Meaning: Models and proofs

What does a theory of meaning involve? Does it consist in representation in terms of models, is it best articulated rather in terms of inferential connections, or is there some third possibility? The central theme of the workshop concerns formal approaches to meaning, and the meaning of logical connectives in particular. Are the meanings of the logical constants best characterized truth-conditionally or proof-conditionally, or in some other way? Is there indeed a conflict between model-theoretic and proof-theoretic semantics, or can the two be reconciled? What, if any, are the constraints on semantic characterizations of logical expressions? For instance, is the infamous ‘tonk’ semantically well-defined? How do the meaning of the logical constants connect with deductive practice? Is Modus Ponens valid in virtue of the meaning of ‘if’, or does the validity of the inference define the meaning of the conditional? How do philosophical and formal questions about the semantics of logical expressions extend to various non-classical logics?