Second Conference of the European Moral Responsibility Consortium (EMRC)
\nSeptember 28-30\, 2026
\nDepartment of Philosophy\, University of Salzburg\, Austria
\n\nSubmission Deadline: \;March 15\, 2026
\nKeynote Speakers:
\nThe EMRC (European Moral Responsibility Consortium) is a platform devoted to facilitating coordination and cooperation among philosophers based in Europe who are working in the area of moral responsibility and on related topics (free will\, blame\, collective responsibility\, punishment\, moral responsibility and AI\, etc.). From September 28-30\, 2026\, the second conference of the EMRC will be held in Salzburg\, Austria.
\nWe invite submissions from researchers from all parts of the world at any career stage. If you are interested\, please submit an anonymized abstract of 400-800 words by March 15\, along with an email including your name\, title\, and affiliation to \;leonie.eichhorn@plus.ac.at. \;Acceptance will be communicated by April 15. If accepted\, we will cover costs for at least one dinner.
\nA new EMRC website is in the making. In the meantime\, you can check the website of the Salzburg Ethics Group for practical information on the event: https://salzburgethics.com/emrc-conference-2026/
\nIf you have any questions regarding the conference\, please contact us at leonie.eichhorn@plus.ac.at
\nThe conference is organized by Leonhard Menges &\; Leonie Eichhorn (Salzburg Ethics Group) as part of the research project &ldquo\;Skepticism about Praiseworthiness&rdquo\;.
\nThe conference has received funding from:
FWF\, Austrian Science Fund (Grant DOI: 10.55776/PAT1933724)
GAP\, Gesellschaft fü\;r Analytische Philosophie
It is natural to theorize gender within a normative framework: gender is not a neutral classificatory category\, but one which encodes evaluative assumptions\, sets standards of correctness\, and generates reasons and obligations for individuals. At the same time\, philosophical thought about normativity itself - for instance\, about the nature of agency\, reasons\, authority\, or objectivity - has been shaped by socially situated assumptions. As a result\, the intersection between gender and normativity as areas of philosophical theorizing can be particularly fruitful\, enhancing our understanding of both categories and motivating revisions to our existing accounts of either. \; \;
\nWe invite abstracts for three contributed talks that explore issues concerning normativity\, gender\, and their connections. Abstracts that lie at the intersections between different fields or subfields of philosophy are also welcome. Possible topics can include but are not limited to: \; \;
\nSubmissions from underrepresented groups are particularly encouraged.
\nConfirmed speakers: \;
\nStina Bjö\;rkholm\, Institute for Futures Studies\, Stockholm \; \;
\nRach Cosker-Rowland\, University of Leeds \;
\nN. G. Laskowski\, University of Maryland\, College Park \;
\nLaura Nicoară\, Tampere University \;
\nSiiri Porkkala\, Tampere University \;
\nAbstract details \;
\nLength: 750-1000 words\, suitable for a 30-minute presentation with a 45-minute Q&\;A\, or a 45-minute presentation with a 30-minute Q&\;A. \;
\nDeadline: 15 March 2026 \;
\nNotification of Acceptance: End of March \;
\nSubmission: Please submit your abstracts to normativityandgender@gmail.com. The submission should be attached to the email in .pdf format and prepared for blind review. Please include the following information separately in the body of the email: your name(s)\, affiliation(s)\, the title of your talk\, and whether you consider yourself to be a member of an underrepresented group. \;
\nAbout the workshop \;
\nThe workshop is in-person only. The venues are accessible and childcare is available during the presentations\, if required. \; \;
\nUnfortunately\, we are unable to provide monetary assistance for travel or accommodation. \; \;
\nThis workshop is organized by the Normativity\, Gender\, and Mathematics project\, funded by Kone Foundation\, and the Quasi-Realism project\, funded by the Research Council of Finland. \; \;
\nOrganizers: Laura Nicoară\, Siiri Porkkala\, Jenni Rytilä\;\, Teemu Toppinen\, Vilma Venesmaa. \;
\nFor any questions\, please contact the organizers at normativityandgender@gmail.com. \;
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260317T170000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261117T170000 SUMMARY:Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics: Online Lecture Series UID:20260311T213612Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:We invite abstract submissions for a 2-day workshop on risk and uncertainty in ethics\, hosted by the Centre for Aesthetic\, Moral\, and Political Philosophy (CAMP) at the University of Leeds. \;
\nRisk and uncertainty pose challenges throughout ethical theory and practice: when we make choices while uncertain about the relevant moral principles or non-moral facts\, when we face questions about the permissibility of taking risks on behalf of others\, and in foundational debates about the nature of normative judgements themselves. \;
\nThe aim of this workshop is to explore these issues\, through work in metaethics\, normative ethics\, ethics and decision theory\, applied ethics\, and moral epistemology. Talks may address questions such as: \;
\n- How should we act under moral uncertainty? \;
\n- What are the moral constraints on our attitudes to risk and ambiguity? \;
\n- What is the moral significance of imposing risks on others? \;
\n- How should risk and uncertainty be handled in domains such as medicine\, law\, and public policy? \;
\n- What do deontological or virtue-ethical theories say about decisions under risk and uncertainty? \;
\n- How should we understand the dimension of certitude in our ethical judgements? \;
\n- Can the tools of formal epistemology and decision theory be fruitfully applied to questions about our moral judgements and choices? \;
\nPlease submit your anonymised abstract of no more than 500 words\, suitable for a 45 minute presentation.
\nAbstracts should be sent to: n.d.makins@leeds.ac.uk. \;
\nThe deadline is 20th March 2026.
\n
We welcome abstracts from people at all career stages\, though have reserved several slots for early career researchers. We hope to be able to offer some financial support to speakers\, but will prioritise support for those most in need. \;
The Inter-University Workshop on Mind\, Art and Morality promotes the interconnections across different areas in philosophy and\, more specifically it favors the study of issues lying at the intersection of ethics\, aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. In previous editions\, the Workshop has been devoted either to the production of a particular philosoher\, such as Richard Wollheim\, Jonathan Dancy\, Christine Korsgaard\, Shaun Nichols\, David Filkenstein\, and Malcolm Budd\; or to explore topics like the Philosophy of Music (with Peter Kivy\, Noë\;l Carroll or Derek Matravers)\, Self-Knowledge (with David Filkenstein and Sarah Sawyer) Art and Negative Emotions (with Susan Feagin and Eileen John) or the Cognitive Value of Fiction ( Gregory Currie\, Robert Pippin).
\nThe 2026 edition will explore a central philosophical topic\, namely: \;the meaning of mortality.
\nCALL FOR PAPERS: BEFORE OCTOBER 31\, 2025. See further details in the workshop webpage.
\n ORGANIZER;CN=Josep E. Corbi;CN=Sergi Rosell: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260401T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260401T090000 SUMMARY:WoW 2026 – Sixth International Workshop on Welfare and Ethics UID:20260311T213615Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Campus C9.3\, Saarbrücken\, Germany\, 66123 DESCRIPTION:Keynote speakers
\nKatarzyna de Lazari-Radek (University of Lodz)
\nTheron Pummer (University of St Andrews)
Call for Papers
\nWe are inviting submissions for talks\, which should be between 20 and 30 minutes in length. We are particularly interested in current or future research projects\, and especially welcome submissions from philosophers in underrepresented groups. To propose a talk\, please send an abstract of approximately 500 words as a PDF attachment to \;workshoponwelfare@gmail.com. The abstract should be suitable for blind review\, i.e. it should not contain any information that may identify you as the author. The deadline for submission is 1 April 2026. We aim to notify you about the acceptance of your paper by the end of April. Please make sure that the email to which the abstract is attached contains your name\, institutional affiliation\, and the title of the paper. \;
\nInformation on the workshop
\nConsiderations about the nature of welfare\, the value of welfare\, its distribution\, or welfare-based claims and complaints are central to moral philosophy. They are of particular concern for all philosophers who take welfare to be (at least) one source for normative reasons. Evaluative and deontic considerations about welfare provide an array of fascinating philosophical questions.
It is (quite) uncontroversial that welfare has moral value and provides moral reasons\, but it is highly contested how in particular. We ought not to harm people\, but do we also ought to benefit them? Does this include non-human animals and other agents\, and does it include future people even if their existence depends on our actions? Can we aggregate people&rsquo\;s welfare\, or should we limit the trade-offs between their harms and benefits?
Our account of welfare has implications for ethics\, but do ethical considerations also provide reasons to adopt one or another theory of welfare? What is the interaction between theories of welfare and the ethics of welfare? \;
Some lives are better and some are worse\, but what constitutes their prudential value? Are well-being and ill-being analogous or do they differ in structure and relevance &ndash\; and what do particular theories imply? What are the relevant underlying concepts of desire\, pleasure\, friendship\, or other objective goods on which welfare may depend?
This workshop provides a forum for the discussion of those and related questions. It aims at rallying scholars of philosophy to expand our understanding in these issues\, and we hope to promote the philosophical engagement with ethics\, welfare\, and how they interact.
The workshop is organised by Jonas Harney (TU Dortmund University)\, Thorsten Helfer (Saarland University)\, Maximilian Klein (Saarland University) and Hasko von Kriegstein (Toronto Metropolitan University) and generously supported by UdS Professorship for Practical Philosophy.
More details and updates on \;https://tinyurl.com/48twvh29 For further information\, please contact the organisers at \;workshoponwelfare@gmail.com.
BACKGROUND
\nXan Bozzo (University of Wisconsin\, Stout) and Harrison Lee (University of Mississippi) are co-organizing the second annual Miss-Stout Ethics Workshop\, to be held June 4-5\, 2026 in Milwaukee\, WI. \;
\nWe aim to host 10-12 philosophers to present works in progress in any area of ethics\, broadly construed to include applied\, normative\, and metaethics. Presentations will be brief (5-15 minutes) and will be followed by extended discussion (35-45 minutes). \;
\nWe invite submissions of abstracts of 500-1000 words. Accepted participants will be asked to circulate rough drafts to all workshop participants by May 14\, 2026. Participants will be expected to read all drafts in advance of the workshop. \;
\nLODGING &\; STIPEND
\nParticipants will receive a $1500 stipend. There is no stipend for virtual participants.
\nThe stipend is being generously provided by the Center for Applied Ethics at UW-Stout. Accepted participants can expect to receive the stipend sometime after the workshop\, in June or July. \;
\nThe 2026 workshop will be held at Saint Kate -- The Arts Hotel. Saint Kate is a 4-star hotel located in the heart of Milwaukee. It features five unique art galleries with exhibitions that rotate throughout the year\, live music\, and numerous bar and dining options.
\nParticipants who reserve a room by May 6\, 2026 will receive the group state rate of $103/night. Participants are encouraged to reserve a room for the nights of June 3 and 4\, and possibly June 5\, depending on travel plans. \;
\nHOW TO APPLY
\nApplications are due by \;April 1\, 2026.
\nTo apply\, send an email to \;bozzoa@uwstout.edu and \;jhlee3@olemiss.edu with the subject line "Ethics Workshop Application" and the following information in the body of the email:
\nThere are a limited number of slots for this workshop. \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Alexander Bozzo;CN=Harrison Lee: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20260410T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20260410T170000 SUMMARY:Sixth Groningen Metaethics Workshop UID:20260311T213617Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Amsterdam LOCATION:Oude Boteringestraat 52\, Groningen\, Netherlands DESCRIPTION:The sixth Groningen Metaethics Workshop will take place on Friday 10 April 2026 at the University of Groningen\, the Netherlands.
\nOur keynote speaker will be Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm University). There will be five slots for submitted papers.
\nWe invite submissions of abstracts on any topic in metaethics or metanormativity. Abstracts can be up to 1000 words and should be anonymised. They should be suitable for a thirty minute talk\, which will be followed by thirty minutes of discussion.
\nYou can submit your abstract by emailing it as a PDF file to \;groningenmetaethicsworkshop@gmail.com. Please include your name\, your email address\, and the title of your abstract in a separate PDF file.
\nSubmission deadline: 30 January 2026.
ORGANIZER;CN=Bart Streumer;CN=Daan Evers: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260410T100000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260410T170000 SUMMARY:9th Annual Regional Student Ethics Conference UID:20260311T213618Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:201 Mullica Hill Road\, Glassboro\, United States\, 08028 ORGANIZER;CN=Ellen Miller: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260410T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260412T170000 SUMMARY:Kantian Moral Constitutivism UID:20260311T213619Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:1100 E 57th Street\, Chicago\, United States ORGANIZER;CN=T. A. Pendlebury;CN=Matthias Haase: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260417T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260418T170000 SUMMARY:1st UChicago WAMIP Philosophy Graduate Conference: Practical Philosophy & Philosophy’s Practicalities UID:20260311T213620Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:Chicago\, United States\, 60637 DESCRIPTION:UChicago&rsquo\;s Women in Philosophy (WIP) and Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) invites abstracts for the first WAMIP (Women &\; Minorities in Philosophy) Philosophy Graduate Conference\, taking place on April 17-18\, 2026 at the University of Chicago.
\nThis conference brings together graduate students and scholars working on moral philosophy\, broadly construed\, coming from a wide variety of philosophical backgrounds to discuss issues in philosophy and academia. In addition to discussing research\, it is our conference&rsquo\;s explicit aim to make tacit institutional knowledge about academia more explicit\, foster community\, and just generally help each other excel.
\nLocation University of Chicago
Dates April 17-18\, 2026
CFA Deadline February 2\, 2026
Keynotes
Zoë\; Johnson King (Harvard)
Annette Martí\;n (UIC)
Mikayla Kelley (UChicago)
The first day of the event is a topical conference on moral philosophy (see below for more info). It includes two keynotes and two graduate panels. On the graduate panels\, each graduate student has 15-20 minutes to present their work. After each one has presented\, there will be an open Q&\;A for all panelists.
\nThe second (half-)day will include a panel discussion where we invite our keynotes to talk about pragmatics in academia\, with a particular focus on supporting and highlighting the experiences of minorities in philosophy. The point of this is really to make tacit knowledge about these things more widely available.
\nApril 17
9-10.30 Annette Martí\;n (UIC)
11-12.30 Graduate Student Panel
12.30 - 13.30 Lunch
13.30 - 15 Graduate Student Panel
15.30 - 17 Zoë\; Johnson King (Harvard)
April 18
9-10.30 Mikayla Kelley (UChicago)
11-12.30 Keynote Panel Discussion on the Pragmatics of Academia
The eight annual Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop will be held in Montreal (as a special one-off) on April 24 -- 25\, 2026.
\nThe workshop aims to provide a forum for stimulating and constructive exchange among philosophers currently working on issues concerning normativity\, broadly construed to include: the traditional questions of \;metaethics (and analogous questions about other normative domains)\; \;theories of reasons\, rationality and reasoning\; the semantics and pragmatics of normative language\; the psychology of normative judgment\; and the nature of epistemic normativity. The hope is to showcase cutting-edge work in these and related areas\, providing speakers with useful feedback\, and other participants with lively presentations and conversation.
\nThere will be eight talks in total\, seven of which will be selected via an open call for abstracts and an anonymous review process\, plus a keynote address by Jane Friedman (NYU). For the seventh workshop running\, papers accepted to this year's workshop will be eligible for publication in a special issue of Philosophical Studies.
\nWe very much hope you'll join us in beautiful and vibrant Montreal next spring for the workshop's eight year. In addition to excellent presentations\, there will be plenty of opportunities for socializing with fellow normativity folks at a selection of Montreal's lovely restaurants and bars on each night of the event.
ORGANIZER;CN=Christopher Howard;CN=Margaret Shea;CN=Alex Worsnip: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260501T234500 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260501T234500 SUMMARY:MadMeta XXIII UID:20260311T213622Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:702 Langdon Street\, Madison\, United States\, 53706 DESCRIPTION:Abstracts of papers in any area of metaethics are due by May 1\, 2026. Abstracts should be 3 double-spaced pages\, and may contain a fourth\, optional page for References. Abstracts must be prepared for blind review. There is a limit of one submission per person. Speakers in the 2024 or 2025 MadMeta workshop are not eligible to submit abstracts for the coming event. A program committee will evaluate submissions and make decisions by early June 2026. \;Please send abstracts via email to workshop organizer \;Russ Shafer-Landau (russshaferlandau@gmail.com).
\n ORGANIZER;CN=Russ Shafer-Landau: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Lisbon:20260508T140000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Lisbon:20260508T143000 SUMMARY:From the Prompt to the Output: Tripartite AI Mediation in Digital History UID:20260311T213623Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Lisbon LOCATION:Via Panorâmica\, s/n: 4150-564\, Porto\, Portugal DESCRIPTION:[Call for Abstracts]
\n6th International Conference on Philosophy of Mind: Artificial Intelligence \;(6ICPH)
\nFaculty of Arts and Humanities\, University of Porto\, Porto\, Portugal
4-8 May 2026 (4-5 May\, Online | 6-8 May\, in-person)
About: The 6th International Conference on Philosophy of Mind: Artificial Intelligence (6ICPH) brings together researchers\, academics\, and students working on central problems in philosophy of mind\, with this edition placing artificial intelligence at the center of the programme. Hosted by the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Porto (Porto\, Portugal)\, the conference invites dialogue across philosophy of mind\, philosophy of cognitive science\, and adjacent fields that take AI as both an empirical phenomenon and a conceptual stress-test for our theories of mentality. The guiding aim is to examine what contemporary AI \; &mdash\; especially language-based and multimodal systems &mdash\; does (and does not) illuminate about understanding\, intentionality\, representation\, rationality\, agency\, and consciousness. Alongside classic debates (e.g.\, functionalism\, computationalism\, connectionism\, embodied and enactive approaches)\, the conference foregrounds questions that have become newly urgent: whether large language models support attributions of semantic competence or merely simulate it\; how norms of reasoning and explanation should be reconceived when behaviour emerges from distributed statistical structures\; whether artificial systems can participate in social cognition (coordination\, trust\, testimony\, deception) and what this implies for mindreading and second-person interaction\; and how reliance on AI tools reshapes human cognition through extended and scaffolded practices (search\, writing\, memory\, attention\, and self-interpretation).The event runs in a hybrid format: online sessions on 4&ndash\;5 May 2026\, followed by in-person sessions on 6&ndash\;8 May 2026 at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities\, University of Porto.
\nPHILOSOPHY OF MIND AWARD 2026 (in-person talks only): The best-submitted abstract will receive the opportunity to deliver a special Award Talk similar to a keynote talk (note: the selected author will have the fee waived).
\nThe final deadline to submit proposals in different research topics is \;March 29\, 2026.
\n\;
\nKEYNOTES SPEAKERS:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Anil Seth is Professor of Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience at the University of Sussex and Director of the Sussex Centre for Consciousness Science.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Diana I. Pé\;rez is a Full Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) and the Director of the IIF&ndash\;SADAF&ndash\;CONICET.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Paul Thagard is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo\, where he founded and directed the Cognitive Science Program.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Gloria Andrada is a Ramó\;n y Cajal researcher at the Institute of Philosophy (IFS)\, Spanish National Research Council (CSIC)\, Madrid.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Miguel Pais-Vieira is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Medical Sciences at the University of Aveiro (iBiMED).
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Â\;ngela Leite is a Researcher at the Centre for Philosophical and Humanistic Studies (CEFH) at the Catholic University of Portugal (Braga).
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Marina Trakas is an Assistant Researcher at CONICET (Argentina) and next year (2026) she will be a FCT Researcher at the Centre for Philosophy at the University of Lisbon.
\n\;
\nTopics might include (but are not limited to):
\n1. Consciousness\, Subjectivity\, and Artificial Systems
\na. Competing theories of consciousness (global workspace\, higher-order\, predictive processing) and what they imply for AI
b. The &ldquo\;hard problem&rdquo\; and whether AI changes (or merely rephrases) it
c. Machine consciousness: criteria\, tests\, and the status of &ldquo\;phenomenal&rdquo\; ascriptions to AI
2. Perception\, World-Modelling\, and Machine Inference
\na. Perception as active construction: implications for artificial perception (vision-language models\, robotics)
b. Predictive coding\, Bayesian perception\, and AI as &ldquo\;prediction machines&rdquo\;
c. 4E cognition and AI: embodied agents\, sensorimotor contingency\, and situated learning
3. Representation\, Meaning\, and Intentionality in Humans and AI
\na. Internalism vs. externalism under contemporary AI (training data\, environment\, social embedding)
b. From symbols to vectors: what do embeddings represent (if anything)?
c. Artificial intentionality: original vs. derived content\; can AI have aboutness or only mimic it?
4. Reasoning\, Rational Agency\, and Autonomy
\na. Reasoning beyond correlation: inference\, explanation\, and &ldquo\;competence vs. performance&rdquo\; in AI
b. Agency and control in human&ndash\;AI systems: who acts when decisions are AI-mediated?
c. Bias\, rationality\, and epistemic norms: when AI recommendations count as reasons
5. The Self\, Personal Identity\, and Digital Mediation
\na. Minimal\, narrative\, and extended self under AI scaffolding (assistants\, recommender systems)
b. Memory\, identity\, and externalised cognition (search\, notes\, &ldquo\;AI memory&rdquo\;)
c. Uploading\, duplication\, and continuity: metaphysics of identity with AI simulations
6. Mind&ndash\;Brain Relations and Computational Neuroscience
\na. Reductionism vs. pluralism: what computational models explain (and what they don&rsquo\;t
\nb. First-person data in an AI age: experience sampling\, neurophenomenology\, and modelling
\nc. AI in neuroscience: limits of decoding\, prediction\, and mechanistic explanation
\n7. Explainability\, Understanding\, and Epistemic Responsibility
\na. What counts as an explanation for a mind? Contrast: mechanistic\, functional\, and narrative explanation
b. Interpretability vs. justification: explanations for users\, clinicians\, regulators\, and researchers
c. Trust\, opacity\, and epistemic dependence: when reliance on AI is rational (or negligent)
\;
\n8. Ethics of AI\, Neurotechnology\, and Cognitive Liberty
\na. Brain&ndash\;computer interfaces and AI: agency\, enhancement\, and responsibility gaps
b. Neuroprivacy and &ldquo\;mind-reading&rdquo\; claims: conceptual and ethical boundaries
c. Governance of human&ndash\;AI cognition: auditability\, contestability\, and moral crumple zones
\;
\n9. Emotion\, Social Cognition\, and Human&ndash\;AI Interaction
\na. Affective states and AI: recognition\, simulation\, and the ontology of &ldquo\;emotion&rdquo\; in machines
b. Empathy\, testimony\, and trust in conversational AI
c. Moral cognition with AI advisors: persuasion\, manipulation\, and norm-shaping
\;
\n10. Extended\, Embedded\, and Collective Minds in the Age of AI
\na. Where does cognition end? LLMs as cognitive artefacts and &ldquo\;thinking with tools&rdquo\;
b. Language as a social technology: AI-driven standardisation and normative drift
c. Collective epistemology: AI\, group cognition\, and the reshaping of public reason
\;
\n11. Psychiatry\, Classification\, and Algorithmic Diagnosis
\na. Mental disorder: natural kinds\, social constructs\, and algorithmic categories
b. Prediction vs. understanding in computational psychiatry and clinical AI
c. Identity\, stigma\, and self-interpretation under diagnostic AI systems
\;
\n12. Evolution\, Cognition\, and Artificial Minds
\na. Evolutionary perspectives on intelligence: what AI lacks (development\, embodiment\, niche construction)
b. Modularity and architectures: are LLMs &ldquo\;general\,&rdquo\; or just wide?
c. Language evolution and AI language: what &ldquo\;fluency&rdquo\; shows (and what it can&rsquo\;t show)
13. Attention\, Salience\, and Control in Humans and Machines
\na. What is attention? Comparative models: neural attention vs. transformer &ldquo\;attention&rdquo\;
b. Control\, distraction\, and optimisation: how AI systems capture and steer attention
c. Situated attention: organism&ndash\;environment loops\, interfaces\, and cognitive ecology
\;
\nSpecial Track I: Artificial Intelligence and the Philosophy of Mind
\nThis track explores the philosophical implications of AI\, cognitive models\, and the nature of artificial cognition. Topics may include:
\na. \; \; \; \; \; \; Can AI be conscious? Theories of artificial consciousness
\nb. \; \; \; \; \; \; Computational models of thought and mental representation
\nc. \; \; \; \; \; \; \; AI and intentionality: can machines have beliefs and desires?
\nd. \; \; \; \; \; \; The problem of explainability in AI
\ne. \; \; \; \; \; \; LLMs\, ChatGPT\, DeepSeek: philosophical approaches
\n\;
\nSpecial Track II: Conceptualizing Polysemy
\nThe focus of this panel is on ways of capturing \;polysemy \;at the conceptual level. Work on the nature\, structure and role of concepts expressed or encoded by polysemic words is welcome. Topics may include:
\na. \; \; \; \; \; \; Arguments for &ldquo\;rich&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;thin&rdquo\; theories of lexical meaning of polysemous words
\nb. \; \; \; \; \; \; Approaches to co-predication
\nc. \; \; \; \; \; \; \; Accounts of communication with polysemous words
\nd. \; \; \; \; \; \; Mechanisms of sense-selection or alternatives to it
\ne. \; \; \; \; \; \; Experimental studies that bear on polysemy and have impact on the debate
\nf. \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; Applications of the polysemy idea to less-discussed or novel expressions
\n\;
\nFEES (accepted speakers)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Early Stage (until 10 April 2026)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Professionals (posdoc\, professor\, tenure-track): &euro\; 160\,00
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Students: (Master\, PhD): &euro\; 100\,00
\n\;
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Later Stage (10April &ndash\; 30 April 2026)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Professionals (posdoc\, professor\, tenure-track): &euro\; 220\,00
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Students: (Master\, PhD): &euro\; 150\,00
\n\;
\nFEES (attendance)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Online Segment (4-5 May 2026\, Microsoft Teams)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Professionals (posdoc\, professor\, tenure-track): &euro\; 30\,00
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Students: (Master\, PhD): &euro\; 20\,00
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; In-Person Segment (6-8 May 2026\, FLUP)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Professionals (posdoc\, professor\, tenure-track): &euro\; 30\,00
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Students: (Master\, PhD): &euro\; 20\,00
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Both Segments (4-5May 2026\, Microsoft Teams + 6-8 May 2025\, FLUP)
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Professionals (posdoc\, professor\, tenure-track): &euro\; 50\,00
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Students: (Master\, PhD): &euro\; 30\,00
\n\;
\nLanguages of the colloquium: English and Portuguese.
\nSUBMISSIONS:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; IMPORTANT: you should clearly state if you are submitting for the online segment (OS) (4-5 May) or the in-person segment (PS) (6-8 May). If online\, you need to provide a preferred day (4 or 5 May) and time schedule (Morning: 9h30-12h30\; Afternoon: 14h00 &ndash\; 18h) considering the Lisbon Time Zone.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; In-person submissions have a higher chance of being accepted (more slots available) and are automatically registered for the Philosophy of Mind Award 2026.
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Proposals should include two files: (in word. format: pdf. formats will not be accepted):
\no \; \; (1) a cover page with identification\, clear academic affiliation (if several\, choose the main)
\no \; \; (2) an anonymized title and abstract (maximum 250 words\, up to 10 references)
\no \; \; (3) sent to interconfphilmind@gmail.com
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Paper duration: 30 minutes (20 minutes presentation + 10 minutes for discussion)\;
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Notification Info: in order to facilitate the request for funding of the accepted talks so speakers can prepare their travel in advance\, notification of acceptance or rejection will be given in a 7-10 days period (review) after the submission\;
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Publications: Some of the papers presented at the conference are expected to be published in several projects (edited volume\, special issue\, etc.\; the publication process will be independent and optional\; more details after the conference)\;
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Any doubts or concerns can be addressed to: interconfphilmind@gmail.com
\nVenue: Faculty of Humanities of the University of Porto (Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto) | Address: Via Panorâ\;mica\, s/n: 4150-564\, Porto\, Portugal.
\nOrganization: Mind\, Language and Action Group | Institute of Philosophy | University of Porto
\nOrganizing Committee
\nSteven S. Gouveia (Chair)
\nSofia Miguens
\nDan Zeman
\nRafael Antunes Padilha
\nJé\;ssica Azevedo
\nMaria Luiza llenaco
\nThales Maia
\nInê\;s Silva
\n\;
\nSupport:
\nCEEC Project by FCT 2022.02527.CEECIND
\nTL Modern &\; Contemporary Philosophy
\nRG Mind\, Language and Action Group (MLAG)
\nInstituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto &ndash\; UID/00502
\nFundaç\;ã\;o para a Ciê\;ncia e a Tecnologia (FCT)
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260517T150000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260519T170000 SUMMARY:SLACRR 2026 UID:20260311T213624Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:6177 Delmar Ave\, Saint Louis\, United States DESCRIPTION:St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality provides a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason\, broadly construed. In addition to two invited speakers\, the other speakers will be chosen from submitted abstracts.This will be the 16th SLACRR.
ORGANIZER;CN=Eric Wiland;CN=Billy Dunaway;CN=Matthew McGrath;CN=Elizabeth Jackson: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260520T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260521T170000 SUMMARY:Risk and Uncertainty in Ethics UID:20260311T213625Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/London LOCATION:Leeds\, United Kingdom DESCRIPTION:Join us for a 2-day workshop on risk and uncertainty in ethics\, hosted by the Centre for Aesthetic\, Moral\, and Political Philosophy (CAMP) at the University of Leeds!
\nRisk and uncertainty pose challenges throughout ethical theory and practice: when we make choices while uncertain about the relevant moral principles or non-moral facts\, when we face questions about the permissibility of taking risks on behalf of others\, and in foundational debates about the nature of normative judgements themselves. \;
\nThe aim of this workshop is to explore these issues\, through work in metaethics\, normative ethics\, ethics and decision theory\, applied ethics\, and moral epistemology. Talks may address questions such as: \;
\n- How should we act under moral uncertainty? \;
\n- What are the moral constraints on our attitudes to risk and ambiguity? \;
\n- What is the moral significance of imposing risks on others? \;
\n- How should risk and uncertainty be handled in domains such as medicine\, law\, and public policy? \;
\n- What do deontological or virtue-ethical theories say about decisions under risk and uncertainty? \;
\n- How should we understand the dimension of certitude in our ethical judgements? \;
\n- Can the tools of formal epistemology and decision theory be frtuifully applied to questions about our moral judgements and choices? \;
\nProgramme tbc. \;
\nThis event is free and open to all. Please email n.d.makins@leeds.ac.uk to register. \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Nicholas Makins;CN=Joseph Bowen: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260601T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260601T234500 SUMMARY:Using AI tools to support ethical inquiry—Can it be done? If so\, how\, and what are the risks and potential benefits? UID:20260311T213626Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:CFP: \;Using AI tools to support ethical inquiry&mdash\;Can it be done? If so\, how\, and what are the risks and potential benefits?
\nThus far\, there has been little academic discussion on whether and\, if so\, how\, different types of AI tools could be incorporated into ethics research\, and what the risks and potential benefits are of such uses. This is perhaps surprising\, given that there has been much discussion on how AI can support scientific research\, as well as on how AI can be incorporated into digital humanities research projects. Furthermore\, from another angle\, there has been discussion on whether AI could support the moral reasoning and decision-making of individuals. And since 2022\, there has been extensive coverage in popular media on how students are using generative AI within the classroom\, and the various challenges that such uses pose. Nonetheless\, what role AI might play in philosophy research\, including ethics research\, has yet to receive substantial attention.
\nFor this topical collection in Philosophy &\; Technology\, we invite submissions that address philosophical questions regarding the use of AI tools to support ethical inquiry. (We interpret ethical inquiry broadly\, to incorporate normative ethics\, metaethics\, applied ethics\, and professional ethics\, such as medical ethics or research ethics. Note that the focus of this special issue is not on the use of AI in education except inasmuch as such uses advance ethics research.)
\nRelevant questions on this topic may include:
\n- What kinds of ethics research tasks can or cannot be supported or performed by AI tools? For instance\, are there ways in which AI can help with processes of deliberation\, reasoning\, argumentation\, evaluation\, theorizing\, or other activities? Or could AI be used to support one or more methods that are used (whether explicitly or implicitly) in ethics\, like conceptual analysis\, conceptual engineering\, reflective equilibrium\, argument and objection generation\, thought experiment generation\, casuistry\, introspection\, moral perception\, anticipation and prospection\, etc.?
\n- Which uses of AI tools in ethics research involve special kinds of wrongs or risks? Are particular uses especially likely to make philosophy less interesting or less valuable?
\n- What sorts of goods are lost when people attempt to use AI to &ldquo\;summarize&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;analyze&rdquo\; philosophical texts or literatures or to &ldquo\;articulate&rdquo\; an idea or argument?
\n- Are AI tools generally better suited for incorporation into processes of discovery than processes of justification? Or are there other generalizations that can be made about the kinds of AI uses within ethics research that are more likely to be fruitful or are less risky?
\n- Does AI have special potential to aid research in some areas of applied or professional ethics\, as opposed to more fundamental areas of ethics\, or metaethics?
\n- Might efforts to incorporate AI tools into ethics tasks help us better understand or refine the methods we use? Could philosophers use AI to develop new methods for ethics?
\n- If AI can support ethics research in particular ways\, does this have implications for how we should think about ethics as a research field?
\n- Could AI systems be ethics experts\, and might human ethicists have reason to defer to AI systems on some ethics questions?
\n\nEditors: \;
\nElizabeth O'Neill\, Assistant Professor\, Philosophy &\; Ethics\, Eindhoven University of Technology
\nPhilip Nickel\, Associate Professor\, \;Philosophy &\; Ethics\, \;Eindhoven University of Technology
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260604T080000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260605T170000 SUMMARY:Miss-Stout Ethics Workshop UID:20260311T213627Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:139 E Kilbourne Ave\, Milwaukee\, United States\, 53202 DESCRIPTION:BACKGROUND
\nXan Bozzo (University of Wisconsin\, Stout) and Harrison Lee (University of Mississippi) are co-organizing the second annual Miss-Stout Ethics Workshop\, to be held June 4-5\, 2026 in Milwaukee\, WI. \;
\nWe aim to host 10-12 philosophers to present works in progress in any area of ethics\, broadly construed to include applied\, normative\, and metaethics. Presentations will be brief (5-15 minutes) and will be followed by extended discussion (35-45 minutes). \;
\nWe invite submissions of abstracts of 500-1000 words. Accepted participants will be asked to circulate rough drafts to all workshop participants by May 14\, 2026. Participants will be expected to read all drafts in advance of the workshop. \;
\nLODGING &\; STIPEND
\nParticipants will receive a $1500 stipend. There is no stipend for virtual participants.
\nThe stipend is being generously provided by the Center for Applied Ethics at UW-Stout. Accepted participants can expect to receive the stipend sometime after the workshop\, in June or July. \;
\nThe 2026 workshop will be held at Saint Kate -- The Arts Hotel. Saint Kate is a 4-star hotel located in the heart of Milwaukee. It features five unique art galleries with exhibitions that rotate throughout the year\, live music\, and numerous bar and dining options.
\nParticipants who reserve a room by May 6\, 2026 will receive the group state rate of $103/night. Participants are encouraged to reserve a room for the nights of June 3 and 4\, and possibly June 5\, depending on travel plans. \;
\nHOW TO APPLY
\nApplications are due by \;April 1\, 2026.
\nTo apply\, send an email to \;bozzoa@uwstout.edu and \;jhlee3@olemiss.edu with the subject line "Ethics Workshop Application" and the following information in the body of the email:
\nThere are a limited number of slots for this workshop. \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Alexander Bozzo;CN=Harrison Lee: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260605T140000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260606T170000 SUMMARY:Moral Metaphysics at Maryland (MMaM 2026) UID:20260311T213628Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:College Park\, United States\, 20742 DESCRIPTION:The 2nd Moral Metaphysics at Maryland (MMaM) Workshop will be held at the University of Maryland\, College Park\, on Friday and Saturday\, June 5-6\, 2026.
\nLast year was the inuagural MaMM (Details here: \;https://philevents.org/event/show/129354). We then invited a mix of speakers on the basis of their existing contributions to the field or evaluation of abstracts. The organizers are a bit too swamped to run a CfA this year\, but email us at \;moralmetaphysicsatmaryland@gmail.com if you'd like to participate as an audience member. \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Harjit Bhogal;CN=Daniel Fogal;CN=N. G. Laskowski: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260609T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260610T170000 SUMMARY:Normativity and Gender Workshop UID:20260311T213629Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Helsinki LOCATION:Tampere\, Finland DESCRIPTION:It is natural to theorize gender within a normative framework: gender is not a neutral classificatory category\, but one which encodes evaluative assumptions\, sets standards of correctness\, and generates reasons and obligations for individuals. At the same time\, philosophical thought about normativity itself - for instance\, about the nature of agency\, reasons\, authority\, or objectivity - has been shaped by socially situated assumptions. As a result\, the intersection between gender and normativity as areas of philosophical theorizing can be particularly fruitful\, enhancing our understanding of both categories and motivating revisions to our existing accounts of either. \; \;
\nWe invite abstracts for three contributed talks that explore issues concerning normativity\, gender\, and their connections. Abstracts that lie a the intersections between different fields or subfields of philosophy are also welcome. Possible topics can include but are not limited to: \; \;
\nSubmissions from underrepresented groups are particularly encouraged.
\nAbstract details \;
\nLength: 750-1000 words\, suitable for a 30-minute presentation with a 45-minute Q&\;A\, or a 45-minute presentation with a 30-minute Q&\;A. \;
\nDeadline: 15 March 2026 \;
\nNotification of Acceptance: End of March \;
\nSubmission: Please submit your abstracts to normativityandgender@gmail.com. The submission should be attached to the email in .pdf format and prepared for blind review. Please include the following information separately in the body of the email: your name(s)\, affiliation(s)\, the title of your talk\, and whether you consider yourself to be a member of an underrepresented group. \;
\nAbout the workshop \;
\nThe workshop is in-person only. The venues are accessible and childcare is available during the presentations\, if required. \; \;
\nUnfortunately\, we are unable to provide monetary assistance for travel or accommodation. \; \;
\nThis workshop is organized by the Normativity\, Gender\, and Mathematics project\, funded by Kone Foundation\, and the Quasi-Realism project\, funded by the Research Council of Finland. \; \;
\nOrganizers: Laura Nicoară\, Siiri Porkkala\, Jenni Rytilä\;\, Teemu Toppinen\, Vilma Venesmaa. \;
\nFor any questions\, please contact the organizers at normativityandgender@gmail.com. \;
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260612T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260612T170000 SUMMARY:Ethical Theory and Obligatory Ends UID:20260311T213630Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Bielefeld\, Germany DESCRIPTION:The concept of an \;obligatory \;end is commonly associated with Kantian ethics\, specifically\, with Kant's idea that there are duties to adopt the happiness of others and one's own perfection as ends. However\, the notion of \;obligatory \;ends has been recently attracting philosophical interest from outside Kantian tradition and there is good reason to think that this notion can be fruitfully employed in moral theorising beyond Kantian ethics. \;Obligatory \;ends play an important role in recent treatments of topics such as supererogation (Portmore \;2023)\, moral demandingness and justification of moral options (Hanser 2014\, Igneski 2008\, Noggle 2009\, Sticker 2024)\, collective harm (Albertzart 2019)\, and moral and non-moral normativity more generally (Bastian 2025\, Greenspan 2010\, \;Portmore \;ms\, van Ackeren &\; Sticker 2018). The aim of this workshop is to further investigate the nature of \;obligatory \;ends and the role they can play in ethical theory broadly construed.
\nThe following is a non-exhaustive list of questions\, with which this workshop is concerned:
\nParticipation is free\, but registration is required and places are limited.
\nRegistration deadline: 08 June \;2026
\nRegister at obligatory.ends(at)uni-bielefeld(dot)de
\nPlease visit our website for further information:
ORGANIZER;CN=Dmitry Ananiev;CN=Benjamin Kiesewetter: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260619T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260620T170000 SUMMARY:FrankMeta.8 UID:20260311T213631Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Frankfurt am Main\, Germany DESCRIPTION:FrankMeta is the annual meta-ethics conference at the Frankfurt School of Finance &\; Management. It \;is designed to bring together philosophers working on normativity and metanormativity\, broadly construed. We invite submissions on new work in the metaphysics\, (meta)semantics\, epistemology and psychology of normative discourse\, as well as papers on reasons and rationality.
\nThe conference will run over two days and provide plenty of time for discussion and exchange.
ORGANIZER;CN="Sebastian Köhler";CN=Christine Tiefensee: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Indiana/Indianapolis:20260622T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Indiana/Indianapolis:20260628T170000 SUMMARY:Patience in Adversity Summer Seminar UID:20260311T213632Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:America/Indiana/Indianapolis LOCATION:Notre Dame\, United States DESCRIPTION:This seminar aims to equip doctoral students and early career scholars in philosophy and religion to explore patience in adversity. We hope participants will emerge ready to contribute to the growing research on patience as it relates to courage\, anger\, self-control\, awe\, as well as how virtues interact with personal and structural hardship.
\n
The seminar will cover cutting-edge research in philosophy and religion and will feature senior scholars who will present their own work and advise students on their writing projects in this general area. Participants will benefit from mentoring and engagement with their own research during daily sessions.
Together\, we will consider questions such as:
\nLogistics and Funding: Seminar main meetings will convene each day and involve discussion of invited scholars&rsquo\; work\, breakout sessions\, and small group mentoring workshops. Seminar participants will receive a $5\,000 honorarium for their participation and time. All payments will be made in US dollars.Cost of travel and lodging for award recipients is expected to be covered by the individuals themselves.
\nApplication Deadline: January 9\, 2026.
\n
Application Instructions: Applicants must submit the following materials at this link (https://baylor.app.box.com/f/e71a529d377840e896baddc6ed936914) using the document names indicated below each document description:
1) Letter of application of no more than 1 page explaining: what topics regarding patience interest you\; connection of these topics with your previous or ongoing research\; how research you do or plan to do impacts populations facing adversity\; level of familiarity with moral psychology and virtue ethics generally.
\nName Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] &ndash\; Letter of Application
\n2) A 250-word statement describing the scholar&rsquo\;s capacity for successful collaboration with scholars from diverse disciplines and backgrounds (psychology\, religion\, philosophy).
\nName Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] - Collaboration Statement
\n
3) Curriculum Vitae
Name Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] - CV
\n
4) Short bio (less than 200-word) for posting on a website featuring participants.
Name Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] - Short Bio
\n
5) Letter of support from primary advisor (PhD mentor for graduate students\, supervisor for postdoctoral researchers) stating the advisor&rsquo\;s supports for the advisee's participation and time commitment.
Name Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] - Letter of Support
\n
6) Contact information for an additional 2-3 professional references (no letter is required from these additional references at time of application.)
Name Document: [Your Last Name\, Your First Name] - Professional References
ORGANIZER;CN=Anne Jeffrey;CN=Fannie Bialek: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20260623T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20260624T170000 SUMMARY:The Politics of Skepticism UID:20260311T213633Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Amsterdam LOCATION:Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam\, Amsterdam\, Netherlands\, 1081 HV DESCRIPTION:Skepticism is usually understood as a view or stance in epistemology: the skeptic raises a set of challenges to our beliefs and claims to knowledge. But doubt has always had ethical and political implications. Ancient Pyrrhonists saw suspension of judgement as a path to tranquility. Early modern thinkers used skeptical arguments against religious and political authority. In more contemporary debates over expertise\, trust\, and the "crisis of knowledge"\, questions of what we can know are inseparable from political questions.
\nThis conference explores the ethics and politics of skepticism and doubt. How does skepticism interact with politics--does skepticism undermine or enable certain political arrangements\, ideologies\, or ethical stances? What are the ethical and political implications of different skeptical views or stances? What can we say about specific contexts where doubt may be productive or perilous\, such as in democratic deliberation\, or challenges to scientific consensus?
ORGANIZER;CN=Christopher Ranalli;CN=Robin McKenna: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260701T110000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260702T170000 SUMMARY:WoW 2026 – Sixth International Workshop on Welfare and Ethics UID:20260311T213634Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Campus C9.3\, Saarbrücken\, Germany\, 66123 DESCRIPTION:Keynote speakers
\nKatarzyna de Lazari-Radek (University of Lodz)
\nTheron Pummer (University of St Andrews)
Call for Papers
\nWe are inviting submissions for talks\, which should be between 20 and 30 minutes in length. We are particularly interested in current or future research projects\, and especially welcome submissions from philosophers in underrepresented groups. To propose a talk\, please send an abstract of approximately 500 words as a PDF attachment to \;workshoponwelfare@gmail.com. The abstract should be suitable for blind review\, i.e. it should not contain any information that may identify you as the author. The deadline for submission is 1 April 2026. We aim to notify you about the acceptance of your paper by the end of April. Please make sure that the email to which the abstract is attached contains your name\, institutional affiliation\, and the title of the paper. \;
\nInformation on the workshop
\nConsiderations about the nature of welfare\, the value of welfare\, its distribution\, or welfare-based claims and complaints are central to moral philosophy. They are of particular concern for all philosophers who take welfare to be (at least) one source for normative reasons. Evaluative and deontic considerations about welfare provide an array of fascinating philosophical questions.
It is (quite) uncontroversial that welfare has moral value and provides moral reasons\, but it is highly contested how in particular. We ought not to harm people\, but do we also ought to benefit them? Does this include non-human animals and other agents\, and does it include future people even if their existence depends on our actions? Can we aggregate people&rsquo\;s welfare\, or should we limit the trade-offs between their harms and benefits?
Our account of welfare has implications for ethics\, but do ethical considerations also provide reasons to adopt one or another theory of welfare? What is the interaction between theories of welfare and the ethics of welfare? \;
Some lives are better and some are worse\, but what constitutes their prudential value? Are well-being and ill-being analogous or do they differ in structure and relevance &ndash\; and what do particular theories imply? What are the relevant underlying concepts of desire\, pleasure\, friendship\, or other objective goods on which welfare may depend?
This workshop provides a forum for the discussion of those and related questions. It aims at rallying scholars of philosophy to expand our understanding in these issues\, and we hope to promote the philosophical engagement with ethics\, welfare\, and how they interact.
The workshop is organised by Jonas Harney (TU Dortmund University)\, Thorsten Helfer (Saarland University)\, Maximilian Klein (Saarland University) and Hasko von Kriegstein (Toronto Metropolitan University) and generously supported by UdS Professorship for Practical Philosophy.
More details and updates on \;https://tinyurl.com/48twvh29 For further information\, please contact the organisers at \;workshoponwelfare@gmail.com.
Collectives and other groups have the capacity to do more than any of their individual members could accomplish alone. Groups can achieve great accomplishments and benefits\, but they can also commit evil at scale. Likewise\, through the division of cognitive labor and with the support of technologies of communication and inference\, collectives can learn things that no individual could achieve in a lifetime. However\, collectives can also spread misinformation\, disinformation\, unwarranted conspiracy theories\, and propaganda at hitherto-unimagined speed and scale. \;
\nThis course addresses both the promise and the peril that attend our increasingly connected\, global community. It offers participants the chance to think through the ethical difficulties of existence within contemporary communities\, and consider how to construct those communities in ways that enable us to flourish together as moral\, epistemic\, and political agents. We will begin with an introduction to individual virtue theory (both ethical and epistemic)\, then expand to a consideration of collective virtue theory.
\nPhilosophers have developed accounts not only of the virtues but also detailed accounts of the vices that oppose and undermine them. The fields of both vice ethics and vice epistemology have grown in recent years. Many of these vices only exist in collective contexts because they presuppose various forms of complex sociality. Interdisciplinary scholars have also developed more thorough accounts of not only individual but also collective virtues and vices\, as well as the relationship between individual and collective virtues and vices. The resulting understanding of cognitive technologies and the forms that cognitive conflict can take informs our thinking about what virtue is up against\, and what it consists of. \;
\nThe team of teachers of this course has experience with both theorizing and conducting empirical studies\, using methods from psychology\, cognitive science\, and artificial intelligence.
\nFinancial aid is available. \;
\nApplication deadline: 2026 March 1.
ORGANIZER;CN=Mark Alfano: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260731T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260731T234500 SUMMARY:Husserl and Schutz on Intersubjectivity. Phainomenon UID:20260311T213636Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:CALL-FOR-PAPERS
\nHusserl considered the establishment of a transcendental community of subjects necessary for the possibility of obtaining transcendental knowledge of oneself and the world. Notwithstanding\, Husserl's philosophy has been regarded as solipsistic for a significant period. However\, analysis of Husserl's theory of perception\, even prior to the publication of the \;Cartesian Investigations\, \;suggests otherwise. According to this view\, experience of the world is understood as public rather than private. Perceived objects are not exclusive to a single perceiving subject\, although they are given in subjective experience. For this reason\, at least from the 1920s onwards\, Husserl refers to the egological foundation of his philosophy as leading toward an intersubjective transcendental phenomenology\, or even (as one can read in Hua IX: 539)\, towards a sociological phenomenology.
\nThe issue of "transcendental intersubjectivity"\, beginning from a transcendental ego\, and its role in the constitution of an intersubjectively valid world\, is discussed in Husserl's 5th Cartesian Meditation as well as in numerous unpublished manuscripts. This topic was further explored by later phenomenologists\, including Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe. Others\, overlooking Husserl's focus on the constitutive role of intersubjectivity rather than its empirical forms\, charged him with neglecting the ethical aspects of the I-Thou relationship\; this critique was most notably advanced by Emanuel Lé\;vinas. However\, it was in the 1950s that Alfred Schutz offered one of the most critical perspectives on the project of establishing an intersubjective transcendental community of egos. Schutz argued\, namely: \;1) Husserl's transcendental Ego cannot be put in the plural. \;2) Husserl did not provide conclusive proof that the existence of other Egos is a problem of the transcendental sphere. \;3) Intersubjectivity is just an empirical-mundane problem. \;4) \;Transcendental subjectivity must be replaced by mundane intersubjectivity.
\nAdditionally\, Schutz made several observations about Husserl's method in the 5th Cartesian Meditation. He argued that Husserl's concept of reduction to the "sphere of the proper" assumes a distinction between the proper and the alien\, which could only have been established prior to the reduction. Schutz also noted that the experience of pairing\, which presents the alien body as similar to one's own\, lacks precision\, as it does not consider differences such as those between male and female\, or between humans and animals.
\nNº\; 40 of \;Phainomenon \;aims to retrieve this issue\, offering not only an analysis of the Husserl-Schutz debate\, but also exploring new perspectives\, namely (but not restricted to):
\n1) the ways the experience of an alien self can be addressed from a phenomenological point-of-view\;
\n2) intersubjectivity and lifeworld\;
\n3) the role of the lived body in the experience of "pairing"\;
\n4) "higher-level" intersubjective communities: family\, corporations\, trade-unions\, state institutions\;
\n5) "mundane phenomenology" and sociology\;
\n6) Schutz: continuation and criticisms (Lester Embree\, Thomas Luckman\, Jü\;rgen Habermas\, and others).
\nThe deadline for submitting proposals is July 31\, 2026.
\nThe author guidelines can be consulted and articles submitted at the following link: \;https://phainomenon-journal.pt/index.php/phainomenon/about/submissions
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20260925T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20260927T170000 SUMMARY:MadMeta XXIII UID:20260311T213637Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:America/Chicago LOCATION:702 Langdon Street\, Madison\, United States\, 53706 ORGANIZER;CN=Russ Shafer-Landau: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260928T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260930T170000 SUMMARY:Second Conference of the European Moral Responsibility Consortium (EMRC) UID:20260311T213638Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Vienna LOCATION:Salzburg\, Austria DESCRIPTION:The EMRC (European Moral Responsibility Consortium) is a platform devoted to facilitating coordination and cooperation among philosophers based in Europe who are working in the area of moral responsibility and on related topics (free will\, blame\, collective responsibility\, punishment\, moral responsibility and AI\, etc.). From September 28-30\, 2026\, the second conference of the EMRC will be held in Salzburg\, Austria. Besides the keynote talks\, there will be contributed talks to be allotted via a call for abstracts.
ORGANIZER;CN=Leonhard Menges;CN=Leonie Eichhorn: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261022T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20261023T170000 SUMMARY:Amsterdam Kant Conference 2026: Moral Epistemology & Metaphysics UID:20260311T213639Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Amsterdam LOCATION:Amsterdam\, Netherlands DESCRIPTION:CFA. Amsterdam Kant Conference 2026: Moral Epistemology &\; Metaphysics \; \; 22nd and 23rd October 2026\, University of Amsterdam \; Confirmed speakers: Andrew Chignell (Princeton University) Patrick Kain (Purdue University) Jessica Tizzard (Universitä\;t Tü\;bingen) Alix Cohen (University of Notre Dame) - conditionally \; In light of the ongoing research project &lsquo\;Moral Truth: Exploring the Concept of Practical Cognition in Kant&rsquo\;s Ethics&rsquo\;\, the University of Amsterdam will host a conference on Kant&rsquo\;s moral epistemology &\; metaphysics. We invite submissions for presentations related to this theme. \; \;
\nPossible topics include\, but are not limited to:
\n\;Presentations are 25 minutes\, with 20 minutes of Q&\;A. Abstracts of up to 500 words (excluding references) can be submitted to t.m.smits@uva.nl. Please include your name &\; affiliation in the body of the e-mail\, with no personal details in the enclosed abstract (PDF). The deadline for submissions is March 1st\, and the result will be communicated by March 31st. \;
\nThe conference is made possible by the Dutch Research Council\, the University of Amsterdam&rsquo\;s Philosophy Department\, the Philosophy and Public Affairs group\, and the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis. It is organized by Thomas Nys and Tijn Smits. Questions can be sent to \;t.m.smits@uva.nl.
ORGANIZER;CN=Tijn Smits;CN=Thomas Nys: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260305T084418Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261030T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome:20261031T170000 SUMMARY:Obligation and Normativity in Modern Moral Philosophy UID:20260311T213640Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-gkq4t TZID:Europe/Rome LOCATION:Milano\, Italy DESCRIPTION:What is distinctive about \;modern \;moral philosophy\, i.e.\, that written in the 17th \;and 18th \;centuries\, is often considered to be its conception of obligation. G.E.M. Anscombe\, for instance\, famously argued that modern moral philosophers\, and her contemporaries under their influence\, were wrong to try and ground the normativity of morality without reference to a divine lawgiver. Whether they are critical or merely interpretive in nature\, the views of many other influential philosophers such as H.A. Prichard\, Bernard Williams\, and Stephen Darwall have all agreed in this respect. Indeed\, Christine Korsgaard describes what she calls &lsquo\;the normative question\,&rsquo\; that is\, what \;justifies \;the demands that morality makes on us\, as one that was especially pressing for modern moral philosophers from roughly Grotius to Kant. How did modern moral philosophers explain the normativity of morality? How do modern figures use the concept of obligation to account for the normativity of morality? This conference and the planned edited volume will address these and related questions. Collectively\, the participants will engage with the works of a variety of major and minor figures from the modern period to enrich our historical and systematic understanding of the nature of morality&rsquo\;s normativity.
ORGANIZER;CN=Michael Walschots;CN=Stefano Bacin: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR