Agency: Who is morally responsible?

null, Monima Chadha

Abstract: This paper defends a Buddhist inspired response to the question raised in the title of the paper. Vasubandhu argues that actions do not require an agent, they can be explained in terms of causal relations between mental and physical states. If there are no agents, it seems that no one could be held (morally) responsible for ‘their’ (morally evaluable) actions.  I develop what I will call the Responsible Agency Challenge by reference to Vasubandhu’s no self view. I argue that contemporary philosophers are also susceptible to the same challenge. I discuss a Strawsonian response to the Responsible Agency challenge and show why it doesn’t work. I explain the inevitably revisionary upshot of the Responsible Agency challenge  for our ordinary responsibility practices. The aim is to make room for revisionism about our ordinary interpersonal practices and reactive attitudes.