On concrete/abstract objects

Our intuitive understanding of matter is linked to the idea of concreteness: a material object is a concrete object, which generally means it is a physical macro-object of ordinary experience, e.g. a table or a cat. The distinction between abstract and concrete objects is, however, quite controversial: the abstract/concrete distinction plays a curious role in contemporary philosophy. On the one hand, it is widely agreed that the distinction is of fundamental importance. And, on the other, yet there is no standard account of how it should be drawn. There are several differing accounts of how an object can be defined abstract rather than concrete: a) sense-perception account: an object is concrete if and only if it can be encountered by our senses; b) The causal account (weak version): an object is concrete if and only if it can participate in a causal chain; c) The causal account (strong version): an object is abstract if and only if it cannot be a cause; d) The spatio-temporal model (weak version): an object is abstract if and only if it is non-spatial; e) The spatio-temporal account (strong version): an object is abstract if and only if it is non-spatial and non-temporal; f) The identity of indiscernibles account: an object is concrete if and only if it fails to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles. That is, if any two objects share all their properties, but still remain different, then they fail to satisfy the identity of indiscernible, and so are concrete. Each of these accounts seems to have limited powers of explanation, and each explanation raises many controversial points. For instance: Is concreteness an intrinsic property of objects? That is: can an object x be concrete in a world w1 and be abstract in a world w2 (assuming that the same object exists in more than one possible world)? Are there abstract objects? Are they non-existent? Are they physical? Is concrete/abstract distinction to be related to the distinction material (physical)/non-physical? If one admitted the existence of God, should one consider Him as a concrete rather than an abstract object? And if one would consider Him in such a way, if one admitted the co-extensiveness of the properties M (material) and C (concrete), should we say that God is a material object? The aim of the panel is to provide an answer to these and other questions.

The conference, sponsored by University of Palermo FFR Programme, will take place from 10 to 13 April, 2014. It will be hosted by The Department of the Humanistic Sciences (Dipartimento di Scienze Umanistiche) and organized in cooperation with the International Center for Philosophical Research (Centro Internazionale per la Ricerca Filosofica – CRF) and Società Filosofica Italiana (“Santino Caramella” chapter). The conference will be held in Palermo, Sicily. Participants will also have the opportunity to explore neighboring, historic locales and other relevant sites in Siciliy.

Conference Proceedings will be published in EPEKEINA. International Journal of Ontology. History and Critics.

Franca D’Agostini, Polytechnic University of Turin ([email protected])

Marco Simionato, Cà Foscari University of Venice ([email protected])