Women have long contributed to the development of theology and philosophy\, yet their voices have often been marginalized\, mediated through restrictive frameworks\, or silenced altogether. At the same time\, women have consistently found innovative means of expression &mdash\; from letters\, diaries\, and poetry to public lectures\, activism\, and today&rsquo\;s digital platforms &mdash\; to engage in theological and philosophical discourse.
This seminar approaches communication not only as a neutral means of expression\, but also as a form of power: the choice of medium\, style\, and platform can grant authority\, negotiate legitimacy\, or challenge dominant structures. From early modern women writing in private correspondence to contemporary digital influencers shaping theological debates\, the act of communication becomes a way to establish intellectual presence\, resist exclusion\, rethink society\, or reshape normative traditions.
The rise of digital culture has introduced new dynamics. Social media\, for example\, can amplify women&rsquo\;s perspectives and create alternative networks of recognition\, while also enabling ideologically charged phenomena &mdash\; such as the &ldquo\;tradwife&rdquo\; movement &mdash\; that recast debates about gender\, religion\, and philosophy. Situating such case studies within longer histories of women&rsquo\;s communicative practices allows us to explore continuities\, ruptures\, and tensions between tradition\, innovation\, and the struggle for authority.
The seminar thus invites critical reflections on the interplay of gender\, communication\, and power\, considering both historical trajectories and contemporary challenges. Contributions may address individual thinkers\, broader cultural movements\, or theoretical frameworks that illuminate how female voices have engaged with and transformed theological and philosophical discourse.
28.04.2026\, 4.30-6pm (Paris time): 2 lectures
\nFloris Verhaart &ndash\; Johanna Dorothea Lindenaer: Memoirist\, Translator\, and Religious Polemicist
\nMargaret Matthews &ndash\; Rhetoric\, Method\, and Genre in Gabrielle Suchon&rsquo\;s Treatise on Ethics and Politics
\n\n05.05.2026\, 4.30-6pm (Paris time): 2 lectures
\nElodie Pinel &ndash\; Vernacular Theology and Authority: Marguerite Porete\, Mechthild of Magdeburg\, Hadewijch of Antwerp
\nLila Braunschweig &ndash\; A Voice of One&rsquo\;s Own: Philosophizing as Feminized Subjects (Impostor Syndrome &\; Authority)
\n\n12.05.2026\, 4.30-6pm (Paris time): 2 lectures
\nElżbieta Filipow &ndash\; Women&rsquo\;s Writing of Harriet Taylor Mill and its Various Modes of Self-expression
\nShamoni Sarkar &ndash\; Karoline von Gü\;nderrode: Fragmentation\, Philosophy\, and Early German Romanticism
\n\n19.05.2026\, 4.30-6pm (Paris time): 2 lectures
\nMaxim Demin &ndash\; Philosophy\, God-Seeking\, and Developmental Psychology: Stolitsa and Volkovich in Late Imperial Russia
\nPatricia Guevara Wozniak &ndash\; The Metaphysical Tenacity of Barbara Skarga &ndash\; Metaphysics in Totalitarianism
\n\n02.06.2026\, 4.30-6pm (Paris time): 2 lectures
\nJake Nicholas Brooks &ndash\; Autonomy Beyond Kant: Butler\, Tronto\, and Interdependence
\nKaimé\; Guerrero Valencia &ndash\; Intervening Assemblages of Trans-formation/Action: Beatriz Nascimento (1942-1995)
\n\n09.06.2026\, 4.30-6pm (Paris time): 2 lectures
\nMarianne Najm Abou-Jaoude &ndash\; Beneficent Communication as Power
\nRoula Azar Douglas &ndash\; Women&rsquo\;s Digital Voices and the Reconfiguration of Public Debate
\n\nFor further information about the talks and the speakers\, please visit the webpage: \;
CFA: 8th Scientific Understanding and Representation (SURe) annual workshop
\nCall for abstracts
\n\;
\n\; \; \; \; \;We invite authors to submit abstracts of up to 750 words (4500 characters) for the upcoming 8th \;annual \;Scientific Understanding and Representation (SURe) \;workshop. \;
\n\; \; \; \; \;The workshop will take place \;May 27-29\, 2026\, at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology\, The Polish Academy of Science (IFiS PAN) in Warsaw.
\n \;
\;
Submission link: \;https://cmt3.research.microsoft.com/SURe2026/Track/1/Submission/Create
\nSubmission deadline: \;20 January 2026
\nDeadline for communicating decisions: \;20 February 2026
\nConference dates: \;May 27-29\, 2026
\n\;
\nKeynote speakers
\n- \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Magdalena Małecka \;(University of Copenhagen)
\n- \; \; \; \; \; \; \;Igor Douven \;(Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
\nBook Panel \;on \;The Social Fabric of Understanding \;by \;Federica Malfatti (University of Innsbruck)
Panelists: \;
\n- Finnur Dellsé\;n \;(University of Iceland &\; Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences)
\n- Alfredo Vernazzani \;(Ruhr-Universitä\;t Bochum)
\n\;
\nFor more information about the workshop series and updates about the 8th \;edition\, please visit the SURe website: \;https://sure-workshop.weebly.com/current-workshop.html
\n\;
\nWorkshop description
\n\;
\nRepresentations play a central role in scientists&rsquo\; understanding of the world. From mathematical models to diagrams\, different representations in highly varied contexts yield diverse insights across the physical\, biological\, and social sciences. Despite the fact that how a phenomenon is represented has far-reaching ramifications for how it is understood\, the literatures on scientific understanding and scientific representation are largely independent of each other. The time is ripe to foster greater synergy between these two areas in the philosophy of science\, as they face complementary problems&mdash\;and hold the promise of complementary solutions. For more information about the workshop series\, go \;here.
\n\;
\nLocal Organizing Committee
\nDaniel Kostić\, Anna Martin\, and Marcin Miłkowski
\nImportant dates:
\nJanuary 20\, 2026 \;&ndash\; Deadline for submissions
\nFebruary 20\, 2026 \;&ndash\; Notification of acceptance
\nMay 27-29\, 2026 \;&ndash\; Workshop
ORGANIZER;CN="Daniel Kostić";CN="Marcin Miłkowski";CN=Anna Michalska: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260503T113603Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T190000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T210000 SUMMARY:II Online Workshop of the Latin American Network of Affective Studies UID:20260504T192527Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:The Latin American Network of Affective Studies\, an interdisciplinary network of researchers on emotion and affectivity from Latin America\, invites everyone to participate in its second online workshop (in Spanish and Portuguese)\, to be held on May 28th \; \;at 7pm (GMT-3). This edition of the workshop will feature Robson Ramos dos Reis (UFSM\, Brazil) on &ldquo\;Fenomenologia da Perda em Populaç\;õ\;es Clí\;nicas&rdquo\; and Fernando Cardona (Pontifica Universidad Javariana\, Colombia) on &ldquo\;Sufrimiento y Consuelo: Un Desafio Antropologico". Please register at \;info@redeaf.org \;to receive the link.
FARM is a conference that aims to bring together researchers studying meaning\, reasoning and rational norms. \;
\nConference webpage: https://mmandelkern.github.io/farm26.html
\nTime: October 10-11\, 2026
\nLocation: NYU Department of Philosophy
\nWe welcome submissions from a variety of fields\, including epistemology\, philosophy of language\, decision theory\, philosophical logic\, metaphysics\, philosophy of mind\, and metaethics. \;
\nWe will cover accommodation for speakers and assist with travel.
\nPlease submit a draft of no more than 5000 words formatted for anonymous review. \; Submissions are due June 15\, 2026
\nSubmission link: https://openreview.net/group?id=FARM/2026/Conference#tab-your-consoles
\nPlease contact the organizers with any questions. \;
\nConference email: farm.nyip@gmail.com
\n ORGANIZER;CN=Matthew Mandelkern;CN=Harvey Lederman;CN=Snow Zhang;CN=Paolo Santorio;CN=Julia Staffel: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260503T113603Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260620T091500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260620T170000 SUMMARY:Gadamer and the Task of Philosophy UID:20260504T192529Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Europe/London LOCATION:Oxford\, United Kingdom ORGANIZER;CN=Carolyn Culbertson;CN=Jessica Frazier: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260503T113603Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260707T234500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260707T234500 SUMMARY:Phenomenological Anthropologies and Forms of the Human UID:20260504T192530Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:In the context of contemporary phenomenology\, the issue of anthropology reappears as an irreducible problem to definitions\, closed typologies\, or normative models of the human being. \;From Husserl to contemporary phenomenologies\, the human being manifests a mode of appearing that occurs in the world\, in the body\, in affectivity\, in relation to the other\, in finitude\, in historicity\, and in openness to what exceeds it. In this sense\, the human phenomenon compels us to think of anthropology without essentialisation\, attentive to donation\, to the event\, to original passivity\, to exposure\, and to the distance the subject maintains from itself.
\nThis dossier invites scientific articles that critically address phenomenological anthropologies\, understood as attempts to think about the human from its mode of appearing\, rather than from a prior definition. The focus is particularly on exploring how the human phenomenon exceeds the classical horizon of philosophical anthropology and opens possibilities for understanding the human being as one who gives itself in encounter\, who is constituted in relation\, who discovers itself thrown\, affected\, exposed\, called\, or received.
\nContributions are expected to engage\, among others\, with issues such as:
\nthe impossibility or necessity of an anthropology without essentialist definition
\nthe status of the lived body and flesh
\ndonation\, passivity\, and receptivity as anthropological keys
\nalterity\, intersubjectivity\, and encounter
\nfinitude\, affectivity\, and vulnerability
\nthe event and its impact on understanding the human
\nthe relationship between anthropology\, phenomenology\, and hermeneutics
\ntensions between subjectivity\, ipseity\, and the decentring of the self
\nArticles may engage with classical and contemporary authors of the phenomenological tradition\, such as Husserl\, Scheler\, Stein\, Plessner\, Gehlen\, Heidegger\, Merleau-Ponty\, Levinas\, Marcel\, Ric&oelig\;ur\, Henry\, Marion\, Dastur\, Falque\, Lacoste\, Waldenfels\, Serban\, Depraz\, Mensch\, Zahavi\, among others\, as well as with current debates surrounding the very possibility of a phenomenological anthropology.
\nThe dossier will be published in Mutatis Mutandis: International Journal of Philosophy. Submissions must strictly adhere to the editorial guidelines\, presentation\, citation\, and evaluation standards available in www.revistamutatismutandis.com.
\n ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260503T113603Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260731T230000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260731T230000 SUMMARY:Synthese Topical Collection - Artificial Joint Intentionality: Skilled Social Interactions in the Age of AI UID:20260504T192531Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:With the rapid progress in generative AI technology\, we find ourselves at the beginning of an AI revolution. AI systems typified by Large Language Models (LLMs) invite us to treat them as conversational and thought partners. These systems will play an increasingly significant role in our social world. To understand their impact\, this Topical Collection proposes to combine foundational work from philosophy on the nature of joint skilled action\, including the role of social affordances\, with the analysis of interactive AI systems that may have the potential to qualify as partners in social agency.
\nMany skills essential for us as social agents can only be expressed with others or involve others as social objects. The concept of an affordance\, which picks out action opportunities in an agent&rsquo\;s environment\, can be extended to opportunities for social action\, that is\, to social affordances that include other social agents presenting social action opportunities.
\nGiven the conversational interface between humans and artificial systems such as LLMs\, we can expect to perceive or rely on social affordances in human-machine interactions: AI systems such as LLMs and social robots are designed to provide social cues and thereby offer opportunities for the expression of social action. AI systems now occupy various social roles&mdash\;as collaborators\, companions\, friends\, counselors\, and even therapists&mdash\;raising a host of theoretical\, practical\, and ethical questions about their capacity to produce and interpret social cues.
\nAppropriate topics for submission include\, among others:
\n- What are the commonalities and differences between human-human\, human-machine\, and machine-machine interactions?
\n- What is missing in interactions in which machines are involved in comparison with human social interactions? What are the practical and ethical implications? Can (and if so\, should) artificial systems be trained to be skilled &ldquo\;partners&rdquo\; in joint activities with human partners?
\n- Can artificial systems based on generative AI technology (like LLMs) qualify as genuine agents and\, in particular\, social agents? How might social ontological accounts of group agency be brought to bear on candidate generative AI agents?
\n- To what extent do they genuinely present social affordances? To what extent do they have social skills?
\n- How should we conceptualize the abilities of artificial systems that may play roles in joint intentional activities?
\n- Does it make a difference whether a human agent conceptualizes the AI system as a tool\, as opposed to a partner\, in a joint activity?
\nFor further information\, please contact the corresponding guest editor: jrust@stetson.edu
\nThe deadline for submissions is July 31\, 2026.
\nThe CFP can be found here: https://link.springer.com/journal/11229/collections
\nSubmissions via: https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260503T113603Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260901T234500 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20260901T234500 SUMMARY:The Metaphysical Society of America UID:20260504T192532Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:America/Los_Angeles LOCATION:702 E. Desmet Ave.\, Spokane\, United States DESCRIPTION:The 2027 conference of the MSA invites submissions on the theme of the &ldquo\;metaphysics of habit\,&rdquo\; understood both as a subjective and objective genitive. Contributors may explore the metaphysical underpinnings of habit or investigate habit as a metaphysical principle in its own right. Topics of interest include\, but are not necessarily limited to\, the following questions:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit a pragmatic device for assuaging epistemological impasses\, as in Hume\, or can it have a genuine metaphysical function? If so\, how\, when and under what conditions?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit conscious or unconscious\, intelligent or blind? Is it a sign of rational consistency or the erosion of thought into blind compulsion? Is it learned or inherited\, adaptive or mechanical\, spontaneous or rote\, proactive or reactive? Is habit a result of repetition or the propensity to repeat? Or\, does habit subvert these dichotomies altogether?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Are practice\, routine\, custom\, tics and neuroses distinct in kind from habit itself or only various degrees or intensities of habit? Or\, is habit a species of one of these categories?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Must habit be relegated to psychology or is habit operative at other\, or even all\, domains of being? What of motricity or motor habit? Are instinct and inertia species of habit? Is habit a metaphysical principle underpinning various notions of evolution? Might it underwrite scientific theories\, e.g. quantum theory? Could habit account for the lawfulness of nature itself? What is the metaphysics of social and collective habits? Could there be a theology of habit?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit an attribute or might it constitute substantiality itself? Do individuals possess habits or is the self but a nexus of habits? Are some kinds of beings inherently habitual and others impervious to habit? Can a rock acquire a habit? Can artificial intelligence?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit an effect\, a cause or the very principle of causality itself? Is habit antecedent to its effects or simultaneous with them? Is habit a result consequent to its cause(s) or simultaneous with it? Or\, is it temporalization itself?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Can habit perform the functions Kant allotted to transcendental structures &ndash\; synthesis\, identity\, regularity\, temporal contraction? If so\, are traditions that make habit into a metaphysical principle\, e.g. French Spiritualism and American Pragmatism\, post-Kantian? Or\, are they instead post-Humean or post-Leibnizian?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Can habit be simultaneously empirical and contingent\, yet also universal? Is habit a priori or a posteriori\, transcendental or empirically real? Could habit ground a &ldquo\;metaphysical empiricism\,&rdquo\; &ldquo\;transcendental empiricism&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;critical realism&rdquo\;?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit dyadic and chiasmatic? Does habit have more to do with the Dyad or the One?
\nAbstracts that address these and related questions and issues in original ways are especially encouraged and will be prioritized. Submissions of abstracts for papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome.
\nGuidelines for the Submission of Abstracts
\nDeadline: September 1\, 2026
\nSubmit to: Jessica Wahman\, Vice President of the MSA (msamarch2027@gmail.com)
\nFormat: Word documents of no more than 600 words. Late abstracts and those shorter than 400 words or longer than 600 words will not be considered. To facilitate double-anonymous review\, an abstract should not contain the author&rsquo\;s name or otherwise identify the author. In the email to which the abstract is attached\, authors should indicate full name\, institutional affiliation (if any)\, and abstract title. The email subject-line should read: \; 2027 MSA Submission [last name of author)] -- for example: 2027 MSA Submission Leibniz.
\nAristotle Prize
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s annual Aristotle Prize\, which is only awarded if a submission is deemed worthy of the prize\, is open to current students without a Ph.D. The Aristotle Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with costs for attending the annual meeting.
\nPersons who wish to be considered for this prize must a) clearly state (in an email message accompanying their submission) their eligibility for this prize and their desire to be considered for it\, and b) submit a full\, final paper in addition to the abstract by the September 1\, 2026 deadline. The body of the text (as is proposed to be read at the meeting) must be no longer than 3\,750 words.
\nPlato Prize
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s annual Plato Prize\, which is only awarded if a submission is deemed worthy of the prize\, is open to persons who have received their first Ph.D. in the last six years&mdash\;thus (for the 2027 meeting) in 2021 or more recently. The Plato Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with costs for attending the annual meeting.
\nPersons who wish to be considered for this prize must a) clearly state (in an email message accompanying their submission) their eligibility for this prize and their desire to be considered for it\, and b) submit a full\, final paper in addition to the abstract by the September 1\, 2026 deadline. The body of the text (as is proposed to be read at the meeting) must be no longer than 3\,750 words.
\nTravel Grants
\nThanks to the generous support of past MSA Presidents\, Society members\, and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot Fund for Systematic Philosophy\, the MSA is pleased to be able to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $400 to current graduate students and post-doctoral researchers within two years of their first PhD whose submissions are selected for the conference program. Persons who wish to receive such reimbursements must state their eligibility in their submission email and\, at the conference\, provide the MSA with all relevant expense receipts. (Invoices are not acceptable.)
\nAcceptance decisions will be announced by November 20\, 2026.
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s Executive Council (https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/about.htm) operates as the vetting committee. Those accepted for the conference must submit completed papers by February 20\, 2027 to allow review by session chairs. Papers may not exceed 3\,750 words. Eligibility to present at the conference requires payment of both membership and registration fees (https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/membership.htm).
ORGANIZER;CN=Tyler Tritten: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260503T113603Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261010T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261011T170000 SUMMARY:Formal Approaches to Rationality and Meaning (FARM) UID:20260504T192533Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:New York\, United States DESCRIPTION:FARM is a conference that aims to bring together researchers studying meaning\, reasoning and rational norms.
ORGANIZER;CN=Matthew Mandelkern;CN=Harvey Lederman;CN=Snow Zhang;CN=Paolo Santorio;CN=Julia Staffel: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260503T113603Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Vancouver:20261030T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Vancouver:20261031T170000 SUMMARY:Can social ontology change the world? UID:20260504T192534Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:America/Vancouver LOCATION:Vancouver\, Canada DESCRIPTION:The International Social Ontology Society workshop "Can Social Ontology Change the World?" will take place October 30-31\, 2026 at the Harbour Centre Campus of Simon Fraser University in downtown Vancouver\, British Columbia. \;
\nIn recent years\, the sub-discipline of social ontology has undergone a decidedly political reorientation. In non-ideal\, emancipatory\, and critical social ontology\, theorists explicitly ask whether our theorizing should have political goals or be relevant for political ends. An uptick in investigations on the metaphysics of race and gender has centered anti-racist\, feminist\, and trans struggles. These projects (e.g.\, Haslanger 2000\; Dembroff 2016\; Jenkins 2023\; Richardson 2023) explicitly theorize with a political purpose\, and so presuppose that social ontology can play a role in the struggle for social justice. But\, taking a step back\, this workshop questions the precise relationship between social ontology and politics. Are social ontologists changing the world\, or merely interpreting it? Given the former\, are there social ontological theories or methods better suited for direct political intervention\, and\, if so\, what makes them better? Given the latter\, what is the relationship\, if any\, between description and political intervention? \; \; \;
\nWe invite the submission of abstracts of 500-700 words for 20-minute presentations of papers related to the theme of the conference. Please send anonymized abstracts to \;social.ontology.and.the.world@gmail.com. The deadline for submitting is \;June 15th\, with notice of acceptance by July 15th. \; \;
\nSome \;travel grants and support for accommodations \;will be available for graduate students and faculty members who do not have access to research funds\; please indicate in your submission email if you would like to be considered for support. \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Zara Anwarzai;CN=August Faller: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260503T113603Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270116T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20270116T090000 SUMMARY:CFP Discipline Filosofiche\, XXXVII\, 1\, 2027: Phenomenological Analyses of Emotions in their Ontological and Metaphysical Implications\, ed. by Giuliana Mancuso UID:20260504T192535Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:DISCIPLINE FILOSOFICHE\, XXXVII\, 1\, 2027: PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSES OF EMOTIONS IN THEIR ONTOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS Edited by Giuliana Mancuso Over the past twenty years\, scientific literature on emotions has grown enormously\, and the same has occurred in philosophy. In light of the assumptions&mdash\;often implicit&mdash\;that guide scientific research programs\, the wealth of their findings\, and the explanatory hypotheses advanced on the basis of such observational and theoretical grounds\, it is inevitable that philosophers ask what the specific contribution of philosophy to research on emotions might be\, given the intertwining of physiological\, expressive\, behavioral\, cognitive\, evaluative\, normative\, and motivational components that emotions involve\, as well as their social relevance. In other words\, what does philosophy have to say about emotions in relation to what the natural and social sciences already tell us about them? The answers naturally vary depending on the conceptions one may hold of philosophy\, but there is a particular philosophical tradition that appears especially well suited to addressing phenomena such as emotions in their characteristic two-fold nature as subjective\, first-person experiences and at the same time as objective experiences that disclose aspects of the world&mdash\;a two-fold structure that philosophical reflections on emotions have often sacrificed in favor of one aspect or the other. This tradition is phenomenology\, understood not generically as an empirical investigation of &ldquo\;what it is like to feel\,&rdquo\; but properly as the study of embodied consciousness in its directedness toward other subjects as well as toward objects\, states of affairs\, and events in the world. With respect to the contemporary philosophy of emotions as a chapter of the philosophy of mind in its relation to the cognitive sciences\, the phenomenological approach in fact claims a primacy that is\, first of all\, temporal. Between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries\, emotions acquired centrality in philosophy primarily thanks to what Husserl described as an already existing method\, of which Husserlian transcendental phenomenology conceived itself as &ldquo\;a certain radicalization&rdquo\; (HUA IX\, 302). This was descriptive or phenomenological psychology\, a philosophical research project on consciousness and its lived experiences that ran parallel and as an alternative to the experimental psychology of the time. Its main figures were Brentano\, Stumpf\, and Th. Lipps\, and it was from this tradition that Husserl himself set out in his \;Logical Investigations. Under the influence of Husserl\, it was then Lipps&rsquo\;s students and collaborators in Munich\, and later Husserl&rsquo\;s in Gö\;ttingen\, who defended the idea of a distinctive affective intentionality irreducible to that of other mental states such as beliefs\, judgments\, or desires. In their works they developed extraordinarily detailed eidetic analyses of particular classes of emotional experiences\, their contents\, and the themes connected with them&mdash\;analyses that\, in what is perhaps the most famous case\, that of Max Scheler\, culminated in a complex philosophical theory of emotional functions and acts\, as well as of their objects\, namely values. In subsequent developments of phenomenological philosophy\, the role accorded to affectivity remained central in Heidegger\, Sartre\, Merleau-Ponty\, Levinas\, and Henry\, as well as later in Hermann Schmitz&rsquo\;s &ldquo\;new phenomenology&rdquo\;&mdash\;with its conception of emotions as spatially extended atmospheres that transcend the mind/body distinction and the distinction between psychophysically separate individuals&mdash\;in Waldenfels&rsquo\;s &ldquo\;responsive phenomenology\,&rdquo\; and\, finally\, in the numerous studies of recent years at the intersection of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences on classical phenomenological themes such as intersubjectivity\, empathy\, and the emotional forms of collective intentionality. In such a context\, a renewed focus on emotions and values has been prompted by the publication\, in 2020\, of the \;Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins \;(HUA XLIII)\, which bring together analyses carried out by Husserl between 1909 and 1914 and subsequently in the first half of the 1920s. Against this background\, \;Discipline filosofiche \;intends to devote a special issue to phenomenological analyses of emotions\, past and present\, and invites authors to submit contributions on the following topics:
\nThe 2027 conference of the MSA invites submissions on the theme of the &ldquo\;metaphysics of habit\,&rdquo\; understood both as a subjective and objective genitive. Contributors may explore the metaphysical underpinnings of habit or investigate habit as a metaphysical principle in its own right. Topics of interest include\, but are not necessarily limited to\, the following questions:
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit a pragmatic device for assuaging epistemological impasses\, as in Hume\, or can it have a genuine metaphysical function? If so\, how\, when and under what conditions?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit conscious or unconscious\, intelligent or blind? Is it a sign of rational consistency or the erosion of thought into blind compulsion? Is it learned or inherited\, adaptive or mechanical\, spontaneous or rote\, proactive or reactive? Is habit a result of repetition or the propensity to repeat? Or\, does habit subvert these dichotomies altogether?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Are practice\, routine\, custom\, tics and neuroses distinct in kind from habit itself or only various degrees or intensities of habit? Or\, is habit a species of one of these categories?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Must habit be relegated to psychology or is habit operative at other\, or even all\, domains of being? What of motricity or motor habit? Are instinct and inertia species of habit? Is habit a metaphysical principle underpinning various notions of evolution? Might it underwrite scientific theories\, e.g. quantum theory? Could habit account for the lawfulness of nature itself? What is the metaphysics of social and collective habits? Could there be a theology of habit?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit an attribute or might it constitute substantiality itself? Do individuals possess habits or is the self but a nexus of habits? Are some kinds of beings inherently habitual and others impervious to habit? Can a rock acquire a habit? Can artificial intelligence?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit an effect\, a cause or the very principle of causality itself? Is habit antecedent to its effects or simultaneous with them? Is habit a result consequent to its cause(s) or simultaneous with it? Or\, is it temporalization itself?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Can habit perform the functions Kant allotted to transcendental structures &ndash\; synthesis\, identity\, regularity\, temporal contraction? If so\, are traditions that make habit into a metaphysical principle\, e.g. French Spiritualism and American Pragmatism\, post-Kantian? Or\, are they instead post-Humean or post-Leibnizian?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Can habit be simultaneously empirical and contingent\, yet also universal? Is habit a priori or a posteriori\, transcendental or empirically real? Could habit ground a &ldquo\;metaphysical empiricism\,&rdquo\; &ldquo\;transcendental empiricism&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;critical realism&rdquo\;?
\n·\; \; \; \; \; \; Is habit dyadic and chiasmatic? Does habit have more to do with the Dyad or the One?
\nAbstracts that address these and related questions and issues in original ways are especially encouraged and will be prioritized. Submissions of abstracts for papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome.
\nGuidelines for the Submission of Abstracts
\nDeadline: September 1\, 2026
\nSubmit to: Jessica Wahman\, Vice President of the MSA (msamarch2027@gmail.com)
\nFormat: Word documents of no more than 600 words. Late abstracts and those shorter than 400 words or longer than 600 words will not be considered. To facilitate double-anonymous review\, an abstract should not contain the author&rsquo\;s name or otherwise identify the author. In the email to which the abstract is attached\, authors should indicate full name\, institutional affiliation (if any)\, and abstract title. The email subject-line should read: \; 2027 MSA Submission [last name of author)] -- for example: 2027 MSA Submission Leibniz.
\nAristotle Prize
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s annual Aristotle Prize\, which is only awarded if a submission is deemed worthy of the prize\, is open to current students without a Ph.D. The Aristotle Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with costs for attending the annual meeting.
\nPersons who wish to be considered for this prize must a) clearly state (in an email message accompanying their submission) their eligibility for this prize and their desire to be considered for it\, and b) submit a full\, final paper in addition to the abstract by the September 1\, 2026 deadline. The body of the text (as is proposed to be read at the meeting) must be no longer than 3\,750 words.
\nPlato Prize
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s annual Plato Prize\, which is only awarded if a submission is deemed worthy of the prize\, is open to persons who have received their first Ph.D. in the last six years&mdash\;thus (for the 2027 meeting) in 2021 or more recently. The Plato Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with costs for attending the annual meeting.
\nPersons who wish to be considered for this prize must a) clearly state (in an email message accompanying their submission) their eligibility for this prize and their desire to be considered for it\, and b) submit a full\, final paper in addition to the abstract by the September 1\, 2026 deadline. The body of the text (as is proposed to be read at the meeting) must be no longer than 3\,750 words.
\nTravel Grants
\nThanks to the generous support of past MSA Presidents\, Society members\, and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot Fund for Systematic Philosophy\, the MSA is pleased to be able to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $400 to current graduate students and post-doctoral researchers within two years of their first PhD whose submissions are selected for the conference program. Persons who wish to receive such reimbursements must state their eligibility in their submission email and\, at the conference\, provide the MSA with all relevant expense receipts. (Invoices are not acceptable.)
\nAcceptance decisions will be announced by November 20\, 2026.
\nThe MSA&rsquo\;s Executive Council (https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/about.htm) operates as the vetting committee. Those accepted for the conference must submit completed papers by February 20\, 2027 to allow review by session chairs. Papers may not exceed 3\,750 words. Eligibility to present at the conference requires payment of both membership and registration fees (https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/membership.htm).
ORGANIZER;CN=Tyler Tritten: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260503T113603Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20300531T090000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20300531T090000 SUMMARY:Phenomenologies of Religious Experience UID:20260504T192537Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Europe/London DESCRIPTION:This series invites proposals in classical phenomenology\, French phenomenology\, pre- and post-phenomenologies\, and in methodologies that bridge phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The relation between phenomenology and religious experience can be considered in a variety of modes: epistemic (phenomenology as a "rigorous science" of religious experience in Husserl's sense)\; ontic (phenomenology as a way to access the core motive\, or regulative ideal\, of religion)\; analogical (phenomenological experience as a secular version of religious experience)\; generalizing (religious experience turning into phenomenological experience when stripped from its dogmatic frame)\, etc. Proposals can take critical\, descriptive\, theoretical\, comparative\, historical\, or other approaches\, and they can focus on the interplay between religious or spiritual experience and assorted theoretical approaches\, or proceed from such experience towards building a new theory. In accord with Husserl&rsquo\;s original intent\, the series welcomes attempts to locate spiritual or religious experience within a broader theory of the sciences (Wissenschaftslehre) and to expand phenomenology towards transcendental philosophy and metaphysics.
The series covers five areas:
1) Clarifications of religious and spiritual experience\, its formal phenomenological research\, and its relationships to art\, textuality\, culture\, anthropology\, politics\, and comparative religion\;
2) Metaphysical extensions of the phenomenology of religious and spiritual experience\;
3) Existential and psychological analyses\, in different traditions\, of religious and spiritual experience\;
4) Theologies of religious experience\, with or beyond a specific focus on ritual and liturgy\, including liberation theologies\, feminist theologies\, theologies at the intersection of religious experience and race\, social status\, etc.\;
5) The phenomenology of religious and spiritual experience as applied to and/ or examined within medicine\, nursing\, and the health sciences and the natural and social sciences.
The series is published in cooperation with the Society for the Phenomenology of Religious Experience\, \;www.sophere.org.
Editors: \;Michael Barber (michael.barber@slu.edu)\, Peter Costello (PCOSTELL@providence.edu)\, Olga Louchakova-Schwartz (founding editor\, \;olouch@ucdavis.edu)\, and Martin Nitsche (nitsche@flu.cas.cz)
Advisory Board: \;Jason Alvis (University of Vienna)\, Angela Ales Bello (Pontifical Lateran University)\, Michel Bitbol (The French National Center for Scientific Research)\, Carla Canullo (University of Macerata)\, David Ciavatta (Ryerson University)\, Crina Gschwandtner (Fordham University)\, Neal DeRoo (The King&rsquo\;s University)\, Thomas Fuchs (University of Heidelberg)\, James G. Hart (University of Indiana)\, Richard Kearney (Boston College)\, Jeff McCurry (Duquesne University)\, Felix O&rsquo\;Murchadha (National University of Ireland\, Galway)\, Dermot Moran (Boston College)\, Tom Nenon (The University of Memphis)\, Ryōsuke Ōhashi (Universities of Kyoto and Osaka)\, Vincent Pastro (Jesuit School of Theology of Santa Clara University and Aquinas Institute of Theology\, St Louis)\, Hans Rainer Sepp (Charles University)\, Michel Staudigl (University of Vienna)\, Claudia Welz (Aarhus University)
Staff editorial contact: \;Jana Hodges-Kluck (jhodges-kluck@rowman.com) \;
*Please note that this event has officially been postponed. More information will be made available asap in the near future*
\nMany human cognitive capacities and processes may be deployed creatively\, from unique choices made for oneself up through novel cultural shifts. Similarly\, large swaths of our daily lives are taken up with performing spontaneous\, on-the-fly\, and unplanned activities that are\, in a word\, improvised. \; Charting out the nature of both creativity and improvisation\, taken individually or together\, remains an open and pressing issue. In this conference\, we will delve into various philosophical\, theoretical\, empirical\, and interdisciplinary issues that are related to creativity and improvisation. A non-exhaustive list of related questions and themes for this topic include:
\n- What is the relationship between improvisation and creativity?
\n- What is the relationship between creative activity and well-being?
\n- What is the best way to model individual and collective creativity?
\n- Is creativity in the arts the same thing as in other domains\, such as in science or business?
\n- What are the pros and cons of different scientific operationalizations of creativity and improvisation?
\n- Provide a conceptual analysis of creativity and/or improvisation.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR