Rights and Reasons

Moral rights occupy a central place in contemporary moral theorizing. At the same time, a promising hypothesis in the theory of normativity is that normative phenomena (including moral phenomena) can be explained in terms of reasons, i.e., in terms of the factors that count in favour of actions or attitudes. The aim of this workshop is to investigate and discuss the relation between moral rights and normative reasons.

The workshop will focus on (but is not limited to) questions such as the following:

·  What are the connections between moral rights, moral duties, and moral reasons?

·  Can rights be analysed in terms of reasons or should rights be regarded as reason-providing?

·  What (if anything) do reasons-based analyses of rights imply for the justification of moral rights and for first-order moral theory?

·  What can our best accounts of moral rights contribute to our understanding of normative reasons?

There is a small number of slots available for contributions that will be selected from an open call for abstracts.

Please send your abstract as a PDF file prepared for blind refereeing accompanied by a separate file containing your name, paper title, institutional affiliation, and contact information to [email protected]

Word limit: 500-1,000 words (including notes but excluding bibliography). Papers should be suitable for a 40-minute presentation.

Deadline: July 1st, 2024

We encourage PhD students and individuals from underrepresented groups to submit. For those without access to travel funds, we can offer accommodation during the workshop.

Please direct your inquiries to dmitry.ananiev[at]uni-bielefeld.de