Francis Bacon Workshop 2013

This workshop is free and open to all. Those planning to attend are requested to register by e-mailing the organiser Professor Daniel D. Hutto, [email protected], inserting the subject line ‘Registration for FB Workshop Oct 30 2013’. Attendees will need to make their own arrangement for lunch/refreshments.   

TIMETABLE

13.30     Huw Price (Cambridge) Bertrand Russell Professor of Philosophy and a Fellow of Trinity College             

'Disagreements about disagreements’                 
I outline my criticism of Richard Rorty on the issue of whether pragmatists should expect a distinction between justification and truth, and discuss Rorty’s replies.  

14.30     Glenda Satne (Copenhagen) Marie Curie Experienced Researcher               

‘On the Natural Origins of Content’                 
I start by reviewing the current state of play of the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. The diagnosis is that if there is to be progress, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content and the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always contentful must be abandoned. I then propose ways of redirecting the efforts of the main players to start functioning effectively as a team and maybe, just maybe, even win the game.  

15.30     Tea/Coffee   16.00    

Daniel D. Hutto (Hertfordshire/Wollongong) Professor of Philosophical Psychology               

‘Cognitive Gaps and Explanatory Traps’                 
When important differences are acknowledged between more basic and more sophisticated ways of thinking about the world it can look as if an unbridgeable cognitive gap exists. I argue that if we are to avoid falling into a familiar explanatory trap when addressing this issue we would do well not to seek for philosophical explanations of a familiar kind. Nevertheless, I also defend the view that resisting the call to give such philosophical explanations is not at odds with adopting a naturalistic stance – at least where that stance is understood in a particular, Wittgensteinian way.