Approaches to Argumentation

This workshop hosted by Old Dominion University and sponsored by a grant from Yale-NUS College focuses on global philosophical approaches to theories of argumentation, from Susan Stebbing in England to Nyāya philosophers in India—and beyond. The first half of the day includes three talks by philosophers working in critical thinking, logic, and argumentation. The second half of the day focuses on discussion of draft material from Malcolm Keating's book, Reason in an Uncertain World, (under contract with OUP), introducing non-specialists to Nyāya social epistemology and argumentation.

The main workshop goal is to facilitate conversation across philosophical traditions and among subdisciplines. Discussion of Keating's book will enable both instruction in Nyāya philosophy for those unfamiliar with Indian philosophy as well as improvements on the manuscript, which aims to introduce a broad range of readers to early Nyāya approaches to argumentation and epistemology.

10:30–11:20 am: Teresa Kouri Kissel, Title: Susan Stebbing and Common Sense Thinking

Abstract: Stebbing's philosophical positions and practices were heavily reliant on common sense beliefs and truths. In this paper, I will develop a more robust notion of what Stebbing takes common sense to be, as well as providing an extended example of her treatment of the common sense notion of "number", and an explanation of how her view differs from Reid's and Moore's.

11:25–12:15 pm:  Anand Vaidya, Can Indian Logic Contribute to the Debate over Logical Pluralism? The Case of Jaina Logic

Abstract: In this talk I will examine in what sense Jaina contributions to debate and dialouge are contributions to logical theory by looking at several definitions of logic. I will then settle on an account of the ways in which Jaina contributions are relevant to logical theory. I will then move on to the philosophy of logic and present the debate between logical pluralism and logical monism against the background of the logical trinity which includes classical, intuitionistic, and paraconsistent logics. Finally, I will examine the question: do the contributions coming from Jainism to logical theory have any impact on the debate over logical pluralism? For example by increasing the kinds of logics we must consider or by forcing a choice between logical monism and logical pluralism.

12:20 pm–1:10 pm: Malcolm Keating, Dialogical Equivocation in Nyāya Argumentation

Abstract: Among the flaws which can force defeat in a debate for Nyāya philosophers is something called chala, often translated "equivocation" or "quibble," as it involves misconstruing an opponent's language. However, chala cross-cuts these categories as understood in broadly Anglo-analytic thought, and raises questions about the responsibility of interlocutors for precision in the face of the inescapable ambiguity of language. Through the work of ninth-century Vācaspati Miśra, I consider what chala might tell us about ambiguity, equivocation, and constructive debate.

1:30 pm: Participant Lunch

3:00 pm–3:30 pm: Malcolm Keating, The Problem of Introduction

Abstract: The project of introducing Indian philosophy to new audiences (both academic and more widely) faces several challenges: limitations in available translations, tensions between historical and problem-centered approaches, negotiating comparisons with dominant traditions, and anticipating reader biases. This short talk considers several challenges, identifies some possible models, and raises questions for the audience to discuss in application to introducing early Nyāya philosophy.

3:30 pm–5:00 pm: Book Draft Open Discussion