Autonomy: Coercion, Nudging and the Epistemic Analogy

David Enoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Umeå University

The Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies

THE BURMAN LECTURES IN PHILOSOPHY 2023

Autonomy: Coercion, Nudging and the Epistemic Analogy

David Enoch, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Lecture 1: Contrastive Consent and Third-Party Coercion

Monday May 15, 13.15-15.00, Hörsal HUM.D.210 (Hörsal E)

Abstract: If Badguy threatens Goodguy with harm, and Goodguy consents to giving his money to Badguy (to avoid the harm), Goodguy’s consent is invalid because coerced. But if under Badguy’s coercive threat Goodguy proceeds to consent to paying someone else (or to hiring a bodyguard), the consent may very well be valid. The challenge is to explain this difference. In this paper I argue that the way forward is to recognize that the content of consent is contrastive – one doesn’t just agree to giving the money; rather, one consents to giving-the-money-rather-than-some-alternative. And then the normative upshot of the relevant consent depends on what the morally relevant contrast is, which in turn depends on who is (before the relevant interaction) entitled to what against whom. We have, I think, independent reasons to understand consent contrastively, and once we do, we can solve the puzzle of third-party coercion with ease.

Lecture 2: How Nudging Upsets Autonomy

Tuesday May 16, 13.15-15.00, Hörsal HUM.D.210 (Hörsal E)

Abstract: Everyone suspects – perhaps knows, but at least suspects – that nudging offends against the nudged’s autonomy. But it has proved rather difficult to say why. In this paper I offer a new diagnosis of the tension between even the best cases of nudging and the value of autonomy. If true, this diagnosis improves our understanding of nudging, of course, but it also improves our understanding of the value of autonomy. Relying on the distinction between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as non-alienation, I show that nudging need not offend against either. But it does sever the tie between them, the possibility of achieving non-alienation in virtue of having sovereignty. Analogies to common themes in virtue epistemology help to establish this point.

Lecture 3: Epistemic Autonomy May Not Be a Thing

Wednesday May 17, 13.15-15.00, Hörsal HUM.D.210 (Hörsal E)

Abstract: In the practical domain, there are some decisions such that it’s more important that the agent make them herself than that they make the best decision. (Think, for instance, about choosing a romantic partner). In such cases, it seems like a rational agent may insist on making the decision themselves, fully recognizing that if they let someone else decide for them, the decision may be (otherwise) better. In the epistemic case, though, there doesn’t seem to be an analogue of this phenomenon. If I wonder whether p; it seems to me when I consider the first-order evidence that p; but I recognize that my chances of getting to a true belief regarding p are much higher if I rely on you instead; and you say that not-p – well, in such a case it seems a belief in p is never epistemically justified. This paper is my (tentative, and not systematic) attempt to think through this disanalogy and what it teaches us about autonomy in the practical and epistemic domains.

All interested are welcome to these lectures!