Call for Papers \;
\nBook Symposium on Fundamental Things \;
\nPhilosophical Inquiries\, Issue 1/2027 \;
\nGuest Editors: Giorgio Lando\, Giorgio Mazzullo \;
\nWe invite submissions for a book symposium on the themes of &ldquo\;Fundamental Things&rdquo\; (Oxford University Press\, 2023) to be published in the first 2027 issue of Philosophical Inquiries. \;
\nLouis deRosset&rsquo\;s Fundamental Things. Theory and Applications of Grounding (OUP 2023) develops a theory of grounding that articulates the prominent philosophical view that reality is structured in layers\, with higher-level phenomena depending on and being determined by more fundamental ones. \;
\nWe welcome papers that engage critically and constructively with the arguments and themes of the book. \; \;
\nhttps://academic.oup.com/book/45749 \;
\nTopics may include\, but are not limited to: \;
\nGrounding and Fundamentality \;
\nThe Relata of Grounding \;
\nWhat Grounds the Grounding Facts \;
\nGrounding and Reduction \;
\nGrounding and Causality \;
\nGrounding and Multiple Realizability \;
\nMetaphysical Laws \;
\nTruth and Grounding \;
\nThe Connection Problem \;
\nContributions should aim to engage directly with the content and arguments of Fundamental Things\, ideally fostering a dialogue with its author and its broader philosophical implications.The symposium-formally known as a Focus-will consist of: \;
\na short\, two-page pré\;cis of deRosset&rsquo\;s book written by the author\; \;
\na number of contributors&rsquo\; papers engaging with its themes\; \;
\na collective response by deRosset addressing the contributors&rsquo\; papers. \;
\nSubmission Guidelines \;
\nWe are looking for contributions of approximately 8\,000 words (including references). Submissions will undergo peer review in line with the journal&rsquo\;s editorial policies. \; \;
\nPlease submit your contribution here:https://www.philinq.it/index.php/philinq/about/submissions \;
\nWhen submitting your paper\, please make sure to select the section &ldquo\;Focus&rdquo\; from the submission menu. This ensures that your contribution will be considered as part of the symposium on Fundamental Things. \;
\nSubmission Deadline: April 15\, 2026 \;
\nAbout the Journal \;
\nPhilosophical Inquiries is a peer-reviewed philosophy journal published in English. It is indexed in Scopus\, The Philosopher&rsquo\;s Index\, and other major databases\, and is currently ranked Q2 in the SCImago Journal Rank. More information is available at:https://www.philinq.it/index.php/philinq/index. \;
\nFor further information\, giorgio.lando@univaq.it or giorgiomazzullo@gmail.com. \;
\nWe look forward to receiving your contributions! \;
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260406T055025Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260415T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260415T234500 SUMMARY:Deep Desagreements/ Descuerdos profundos - Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia UID:20260406T055039Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-r5qzs TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Revista Colombiana de Filosofí\;a de la Ciencia - Dossier sobre Desacuerdos Profundos
\nEditor invitado: \;Omar Vá\;squez Davila (U. Nacional General Sarmiento)
\nMuchos debates sociales\, cientí\;ficos y filosó\;ficos son abordados actualmente recurriendo a la noció\;n de desacuerdos profundos\, la cual fue propuesta por Fogelin (1985). Inspirado en algunas ideas del ú\;ltimo Wittgenstein\, Fogelin propone que hay contextos de discusió\;n anormales en los cuales no está\;n dadas las condiciones para la argumentació\;n\, contextos en los que las partes de un debate no tienen un trasfondo comú\;n de creencias y preferencias compartidas. Debido a esta carencia\, Fogelin considera que estos debates no pueden ser resueltos argumentativamente - a pesar de que las partes se expresen empleando un lenguaje argumentativo - y ofrece\, a modo de ejemplo\, debates sobre la despenalizació\;n del aborto y la discriminació\;n positiva.
\nLo interesante de los desacuerdos profundos es que su supuesta irresolubilidad no se debe\, segú\;n Fogelin\, a que las partes sean obstinadas o necias. Por el contrario\, las mismas pueden tener la mejor predisposició\;n a cambiar de opinió\;n\, estar libres de prejuicios\, ser coherentes\, etc.\, pero aun así\; desacordar. Para Fogelin\, el desacuerdo se mantiene porque está\;n involucradas proposiciones fundamentales\, o lo que Putnam llamara &ldquo\;proposiciones estructurales&rdquo\; (framework propositions). En la ú\;ltima dé\;cada las ideas de Fogelin han sido intensamente discutidas en revistas especializadas de epistemologí\;a\, ló\;gica y filosofí\;a en general. A su vez\, la noció\;n de desacuerdos profundos está\; siendo usada para modelar debates é\;ticos\, polí\;ticos y cientí\;ficos. Sin embargo\, existen muchos problemas alrededor de la noció\;n de desacuerdo profundo que no han alcanzado ni siquiera un moderado consenso.
\nEl presente dossier especial de la Revista Colombiana de Filosofí\;a de la Ciencia coincide con el 30 aniversario de la publicació\;n de Fogelin de &ldquo\;La ló\;gica de los desacuerdos profundos&rdquo\; en la revista Informal Logic\, y tiene como objetivo recibir propuestas que aborden los temas que hemos descripto. En particular\, será\;n de especial interé\;s las propuestas que aborden el problema de la naturaleza de los desacuerdos profundos\, las que discutan los ejemplos que han sido propuestos en la literatura\, y aquellas que traten la cuestió\;n de si son o no resolubles racionalmente. Este interé\;s no excluye otras maneras de aproximarse a los desacuerdos profundos.
\nInformació\;n para el sometimiento:
https://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/about/submissions
Languas aceptadas: \;Spanish\, English\, and Portuguese
Fecha Lí\;mite: \;Abril 15\, 2026
Identificar el sometimiento como "Dossier Desacuerdos Profundos" \;
\n-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\nColombian Journal of Philosophy of Science &ndash\; Special Issue on Deep Disagreements
\nGuest Editor: \;Omar Vá\;squez Davila (U. Nacional General Sarmiento)
\nMany contemporary social\, scientific\, and philosophical debates are currently being examined through the lens of the notion of deep disagreements\, a concept first introduced by Fogelin (1985). Drawing inspiration from some of the later ideas of Wittgenstein\, Fogelin suggests that there are abnormal contexts of discussion in which the conditions for argumentation are not met&mdash\;contexts in which the parties to a debate lack a shared background of beliefs and preferences. Due to this absence\, Fogelin argues that such debates cannot be resolved through argumentation&mdash\;even though the parties may express themselves in argumentative language. As examples\, he cites debates on the decriminalization of abortion and affirmative action.
\nWhat is particularly interesting about deep disagreements is that\, according to Fogelin\, their supposed irresolvability is not due to the participants being stubborn or unreasonable. On the contrary\, both parties may be open to changing their minds\, free of prejudice\, logically coherent\, and yet still disagree. For Fogelin\, the persistence of disagreement is due to the involvement of fundamental propositions&mdash\;what Putnam would later call framework propositions. Over the past decade\, Fogelin&rsquo\;s ideas have been the subject of intense debate in specialized journals in epistemology\, logic\, and philosophy more broadly. At the same time\, the notion of deep disagreement is increasingly being used to model ethical\, political\, and scientific controversies. Nonetheless\, there remain many unresolved problems surrounding the very notion of deep disagreement\, and no moderate consensus has yet been reached.
\nThis special issue of the Colombian Journal of Philosophy of Science coincides with the 30th anniversary of the publication of Fogelin&rsquo\;s &ldquo\;The Logic of Deep Disagreements&rdquo\; in the journal Informal Logic\, and aims to receive submissions addressing the topics outlined above. Of particular interest will be contributions that examine the nature of deep disagreements\, discuss the cases proposed in the literature\, or explore whether and to what extent these disagreements can be resolved rationally. This interest\, however\, does not exclude other approaches to the study of deep disagreements.
\nSubmission information:
https://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/about/submissions
Languages accepted: Spanish\, English\, and Portuguese
Deadline: \;April 15\, 2025
Identify the submission as "Dossier Deep Disagreements"
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260406T055025Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260417T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260417T170000 SUMMARY:Theory and Practice after the Practice Turn – Where Social Theory and Empirical Philosophy meet UID:20260406T055040Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-r5qzs TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Sociology and philosophy have always shared a close relationship. \;Critical Theory famously tied the two \;disciplines together to unravel societal phenomena\, and feminist \;philosophers regularly borrow
sociological concepts to understand domination and power asymmetries. Similarly\, sociologists often \;draw on philosophical concepts to sharpen their analyses. In recent \;years\, this dialogue has gained new momentum through the so-called \;"practice turn" in epistemology and philosophy of science. \;Contemporary philosophy of science and applied epistemology increasingly \;incorporate empirical \;methods originally developed within the social sciences such as \;interviews and ethnographic studies. But while empirical approaches from \;sociology are frequently adopted\, social-theoretical concepts remain \; \;rarely integrated within epistemology and philosophy of science.
It is the goal of this workshop to explore the potential of social \;theory for empirical approaches in philosophy of science and \;epistemology. What are instances of fruitful applications of social \;theory to philosophy of science and epistemological scholarship? How \;does social theory transform when it is resituated in a different \;disciplinary setting? What are caveats and best practices when using social theory as a philosopher of science/epistemologist?
The Taiwan Metaphysics Colloquium 2026 (TMC 2026)
\nNaturalistic Philosophy and Grounding
\nDates: 30 Apr &ndash\; 3 May 2026
\nLocation: National Taiwan University\, Taipei\, Taiwan
\nEvent page: https://philevents.org/event/show/145134
\nCall for abstracts: https://philevents.org/event/show/145138
\nContact:
\nNational Taiwan University&rsquo\;s Center for Traditional and Scientific Metaphysics (TSM Center): tsmntu@gmail.com
\nKeynote speakers:
\nJessica Wilson (University of Toronto) [Wendy Huang Lecture]\;
Alyssa Ney (LMU Munich) [Tony Cheng Lecture]\;
Otá\;vio Bueno (University of Miami)
Featured Speakers:
\nJohn Bigelow (Monash University)\;
David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney)\;
Ruey-Lin Chen (National Chung Cheng University)
Invited Speakers:
\nDavid Builes \;(Princeton University)\;
Benj Hellie (University of Toronto)\;
Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (De La Salle University)\;
Kevin Morris (Tulane University)\;
Kelly Trogdon (Virginia Tech)
About the conference series and the 2026 conference
\nSupported by the generous donation of the Frontward Foundation\, the Taiwan Metaphysics Colloquium series (TMCs) is one of the most renowned international philosophy conference series in Taiwan. Held biennially\, it aims to provide a platform for dialogue among researchers working on a wide range of contemporary metaphysical issues. In previous years\, the conferences under the series have invited many renowned local and international scholars\, including David Charles\, Max J. Cresswell\, Dorothy Edgington\, Pascal Engel\, Hartry Field\, Robert Goldblatt\, Alan Hayek\, Jennifer Hornsby\, Christian List\, Hiroakira Ono\, David Papineau\, and Daniel Stoljar. Following the conference series\, multiple international anthologies have been published\, including a Logic in Asia (LIAA) book series (Springer) and a special issue of Synthese.
\nThis year&rsquo\;s conference is themed &ldquo\;Naturalistic Philosophy and Grounding&rdquo\; and welcomes contributions related to naturalistic philosophy\, grounding\, or both. The idea of doing philosophy naturalistically in a natural world has dominated a significant portion of twentieth-century philosophy. Nonetheless\, this idea has recently often been treated as an implicit background framework\, while (arguably) non-naturalistic approaches and perspectives &ndash\; such as anti-realism\, panpsychism\, idealism\, phenomenology\, and others &ndash\; have experienced a renaissance. This conference aims to provide an opportunity to reinvestigate philosophical naturalism and naturalistic philosophy\, especially (though not exclusively) issues related to physicalism\, scientism\, naturalizing philosophical approaches\, natural entities\, the grounding structures of our world\, and even new conceptual expansions of the naturalistic worldview\, such as artificial intelligence.
\nWe welcome submissions in standard metaphysics\, philosophy of mind\, philosophy of language\, philosophy of religion\, metaethics\, metaphilosophy\, and related areas\, provided that the topic has a metaphysical dimension\, broadly construed. \;We are also open to contributions from emerging and cutting-edge areas\, such as the philosophy of artificial intelligence.
\nNo particular methodology is required: we welcome submissions from analytic\, continental\, and non-Western traditions\, provided that the topic is relevant to the conference themes and the paper&rsquo\;s argumentative style can engage substantively with the conference&rsquo\;s discussions.
\nHosts:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Taiwan Association for Logic\, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology (LMPST Taiwan): \;https://www.lmpsttw.org/en/home
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; National Taiwan University&rsquo\;s Center for Traditional and Scientific Metaphysics (TSM Center): \;https://tsmntu.org/
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; National Taiwan University&rsquo\;s Center for Asian Philosophy and Analytic Philosophy
\nSupported by:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; Frontward Foundation
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; \; College of Liberal Arts\, National Taiwan University
ORGANIZER;CN=Lok-Chi Chan;CN=Nihel Jhou;CN=Duen-Min Deng;CN=Christian Wenzel: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260406T055027Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260507T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260508T170000 SUMMARY:Philosophy: What and How? UID:20260406T055042Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-r5qzs TZID:Europe/Vienna LOCATION:Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1\, Vienna\, Austria DESCRIPTION:Views on what philosophy is and how it should be done vary widely. Is philosophy concerned with reality or our concepts used for grasping aspects of reality? Does philosophy use a priori or empirical methods? What is the role of intuitions? Of hypothetical cases? What are philosophers trying to find out? Is philosophy a descriptive or a normative discipline\, or both? This workshop brings together a diverse group of philosophers who have tried to answer some of these questions. We are looking forward to illuminating talks and fruitful discussions.
This workshop is supported by the PACE \; (https://pace.phl.univie.ac.at/) \;and KiC (https://www.knowledgeincrisis.com/) projects.
The Group of Studies in Neurophilosophy (GENF)\, affiliated with the Federal University of Fronteira Sul (UFFS)\, has the honor of inviting researchers\, faculty\, and undergraduate and graduate students to its 1st UFFS International Congress on Neurophilosophy: Neurophilosophy\, after 40 years\, to be held in a hybrid format on May 11\, 12\, 13\, and 14\, 2026. This year\, we celebrate four decades since the 1986 publication of Patricia Churchland's book Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain\, widely recognized as the foundational point of Neurophilosophy. Since then\, Neurophilosophy has established itself as a field of study that seeks a unified science of the mind-brain\, involving disciplines such as neuroscience\, philosophy\, computing\, psychology\, and psychiatry. Thus\, the 1st UFFS International Congress on Neurophilosophy: Neurophilosophy\, after 40 years\, aims to reflect on the advances\, challenges\, and future of trans- and interdisciplinarity in the study of the mind-brain over these 40 years\, with special focus on Neurophilosophy in Brazil.
\nKEYNOTE SPEAKERS:
\nCesar Schirmer dos Santos (UFSM)
\nFederico Burdman (UAH)
\nJonas Gonç\;alves Coelho (UNESP)
\nOsvaldo Pessoa Jr. (USP)
\nPatrí\;cia Fanaya (UNB)
\nPreston Stovall (UHK)
\nSerdal Tü\;mkaya (IHU)
\nSergio Barberis (UBA)
\nSofia Inê\;s Stein (USP)
\nSteven Gouveia (UPORTO)
\nZuleide Igná\;cio (UFFS)
\n\n\nCALL FOR ABSTRACTS: \;
\n&bull\; Submission Period: January 23 to February 28\, 2026.
\n&bull\; Notification Acceptance: By March 30.
\n&bull\; Event Dates: May 11-14.
\n&bull\; Access: Online\, via Google Meet. Links will be provided by email.
\nThematic Axes:
\nFoundations of Neurophilosophy: Discussions on the legacy of Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland and of Eliminative Materialism\; History of the emergence of Neurophilosophy\; Co-Evolution\; New developments in the Churchlands' Neurophilosophy\; New neurophilosophical interpretations of Neural Networks.
\nNeurophilosophy in Brazil: Political and theoretical reflections on how Neurophilosophy can be practiced authentically and freely in Brazil\; Brazilian reception of the Churchlands' Neurophilosophy\; Neurophilosophical trends in Brazil.
\nNeurophilosophy of Psychiatry: New explanatory models for brain-mind disorders (Schizophrenia\, Mood Disorders\, Personality Disorders\, Sleep Disorders\, Chronic Pain\, Dementias\, Aphasias\, ASD\, ADHD\, Addictions\, etc.)\; Elucidations on the co-evolutionary influence between Psychiatry and Neurophilosophy\; Etiology and Pathogenesis in Psychiatry\; Diagnostic challenges.
\nConsciousness\, Cognition\, and Evolution: New approaches concerning the explanatory gap\; Evolutionary arguments related to Neurophilosophy\; Evolutionary plausibility and Neurophilosophy.
\nFree Will and Neurosciences: New explanatory models of free will\; Denial of free will\; (In)Compatibilism\; (In)Determinism\; Agency.
\nNeuroethics and Neural Law: Moral challenges posed by new neurotechnologies and brain interventions\; Co-evolution between Neurophilosophy and Law\; Neuronal anti-racism\; Neuronal injustice\; Neurophilosophical discussions on gender.
\nReductionist and Non-Reductionist Neurophilosophy: Discussions on the limits of intertheoretic reduction\; Interpretative failures of non-reductionism\; Defense of the Churchlands' Eliminative Materialism.
\n\; Instructions for Abstract Submission [Oral Presentations]: \; Abstracts must be submitted in PDF format to the email alisson.b.moreira.nacional@gmail.com\, with the Subject line: Congress / Abstract Submission\, accompanied by a separate identification file\, following the guidelines below: \;
\n\; Note: By submitting an abstract\, the author grants permission for its subsequent publication in the event's official Book of Abstracts. \;
\n\n\nCoordination:
\nAlisson Brandemarte Moreira (UFFS\, GENF)
\nJoã\;o Pedro Á\;vila Teixeira (UFMG\, GENF)
\nOrganization &\; Scientific Committee:
\nEdiovani Antô\;nio Gaboardi (UFFS\, GENF)
\nFlá\;vio Miguel Zimmermann (UFFS\, GENF)
\nJoã\;o Carlos Lopes do Prado (UFFS\, GENF)
\nNewton Soares Santarossa (UFSC\, GENF)
\nMaria Luiza Iennaco (USP\, GENF)
\nMarcio Martins (UFMT\, GENF)
\nYasmin Maeda de Souza (PUC/RS\, GENF)
\nMore information:
ORGANIZER;CN=Maria Luiza Iennaco;CN=Alisson Brandemarte Moreira: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260406T055027Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260512T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260513T170000 SUMMARY:Hyperintensionality and (Meta)-Metaphysics UID:20260406T055044Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-r5qzs TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Thunbergsvägen 3H\, Uppsala\, Sweden\, 751 20 DESCRIPTION:Workshop: Hyperintensionality and (Meta)-Metaphysics
\nDate: 12-13 May
Location: Uppsala University
Organizers: Å\;ke Gafvelin (Uppsala University)\, Andrea Crepoli (Uppsala University)\, Matti Eklund (Uppsala University).
Description:
\nRecent debates in metaphysics have concerned notions such as grounding\, essence and structure. These notions appear to be hyperintensional\, in that they make distinctions finer than those captured by standard possible worlds semantics. \;
\nThis workshop brings together philosophers working at the intersection of hyperintensional semantics\, metaphysics and meta-metaphysics. The worskhop will explore the implications of hyperintensionality for metaphysical theorizing and critically examine the metaphysical underpinnings of hyperintensional distinctions.
\nSpeakers:
\n
Franz Berto (University of St. Andrews): "When Sentences Say The Same"
Dustin Gooß\;ens (Ruhr-Universitä\;t Bochum): "Non-Representational Hyperintensional Metaphysics"
Christopher J. G. Meacham (University of Massachusetts\, Amherst): "Complete Grounding"
Michael J. Raven (University of Victoria): "Essence and Modalities"
Alessandro Torza (University of Parma): "Does Williamson's Suppositional Heuristic have a Problem with Counterpossibles?"
Evie Willems (Indepedent researcher): "The intensional landscape: Salvaging Eli Hirsch&rsquo\;s intensional deflationism from metaphysical commitments"
Practical information
\nThe workshop will take place at the Department of Philosophy\, Uppsala University. Attendance is free\, but registration is required. \;
ORGANIZER;CN="Åke Gafvelin";CN=Matti Eklund;CN=Andrea Crepoli: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260406T055027Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260601T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260601T234500 SUMMARY:Reimagining Social Epistemology: Methodological Reassessments and Future Prospects (Special Issue of Crítica in memory of Alvin I. Goldman) UID:20260406T055045Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-r5qzs TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Since the publication of Alvin Goldman&rsquo\;s (1999) Knowledge in a Social World\, social epistemology has undergone remarkable growth and innovation\, establishing itself as a dynamic and influential field of philosophical inquiry. This expansion has been driven by a wave of theoretical innovation\, deepening our understanding of knowledge as it is situated within social contexts.
\nOver the past two decades\, numerous research programs have taken social epistemology in diverse and thought-provoking directions. These include\, but are not limited to: Judgement Aggregation (e.g. List &\; Pettit\, 2002)\, Group Virtue Epistemology (e.g. Kallestrup\, 2020)\, Situated Feminist Epistemology (e.g. Grasswick &\; Webb\, 2002)\, 4E Cognition (e.g. Catala\, et al.\, 2021)\, the Epistemology of Attention (Pinedo &\; Villanueva\, 2022)\, Socially Extended Epistemology (e.g. Carter et al. 2018)\, Environmental Epistemology (Amico-Korby et al.\, 2024)\, Epistemic Logic (e.g. Baltag\, 2018)\, Affective Epistemology (Berninger\, 2019)\, the Sociology of Knowledge (e.g. Fuller\, 2002)\, Epistemic Injustice (e.g. Origgi\, 2022)\, Cognitive Niche Construction (e.g. Arfini et al.\, 2019)\, and Ideology Critique (e.g. Haslanger\, 2021).
\nThese approaches have introduced fresh perspectives on key questions in social epistemology\, incorporating factors such as inter-agent interaction\, the role of material environments\, and the influence of pragmatic factors in epistemological accounts.
\nGiven this backdrop of diversity and innovation\, the time is ripe for a comprehensive reassessment of the methodologies underpinning research in social epistemology. Such a reflection will not only help consolidate the field but also open up new pathways.
\nIn memory of Alvin Goldman and in recognition of his seminal contributions to the field\, we invite submissions that engage with the following questions:
\nBy critically engaging these and related questions\, we aim to sharpen the theoretical and methodological tools of social epistemology\, ensuring its continued relevance and impact&mdash\;both philosophically and socially. \;
\nSubmission Guidelines
\nPapers should not exceed 10\,000 words\, excluding references\, and must be submitted in PDF or Word format to the following email mael@filosoficas.unam.mx. \;Submissions should conform to Crí\;tica's Style Guide. Contributions may be written in English or Spanish. Authors who would like feedback on the suitability of a potential proposal are welcome to contact us in advance. The deadline for submissions is \;June 1st\, 2026.
\nAuthors must submit two electronic versions of their manuscripts. One should include the author's name\, the title of the contribution\, email address\, and postal address (including phone number). A second version must be prepared for anonymous peer review\, with all references to the author omitted\, including acknowledgments and bibliographic details. The file containing the article must include the title\, an abstract (maximum 100 words)\, and a list of five keywords not mentioned in the title. If possible\, the title\, abstract\, and keywords must be provided in both Spanish and English.
\nCrí\;tica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofí\;a \;is a quarterly journal published by the Institute for Philosophical Research at UNAM in Mexico. For more information\, please visit http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx.
\n\;
\nReferences
\nAmico-Korby\, D.\, Harrell\, M.\, &\; Danks\, D. (2024). Environmental epistemology. Synthese\, 203(3)\, 81.
\nArfini\, S.\, Bertolotti\, T.\, &\; Magnani\, L. (2019). Online communities as virtual cognitive niches. Synthese\, 196(1)\, 377-397.
\nBaltag\, A.\, Boddy\, R.\, &\; Smets\, S. (2018). Group knowledge in interrogative epistemology. In H. van Ditmarsch &\; G. Sandu (Eds.)\, Jaakko Hintikka on knowledge and game-theoretical semantics (pp. 131&ndash\;164). Springer.
\nCatala\, A.\, Faucher\, L.\, &\; Poirier\, P. (2021). Autism\, epistemic injustice\, and epistemic disablement: A relational account of epistemic agency. Synthese\, 199(3)\, 9013-9039.
\nCarter\, J. A.\, Clark\, A.\, Kallestrup\, J.\, Palermos\, S. O.\, &\; Pritchard\, D. (Eds.). (2018). Socially extended epistemology. Oxford University Press.
\nFuller\, S. (2002). Social epistemology. Indiana University Press.
\nGoldman\, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Oxford University Press.
\nGrasswick\, H. E.\, &\; Webb\, M. O. (2002). Feminist epistemology as social epistemology. Social epistemology\, 16(3)\, 185-196.
\nHaslanger\, S. (2021). Political epistemology and social critique. Oxford studies in political philosophy\, 7\, 23-65.
\nKallestrup\, J. (2020). Group virtue epistemology. Synthese\, 197\, 5233-5251.
\nList\, C.\, &\; Pettit\, P. (2002). Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result. Economics &\; Philosophy\, 18(1)\, 89-110.
\nOriggi\, G. (2012). Epistemic injustice and epistemic trust. Social Epistemology\, 26(2)\, 221-235.
\nPinedo\, M. &\; Villanueva\, N. (2022). Epistemic de-platforming. In D. B. Plou\, V. F. Castro &\; J. R. Torices\, eds.\, The Political Turn in Analytic Philosophy: Reflections on Social Injustice and Oppression. De Gruyter\, pp. 105&ndash\;134.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260406T055027Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260630T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260630T090000 SUMMARY:1st UFFS International Congress on Neurophilosophy: Neurophilosophy\, after 40 years UID:20260406T055046Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-r5qzs TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:Call for Papers - Book on Neurophilosophy
\nGENF invites submissions in English\, German\, and Portuguese for composing the official Congress&rsquo\;s book\, which is going to be published by a Brazilian academic press. Evaluation will be conducted by the Scientific Committee using a double-blind review system.
\n\;1. Evaluation Criteria
\nOriginality: Innovative approach to the subject.
\nCo-evolution: Trans- and interdisciplinary integration between neuroscience and philosophy.
\nConceptual Clarity: Technical and terminological precision.
\nLogical Criteria: Coherence and robustness of the argumentation.
\nNote: The use of Generative AI tools (such as ChatGPT\, Gemini\, DeepSeek\, etc.) is expressly prohibited. If usage is detected\, the paper will be automatically rejected.
\n4. Diversity and Inclusion
\nWe encourage the protagonism of neurodiverse\, geographic\, ethnic\, racial\, and gender minorities. The GENF values the plurality of neurophilosophical perspectives.
\n5. Important Dates [Book]
\n&bull\; Submission Period: January 23 to June 30\, 2026.
\n&bull\; Final Results: July 15\, 2026.
\n&bull\; Revision Period for Publication: Until July 31\, 2026.
\n&bull\; Results Announcement: E-Mail
\n6. Instructions for Book Chapter Submission
\nPapers must be submitted in PDF format to the email alisson.b.moreira.nacional@gmail.com with the Subject line: Neurophilosophy - Book Chapter Submission\, together with a separate identification file\, following the guidelines below:
\n&bull\; \; Identification File (Digitally Signed) Must contain:[1] Full name(s)\, highest degree\, institutional affiliation\, and funding agency support listed below the title\; [2] A declaration that the paper is original and has not been published in any other medium\, as well as that no generative AI (ChatGPT\, Gemini\, DeepSeek\, etc.) was used in the writing of the article\; [3] grant of rights for publication in the official Event E-Book. Follow the template available at:https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OAcd8E490uhh9T2BHuR9knHfwUhMwN99kkCtxIDroZU/edit?usp=sharing.
\nLanguages: Papers may be submitted in Portuguese\, English\, and German.
\nTitle: Centered and in bold\, font size 16.
\nAbstract: Between 200-300 words. Must clearly contain: objective\, theoretical framework\, and conclusions (or expected results). This must be followed by an Abstract (a translation of the summary and keywords into English). In the case of a paper written in English\, place the abstract first\, followed by the resume in Portuguese or German.
\nKeywords: Three terms\, separated by semicolons (\;)\, ending with a dot (.)
\nPage Limit: 15-20 pages\, excluding the Bibliographic References.
\nFormat: Times New Roman font\, size 12\, 1.5 line spacing. All papers must be prepared for double-blind review. That is\, they must not contain any form of personal identification. Must conform to current APA standards.
\nTopic:
This year'sannual WFAP graduate conference is devoted to debates around philosophical methodology. It is centered around the question of whether philosophy is best done from the philosophical armchair or whether it can and should be done using empirical methods. The conference is focused on the extent to which the emergence of naturalistic approaches and of experimental philosophy (&ldquo\;X-Phi&rdquo\;) pose a problem to &lsquo\;traditional&rsquo\; armchair methods (e.g. consulting intuitions\, conceptual analysis\, reflective equilibrium\, conceptual engineering). We are interested both in work that focuses on individual methods or on the relations between them (e.g. their compatibility).
We aim to bring together early career and advanced researchers in order to discuss questions such as: \;
\nWe welcome submissions that apply these methodological issues to other philosophical debates as case studies.
\nIf you wish to align your talk with the WFAP's reading circle in preparation for the conference\, feel free to check out our readings here:
https://wfap.philo.at/reading-schedule-25-26/
You can take a look at our past graduate conferences here:
https://wfap.philo.at/conferences
*Please note that this event has officially been postponed. More information will be made available asap in the near future*
\nMany human cognitive capacities and processes may be deployed creatively\, from unique choices made for oneself up through novel cultural shifts. Similarly\, large swaths of our daily lives are taken up with performing spontaneous\, on-the-fly\, and unplanned activities that are\, in a word\, improvised. \; Charting out the nature of both creativity and improvisation\, taken individually or together\, remains an open and pressing issue. In this conference\, we will delve into various philosophical\, theoretical\, empirical\, and interdisciplinary issues that are related to creativity and improvisation. A non-exhaustive list of related questions and themes for this topic include:
\n- What is the relationship between improvisation and creativity?
\n- What is the relationship between creative activity and well-being?
\n- What is the best way to model individual and collective creativity?
\n- Is creativity in the arts the same thing as in other domains\, such as in science or business?
\n- What are the pros and cons of different scientific operationalizations of creativity and improvisation?
\n- Provide a conceptual analysis of creativity and/or improvisation.
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