James Martineau Lecture - "Moral Realism and the Plasticity of Mind"

Rae Langton, Rae Langton (Cambridge University)

Lecture Synopsis

In ethics and philosophy of science alike, the ‘plasticity of mind’ has seemed to spell problems for realism. But it should not in philosophy of science (Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind 1979). And it should not in ethics. By ‘plasticity of mind’ I mean roughly projective perception, e.g. due to the ‘theory-ladenness of observation’ (Kuhn, Churchland), ‘the cognitive penetrability of perception’ (Siegel), the mind’s ‘great propensity to spread itself on external objects’ (Hume).

If perception is projective, shaped and structured by antecedent cognitive, conative or affective states of the perceiver, this may seem to undermine scientific realism on the one hand (Kuhn), moral realism on the other (Hume, Mackie).

We can learn from the parallel. Projective perception doesn’t undermine scientific realism (Churchland). And it needn’t undermine moral realism either.

Projective perception can be epistemically disabling or enabling, helping us see reality worse, or better.

The ability to projectively ‘see aright’ is of particular moral significance; and likewise the social structures and practices that constrain that ability (Munton).

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