Alleged Epistemological Consequences of Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem

Graham Oppy (Monash University)

Abstract: Many people have tried to draw epistemological consequences from Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem. For example, in a recent paper-- "Godel, Thomas Aquinas and the Unknowability of God"--Denys Turner takes seriously the idea that Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem shows that our knowledge of arithmetic is relevantly similar to our knowledge of God (according to Thomistic accounts of God and our knowledge of God). I shall provide a bunch of different reasons for thinking that it is just a mistake to suppose that Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem has interesting epistemological consequences. And, although I won't play up this point, I shall also suggest that it is a mistake to suppose that Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem has interesting metaphysical consequences.