3rd Eastern Hemisphere Language & Metaphysics Network online meeting

Wednesday, September 7, 2022 

Schedule (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong): 

9.00 - 9.10am: Introductory remarks
9.10 - 9.45am: Natalja Deng (Underwood International College, Yonsei University) - What if time were ineffable?
9.45 - 9.55am: Akiko Frischhut (Akita International University) - comments
9.55 - 10.20am: Q & A
10.20 - 10.30am: Break
10.30 - 11.05am: Joel Katzav (University of Queensland) - Grace Andrus de Laguna's critique of analytic philosophy
11.05 - 11.15am: Joe Ulatowski (University of Waikato) - comments
11.15 - 11.40am: Q & A
11.40 - 11.45am: Closing remarks

Times are for China, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong
+1hr Japan & Korea
+2hrs Sydney
+4hrs New Zealand

Natalja Deng - What if time were ineffable?

• Abstract: Well, for one thing, it would be difficult to (give a) talk about it. Actually, the talk will suggest that what is ineffable is time’s nature with respect to the question of dynamicity (whether time is dynamic in a way that space is not). The question of dynamicity would be a kind of conceptual veil beyond which we can’t look, except to hypothesize that there is something beyond. There are two intended upshots: (1) the question of dynamicity is in the background of all enquiry into time (whether done by physicists, philosophers, or interested folk), and (2) it can safely be left there. The talk will outline the ineffability view, address the paradox of ineffability and put ineffability to work for the Flowing Block (aka Tenseless Passage) view.

Joel Katzav - Grace Andrus de Laguna's critique of analytic philosophy

• Abstract: Many of the arguments and positions Grace Andrus de Laguna developed during the early decades of the twentieth century came to be central to analytic philosophy. These arguments and positions included, even before 1930, a critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a private language argument, a use theory of meaning, a critique of type physicalism, a functionalist theory of mind, a critique of internalism about mental content, a critique of reductionism in science, a methodology of research programs in science and more. Nevertheless, de Laguna identified herself as a defender of the speculative vision of philosophy, a vision which, in her words, “analytic philosophy condemns.” I present her speculative vision of philosophy as well as some of the main ways in which she found analytic philosophy to be wanting. I also outline one of her main arguments against analytic philosophy, specifically her philosophy of science- and philosophy of language-based argument against the view that key parts of established opinion, e.g., common sense or science, should be assumed to be true at the outset of philosophical inquiry. I, further, briefly consider how her argument bears on the views of George E. Moore, Willard V. Quine and David Lewis.