Why is belief involuntary?

Anthony Booth (University of Sussex)

Abstract: The debate between "Normativists" and "Teleologists" about the normativity of belief has been taken to hinge on the question of which of the two views best explains why it is that we cannot believe at will. Of course, this presupposes that there is an explanation to be had (in a sense that will be specified). Here, I argue that this supposition is unwarranted, that Doxastic Involuntarism is a mere brute psychological fact. I argue that this result is made apparent when we consider what the aim or norm of suspended judgment is, that suspended judgement must be involuntary if belief is, and that the aim or norm of suspended judgement cannot be both constitutive and transparent.

Autumn 2013 Programme
http://philosophy.sas.ac.uk/LEMAutumn2013(with links to abstracts)


Venue: All talks begin at 5.00pm in Room 243, second floor, Senate House, Malet Street, WC1 (except 5 Nov, Room 246).
Directions to Senate House: http://www.london.ac.uk/fileadmin/documents/home/map.pdf

If you would like to have dinner with the speaker on the evening of their talk please contact the LEM convenor, Dr Corine Besson: [email protected]

Poster: https://philosophy.sas.ac.uk/sites/default/files/files/LEM%20Poster%20Autumn%202013.pdf

Co-convenors: Dr Corine Besson (Sussex) and Robert Bassett