</p>\n<p>-Revised draft due: sometime in February 2027</p>\n<p>The papers will then be sent out by OUP for vetting and\, once returned\, contributors may make further changes. The praise-themed edition of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is expected to be in print 2028.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Anonymized abstracts (of 500-1000 words</strong>) should be submitted to&nbsp\;<strong>praiseworkshop2026@gmail.com</strong>&nbsp\;by the end of <strong>April 30</strong> (last time zone on Earth).</p>\n<p><br>Confirmed Presenters:</p>\n<p>Jules Holroyd</p>\n<p>Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen</p>\n<p>Zo&euml\; Johnson King</p>\n<p>Victoria McGeer</p>\n<p>Coleen Macnamara</p>\n<p>Leo Menges and Leonie Eichhorn</p>\n<p>Dana Nelkin</p>\n<p>David Shoemaker</p>\n<p>Daniel Telech</p>\n<p><br> &nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261112T083000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261112T170000
SUMMARY:Beyond Function: The Self in the Modern World
UID:20260826T122314Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:65-30 Kissena blvd\, Flushing\, United States\, 11367
DESCRIPTION:<p><a name="OLE_LINK1"></a><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Beyond Function: The Self and the Modern Condition</strong></p>\n<p>The French existentialist Gabriel Marcel once diagnosed the defining problem of modernity as the<em> "misplacement of the idea of function." </em>In his famous essay\, &ldquo\;On the ontological Mystery\,&rdquo\; he describes modern society as essentially empty because it increasingly understands both the world and the person in terms of utility\, efficiency\, productivity\, quantifiable performance\, etc. In such a climate\, the human person is easily reduced to a collection of functions rather than recognized as a unique and irreducible self. Marcel&rsquo\;s critical analysis of the modern condition as well as those of many of the early existentialist&mdash\;Martin Buber\, Karl Jaspesrs\, Martin Heidegger\, and even Soren Kierkegaard&mdash\;raised serious concerns and broader philosophical questions that continue to confront us today\, nearly a century later. How does contemporary social\, technological\, political\, and economic structures shape our self-understanding? Do they promote authentic selfhood\, or do they encourage forms of alienation that obscure what it means to be human? Do they encourage objectified relationships that engender I-it relations with? Do they promote a self-objectification that leads to mental illness?</p>\n<p>This conference invites students and scholars to explore these questions baring on the relationship between the self and the modern world. We seek philosophical reflection upon the nature of selfhood and the ways in which contemporary realities influence our understanding of personal identity\, agency\, freedom\, community\, and what it means to live &ldquo\;the good life.&rdquo\; We are particularly interested in papers that examine how modern technological\, scientific\, philosophical\, social\, political\, or religious developments contribute to&mdash\;or challenge&mdash\;our understanding of the self and the conditions of a good\, meaningful\, and fulfilling human life. Deeper philosophical reflection on the self enables us to reconsider or re-envision not only who we are\, but also what kinds of conditions are necessary for genuine human flourishing. We welcome papers that creatively engage these questions from historical or contemporary perspectives\, or that draw upon interdisciplinary approaches illuminating the nature of the self in the modern world.</p>\n<p>Here are suggested topics:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What does it mean to be a self in the modern world?</li>\n<li>Can religion provide practical and ontological grounding for the perils of modern existence? Or is the modern world antithetical to the religious/spiritual life?</li>\n<li>What does it mean to flourish? Reconsidering the good life under modern conditions</li>\n<li>Can we still become ourselves? Exploring authenticity\, alienation\, and meaning</li>\n<li>Are we really autonomous? Agency and the modern self</li>\n<li>Ontology and the transformation of selfhood. Does technology&mdash\;social media\, cars\, planes\, guns\, AI\, etc.&mdash\;change who we are?</li>\n<li>How does artificial intelligence influence human self-understanding?</li>\n<li>Who are we online? Social media and the construction of the digital self</li>\n<li>When does a person become a product? Consumer culture and the commodification of the self</li>\n<li>What would it mean for artificial intelligence to be a self and should we relate to AI?</li>\n<li>What moral issues are most pertinent with the grow of artificial intelligence?</li>\n<li>How does globalization affect culture and personal identity?</li>\n<li>What can existentialism and phenomenology teach us about being a self?</li>\n<li>What have we learned about the self? Classical\, modern\, and contemporary approaches</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We are especially interested in&mdash\;though not limited to&mdash\;papers engaging thinkers such as S&oslash\;ren Kierkegaard\, Gabriel Marcel\, Karl Jaspers\, Emmanuel Levinas\, Martin Buber\, Simone Weil\, Charles Taylor\, Alasdair MacIntyre\, Hannah Arendt\, Paul Ricoeur\, Edith Stein\, Maurice Merleau-Ponty\, and other philosophers whose work contributes to our understanding of the self\, personhood\, and the challenges of modern existence.</p>\n<p>Abstracts should be 300&ndash\;400 words and clearly state the paper&rsquo\;s thesis and demonstrate relevance to the conference theme. Paper length should be 10 pages\, double-spaced\, or in the 3000 words range.</p>\n<p>Please send the abstract to Anthonhy.malagon@qc.cuny.edu by 10/14/2026.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Anthony Malagon:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261112T083000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261112T170000
SUMMARY:Beyond Function: The Self in the Modern World
UID:20260826T122315Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:65-30 Kissena blvd\, Flushing\, United States\, 11367
DESCRIPTION:<p><a name="OLE_LINK1"></a><strong>Call for Papers</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Beyond Function: The Self and the Modern Condition</strong></p>\n<p>The French existentialist Gabriel Marcel once diagnosed the defining problem of modernity as the<em> "misplacement of the idea of function." </em>In his famous essay\, &ldquo\;On the ontological Mystery\,&rdquo\; he describes modern society as essentially empty because it increasingly understands both the world and the person in terms of utility\, efficiency\, productivity\, quantifiable performance\, etc. In such a climate\, the human person is easily reduced to a collection of functions rather than recognized as a unique and irreducible self. Marcel&rsquo\;s critical analysis of the modern condition as well as those of many of the early existentialist&mdash\;Martin Buber\, Karl Jaspesrs\, Martin Heidegger\, and even Soren Kierkegaard&mdash\;raised serious concerns and broader philosophical questions that continue to confront us today\, nearly a century later. How does contemporary social\, technological\, political\, and economic structures shape our self-understanding? Do they promote authentic selfhood\, or do they encourage forms of alienation that obscure what it means to be human? Do they encourage objectified relationships that engender I-it relations with? Do they promote a self-objectification that leads to mental illness?</p>\n<p>This conference invites students and scholars to explore these questions baring on the relationship between the self and the modern world. We seek philosophical reflection upon the nature of selfhood and the ways in which contemporary realities influence our understanding of personal identity\, agency\, freedom\, community\, and what it means to live &ldquo\;the good life.&rdquo\; We are particularly interested in papers that examine how modern technological\, scientific\, philosophical\, social\, political\, or religious developments contribute to&mdash\;or challenge&mdash\;our understanding of the self and the conditions of a good\, meaningful\, and fulfilling human life. Deeper philosophical reflection on the self enables us to reconsider or re-envision not only who we are\, but also what kinds of conditions are necessary for genuine human flourishing. We welcome papers that creatively engage these questions from historical or contemporary perspectives\, or that draw upon interdisciplinary approaches illuminating the nature of the self in the modern world.</p>\n<p>Here are suggested topics:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What does it mean to be a self in the modern world?</li>\n<li>Can religion provide practical and ontological grounding for the perils of modern existence? Or is the modern world antithetical to the religious/spiritual life?</li>\n<li>What does it mean to flourish? Reconsidering the good life under modern conditions</li>\n<li>Can we still become ourselves? Exploring authenticity\, alienation\, and meaning</li>\n<li>Are we really autonomous? Agency and the modern self</li>\n<li>Ontology and the transformation of selfhood. Does technology&mdash\;social media\, cars\, planes\, guns\, AI\, etc.&mdash\;change who we are?</li>\n<li>How does artificial intelligence influence human self-understanding?</li>\n<li>Who are we online? Social media and the construction of the digital self</li>\n<li>When does a person become a product? Consumer culture and the commodification of the self</li>\n<li>What would it mean for artificial intelligence to be a self and should we relate to AI?</li>\n<li>What moral issues are most pertinent with the grow of artificial intelligence?</li>\n<li>How does globalization affect culture and personal identity?</li>\n<li>What can existentialism and phenomenology teach us about being a self?</li>\n<li>What have we learned about the self? Classical\, modern\, and contemporary approaches</li>\n</ul>\n<p>We are especially interested in&mdash\;though not limited to&mdash\;papers engaging thinkers such as S&oslash\;ren Kierkegaard\, Gabriel Marcel\, Karl Jaspers\, Emmanuel Levinas\, Martin Buber\, Simone Weil\, Charles Taylor\, Alasdair MacIntyre\, Hannah Arendt\, Paul Ricoeur\, Edith Stein\, Maurice Merleau-Ponty\, and other philosophers whose work contributes to our understanding of the self\, personhood\, and the challenges of modern existence.</p>\n<p>Abstracts should be 300&ndash\;400 words and clearly state the paper&rsquo\;s thesis and demonstrate relevance to the conference theme. Paper length should be 10 pages\, double-spaced\, or in the 3000 words range.</p>\n<p>Please send the abstract to Anthonhy.malagon@qc.cuny.edu by 10/14/2026.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Anthony Malagon:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261113T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261113T170000
SUMMARY:8th CNY Moral Psychology Workshop
UID:20260826T122316Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:1331 Salt Springs Rd\, Syracuse\, United States\, 13214
DESCRIPTION:<p>Submit abstracts for the Workshop at the following address.</p>\n<p>https://forms.gle/8foFeWAojyHLuFXr7</p>\n<p>The keynote speaker is Ben Bradley (Syracuse University).</p>\n<p><strong>The deadline for submissions is Friday\, August 21st.</strong></p>\n<p>Please direct any questions or issues to Joseph Spino at spinojm@lemoyne.edu.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Joseph Spino;CN=Randall R. Curren;CN=John M. Monteleone;CN=Irene Liu:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261119T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20261120T170000
SUMMARY:Normative Reasons and Morality 
UID:20260826T122317Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Norbert-Wollheim-Platz 1\, Frankfurt am Main\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p>While the concept of a normative reason is often taken to provide a common currency across different domains of normativity\, its role and nature within the moral domain continue to raise a number of difficult and intriguing questions. Some philosophers have argued that moral reasons are distinctive in virtue of their stringency or overridingness\; others question whether the notion of a normative reason provides the most illuminating framework for understanding moral demands at all. More generally\, the relationship between morality and normative reasons remains contested\, both with respect to the nature of moral reasons and their place within moral thought and practice. This workshop aims to examine these issues from a variety of perspectives and to explore the significance of reasons-based approaches for contemporary moral philosophy.</p>\n<p>We welcome contributions addressing questions including (but not limited to):</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What is the relationship between moral reasons and moral obligations?</li>\n<li>What distinguishes moral reasons from other kinds of reasons\, such as prudential or epistemic reasons?</li>\n<li>How should conflicts between moral reasons and other normative reasons be understood?</li>\n<li>How should cases of supererogation be understood within a reasons-based account of morality?</li>\n<li>Are moral reasons agent-relative or agent-neutral?</li>\n<li>What role do moral advice and moral testimony play in moral thought and practice?</li>\n<li>How should moral uncertainty affect the reasons we have for action?</li>\n<li>How should we understand the relationship between moral reasons and moral reasoning?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>A limited number of slots are available through an open call for abstracts. Please send your abstract\, prepared for anonymous review\, as a PDF file to si [dot] behrens [at] em [dot] uni [hyphen] frankfurt [dot] de (subject line: &ldquo\;Morality and Reasons&rdquo\;). Abstracts should be between 500 and 1\,000 words (including notes but excluding bibliography). Papers should be suitable for a 40-minute presentation. The deadline for submissions is<strong>&nbsp\;July 15\, 2026.&nbsp\;</strong>Applicants will be notified of the outcome by July 31\, 2026.</p>\n<p>We particularly encourage Ph.D. students and individuals from underrepresented groups to submit.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Singa Behrens:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270218T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20270220T170000
SUMMARY:Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
UID:20260826T122318Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Rämistr. 71\, Zürich\, Switzerland\, 8006
DESCRIPTION:<p><a href="https://zegra.ch/events/event/relational-normativity-epistemic-and-practical/">Relational Normativity: Epistemic and Practical &ndash\; ZEGRa</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sebastian Schmidt;CN=Jonas Vandieken:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260826T122300Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20270326T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20270327T170000
SUMMARY:9th Annual Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop
UID:20260826T122319Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:341e:85ff:fe23:45%3
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:Caldwell Hall\, Chapel Hill\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>The ninth annual Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop will be held in Chapel Hill on <strong>March 26 -- 27\, 2027</strong>.</p>\n<p>The workshop aims to provide a forum for stimulating and constructive exchange among philosophers currently working on issues concerning normativity\, broadly construed to include: the traditional questions of metaethics (and analogous questions about other normative domains)\; more abstract and general questions within first-order normative theory\; theories of reasons\, rationality and reasoning\; the semantics and pragmatics of normative language\; the psychology of normative judgment\; and the nature of epistemic normativity. The hope is to showcase cutting-edge work in these and related areas\, providing speakers with useful feedback\, and other participants with lively presentations and conversation.</p>\n<p>There will be eight talks in total\, seven of which will be selected via an open call for abstracts and an anonymous review process\, plus a keynote by Sarah McGrath (Princeton). For the eighth workshop running\, papers accepted to this year's workshop will be eligible for publication in a special issue of <em>Philosophical Studies</em>.</p>\n<p>We very much hope you'll join us in sunny and beautiful Chapel Hill next spring for the workshop's ninth year. In addition to excellent presentations\, there will be plenty of opportunities for socializing with fellow normativity folks at a selection of Chapel Hill's lovely restaurants and bars on each night of the event.</p>\n<p>Many thanks to the UNC Department of Philosophy and Parr Center for Ethics for their generous support of the event.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Chris Howard;CN=Margaret Shea;CN=Alex Worsnip:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
