Lecture 3: The Problem of Suspension
Matthew McGrath (Washington University in St. Louis)

part of: Evidence and Epistemic Norms
December 7, 2023, 2:30pm - 4:30pm
The Taiwan Association for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, The Center for Asian Philosophy and Analytic Philosophy

Nietzsche Hall (B1)
No.85, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Rd.,

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•Date: 12/07

•Time: 14:30-16:30

•Abstract: This lecture continues the examination of evidence-uncritical claims about people should or shouldn’t believe. It’s highly plausible that if you epistemically should believe a proposition p, then it’s false that you epistemically should suspend judgment on whether p. This link between norms for belief and norms for suspension would be easily accommodated if suspension were the mere absence of belief or if it were a state of having an intermediary credence. However, I argue that such views of suspension are independently implausible. The best views of suspension take it to be an agential phenomenon, consisting in postponing or at least refraining from judgment. But it is unclear how an agential phenomenon could come under epistemic norms at all. I explore two possible solutions to this problem, which I call the “problem of suspension.” 

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