Rational agency, reflection and the varieties of metacognition

One of the central questions in philosophical discussions on rational agency is what it takes to respond to reasons for belief and action. Some maintain that the capacity to critically assess one’s reasons is necessary, while others suggest that mere sensitivity to reasons is sufficient. Philosophers thus envisage two notions of rational agency: a reflective one seemingly limited to cognitively developed humans, and an unreflective one that may be within the reach of young children and non-human animals. The relation between the two is beginning to be explored. The empirical debate on metacognition offers a structural analogy with the distinction between object-level cognition and the metacognition involved in thoughts about other thoughts and the ascriptions of mental states. Growing interest in so-called “procedural” metacognition is, at least in part, driven by the ambition to bridge the gap between the two.

In its second workshop, ARED continues to promote the dialogue between the philosophical and empirical study of the mind and rationality by bringing together researchers from different disciplines who are working on the broad themes of rational agency, reflection and metacognition.

The workshop will be held at the Messerli Research Institute in Vienna on May 23-24. The speakers will be:

Preston Stovall (Hradec Králové)

Lieke Asma(Munich)

Hanna Schliehauf (Göttingen)

Cathal O’Madagain (Mohamned VI Polytechnic)

Eva Schmidt (Dortmund)

Hannes Rakoczy (Göttingen)

Celeste Kidd (Berkeley)

Kirsten Blakey (Stirling) 

For more details, please visit the ARED website:  ared.stir.ac.uk. Participation is free but limited. To register please send an email to [email protected]