A gloomy version of redundancy: Frege on the truth-predicate as misleading
Giulia Felappi (University of Southampton), Mark Textor (King's College London)

October 31, 2023, 5:30pm - 7:00pm
Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics and Mind Group

Room G37
Senate House
London WC1B
United Kingdom

This will be an accessible event, including organized related activities

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  • Institute of Philosophy


Birkbeck, University of London
King's College London
King's College London
King's College London

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Abstract: The view that the  truth-predicate is redundant fuels much work on truth. This view can be  traced back to Frege. But unlike current authors, Frege took the  truth-predicate to be a systematically misleading expression. In this  paper we will examine Frege’s arguments for his view and find them suggestive, but wanting. However, Frege’s own view of the sense and reference of ‘that’-clauses will yield a convincing rationale for his position. We will use this result to shed light on the point and purpose of the truth-predicate and on Russell’s main objection to accounts that pair references with senses.

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Custom tags:

#truth, #truth-predicate, #Frege