Intellectual Virtue Signalling

Neil Levy (Macquarie University)

Abstract: Discussions of virtue signalling to date have focused exclusively on the signalling of the moral virtues. I argue that it is important to recognize the existence of intellectual virtue signalling: the status-seeking advertising of supposed intellectual virtues. I argue that not only is intellectual virtue signalling distinct from moral virtue signalling, it also takes distinctive forms. It is also far more likely to be harmful than moral virtue signalling. I provide a heuristic by which we can identify possible instances of intellectual virtue signalling. When people with no relevant expertise rapidly move to offer their opinions on a wide range of topics as soon as these topics become fashionable or newsworthy, and especially when these opinions are contrarian, we should suspect them of intellectual virtue signalling. I argue that intellectual virtue signalling is not only compatible with, but actually conduces to, substantive argument. But I also suggest it is harmful, because it distracts attention from genuine expertise and gives contrarian opinions an undue prominence in public debate.